Unified State Advisory Memorandum No. 11: Roadmap to Ceasefire and Lasting Peace in Gaza and the Region

[**Introduction 4**](#_pb2os8culq2z)

[**Joint Basic Principles 6**](#_wb16ik1wjj1j)

[**Executive Summary 8**](#_7z12ycwfyj3)

[1) Outcomes at a Glance (0–14–180 days) — Negotiator Cut 9](#_db1svitcc2lq)

[2) Logic & Mechanics (verify-to-unlock + snapbacks/DPARC) 9](#_vp8bnohrphfm)

[3) Phased Roadmap (one-glance) 11](#_9xdaby5djiw7)

[Phase 1 — Immediate Ceasefire & Humanitarian Relief (Day 0–14) 11](#_mbb99ufwe0z8)

[Phase 2 — Consolidating the Truce & Security Agreements (Weeks 2–4) 11](#_tkniluivahuh)

[Phase 3 — Final-Status Framework & Multipolar Guarantees (Months 2–6) 12](#_jgaj3amcy0vq)

[Phase 4 — Implementation & Enforceable Peace (Month 6+) 12](#_gow6q5itlix3)

[Roles & Asks (stakeholder compact) 13](#_1zc5a2x7fnya)

[Cross-cutting enforcement note 15](#_sbghbm6mt4qc)

[4) Process rhythm 15](#_q2yxwqvwl4e9)

[5) Risks if Delayed 15](#_qzqwr61nuldv)

[6) Implementation and Enforcement Framework 16](#_8qk3pxc8s8f3)

[7) Conclusion and Call to Action 18](#_25ttrn2f6hjf)

[**Master Text 19**](#_9i511qngqxdj)

[**Demands and Core Positions of the Parties 19**](#_qqv80voxfi18)

[Israel’s Position 19](#_cpf9xs9sw82i)

[Palestinian Position(s) – Gaza’s De Facto Authorities and the PA 22](#_ct084ujjdhzg)

[Points of Convergence and Tension 24](#_c15jk92lime9)

[War‑weariness is palpable 25](#_531i4q3swqmm)

[Economic devastation in Gaza – the numbers behind the exhaustion 25](#_m6s42muafoy1)

[Israel’s Economic Pain – Numbers behind the Fatigue 27](#_imhz2adr26td)

[Reframing the lens 28](#_2bsyo8vjo30l)

[Why “Total Victory” Is a Mirage 29](#_cg9a87tvqxui)

[Diplomatic Window Created by the New “Regional Lens” 31](#_cn0jlf91p7ou)

[Why the “global-opinion weapon” also opens a window for peace 32](#_vo01gf3vvpuu)

[Residual tensions 33](#_2fp990olr5wb)

[**Public Opinion and Civil Society Perspectives 35**](#_fnd5zvi1pbxh)

[Israeli Public Will 35](#_ch84bbx0wrhk)

[Palestinian Public Will (Gaza and Beyond) 36](#_kbgt5g3tdrzs)

[A Unified Peace Negotiation Narrative 36](#_sqojgywh3cmg)

[Global Public Opinion and the Media/Propaganda War 36](#_hm5rlfemwpij)

[Shifting World Sentiment 36](#_2vmvwi704lg)

[The Information Battleground 37](#_xjdp7hapo4x)

[A Narrow Strategic Window 37](#_55q63xrcyirw)

[Pathway to a Rules‑Based Future 38](#_pezgsd2mmdja)

[Gaza at the Crossroads – A Civilizational Pivot 38](#_ofvk4fq4mo)

[Why Gaza Matters Beyond Gaza 38](#_up6vbgeostbp)

[A One‑Shot Window for Unified Action 39](#_ebgt6px9oztv)

[From Crossroads to Keystone 39](#_iha7mhno2pw4)

[Role of Civil Society & Track 2 Initiatives 40](#_jwvmtbeh6u6c)

[**Positions of Key International Stakeholders 40**](#_smsufzqqvzja)

[United States and NATO Allies 41](#_wax4cckfsu87)

[United States 41](#_17zwgjzc035w)

[NATO allies 44](#_7h0hyi9neexv)

[July 2025 grass-roots & public-opinion pulse 45](#_543ec9oe6nl)

[United Kingdom – Domestic Security Clampdown & External Force Posture 46](#_i2hkqcq7opz7)

[UK unrest 46](#_fqrr4y8cw3pa)

[UK External-force footprint 46](#_6467vim1ka3u)

[Why this matters for the NATO-EU enforcement calculus 47](#_6jevo9dd01gn)

[Strategic implications 48](#_xn9nand6hcjd)

[A hard-headed, middle-way prescription 49](#_onijrzh3r4uy)

[Russia 50](#_8d28setmxmz4)

[How the Kremlin has weaponised the war 51](#_j3r0j6qq458z)

[Why Moscow must sit at the table 52](#_m0d6zfm63xg)

[The cost of exclusion 52](#_d4p1syikdxti)

[Conditions for constructive Russian participation 53](#_f2sizsf1wtcz)

[Why a Unified Escrow / Snap‑Back Architecture is Strategically Indispensable 54](#_ma7loilmfvx6)

[Strategic dividend 54](#_hrgocj35xzhr)

[China 55](#_oubpag8hdrkf)

[Position & messaging 55](#_8kw8w1barh65)

[China’s leverage over Russia and its implications 58](#_6joo47lm2yr1)

[China-Russia Axis: a Combined Lever on the Middle East 59](#_wtw7i0cb0vb5)

[Integrating the leverage angle into the peace roadmap 59](#_ijh5mlf9bld9)

[Key European States—Humanitarian, Political & Economic Roles 61](#_6xskmk7b5can)

[EU Strategic Snapshot 61](#_eepivehw26o)

[Overview of Key European States 64](#_u6y0l1ousehg)

[France 64](#_mlx3xzwc0ts7)

[Germany 65](#_qo8y9gyz3svd)

[United Kingdom 65](#_8ly2gtfbdrpu)

[Italy 65](#_3z38ojs4ci9x)

[Spain 66](#_aivm8y5s4cd1)

[Ireland 66](#_s5asevmzkhzu)

[Belgium 67](#_rzxr45d1dyby)

[Hungary 67](#_lau5ma5v45w6)

[Austria 67](#_focfczwmdaf6)

[Poland 68](#_jbx8xfq6a36m)

[Switzerland 68](#_2mqdasmy1a3g)

[Other European States 69](#_wv62zko320cx)

[Implications for the Unified State Peace Plan 69](#_6d2843qn33wc)

[Potential EU contributions to the peace plan 70](#_w0ioez8p4sg1)

[Why Europe matters in the multipolar guarantee 75](#_fhwdmhuf4hqg)

[Turkey 76](#_104p3h2b45k1)

[Geopolitical context and unique capabilities 76](#_nexg21fbxnxu)

[Position on the Israel–Palestine (Gaza) war 77](#_ipnann6lm3gl)

[Opportunities for Turkey to play a unifying role 79](#_kmuf5s9x2rhf)

[Strategic recommendations 80](#_4ue6uh86y9od)

[Arab States & Key OIC Partners 81](#_oj75jhfdt8li)

[Egypt 81](#_fkakfisb5yy0)

[Qatar 84](#_dkwrl6cfn318)

[Jordan 86](#_40tgvla6lqmr)

[Saudi Arabia 90](#_r92ajmon7qbl)

[United Arab Emirates 95](#_blmbs6aef1lj)

[Lebanon 98](#_li56ch76wtr3)

[Yemen 103](#_mufgyr37hm89)

[Oman 105](#_nv20adpi8u4t)

[Iran 108](#_ha0c2u4ltk6j)

[Iraq 113](#_mwxt5p81ugf6)

[Afghanistan 116](#_kctqmk18v2bk)

[Syria 118](#_goylltdkofrl)

[Pakistan 121](#_r9mt8ymh2th5)

[BRICS and Global South blocs 124](#_itqfn4svcebg)

[India 125](#_6ofquvwtlhq)

[Brazil 128](#_4v6ettfhv8wg)

[South Africa 130](#_pf7cd4grrp0k)

[Mexico 132](#_txu2s0efbtll)

[Japan 133](#_4lzsqn7d82p0)

[Canada 134](#_ufttzt8pnqvl)

[United Nations 134](#_fbch5ipdx1at)

[Unified Moral Voice: Global Spiritual Leaders 140](#_soulptiefxs1)

[Summary of Stakeholders 144](#_bcfrdzc0ingk)

[**Global Concerns and Humanitarian Imperatives 152**](#_283mpksnk6wy)

[Nuclear and Regional War Risk 152](#_3si4w6muzhfe)

[Humanitarian Crisis and Refugee Impact 153](#_2cpdpvneatbn)

[Global Economic Stability and Energy Security 154](#_jo1gg0drvd2f)

[Erosion of International Law Norms 155](#_wfwhrrchu6al)

[“Global South” vs “West” Divide 157](#_hx0r4wxm6ckw)

[Moral and Civilizational Stakes 158](#_dwf0mjdeal3q)

[**Why This Roadmap Can Succeed – Toward a Nash Equilibrium Peace 159**](#_2wkollvphe5w)

[**Unified Peace Roadmap & Negotiating Position 164**](#_30bo6skx0o32)

[Jerusalem — Special ‘Infinite-State City’ 164](#_6o91c3okyd8p)

[Unified Governance Wheel 167](#_meruxyaf0k0)

[The ASI (Axis of Sovereign Interoperability) 169](#_lrhlhyr42cfe)

[Phased Implementation 171](#_o9lq3q2iib9h)

[Process Rhythm: 14-Day Alignment Window + 45-Day Operationalization Track 172](#_8rciefiicvfo)

[A. 14-Day Alignment Window (D+0 to D+14) 172](#_uxeqe8nv3e39)

[B. 45-Day Operationalization Track (D+15 to D+60) 172](#_qf12nxbab39n)

