Signals of Convergence — Istanbul Round, POW Exchanges, and the Opening for a Leaders’ Summit
Kyiv | 26 July 2025 – 04:05 EEST (UTC+3)
0. Purpose
To acknowledge the substantial, quiet progress achieved during the 23–25 July 2025 Istanbul track; to recognise the ninth stage of prisoner exchanges conducted on 23 July; to welcome parallel geopolitical stabilisers (notably the EU–China climate statement in Beijing on 24 July); and to encourage all parties to prepare a leaders’ meeting only once a near‑final draft is ready, so that a summit can seal the peace rather than attempt to write it live.
1. Situation snapshot
- Istanbul round (23 July): Talks reportedly lasted about 40 minutes. Delegations agreed to expand the humanitarian track with further POW exchanges; no ceasefire text was concluded. Ukraine pressed for an leaders’ meeting; Russia said gaps remain.
- Ninth POW exchange (23 July): Following Istanbul discussions, Kyiv and Moscow carried out the ninth stage of exchanges, returning seriously wounded and long‑held captives. Prior phases in May exchanged 1,000 for 1,000 over three days — the largest of the war — agreed in Türkiye earlier that month.
- Leaders’ summit signalling: President Erdoğan publicly worked to arrange a Putin–Zelenskyy meeting in Istanbul/Ankara and noted that Donald Trump expressed interest in participating if held in Türkiye; the Turkish presidency later clarified this facilitative aim. The Kremlin said a summit should occur only after expert‑level convergence on a draft settlement.
- EU–China stabiliser (24 July): In Beijing, the EU and China issued a joint climate statement, the principal agreed outcome of a tense summit, implicitly signalling readiness for structured cooperation amid wider disagreements — a helpful backdrop for global risk‑reduction.
2. Reading of the moment
The Istanbul channel is functioning as a trust bridge: short, low‑drama meetings paired with measurable humanitarian outcomes. The absence of harsh public rhetoric after the 23 July round, coupled with swift execution of the POW exchange, is consistent with a deliberate effort to keep space open for a sequenced settlement. A leaders’ summit framed as the culmination of expert work — as Moscow publicly prefers — aligns with negotiation best practice and with Ukraine’s interest in a binding, enforceable text. And it is exactly the workflow set out in Unified State Advisory Memorandum No. 7 – “Roadmap to Ceasefire and Lasting Peace in Ukraine.”
3. Humanitarian gratitude — the POW track as a pillar of peace
The Unified State expresses profound gratitude to Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Türkiye, and all facilitators for the disciplined implementation of prisoner exchanges. Returning the seriously wounded, those held for over three years, and civilians is a landmark of mercy under fire. The May exchange of 1,000 for 1,000 and the ninth stage on 23 July together demonstrate a stable humanitarian lane capable of scaling further. Such exchanges, while not required before the end of hostilities by the Geneva Conventions, are permitted and historically less common in high‑intensity wars; their repetition here is therefore a powerful indicator of emerging cooperation. We urge continued cadence under ICRC facilitation and full compliance with IHL.
4. Facilitators and wider geometry
Türkiye has once again proven Istanbul to be a uniquely effective venue — culturally bridging, operationally discreet, and trusted by both sides. We thank President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for sustained mediation and for publicly preparing the ground for a leaders’ meeting when conditions ripen. We also acknowledge President Donald Trump’s stated interest in supporting a settlement and note reporting of a time‑bound push from Washington, even as battlefield realities and negotiating gaps persist.
Beyond the war theatre, the EU–China summit’s climate accord offers a stabilising signal: even amid trade frictions, the world’s largest markets can align on planetary risk reduction. This cooperative tone — though limited to climate — supports a larger architecture in which great powers help contain nuclear and escalation risks while enabling regional peacemaking.
