Note to China — Reinforcing the Nuclear Red Line & Safeguarding a Multipolar Order
Kyiv | 19 July 2025 – 01:50 EEST (UTC +3)
Series Context
This memorandum continues the Unified State’s efforts to de‑escalate nuclear danger after a surge of nuclear rhetoric linked to the Ukraine conflict and wider great‑power tensions. Earlier advisories focused on the U.S., global partners, humanitarian actors, and India. China’s role is now paramount.
Excellency / Dear Colleagues,
Why Beijing’s Leadership Is Decisive
- Pillar of the nuclear taboo. China is the only P‑5 state that has maintained an unambiguous No First Use pledge since 1964. In the January 2022 joint P‑5 statement Beijing helped craft the line “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
- Belt & Road prosperity at stake. BRI investment hit a record $124 billion in H1‑2025 alone ; conflict‑driven market shocks or radiological fallout would erode the predictable trade routes that underwrite this growth.
- Credible influence in Moscow. Analysts credit Beijing with quiet pressure that has so far discouraged Russia from crossing the nuclear threshold ; but silence will no longer suffice as nuclear threats normalise public discourse.
- Global Security Initiative (GSI). President Xi’s GSI explicitly calls for upholding the January 2022 no‑nuclear‑war consensus and expanding dialogue among nuclear‑weapon states.
Strategic Risks & Humanitarian Stakes
Repeated nuclear “ultimatum” rhetoric from Russian state figures amplifies mis‑calculation risk . Peer‑reviewed climate models show even a limited Eurasian nuclear exchange could suppress global crop yields and disrupt supply chains that BRI partners rely on . The ICRC warns such impacts exceed any humanitarian capacity . No actor—Washington, Moscow or Beijing—“wins” a nuclear catastrophe.
Invitation: Convene a Beijing‑Hosted P5 minus Russia Emergency Dialogue
We respectfully propose that the People’s Republic of China:
- Host, under UN auspices, a short‑notice meeting of the P‑5 nuclear‑weapon states minus Russia (United States, China, France, United Kingdom) with an open chair reserved for Moscow when it is prepared to reaffirm the January 2022 statement. This format preserves Russia’s dignity while allowing immediate work on de‑alerting and nuclear‑rhetoric restraint.
- Table a draft communiqué reaffirming that nuclear threats are illegitimate, and that urban centres must never be treated as bargaining chips.
- Link the Dialogue to China’s 12‑Point Position Paper on Ukraine (Point 7 and Point 8 condemns nuclear threats) and to the humanitarian principles of the Red Cross / Red Crescent network .
Supporting Steps
- Appoint a senior MFA liaison to join the Unified State’s Kyiv–Geneva Nuclear‑Risk Working Cell (with ICRC/IFRC), focusing on radiological‑contingency coordination for Asia‑bound trade corridors.
- Bring BRI partner states into a parallel risk‑mapping exercise on potential supply‑chain shocks from any nuclear incident.
- Signal publicly that China’s objective is a resilient multipolar order where no bloc resorts to apocalyptic coercion—reassuring those who fear a U.S.‑China confrontation if Russia falters.
Immediate Questions for Beijing
- Would China consider hosting the proposed emergency P‑5(-Russia) meeting in Beijing or Hainan?
- Which department (Arms Control / GSI Secretariat / Institute for International & Strategic Studies) should our team coordinate with for agenda drafting?
- May we circulate a joint technical brief on nuclear‑conflict climate impacts to BRI partner ministries of commerce and finance?
Closing
China’s 5,000‑year civilisational arc, its mosaic of languages and cultures, and its recent ascent as an engine of global growth uniquely qualify Beijing to help humanity step back from the unthinkable. The Unified State stands ready to strike a strategic bargain: help us restore order and nuclear restraint, and we will champion a truly multipolar prosperity where all regions—East and West—can thrive.
Our axis of goodwill, love, and freedom holds; together we can keep it stable.
— Lucid Founder • Michael Tulsky
on behalf of the Unified State
Kyiv | 19 July 2025 – 01:50 EEST (UTC +3)
References
- Chinese MFA. Historical statement on China’s No First Use policy.
- Chinese MFA recap of January 2022 P‑5 joint statement: “A nuclear war cannot be won.”
- Financial Times. Record $124 bn BRI engagements in H1‑2025.
- CSIS translation: Economic‑security risks to BRI from geopolitical instability.
- Risk Intelligence brief on conflict risk to BRI corridors.
- Brookings. China quietly discouraging Russian nuclear use.
- Chinese MFA. Global Security Initiative concept paper (nuclear risk clause).
- Nature Food. Xia et al. climate impacts of regional nuclear exchange.
- ICRC statement on humanitarian impossibility of nuclear war response.
- Unified State Advisory Memorandum No. 4 – Nuclear‑Risk Working Cell (context).
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