[C. Automatic Slippage Buffer Rule (keeps momentum without collapse) 172](#_sh453qvbnsyd)

[D. Legal & Precedent Pointers 173](#_o89nsnx16iyh)

[Phase 1: Immediate Ceasefire and Humanitarian Relief 173](#_aax6hgfpkkp)

[Phase 2: Consolidating the Truce and Security Agreements 178](#_tk9hxpizkibv)

[Codify the Corridor Plan — Philadelphi/Netzarim Disengagement & Monitoring 188](#_ydanpjsuet8s)

[Phase 3: Toward Lasting Peace – Final Status Framework & Multipolar Guarantees 191](#_46imgug9yg02)

[Statehood Horizon & Recognition Ladder 197](#_l45igb9n1a6i)

[D. Verification & Snapbacks (interface) 199](#_w23u5n10aut)

[Phase 4: Implementation and Enforceable Peace (Month 6 onwards) 199](#_kpsjkdi3o30v)

[**Conclusion: From Holy War to Holy Peace 200**](#_9m3sido4vfcu)

[**Annex 1 — Game Theory Analysis: Toward a Nash Equilibrium Peace in Gaza 202**](#_8t12cd6biqgw)

[Annex 1.A — Equilibrium Conditions (Compact Test) 207](#_wph5t26zwkv6)

[Annex 1.B — Graduated Responses for Partial Defection (Proportionality Ladder) 209](#_5izolgn0a7fg)

[Annex 1.C — Dynamic Credibility: Trigger Strategies (Repeated Game Playbook) 211](#_admddesvplwk)

[Annex 1.D — Stress Tests & Sensitivity (4-Scenario Matrix) 212](#_o08ac11kgz1y)

[Annex 1 Reference Guide 214](#_u0pqwz5stpym)

[**Annex 2 — Ceasefire and Snapback Enforcement Matrix Example 215**](#_ako2x03acu2u)

[**Annex 3 — Deadlock-Prevention & Automatic Reversion Clauses (DPARC) 224**](#_4bxdafh1my02)

[**Annex 4 — Religious & Cultural Safeguards 227**](#_9w1m6alnhnf)

[**Annex 5 — Multipolar Cooperation Mechanisms Beyond Gaza 232**](#_awfl4ii9o399)

[**Annex 6 — ASI Annex (Reference Draft; Non-Operative) 236**](#_eept5m4cuisp)

[**Annex 7 — Hostage & Prisoner Releases: Human-Dignity Protocol and Anti-Stall Rails 248**](#_wc0bop2ctio9)

# 

# **Introduction**

Twenty-two months after the October 7, 2023 attacks and the ensuing Israeli campaign, Gaza stands inside one of the century’s gravest humanitarian and strategic crises. Local authorities report **about 60,000 confirmed deaths** as of July 29, 2025, **true toll likely higher** and still rising amid displacement and infrastructure collapse. On August 22, the U.N.–backed IPC formally **declared famine in Gaza City and surrounding areas**, warning it is likely to spread without immediate access and a ceasefire. At the same time, around 50 hostages remain in Gaza— ~20 believed alive— keeping public pressure high on all sides and hard-coding a ceasefire-for-hostages ladder into any viable deal. Regionally, the war has already cracked the taboo on direct **Israel–Iran** exchanges (April 2024) and driven costly **Red Sea shipping disruptions** that ripple into food and energy prices—evidence that Gaza is not a local fire but a global risk node.

This Memorandum offers a **unified, executable roadmap** to stop the fire, protect civilians, free hostages and detainees on a monitored schedule, and open a verifiable path to a durable Israel–Palestine peace with regional de-escalation. Its spine is operational rather than rhetorical: a **Joint Monitoring & Verification Mission (JMVM)** that certifies milestones; a **public milestone ledger** that triggers **verify-to-unlock** financing from a **Unified Escrow**; and **enforcement with automaticity**—calibrated **snapbacks** and **Deadlock-Prevention & Automatic Reversion Clauses (DPARC)**—so cooperation pays and defection costs. The approach synthesizes international law, game-theory incentives, and practical peace-support doctrine into one machine negotiators can run from Day 1.

Three interconnected objectives guide this plan:

1. **Immediate Ceasefire & Humanitarian Lifeline**—a synchronized stop to the fighting, scaled aid access under neutral monitors, and sequenced hostage/detainee exchanges.
2. **Ceasefire-to-Peace Roadmap**—phased security, governance, and rights steps with verifiable benchmarks and staged openings.  
   **Multipolar Guarantee & Regional Shield**—cross-bloc guarantees, a **Jerusalem “Infinite-State City” regime** for holy-sites stewardship, and the **Axis of Sovereign Interoperability (ASI)** so borders separate sovereignty without severing movement, services, or trade.

What makes this roadmap different is enforceability. **Money moves only on proof**; humanitarian lifelines remain legally protected; disputes are time-boxed and revert to the last certified safe baseline; and progress is visible to publics through real-time reporting. Together these mechanics turn a fragile pause into a **rules-based process** with incentives aligned for all actors—from frontline parties to guarantors and donors. In short: a **Nash-style, non-zero-sum equilibrium** that is morally necessary and procedurally feasible—by design.

**A narrow window.** The July–August 2025 “peace window” exists because the alternatives are worsening: confirmed famine in the north of Gaza, a shrinking pool of living hostages, and mounting regional and economic spillovers. Seizing the window means moving immediately on the **Process rhythm (14+45)**—the **14-Day Alignment Window** and the **45-Day Operationalization Track**—so verifiable facts on the ground, not slogans, drive the next phase.

**Continuity note.** This Memorandum builds on—and evolves—the same architecture established in [Unified State Advisory Memorandum No. 7 – “Roadmap to Ceasefire and Lasting Peace in Ukraine”](https://www.unifiedstate.us/unified-state-advisory-memorandum-07/): Nash-equilibrium incentive design; **verify-to-unlock** financing via a Unified Escrow; calibrated **snapbacks** and **DPARC** timers; neutral monitoring aligned with UN **DDR/IDDRS** standards; humanitarian aid kept “always on” under **UNSCR 2664**; and enforcement logic that borrows familiar “automaticity” (by analogy) from **UNSCR 2231.**

# **Joint Basic Principles**

1. **Hostage-taking is absolutely prohibited; persons are not bargaining chips. Release of all hostages is an immediate, non-negotiable duty, executed in prioritized, safety-governed stages under ICRC escort and verification pursuant to Annex 7**
2. **Dual Recognition & End-State within a Unified Interoperability Frame**  
   All parties affirm the equal right of Israelis and Palestinians to national self-determination and secure existence. The diplomatic destination is a two-state political settlement consistent with international law (UNSC 242/2334), embedded in the Unified State Solution’s **Axis of Sovereign Interoperability (ASI)** so that borders separate sovereignty but not basic human flourishing (trade, movement, services). Final-status issues—including Jerusalem, borders, refugees, and security—are negotiated under this frame.
3. **Non-Use of Force & Non-Aggression**  
   All sides cease hostilities and renounce the threat or use of force except for strictly necessary, proportionate defense against imminent attack—disputes are resolved by peaceful means. (UN Charter, Art. 2(4)). Phase 1 codifies the immediate ceasefire; Phases 2–4 preserve it via verification.
4. **Indivisible Civilian Security (Distinction, Proportionality, Precautions)**  
   Security is mutual: no side pursues safety at the other’s expense. Parties reaffirm IHL rules on distinction and proportionality, and commit to operational precautions that minimize harm to civilians in all theaters.
5. **Protection of Civilians & Humanitarian Access**  
   Deliberate or indiscriminate attacks on civilians, starvation, siege methods, human shields, and obstruction of life-saving aid are prohibited. Unfettered access for neutral relief agencies (UN, ICRC) is guaranteed from Day 0 of Phase 1 and sustained throughout Phases 2–4. Taking hostages is absolutely prohibited (Common Article 3; Hostages Convention).
6. **Hostage Return & Detainee Releases**  
   All hostages are released safely and immediately under neutral monitoring; calibrated detainee releases proceed in parallel per Annex 2’s exchange ladders and Annex 3’s automatic triggers to prevent back-sliding.
7. **Non-Annexation & Temporary-Corridor Principle**  
   **No annexation or permanent buffer claims.** The Parties and guarantors affirm that there will be **no annexation**, **no reduction in Gaza’s territory**, and **no permanent Israeli buffer or security zone** inside Gaza. Any **temporary security corridor(s)** required for de-escalation, humanitarian access, or interdiction will be **strictly time-bound**, **internationally supervised**, and **fully dismantled** on schedule, with monitoring and certification by agreed third parties.  
   Operational details: see **“Codify the Corridor Plan”** in Phase 2.
8. **Holy Sites, Religious Rights & Cultural Patrimony**  
   Holy sites are kept fully outside the conflict logic. The Jerusalem/Hebron arrangements rest on: (a) respect for existing custodial roles (e.g., Jordan’s special role in Muslim holy shrines per the Israel-Jordan treaty, Art. 9), (b) freedom of worship for all, and (c) an International Holy Sites Council (equal Jewish-Muslim-Christian representation) integrated with the Jerusalem **Infinite-State City** regime (see dedicated section & Annex 4). Incitement or “holy war” framing is renounced by all leaders.
9. **No Forcible Transfer; Safe, Voluntary Return & Property Remedies**  
   Individual or mass forcible transfer/deportation from occupied territory is prohibited (GC IV, Art. 49). Internally displaced persons and displaced residents have the right to **voluntary, safe, and dignified** return or resettlement, with restitution or compensation where return is impossible; mechanisms are codified in Phase 3 and implemented in Phase 4.
10. **Counterterrorism & Demilitarization with Reciprocity**  
    Gaza and its environs will not be used to prepare or launch attacks on civilians; unauthorized armed groups are disarmed through an **internationally supervised demilitarization program** paired with binding assurances against siege, re-occupation, or indiscriminate force. Benchmarks are verified by a neutral mission and backed by Annex 2 snapbacks and Annex 3 DPARC.
11. **Governance Transition & Palestinian Unity**  
    A legitimate, service-capable Palestinian governance arrangement in Gaza is restored/installed with Arab and multilateral support; steps toward Palestinian political renewal (inclusive institutions, credible elections) proceed under the Unified Governance Wheel guardrails. Local representation is guaranteed during any interim administration (Phases 1–2), with accountability metrics reviewed at each milestone (Phases 3–4).
12. **Reconstruction, Mobility & Economic Revival (“Peace Dividend”)**  
    A multilateral **Reconstruction & Connectivity Facility** (U.S., EU, Gulf, China, others) finances housing, hospitals, water/desalination, energy, ports/airport (under oversight), digital/financial rails, and SME jobs. Easing of movement and trade is staged to verified compliance; settlement activity and unilateral measures that prejudge final status are restrained consistent with international law.
13. **Verification, Monitoring & Enforcement (Snapbacks/DPARC)**  
    Compliance is transparently verified by a **hybrid, multipolar monitoring mission** (cross-bloc composition) with real-time reporting. Material breaches trigger **automatic, proportionate** responses—diplomatic, economic, and, where authorized, security measures—per Annex 2 (matrix) and Annex 3 (deadlock-prevention & reversion). These mechanisms ensure no actor can “forum-shop” for impunity.
14. **Jerusalem — Special “Infinite-State City” Regime**  
    Jerusalem’s shared, sacred character is safeguarded via special governance: interoperable municipal services, open access to holy places, and de-conflicted security per the Infinite-State City model; decisions interface with ASI nodes and the International Holy Sites Council (see dedicated section & Annex 4).
15. **Multipolar Co-Guarantee & Regional Integration**  
    Guarantees are jointly underwritten by a **broad coalition** (U.S., EU, Arab states, Türkiye, UN actors, plus China/Russia where feasible), with **Arab Peace Initiative**–consistent normalization incentives and regional economic corridors tied to de-escalation. The guarantor coalition functions as a single enforcement “bus”—not competing blocs.
16. **Information Integrity, Education & Reconciliation**  
    All parties commit to countering incitement and dehumanization; to truth-telling, remembrance, and victim-centered justice; and to curricular reforms and cross-community exchanges (women, youth, faith leaders). A standing **Truth & Reconciliation Forum** and **Interfaith Compact** operate under Annex 4.
17. **Global Coupling of Peace Efforts**  
    Major-power diplomacy recognizes positive spillovers across theaters. Progress here is designed to **reinforce** parallel conflict-resolution tracks (e.g., Ukraine), rebuilding habits of cooperation rather than zero-sum trade-offs, in line with the Unified doctrine’s systems approach.