5. Guidance and next steps
- Keep Istanbul quiet and productive. Maintain short, focused sessions that produce verifiable humanitarian deliverables (POWs, missing persons, nuclear‑facility safety corridors). Each success builds the trust stock needed for a ceasefire framework.
- Design the summit to seal, not write. Accept the Kremlin’s public condition that a leaders’ meeting follows expert convergence. Task working groups now to narrow texts on: ceasefire lines & monitoring, nuclear rhetoric moratorium, POW/child return schedules, and enforcement (snapback/snap‑forward).
- Schedule the next large POW package. Building on May’s 1,000‑for‑1,000 and the 23 July ninth stage, aim a further phased exchange by late August, with priority for the severely wounded, long‑held, women, and young detainees.
- Synchronise with global guarantors. Invite both Western and non‑Western guarantors to pre‑clear enforcement triggers (automatic snapback for breaches; automatic relief for compliance) so the summit communiqué locks a credible mechanism.
- Reinforce the nuclear taboo. Reiterate the P5 January 3, 2022 statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and embed a public moratorium on nuclear threats in the ceasefire text.
- Integrate domestic legitimacy. Kyiv’s rapid move to restore NABU/SAPO independence should proceed to enactment; transparency here strengthens its mandate at the table. Partners should reward swift correction with technical support.
6. Gratitude
To the Ukrainian and Russian negotiators and militaries who executed exchanges with discipline and mercy; to Türkiye and President Erdoğan for steadfast mediation; to President Donald Trump for sustaining emphasis on stopping the killing and exploring a comprehensive settlement; to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin for keeping channels open toward a future summit; and to the European Union and China for signalling cooperative intent on climate even amid wider tensions. These deeds are landmarks of responsibility in a dark hour, and they light a path to peace.
Our axis of goodwill, love, and freedom holds; together we can keep it stable.
— Lucid Founder • Michael Tulsky
on behalf of the Unified State
Kyiv | 26 July 2025 – 04:05 EEST (UTC+3)
References
- Reuters. “Russia, Ukraine discuss more POW swaps; no deal on ceasefire or leaders’ meeting.” Jul 23 2025.
- Al Jazeera. “Russia and Ukraine have discussed further prisoner swaps during brief talks in Istanbul.” Jul 23 2025.
- DW live. “Third round ends in Istanbul; another prisoner exchange agreed.” Jul 23 2025.
- UNITED24 Media. “Ninth stage of prisoner exchange — over 1,000 return home.” Jul 23 2025.
- Ukrainska Pravda (Eng.). “Ninth stage of Ukraine–Russia prisoner swap agreed at Istanbul takes place.” Jul 23 2025.
- Reuters. “Russia and Ukraine complete the exchange of 1,000 prisoners each — largest swap of war.” May 25 2025.
- AP. “Kyiv and Moscow agreed in Istanbul to exchange 1,000 prisoners from each side.” May 23 2025.
- The Washington Post. “Kremlin rules out Putin–Zelensky meeting until end stage of peace talks.” Jul 25 2025.
- The Kyiv Independent. “Erdoğan: Trump may join peace talks if Putin comes to Istanbul/Ankara.” Jun 26 2025 (updated Jul 2025).
- Ukrainska Pravda (Eng.). “Turkish president wants to organise Putin–Zelenskyy meeting, his office clarifies.” Jul 25 2025.
- AP. “Trump wants to play global peacemaker… Gaza derailment shows challenge.” Jul 25 2025.
- Council of the EU. “Joint EU–China press statement on climate.” Jul 24 2025.
- AP. “Europe and China agree to act on climate — and nothing else — in tense Beijing summit.” Jul 24 2025.
- Al Jazeera. “Kremlin says Russia seeks ‘buffer zones’ in Ukraine; Istanbul yielded no breakthrough.” Jul 24 2025.
- Lieber Institute (West Point). “Legal reflections on the Russia–Ukraine prisoner exchange.” Jan 2024.
- ICRC. “Prisoners of war: what you need to know.”
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