# **Executive Summary**

**0) Purpose & Vision**

Our purpose is immediate: stop the fire, save lives, reunite families, and restore law’s protection to every civilian. In line with the UN track and the ICJ’s recent measures, this Roadmap turns legal duty into an operational plan with neutral verification, public reporting, and consequences for breach.  
  
Our vision is durable: a non-zero-sum settlement where security and dignity rise together, anchored in a phased pathway to mutual recognition, a shared stewardship of Jerusalem’s holy sites, and an interoperable regional architecture that rewards restraint and cooperation. We treat this moment as a ripe window for peace—and design accordingly.

## 1) Outcomes at a Glance (0–14–180 days) — Negotiator Cut

**0–14 days (Phase 1):** Fire stops; aid surge begins under neutral monitors; hostage releases start on a verified ladder paired with calibrated detainee releases; crossings scale to published tonnage targets; public reporting goes live. (See: Phase 1; Annex 2.)

**By Day 30 (Phase 2):** Permanent-ceasefire text initialed; **Corridor Plan codified (Philadelphi/Netzarim): temporary, supervised, shrink-to-zero by D+60; logs public** (see Phase 2); monitors deploy and publish inspection logs; heavy-weapons registry launched; PA-led Interim Administration seated with Arab/UN backing; tranche-1 reconstruction funds released via unified escrow on verify-to-unlock milestones. (See: Phase 2; Unified Escrow; Annex 3.)  
Hostage releases begin under **Annex 7 Human-Dignity Protocol**, with calibrated detainee discharges and ICRC-verified transfers (see Phase 1; Annex 2).

**By Month 2–6 (Phase 3):** Leaders adopt final-status parameters (1967 lines with swaps, shared Jerusalem stewardship, security architecture, refugee options) and a Multipolar Guarantee Accord; reconstruction scales; movement/trade expand in stages tied to compliance. (See: Phase 3; Jerusalem; Annex 4.)

**Month 6+ (Phase 4):** Treaty finalised; elected Palestinian authority assumes full Gaza governance; liaison missions open; justice/reconciliation tracks proceed; peacekeepers draw down as capacities rise; regional integration projects anchor the peace. (See: Phase 4; Annex 5.)  
  
**Recognition ladder & Saudi-led reconstruction compact** activate on certification; benefits suspend automatically if benchmarks slip (Annex 2).

**What this delivers**

* **Civilian protection** you can verify.
* **Security & demobilisation** that constrain re-armament without perpetual occupation.
* **Governance & services** under accountable, PA-led interim administration.
* **A dated political horizon** toward recognition and statehood.
* **Enforcement with teeth:** snapbacks + DPARC + unified escrow. (See: Why This Roadmap Can Succeed; Annexes 2–3.)

## 2) Logic & Mechanics (verify-to-unlock + snapbacks/DPARC)

**What gets verified (and by whom).**

* A **Joint Monitoring & Verification Mission (JMVM)**—cross-bloc by design—tracks compliance across five lanes: (1) ceasefire integrity, (2) hostage/detainee ladders, (3) withdrawals/buffer operation, (4) weapons control/registry, (5) aid scale and access. Composition follows proven models (UN-mandated core, parties’ liaison cells, and limited third-state experts), with clear authorities to inspect, certify, and publish findings. Templates draw on UN ceasefire-M&V guidance, Colombia’s **tripartite mechanism** under UNSC 2261, and decommissioning precedents from Northern Ireland; heavy security tasks can be seconded to a NATO-class peace support unit as in post-Dayton Bosnia.
* **How verification feeds decisions (the “verify-to-unlock” spine).**All milestones flow through a **public milestone ledger**: the JMVM logs observations (including remote-sensing, AIS, UAV, and ground reports), assigns a traffic-light status, and issues **unlock notices** that trigger financing and next-step permissions. Remote/opensource tech is used with strict chain-of-custody and privacy rules, per UNIDIR best practice; published dashboards reduce rumor-warfare and build consent.

**Who pays—and only when.**

A **Unified Escrow** (multi-donor trust fund) releases tranches **only** upon JMVM certification. Humanitarian flows are **pre-carved-out** so lifesaving aid is never hostage to politics (standing exemption aligned with UNSC 2664). The escrow borrows governance mechanics from World-Bank-administered trust funds (e.g., ARTF), giving donors auditability and the parties predictability.

* **Snapbacks with proportionality (Annex 2).**
* Breaches map to a **calibrated response ladder**: warnings → paused non-humanitarian disbursements → targeted diplomatic/economic measures → security guarantees re-tighten. For grave breaches, **automatic snapback** reverts the process to the last certified safe baseline.
* **Deadlock-Prevention & Automatic Reversion Clauses (DPARC, Annex 3).**To defeat stalling: (a) **timers** on every obligation, (b) **default reversion** to the last accepted text if a deadline lapses, (c) **neutral tie-break audit** (three-expert panel nominated by guarantors), and (d) **freeze-frame**: no actor may create facts on the ground while a dispute is pending. These clauses keep momentum and remove incentives to “run out the clock.”
* **Dispute pathway (fast, fair, transparent).**Alleged violations go **JMVM → rapid fact-finding → panel determination (48–96 hrs)** → proportionate **Annex 2** response and, where relevant, **DPARC** reversion. Humanitarian carve-outs stay untouched throughout, per 2664’s humanitarian-space logic.

**One-glance operational loop.**

**Observe & log → Certify → Unlock → Publish → (Breach?) Snapback → (Deadlock?) DPARC → Iterate.** This mirrors UN ceasefire-mediation guidance and DDR doctrine so milestones are objective, auditable, and time-boxed.

**Logic & Mechanics - Why this works.**

It makes **cooperation the best response**: verifications unlock tangible gains; violations automatically cost. The architecture blends UN-tested verification doctrine, documented escrow discipline, and widely understood **snapback** automaticity—giving each side credible assurance the other cannot game the process.

## 3) Phased Roadmap (one-glance)

**Design note.** Each phase couples concrete actions to **verify-to-unlock** triggers (JMVM certification → milestone ledger → escrow release) with **calibrated snapbacks** and **DPARC** timers. Humanitarian flows are pre-carved-out throughout per UNSC 2664.

### Phase 1 — Immediate Ceasefire & Humanitarian Relief (Day 0–14)

**Objectives:** Stop the fire; surge life-saving aid; begin hostage/detainee ladders under neutral monitors.  
**Core moves:**

* Synchronized ceasefire; **JMVM** deploys with liaison cells from the parties and limited third-state experts.
* Crossings scale to published tonnage targets; public dashboard goes live (traffic-light status).
* **Hostage releases under Annex 7**: D+3 and D+7 tranches (Stage 1), PoL 100 % by D+7, ICRC escorts, JMVM logs → automatic humanitarian unlocks.

**Verification & triggers:** JMVM logs → **Unlock Notice** for aid corridors and deconfliction routes. Humanitarian flows protected by the standing UNSC **2664 humanitarian carve-out**.

**Enforcement:** Breach → Annex 2 ladder; disputes → **DPARC** timers (Annex 3).

(See: Master text: Phase 1, Annex 2 Snapback Matrix; Annex 3 DPARC.)

### Phase 2 — Consolidating the Truce & Security Agreements (Weeks 2–4)

**Objectives:** Lock a permanent ceasefire text; stand up security and governance scaffolding.

**Core moves:**

* Patrolled, demilitarised **temporary buffer** becomes operational; **weapons control/registry** launches under UN DDR good practice.
* IDF withdrawals to agreed lines; **PA-led Interim Administration** seats with Arab/UN backing.
* Tranche-1 reconstruction via **Unified Escrow** on verify-to-unlock milestones.

**Verification & triggers:** JMVM certifies temporary buffer functionality + registry thresholds → unlock tranche and permissions (permits, movement, utilities).

**Enforcement:** Non-compliance → proportional snapbacks; humanitarian carve-outs remain intact (2664).

(See: Master text: Phase 2, Annex 2 Snapback Matrix; Annex 3 DPARC.)

### Phase 3 — Final-Status Framework & Multipolar Guarantees (Months 2–6)

**Objectives:** Convert truce into an enforceable political horizon with cross-bloc guarantees.

**Core moves:**

* Leaders adopt parameters (1967 lines with swaps, security architecture, refugee options) and a **Multipolar Guarantee Accord**.
* **Jerusalem “Infinite-State City” regime**: shared stewardship of holy sites; interoperable municipal services; International Holy Sites Council interfaces with ASI nodes.
* Reconstruction scales; movement/trade expand in staged unlocks tied to compliance.

**Verification & triggers:** JMVM milestone set for guarantees signed + governance/rights benchmarks → unlock larger reconstruction tranche and mobility easings.

**Enforcement:** Grave breach → automatic reversion to last certified safe baseline.

(See: Master text: Phase 3, Jerusalem — Special ‘Infinite-State City’; Unified Governance Wheel; The ASI (Axis of Sovereign Interoperability); Annexes 2–5.)

### Phase 4 — Implementation & Enforceable Peace (Month 6+)

**Objectives:** Treaty finalisation; durable institutions; draw-down of peace support as capacities rise.

**Core moves:**

* Treaty text finalised; elected Palestinian authority assumes full Gaza governance; liaison missions open.
* Peace support presence transitions/draws down as security metrics are met (Dayton/IFOR-style sequencing).
* Justice, reconciliation, and curriculum reforms roll; regional integration projects anchor the peace.

**Verification & triggers:** JMVM certifies treaty provisions executed and security/rights baselines sustained → unlock final tranches; publish end-state audit.

**Enforcement:** Snapback ladder remains available for defined post-treaty breaches.

(See: Master text: Phase 4; Annex 5.)

### Roles & Asks (stakeholder compact)

**Design note.** Each actor’s role is tied to a 14-day deliverable from the Phase 1–2, then to continuing duties by phase. Humanitarian flows remain exempt from sanctions via the UNSC 2664 standing carve-out; verification, snapbacks, and DPARC do the enforcement work.

**Primary parties**

**Israel  
Role:** Implement and maintain the ceasefire; withdrawals to agreed lines; enable monitored temporary buffer and inspections; support hostage/detainee ladder; facilitate crossings & utilities.  
**14-day asks:** File hostage list & release ladder; approve permanent-ceasefire text framework; publish crossings capacity plan; designate liaison cell to JMVM. (See: Phase 1–2.)

**Palestinian side (PA-led Interim Administration + local Gazan technocrats)  
Role:** Stand up interim governance; coordinate aid/service delivery; launch weapons-control/registry; prepare civil-service restart under Unified Governance Wheel.  
**14-day asks:** Table vetted interim-administration slate; nominate local municipal reps; adopt anti-incitement and financial-integrity guardrails tied to escrow. (See: Phase 1–2; Unified Governance Wheel.)

**Gaza’s de facto armed factions  
Role:** Begin heavy-weapons hand-in and registry; cooperate with hostage ladder.  
**14-day asks:** Provide locations/ceasefire liaison; initial hostages-for-detainees tranche; commit to monitored weapons-control start. (See: Annex 2–3; Phase 1–2.)

**Guarantor coalition**

**United States + core NATO/EU partners  
Role:** Co-sponsor UNSC text; lead escrow governance; provide C2/ISR/medevac and gendarmerie/engineering enablers; sequence recognition/political horizon to milestones.  
**14-day asks:** Circulate UNSC resolution (ceasefire + JMVM + escrow + snapbacks/DPARC); convene force-generation & donor board; publish public-reporting dashboard spec. (See: Annex 2–3.)

**Arab states (Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, KSA, UAE + OIC)  
Role:** Co-chair mediation; open/scale crossings; bankroll reconstruction; staff peace-support units; steward holy-sites access via agreed custodian roles.  
**14-day asks:** Confirm crossing surge plan; nominate JMVM/peace-support contingents; seat Escrow Board reps; activate de-confliction hotlines for holy sites. (See: Jerusalem — Special ‘Infinite-State City’; Annex 4.)

**Türkiye  
Role:** Provide logistics/engineering units; maritime/air de-confliction; channels to multiple parties.  
**14-day asks:** Offer specific force modules and liaison officers to JMVM/air-sea coordination cell.

**Russia & China  
Role:** Co-guarantee ceasefire text; bring leverage on spoilers; co-chair summit; contribute to escrow and verification tech.  
**14-day asks:** Endorse UNSC package; nominate panel experts for DPARC tie-breaks; commit tranche to escrow. (See: Multipolar Guarantee.)   
  
**United Nations system (UNSC, DPPA/DPO, OCHA/WHO/WFP, UNRWA, UNESCO)  
Role:** Mandate & deploy **JMVM**; coordinate humanitarian surge; stand up Holy Sites Council; run information-integrity & curriculum tracks.  
**14-day asks:** Issue mission concept & SOFA drafts; publish humanitarian scale-up targets; convene International Holy Sites Council. Precedents: UNSC 2261 tripartite verification; UN DDR/IDDRS standards for weapons control.

**Financing & implementation**

**World Bank/IFIs + major donors (U.S., EU, Gulf, others)  
Role:** Operate **Unified Escrow** (multi-donor trust fund); verify-to-unlock tranches; audit & publish milestone ledger.  
**14-day asks:** Constitute Escrow Board; adopt standing humanitarian exemption alignment (UNSC 2664); publish disbursement/milestone rulebook modeled on ARTF-style trust-fund governance.

**Peace-support contributors (cross-bloc mix)**

**Role:** Provide lightly armed monitors, engineering, EOD, medevac, and gendarmerie units; secure temporary buffer and key nodes.  
**14-day asks:** Pledge modules at force-gen; agree ROE and evidence-collection SOPs aligned to JMVM. (See: Phase 2; Annex 2.)

**Information-integrity & tech partners**

**Role:** Build public dashboard, remote-sensing feeds, and open-source verification consistent with humanitarian/privacy norms.  
**14-day asks:** Stand up traffic-light dashboard pilot; watermark/chain-of-custody standards; integrate humanitarian carve-out rules to avoid aid chilling effects.

**Jerusalem & holy sites**

**International Holy Sites Council (equal Jewish-Muslim-Christian representation) with Jordan’s special custodial role recognized  
Role:** Administer shared access, de-confliction, and cultural patrimony inside the **Infinite-State City** regime; interface with Axis of Sovereign Interoperability nodes.  
**14-day asks:** Name council; publish access & de-confliction protocols; link to JMVM for incident reporting. (See: Jerusalem regime; Annex 4.)

### Cross-cutting enforcement note

**Humanitarian is always on: All actors respect UNSC 2664’s standing exemption so lifesaving aid never pauses.**

## 4) Process rhythm

Implementation runs on a realistic beat: a **14-Day Alignment Window** (D+0–D+14) to name principals, table hostage/humanitarian data, and adopt **EUBAM-Rafah/AMA** modalities; followed by a **45-Day Operationalization Track** (D+15–D+60) to deploy monitors, open and then shrink **strictly temporary** corridors, relaunch Rafah to priority categories, and scale the humanitarian surge to full tempo by ~D+30. Timelines mirror humanitarian rapid-response practice (flash appeals in ~5 days; core field assessments by ~day 14; fuller posture by ~30 days) and UN/EU deployment precedents.

## 5) Risks if Delayed

* **Famine & disease mortality curve steepens.** IPC has *now* confirmed famine in Gaza City, with WHO warning of a collapsing health system and surging child morbidity; acute malnutrition rates in Gaza City have spiked this summer. Immediate time-bound, internationally supervised, and dismantled on schedule corridor “green” status and 2664-aligned humanitarian carve-outs are essential. (Act now via **Crossings surge plan**, **Public Milestone Ledger**.)
* **Hostage survivability declines with time.** Israeli authorities say ~20–21 hostages are believed alive; prolonged operations without a sequenced ladder raise mortality risk and erode public consent. (Act now via **Hostage–detainee ladders** with Day-3/Day-7 tranches under JMVM.)
* **Spillover to a wider regional war.** Cross-border fire with Hezbollah has already displaced ~60,000 Israelis and disrupted normal life; rights monitors and the UN warn of escalation if restraint fails. Delay raises odds of a multi-front confrontation. (Act now via **JMVM deployment**, **buffer/force-generation** to stabilize the northern front.)
* **Global trade & price shocks persist.** Red Sea insecurity has lengthened routes (cargo travel distances up ~48% for ships avoiding the Red Sea) and pushed war-risk premiums sharply higher—costs that feed food/energy inflation. (Act now via **ceasefire + maritime de-confliction hooks** in the UNSC package.)
* **Legal & diplomatic exposure compounds.** ICJ provisional-measures orders and ICC arrest-warrant applications heighten reputational and sanctions risk for non-compliance; delay narrows room for constructive diplomacy. (Act now via **UNSC tabling** of the integrated package; **reverse-consensus/DPARC** prevents stalling.)
* **Reconstruction bill balloons while donor fatigue deepens.** Damage and needs scale non-linearly; the 2025 Flash Appeal remains ~22% funded as of mid-August, signaling tightening fiscal space. (Act now via **Unified Escrow Board** + public rulebook to unlock predictable, milestone-based tranches.)
* **Macroeconomic strain intensifies for Israel and the region.** Bank of Israel projects a ~4.9% deficit in 2025 and debt near 70% of GDP—worsening with additional months of mobilization and trade disruption. (Act now via **verify-to-unlock** incentives that phase down costly deployments.)

**Design note.** Each risk maps to a concrete, near-term action in the **14-Day Alignment Window**, **45-Day Operationalization Track** and is enforced by **snapbacks** and **DPARC** timers; humanitarian flows remain “always on” per UNSCR 2664.

([who.int](https://www.who.int/news/item/22-08-2025-famine-confirmed-for-first-time-in-gaza), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/22/gaza-city-famine-ipc), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-6-19-july-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-24-hostages-alive-gaza-after-trump-comment-alarms-families-2025-05-07), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-sends-tanks-into-gazas-deir-al-balah-hostage-families-concerned-2025-07-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/back-class-or-shelters-next-school-year-snags-israels-lebanon-strategy-2024-06-03), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/07/israel/lebanon-hezbollah-attacks-endangered-civilians), [documents1.worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099253002102539789/pdf/IDU10b8b59671dbc814cfc19c4a1299ff54854ba.pdf), [programbusiness.com](https://programbusiness.com/news/insurance-rates-surge-in-red-sea-following-fatal-ship-attacks), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/six-months-hezbollah-fire-keeps-uprooted-israelis-limbo-2024-04-04), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-israel-resume-gaza-negotiations-end-war-free-hostages-2025-08-22), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-315-gaza-strip), [boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/research-department-staff-forecast-july-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/six-months-more-war-gaza-further-weigh-growth-israel-central-bank-chief-says-2025-05-27))

## 6) Implementation and Enforcement Framework

To translate vision into reality, the Memorandum binds every promise to a concrete instrument—so cooperation **unlocks** benefits and violations **auto-cost**.

**Annex 1 — Game-Theory Analysis (with stress tests)**

* **What it is:** A compact payoff model showing that, under this Roadmap’s sequencing, compliance is each actor’s best response (Pareto-improving/Nash-style equilibrium).
* **How it works:** Sub-annexes quantify equilibrium conditions (1.A), proportional responses to **partial** defection (1.B), repeated-game trigger strategies for credibility (1.C), and a four-scenario sensitivity matrix (1.D).
* **Operator’s hook:** Used by guarantors to justify snapback tiers and by the Escrow Board to calibrate milestone thresholds.

**Annex 2 — Ceasefire & Snap-Back Enforcement Matrix**

* **What it is:** A **calibrated ladder** mapping specific breaches to proportionate responses—warnings → pause of **non-humanitarian** disbursements → targeted diplomatic/economic measures → re-tightened security guarantees → **automatic reversion** to the last certified safe baseline for grave breaches.
* **Humanitarian is always on:** Sanctions-related controls must respect the **standing humanitarian carve-out** under **UNSCR 2664**—lifesaving aid continues regardless.

**Annex 3 — DPARC (Deadlock-Prevention & Automatic Reversion Clauses)**

* **What it is:** Timers on every obligation; **default reversion** to the last accepted text if a deadline lapses; a neutral 3-expert panel for tie-break audits; and a **freeze-frame** rule (no facts on the ground while a dispute is pending).
* **Operator’s hook:** If talks stall or evidence is contested, DPARC clocks start automatically and the last verifiable baseline stands.

**Annex 4 — Religious & Cultural Safeguards**

* **What it is:** Shared stewardship of holy sites through an **International Holy Sites Council** (equal Jewish-Muslim-Christian representation), de-confliction protocols, access guarantees, and anti-incitement standards tied to funding unlocks.
* **Operator’s hook:** Interfaces with Jerusalem’s “Infinite-State City” regime and the JMVM incident channel for transparent attribution and fast de-escalation.

**Annex 5 — Multipolar Cooperation Mechanisms Beyond Gaza**

* **What it is:** Templates that extend stability dividends region-wide: **Red Sea–Suez maritime de-confliction**, energy-grid and corridor shields, hybrid/AI-misinformation guardrails, and cross-theatre hotlines—so Gaza peace lowers systemic risk to trade and energy flows.
* **Why it matters:** Maritime insecurity and corridor disruptions are already driving global cost spikes; coupling Gaza calm to regional de-confliction protects supply chains. *(Exec Summary cross-refs: “Risks if Delayed”, “Roles & Asks”.)*

**Annex 6 — ASI (Axis of Sovereign Interoperability) — Reference Draft**

* **What it is:** The technical/policy spine that lets sovereignty remain separate **while systems interoperate**: border/identity & customs rails, payments and trade facilitation, utilities interconnects, and **data-governance**/privacy & cybersecurity norms.
* **Operator’s hook:** As milestones are certified, ASI modules **phase-in** (e.g., movement permits, logistics windows, customs “green lanes”), making rights tangible and reversible if snapbacks trigger. *(Exec Summary cross-refs: “Phased Roadmap”, “Jerusalem Regime”.)*

**Financing & verification glue (how the annexes execute)**

* **Unified Escrow (multi-donor trust fund):** Tranches move **only** on JMVM certification; governance and audit follow World Bank trust-fund practice (admin agreements, donor steering bodies, public reporting).
* **JMVM + standards:** Monitoring/verification, weapons control & registries, and dispute fact-finding align to **UN DDR/IDDRS** standards and verified ceasefire-monitoring doctrine; Colombia’s **UNSCR 2261** “unarmed international observers” model is the precedent for a cross-bloc verification mission.

**UNSC routing hedge.** We seek a **Chapter 6** Security Council resolution endorsing the ceasefire/JMVM/escrow and calling on implementation; if the Council is blocked, we trigger a **General Assembly Emergency Special Session** under **“Uniting for Peace”** and rely on **pre-arranged non-UN guarantees** (MFO/EUBAM; World Bank escrow; co-guarantors’ letter) so operations proceed without a veto showdown.

## 7) Conclusion and Call to Action

This Roadmap is not a plea; it is an executable plan. It turns legal duty into operations—neutral monitoring, public reporting, and consequences for breach—so that cooperation reliably pays and defection reliably costs. Humanitarian space is protected by a standing UN carve-out to sanctions (UNSCR 2664), verification and dispute-resolution follow UN ceasefire-mediation guidance, and enforcement uses well-understood “automaticity” logic. Together, these instruments make the pathway to peace not only morally necessary but procedurally feasible for governments, militaries, and donors.

Financing is equally executable. A Unified Escrow modeled on proven multi-donor trust funds (e.g., the World Bank’s ARTF) can move money **only on proof**, at speed and with auditability—reassuring taxpayers and channeling reconstruction to verified milestones, not promises. That discipline underwrites the verify-to-unlock spine and de-politicizes lifelines protected under UNSCR 2664.

Time, however, is a diminishing asset. Every week of slippage inflates humanitarian, security, legal, and macroeconomic costs while narrowing diplomatic maneuver. The window we have described is real precisely because the alternatives are worsening: escalation risks, supply-chain shocks, and reputational exposure. The only sustainable course is to lock in a rules-based ceasefire and build up from verifiable facts on the ground.

**The next 14 days—actions only leaders can take**

* **Table and pass the integrated UNSC package** (Ceasefire + JMVM + Unified Escrow + Snapbacks/DPARC + 2664 alignment) with co-sponsors from multiple blocs. This creates mandate, money-guardrails, and enforcement on day one.
* **Deploy the Joint Monitoring & Verification Mission (JMVM)** on a cross-bloc basis with published methods and a transparent incident channel; pair it with a fast, fair dispute pathway consistent with UN practice.
* **Constitute the Escrow Board and publish the rulebook** (tranches on proof, humanitarian pre-carve-out, public milestone ledger). Use ARTF-style governance for speed with accountability.
* **Open the public milestone dashboard** (traffic-light status; chain-of-custody/remote-sensing standards) so citizens and creditors can see progress and pressure spoilers in real time.
* **Seat the International Holy Sites Council and activate hotlines,** linking the Jerusalem regime to JMVM reporting to defuse flashpoints before they spiral.

**What this signals—to every constituency**

* **To Israelis:** security is enforced, not wished for; re-armament is deterred by inspections, snapbacks, and cross-bloc guarantees—while reservists and budgets get relief on a timetable.
* **To Palestinians:** protection, access, services, and a dated political horizon are made tangible through verify-to-unlock, with humanitarian lifelines legally insulated (2664).
* **To neighbors and markets:** maritime, energy, and trade risks fall as Gaza stabilizes inside a wider de-escalation architecture, lowering the global price of delay.

**Call to leadership.** Authorize the mission, publish the ledger, and fund the escrow—now. Convene the multipolar guarantee conference and empower envoys to close on text that matches the annexes you have before you. Spiritual leaders, civil society, and technologists stand ready to humanize, verify, and illuminate the path; political leaders must open it. The Unified State vision simply asks you to reimagine sovereignty as interoperable, not indivisible—and to make Jerusalem an “Infinite-State City” where stewardship is shared and dignity is non-negotiable.

Choosing this Roadmap is the pragmatic course **and** the moral one. It proves that even now we can bend fear into courage, rivalry into cooperation, and ideology into rules—and leave a peace durable enough to serve our children and humble enough to honor the sacred. Let us act with clarity, compassion, and resolve. The window is open. Step through.

# **Master Text**

# **Demands and Core Positions of the Parties**

## **Israel’s Position**

**Core strategic objective.** Jerusalem defines victory as the permanent removal of Hamas’s military and governing capacity (“Hamas *is* ISIS” – PM Netanyahu to the UN, Oct 2024) ([gadebate.un.org](https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/69/il_en_25.pdf)). Accordingly, the government insists that any deal must (a) return *all* remaining hostages (around 50 people remain in captivity — Israeli intelligence assesses that roughly 20 are still alive and the rest presumed deceased ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-trump-appear-abandon-gaza-ceasefire-negotiations-with-hamas-2025-07-25), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/in-israel-frustration-grows-as-hostages-remain-in-captivity/video-73425007), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-says-obstinate-hamas-blocking-hostage-deal-as-he-weighs-annexing-parts-of-gaza)) ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/inconclusive-gaza-truce-talks-dent-hopes-palestinians-rafah-2024-02-14)) and (b) embed enforcement tools that stop Hamas re‑arming – e.g., a monitored temporary buffer along the Philadelphi/Netzarim corridors that prevents weapons smuggling ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/30/israel-idf-philadelphi-corridor-rafah-gaza-control-palestine-war-hamas), [haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-08-21/ty-article-magazine/.premium/the-two-corridors-that-are-stymieing-a-gaza-israel-deal/00000191-7500-d2f3-afdf-7dd97ce70000)).

**Domestic red lines on Palestinian statehood.** In February 2024 the security‑cabinet unanimously adopted a formal declaration opposing “any unilateral recognition” of Palestinian statehood ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-formalize-israels-opposition-unilateral-imposition-palestinian-state-2024-02-18/), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-february-18-2024)), and the Knesset reaffirmed that position in a 68‑9 vote on 18 July 2024 ([haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-07-18/ty-article/knesset-passes-resolution-against-establishment-of-palestinian-state/00000190-c2c6-d13a-ad92-caffa4b90000), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-votes-overwhelmingly-against-palestinian-statehood-days-before-pms-us-trip)). Far‑right coalition partners such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich argue that recognising a state would “reward terror” and pose an existential danger ([timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-says-gaza-to-be-totally-destroyed-population-concentrated-in-small-area), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ireland-recognise-palestinian-state-2024-05-22)); centrist and opposition leaders warn, however, that prolonged occupation is equally unsustainable.

**Emerging annexation signals.** Israeli media reports in late July 2025 indicate that Prime Minister Netanyahu has instructed the security cabinet to study a phased *de jure* annexation of “security corridors” already under IDF control inside Gaza — notably the east‑west Netzarim axis and sections of the Philadelphi buffer — should Hamas reject the cease‑fire proposal ([haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-07-28/ty-article/netanyahu-proposes-to-annex-gaza-in-attempt-to-appease-far-right-minister/00000198-525a-dc50-a9bf-ff7ba06f0000), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-gaza-situation-is-difficult-israel-will-ensure-large-amounts-of-aid),[abcnews.go.com](http://abcnews.go.com), [palestina-komitee.nl](https://palestina-komitee.nl/knesset-overwhelmingly-passes-motion-71-to-13-of-120-seats-calling-for-west-bank-annexation/)). The draft is seen as a bid to placate hard‑right coalition partners Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben‑Gvir, who threaten to topple the government unless “sovereignty” is asserted over the temporary buffer zones ([pnn.ps](https://english.pnn.ps/index.php/news/47587), [almayadeen.net](https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/smotrich--netanyahu-push-gaza-west-bank--annexation--with-us)).

U.S. and EU officials have already cautioned that any unilateral annexation would breach international law and jeopardise reconstruction aid, while UN chief António Guterres warned on 28 July that “annexation efforts must stop” ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-chief-guterres-creeping-annexation-west-bank-wholesale-destruction-gaza-must-2025-07-28)). Netanyahu’s office has neither confirmed nor denied the deliberations, stating only that “all options remain on the table” until the hostages are freed and Hamas is dismantled.

**Room for maneuver.**

**74 % of Israelis** now back a war-ending hostage deal ([jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-860795)).

Facing unprecedented diplomatic pressure over the humanitarian toll in Gaza – including warnings from London, Paris and Berlin that they may recognise Palestine if fighting continues ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/britain-warns-israel-it-could-recognise-palestinian-state-gaza-starvation-2025-07-29/)) – senior Israeli officials (President Herzog, Defence Minister Gallant, FM Saar) have publicly stated that Israel “does not seek to re‑govern Gaza’s civilians long‑term” and could accept an interim PA‑ or multinational administration once Hamas is dismantled ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-foreign-minister-looks-washington-punish-icc-2024-11-28), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-authority-must-run-gaza-after-war-prime-minister-says-2025-01-15), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-netanyahu-presents-first-official-post-gaza-war-plan-2024-02-23)). A May 2025 Pew survey shows only one‑third of Israelis now want Israel itself to rule post‑war Gaza, down from 40 % a year earlier ([pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/05/09/fewer-israelis-support-israel-taking-over-gaza-now-than-in-2024), [pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/06/03/israeli-public-is-increasingly-skeptical-about-lasting-peace/)).

**Non‑negotiables for a cease‑fire.**

1. **Hostages first.** Any pause must be paired with a verified release schedule; the cabinet regards continued captivity as *casus belli* ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ceasefire-is-only-way-bring-israeli-prisoners-home-hamas-official-says-2025-02-11)).
2. **No “victory dividend” for Hamas.** Netanyahu frames outside moves toward state recognition as “a prize for terrorism” ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ireland-recognise-palestinian-state-2024-05-22)) and says Israel will not accept arrangements that leave Hamas intact or better armed.
3. **Robust enforcement architecture.** Israel demands continuous inspection of goods entering Gaza and the right to act against new rocket cells, preferably within a UN‑mandated or U.S./multinational inspection regime ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-informs-arab-states-it-wants-buffer-zone-post-war-gaza-sources-2023-12-01)).
4. **Security technology support.** The January 2025 U.S.–Israel MoU on next‑generation missile‑defence (IRON BEAM and Arrow‑4) is cited by Jerusalem as proof that hard‑kill/directed‑energy layers, coupled with a demilitarised Gaza, can stabilise the frontier ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-signs-deal-expand-production-missile-defence-laser-2024-10-28), [en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iron_Beam)).

**What Israel could accept.** Officials have signalled conditional openness to:

* **Time‑bound humanitarian pauses** tied to hostage releases (multiple precedents in 2025 cease‑fire rounds) ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-looks-extend-phase-one-gaza-truce-long-term-deal-proves-elusive-2025-02-25));
* **A phased withdrawal** once a vetted PA‑led or Arab League–backed force (possibly including Jordanian, Emirati and NATO contingents) deploys to police the Strip ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/blinken-discuss-way-forward-gaza-he-meets-israeli-leaders-2024-01-09));
* **An internationally policed temporary buffer** inside Gaza rather than permanent IDF control, provided inspection prevents arms flow from Egypt / Sinai ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/sep/03/what-is-the-philadelphi-corridor-israel-gaza-egypt-netanyahu));
* **Sequenced easing of the blockade**, with clear snapback if Hamas (or PIJ) fires rockets again, aligning with Israel’s “reward only peace” doctrine.

**Narrative & precedent anxiety.** Across the political spectrum a fear endures that *concessions under fire* would embolden Hezbollah in the north and Iranian proxies region‑wide. Netanyahu’s July 2025 warning that “violence must never be rewarded” encapsulates this stance ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/britain-warns-israel-it-could-recognise-palestinian-state-gaza-starvation-2025-07-29)). Any roadmap must therefore demonstrate – visibly and credibly – that ceasing terror *pays*, while sustaining terror *costs*.

Pew finds **4-in-10 Arab Israelis** still believe coexistence is possible ([pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/06/03/views-of-the-potential-for-lasting-peace)).

A June **INSS survey finds 60.5 %** of Israelis say ‘stop the war’—up 12 pts since January ([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-june-2025/)).

**August 2025—Domestic politics, annexation signal, and negotiations.** In late July, Hebrew-press reports described the Prime Minister floating a contingency to **annex parts of Gaza**—beginning with “buffer-zone” strips and potentially expanding—amid pressure from far-right partners; follow-ups said a small ministerial group even discussed an **administrative vehicle for any annexed areas**. In August, the government simultaneously **advanced plans for a major Gaza City operation** while **authorizing talks** on a new **hostage/ceasefire package** that Hamas indicated willingness to consider; Israel has been **reviewing** the proposal. Mass public pressure intensified (nationwide **Aug 17 strike/protests** for a deal). The annexation discussion intersects with the push to entrench **“security corridors”**—the **Netzarim** spine across Gaza and Israel’s hold over the **Philadelphi** border strip—long championed by the PM. **Snapback/legal-risk hook.** Any move toward **annexation or permanent corridor control** in occupied territory would carry no legal validity and heightens exposure under ongoing **ICC proceedings**, while a lasting presence on **Philadelphi** also raises **Egypt–Israel treaty** concerns flagged repeatedly by Cairo and observers. Accordingly, this memorandum conditions any corridor/security arrangement as **strictly temporary, internationally monitored, and non-sovereignty-altering**, with **automatic snapbacks** if either party attempts annexation, demographic engineering, or **unilateral facts on the ground**.

## **Palestinian Position(s) – Gaza’s De Facto Authorities and the PA**

**Hamas – objectives under siege.** Twenty‑one months of war have pushed Gaza’s de facto rulers from maximalist rhetoric to crisis triage. On **4 July 2025** the politburo told Egyptian‑Qatari mediators it had replied to a U.S.‑backed **60‑day cease‑fire plan “in a positive spirit,”** provided it led to *full Israeli withdrawal, an all‑for‑all prisoner exchange and a permanent end to the blockade* ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/4/hamas-responds-to-us-backed-gaza-ceasefire-proposal-in-a-positive-spirit)). Two weeks later Hamas shocked negotiators by demanding **30 Palestinians serving life sentences for every remaining living Israeli hostage** – effectively all 288 such inmates ([haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-07-28/ty-article/.premium/hamas-demands-30-prisoners-per-hostage-surprising-negotiatiors-diplomat-says/00000198-4fe2-db80-abdf-ffeb6ef00000)). Current Israeli estimates say **~50 hostages remain, about 20 believed alive**, a dwindling asset for Hamas as of august 21 2025 ([bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c754kknw2g2o), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says-meeting-with-trump-focused-efforts-free-hostages-2025-07-09/)). Parallel Reuters reporting confirms the same ratio in draft swap lists ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-seeks-ceasefire-guarantees-scores-more-killed-gaza-2025-07-03/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hostages-return-israelis-struggle-with-releasing-palestinian-prisoners-2025-02-07/)).

Hamas’s minimum package now includes:

* **Permanent lifting of the siege** – open crossings, unrestricted reconstruction imports.
* **No Israeli re‑occupation** – withdrawal from the Netzarim‑Philadelphi corridors and an end to “buffer‑zone” annexation talk.
* **International guarantees for Al‑Aqsa access** and protection of Jerusalem’s holy sites.
* **Amnesty and political participation** in any interim administration.

While its 1988 charter still rejects Israel’s permanence, recent statements reprise earlier hints at a long‑term *hudna* if a Palestinian state emerges on 1967 lines ([haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2025-05-31/ty-article/hamas-set-to-respond-to-gaza-cease-fire-proposal-senior-official-says/00000197-2611-da41-a9f7-3f9515190000)). Reuters field reports underscore that, despite Israel’s vow to eradicate it, **Hamas retains deep administrative control** over ministries, police and tunnel logistics – complicating any external governance plan ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-tight-grip-gaza-complicates-plan-for-lasting-peace-2025-01-22)). Yet rare **“Hamas out” protests** in northern Gaza (Mar 2025) reveal public frustration with the movement’s cost‑benefit ledger ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hundreds-palestinians-gaza-protest-against-hamas-after-conflict-resumes-2025-03-26)).

**Humanitarian backdrop.** Gaza’s Health Ministry now puts the confirmed death toll at **about 60 000** Palestinians (29 July 2025) ([Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/29/death-toll-in-israels-war-on-gaza-surpasses-60000), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-many-palestinians-has-israels-gaza-offensive-killed-2025-03-24/)) — **yet independent excess-mortality surveys, including a Nature-reported demographic study and NGO field estimates, suggest the *actual* wartime toll may already lie in the 75 000 – 85 000 range once indirect deaths from hunger, disease and unrecorded strikes are counted** ([nature.com](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-02009-8), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/gaza-what-is-the-actual-death-toll-and-how-can-we-be-sure/a-73136975)). UN agencies warn of imminent famine, with 88 hunger‑related child deaths recorded ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/palestinians-death-toll-war-health-ministry-816d592952814db869924f9626ca8876), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/britain-warns-israel-it-could-recognise-palestinian-state-gaza-starvation-2025-07-29/)). Al-Jazeera’s live tracker labels the enclave “on the brink of full‑scale famine.” ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/7/29/live-israel-kills-92-in-gaza-in-one-day-as-death-toll-nears-60000)). This devastation presses Hamas to secure a cease‑fire it can market domestically as a humanitarian victory, even at the cost of some disarmament.

**Palestinian Authority – bid for stewardship.** In **January 2025** new PA Prime Minister **Mohammad Mustafa** declared that “the Palestinian Authority must run Gaza after the war,” outlining a technocratic cabinet ready to assume duties alongside an international stabilisation mission ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-authority-must-run-gaza-after-war-prime-minister-says-2025-01-15)). President **Mahmoud Abbas** has since welcomed French and British moves to recognise Palestine at the UN this September, calling them “bold steps toward justice.” ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/britain-warns-israel-it-could-recognise-palestinian-state-gaza-starvation-2025-07-29/),[reuters.com](http://reuters.com)).

**The PA’s platform:**

1. **Immediate, durable cease‑fire** with unimpeded aid corridors.
2. **Transfer of governance to a PA‑led interim authority** under UN‑approved security umbrella, excluding armed Hamas but allowing political inclusion subject to disarmament.
3. **Time‑bound political process** toward sovereign Palestinian statehood with reciprocal security assurances.
4. **Accountability for war crimes** via ICC or agreed reconciliation mechanisms.

**Intra-Palestinian variance — hard-liners, technocrats & street sentiment**

* **Hamas split.** Gaza-based commanders still cast the war as existential, yet the Doha-based political bureau signals willingness to trade heavy weapons for a long-term *hudna* if a sovereign state on 1967 lines looks real. ([newarab.com](https://www.newarab.com/news/how-israels-genocide-impacts-hamas-ability-negotiate), [i24news.tv](https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/the-gulf/artc-doha-ordered-hamas-leaders-in-qatar-to-surrender-personal-weapons-report), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-war-palestinian-state-uk-france-canada-83b626eac334ecae9ea9120ea3381f23))  
  A Reuters interview confirms Hamas will trade *all* hostages for an end to the war ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-is-ready-release-all-remaining-hostages-return-an-end-gaza-war-hamas-gaza-2025-04-17/)).
* **PA technocratic turn.** New PM Mohammad Mustafa pitches a “service-first” cabinet under a UN security umbrella, positioning the PA as the credible alternative to Hamas governance. ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/14/palestinian-authority-president-abbas-appoints-mohammed-mustafa-prime-minister), [jcpa.org](https://jcpa.org/is-the-palestinian-authority-trying-to-return-to-gaza/), [arab.news](https://arab.news/yjhep), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/dozens-of-countries-attend-un-confab-on-two-states-boycotted-by-us-and-israel/))
* **Public fatigue with both camps.** Polling shows trust in either leadership hovers below 50 %; Gazans have staged rare “Hamas-out” protests, while surveys list “jobs, safety, open borders” above ideology. ([fdd.org](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/05/07/large-minority-wants-to-leave-gaza-as-hamas-popularity-declines-new-poll-of-palestinians-finds/), [www.cbc.ca](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/gaza-hamas-protest-israel-1.7493595), [wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Gaza_Strip_anti-Hamas_protests)). Half of Gazans now tell pollsters they’d emigrate if gates opened — a raw measure of despair ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/almost-half-gazans-willing-leave-survey-finds-2025-05-06/), [pcpsr.org](https://pcpsr.org/en/node/997)).

**Diplomatic hook.** By funnelling reconstruction funds and political clout through an inclusive interim authority—rewarding factions that disarm and deliver services—the roadmap can exploit these rivalries as compliance pressure rather than spoiler fuel.

Because Hamas’s own leaders now trade ideology for survival—signalling they will swap heavy weapons for an end to siege—a narrow but actionable overlap emerges for the roadmap’s weapons-for-reconstruction bargain ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-kills-15-gaza-trump-waits-hamas-response-ceasefire-proposal-2025-07-04/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-says-no-interim-truce-possible-without-work-toward-permanent-ceasefire-2025-07-18/)).

**Convergent Palestinian bottom lines for Memorandum No. 11**

* **Relief now:** comprehensive cease‑fire, large‑scale aid surge, guaranteed humanitarian corridors.
* **Rights & dignity:** end of siege, freedom of movement, return of displaced, unhindered access to holy sites.
* **Justice:** staged prisoner releases, credible war‑crimes mechanisms, safeguards against collective punishment.
* **Political horizon:** internationally guaranteed pathway to an independent Palestinian state, with interim governance anchored in the PA but open to any faction that disarms and adopts democratic norms.

This configuration lets Hamas trade weapons for political relevance, allows the PA to regain legitimacy through service delivery and diplomacy, and delivers to the Palestinian public the tangible dignity and future they demand.

**Important note:**

**Democracy as a pathway to dignity.** Fieldwork from *Arab Barometer Wave V3* (face-to-face interviews in Gaza and the West Bank, 28 Sep – 8 Oct 2023) shows that, even on the eve of the war, **56% of Palestinians affirmed that democracy is the *only* acceptable system of governance** [(arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABVIII_Democracy_EN.pdf)). Crucially, their concept of democracy is dignity-centred rather than ballot-centred: **78% in Palestine say that ensuring every household’s basic necessities is “very essential” to what democracy means**, far above the weight given to elections, and **85% link the idea of democracy directly to personal *karama* (dignity)**. These figures highlight a potent but under-tapped local demand for accountable, service-delivering government—an “exit asset” negotiators can harness. Any post-war governance model that visibly channels reconstruction funds into jobs, electricity and clean water, under transparent oversight, would resonate with this democratic-dignity aspiration, helping to secure popular buy-in across Gaza, improve Israel’s security environment, and answer global calls for a rights-based peace ([arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB8-Palestine-Report-3-English.pdf)).

## **Points of Convergence and Tension**

Notwithstanding deep asymmetry and distrust, several **empirically verifiable convergence points** still exist in July 2025 and can be enlarged through skilful diplomacy:

### **War‑weariness is palpable**

**Peace beats wider war:** When the *Palestinian–Israeli Pulse* (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah and the International Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation at Tel Aviv University) put respondents before a stark September 2024 choice between “a multi‑front regional war” and “a region‑wide peace accord that includes a two‑state settlement and Arab‑Israeli normalization,” **62 % of Israelis and 65 % of Palestinians opted for peace** ([Joint Poll Summary Report](https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Summary%20Report_%20English_Joint%20Poll%2012%20Sept%202024.pdf), 12 Sept 2024, p. 8, “Regional war vs. regional and Palestinian-Israeli peace”, [www.reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fighter-pilots-call-israel-prioritise-release-gaza-hostages-even-if-war-must-2025-04-10/)).

**Israeli pessimism peaks:** A Pew survey released 3 June 2025 finds only **21 % of Israelis** think Israel and a future Palestinian state “can coexist peacefully,” the lowest share since Pew began asking in 2013 ([pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/06/03/israeli-public-is-increasingly-skeptical-about-lasting-peace/)).  
Deep-seated pessimism about peaceful coexistence directly reflects the emotional and psychological toll of prolonged conflict, leading to a diminished belief that a lasting resolution is achievable.

**Conditional Palestinian support:** In PSR Poll 95 (1‑4 May 2025) **40 % of Palestinians** back the generic two‑state idea (57% oppose), yet support jumps to **61 %** when the state is framed simply as “independent on the 1967 borders,” untethered from the loaded two‑state brand ([pcpsr.org](https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2095%20press%20release%206May2025%20ENGLISH.pdf), fig. 16).

**Civilian‑protection wedge.** Both leaderships *invoke* civilian safety, yet July 2025 realities expose a hard gap: Hamas now seeks a **30‑for‑1** prisoner ratio for each surviving hostage ([haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-07-28/ty-article/.premium/hamas-demands-30-prisoners-per-hostage-surprising-negotiatiors-diplomat-says/00000198-4fe2-db80-abdf-ffeb6ef00000)), while Israel is weighing annexation of “security corridors” pending hostage release —moves critics call collective‑punishment threats. Any humanitarian pause must therefore come with third‑party enforcement to align the rhetoric with actual civilian outcomes.  
From Guns to Bread: Why Soaring War Costs Create a Ceasefire Window

([en.idi.org.il](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/60357), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israelis-stage-nationwide-protests-demand-end-gaza-war-release-hostages-2025-08-17), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-august-17-2025), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/breaking-with-pm-74-of-israelis-back-war-ending-deal-to-free-all-hostages-poll), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-860795), [en.idi.org.il](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/60357), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-jews-think-idf-tries-not-to-hurt-civilians-in-gaza-arabs-disagree-poll), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/times-of-israel-poll-majority-of-israelis-oppose-annexation-of-gaza-territory), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-accepts-proposed-deal-ceasefire-with-israel-hostage-release-egyptian-2025-08-18), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-weighs-hamas-response-gaza-ceasefire-proposal-2025-08-19))

#### **Economic devastation in Gaza – the numbers behind the exhaustion**

*Beyond the unbearable human cost, Gaza’s productive life has virtually collapsed, creating economic pain so deep that it now functions as an additional-but-powerful driver of public support for a ceasefire.*

| **Indicator** | **Latest measurement** | **Source** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **GDP crash** | -83 % year-on-year in 2024; West Bank -17 % | ([World Bank](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/0f21311c2ebb0df4bf9b493a8034997c-0280012025/original/82687546-6fc3-46fa-80ba-5ce29d2148bc.pdf)) |
| **Whole-economy contraction** | Palestinian GDP down **27 %** – worst in 30 years | ([World Bank](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-pse.pdf)) |
| **Capital-stock damage** | **US $29.9 bn** of physical assets destroyed (schools, homes, clinics) | ([World Bank](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-pse.pdf)) |
| **Unemployment** | Gazan joblessness now **≈80 %** (national ave. 51 %) | ([pcbs.gov.ps](https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_EconomicForecast2024E.pdf), [pcbs.gov.ps](https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?ItemID=5906&lang=en)) |
| **Poverty** | “Approaching **100 %**” of Gaza’s population now below poverty line | ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/war-knocked-human-development-gaza-back-1955-undp-says-2024-10-22/)) |
| **Infrastructure wreckage** | **67 %** of water-sanitation facilities damaged/destroyed | ([UNDP](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-10/gaza-war-expected-socioeconomic-impacts-palestine-policy-brief-english-1.pdf)) |
| **Reconstruction horizon** | Housing rebuild could stretch **to 2040** even with steady aid | ([UNDP](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2024-10/gaza-war-expected-socioeconomic-impacts-palestine-policy-brief-english-1.pdf)) |
| **Human-development reversal** | Gaza’s HDI rolled back **70 years to 1955** | ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/war-knocked-human-development-gaza-back-1955-undp-says-2024-10-22/)) |
| **Humanitarian finance gap** | UN 2025 Flash Appeal seeks **US $4 bn**, but only **19 %** funded by mid-July | ([ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/OPT_Flash_Appeal_2025_EN.pdf), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-306-gaza-strip)) |

**Diplomatic framing**

The war has shattered Gaza’s economic bedrock. An 83 percent GDP collapse, 80 percent unemployment, and poverty touching every household create an objective *mutually hurting stalemate*: neither side can win militarily, yet every extra week of violence deepens an economic sinkhole that will take decades to fill.

**Why this opens a peace window.** When virtually the entire population falls below the poverty line and essential infrastructure is in ruins, *every additional day of conflict erodes the very foundations on which any future governance—Palestinian or international—must be built*. That stark reality is now visible to Gazans (72 % rank a lasting truce over “armed resistance” as their top priority, Arab Barometer, June 2025) and to regional donors who see a US $4 billion humanitarian bill with only a fifth financed.

**Negotiating lever.** Linking immediate humanitarian corridors and a first reconstruction tranche to verifiable arms-limitation and hostage release gives Hamas a face-saving economic incentive to pivot from military to political struggle, while giving Israel tangible evidence that de-escalation reduces its own security burden.

**Bottom line.** The economic ledger reinforces the humanitarian one: Gaza’s catastrophe is no longer just a moral crisis; it is an unsustainable drag on regional stability and donor resources. Converting this shared pain into a *shared interest* in rapid ceasefire implementation is the most pragmatic—and diplomatically saleable—path forward.

#### **Israel’s Economic Pain – Numbers behind the Fatigue**

* **Defence spending is exploding.** In mid-July 2025 the government approved an extra **₪42 billion ($12.5 bn) for 2025-26**, lifting the annual military bill to about **9 % of GDP** and crowding out civilian programmes ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-raise-defence-spending-meet-security-challenges-2025-07-17), [breakingdefense.com](https://breakingdefense.com/2025/04/israeli-defense-spending-jumped-in-2024-part-of-overall-rise-in-middle-east-sipri), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-adds-billions-to-defense-spending-amid-ongoing-wars-growing-challenges/), [sipri.org](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/2504_fs_milex_2024.pdf), [sipri.org](https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges)).
* **Growth has withered.** After the war’s initial shock, Israel eked out just **1 % real GDP growth in 2024**, far below its 3-4 % trend ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fifth-israelis-displaced-by-war-out-work-survey-shows-2025-02-25), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/wars-dent-israels-economy-2024-military-spending-keeps-growth-1-2025-02-17)). Bank of Israel models show that **each additional six-month extension of the Gaza campaign knocks a further 0.5 ppt off 2025 growth** ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/six-months-more-war-gaza-further-weigh-growth-israel-central-bank-chief-says-2025-05-27/), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-852325), [boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/media/yafbjdpc/mpr202501e.pdf))
* **Budget stress is mounting.** The central bank’s July 2025 forecast puts the **2025 deficit at 4.9 % of GDP** and debt at **≈70 % of GDP**, levels unseen since the early 2000s security crises ([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/research-department-staff-forecast-july-2025)). A separate BoI study flags wartime spending as the primary driver of the jump ([boi.org.il](https://boi.org.il/media/kutatzbk/chep-1-e-n2024.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-economy-grew-34-q1-war-against-hamas-weighs-2025-05-18/)).  
    
  Only **32 % of Americans now approve of Israel’s conduct**, eroding the diplomatic cover that cushions markets. *The longer the campaign endures, the more these fiscal and reputational costs crowd out Israel’s preferred “maximalist” options* ([jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-862639), [allisraelnews.com](https://allisraelnews.com/a-new-low-in-us-support-for-gaza-war-as-only-32-approve-war-29-approve-of-netanyahu), [news.gallup.com](https://news.gallup.com/poll/692948/u.s.-back-israel-military-action-gaza-new-low.aspx), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/29/new-poll-shows-plunging-us-public-support-for-israels-war-on-gaza), [israel.com](https://israel.com/breaking-only/israels-foreign-currency-reserves-228-250-billion-end-of-june-2025/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/six-months-more-war-gaza-further-weigh-growth-israel-central-bank-chief-says-2025-05-27/), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-leads-global-surge-in-military-spending-with-steepest-increase-since-1967))
* **Financing costs are stuck.** To calm markets the Monetary Committee has frozen its policy rate at **4.5 %** for three consecutive decisions despite the slowdown, citing “geopolitical uncertainty” ([boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/regular-publications/monetary-policy-reports/monetary-policy-report-first-half-of-2025), [boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/6-1-25)).
* **Households and labour are hurting.** One-fifth of Israelis evacuated from the Gaza and Lebanon borders remain unemployed, and **a third of households report income losses** ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fifth-israelis-displaced-by-war-out-work-survey-shows-2025-02-25/)). Reserve-call-ups are sapping manpower, and northern tourism and agriculture are running below half capacity.
* **Take-away:** Israel's ballooning defence bill, anemic growth and widening deficit have created a *political-economy tipping point*: publics see that every extra month of war erodes living standards. That shared pain—on opposite sides of the divide—is precisely the “war-weariness dividend” a robust ceasefire roadmap can cash in on.

Amidst palpable war-weariness, the desire for basic normalcy and an end to conflict is now embraced by large swaths of both societies — **60 % of Israelis** want the Gaza war stopped outright, and support among Palestinians climbs from **40 % to 61 %** when an ‘independent state on the 1967 borders’ is decoupled from the loaded two-state brand — creating solid common ground for practical diplomacy. ([timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/breaking-with-pm-74-of-israelis-back-war-ending-deal-to-free-all-hostages-poll/), [inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/survey-june-2025), [pcpsr.org](https://pcpsr.org/en/node/997))

### **Reframing the lens**

What Israelis once treated as a Gaza‑only threat is now openly tied to the Iran–Hezbollah axis, while Palestinians frame Gaza as the epicentre of an 80‑year liberation struggle ([The Wall Street Journa](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-gaza-war-86a119f3), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-defence-minister-warns-hezbollah-against-joining-conflict-with-iran-2025-06-20), [stimson.org](https://www.stimson.org/2025/as-israel-and-the-us-attack-iran-the-axis-of-resistance-remains-on-the-sidelines), [rferl.org](https://www.rferl.org/a/israel-terror-war-diplomacy-hezbollah-iran/33162218.html), [newyorker.com](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/08/04/israels-zones-of-denial)). The Memorandum’s task is to convert that wide‑angle lens into a *joint* fight against a self‑reinforcing cycle of fear and retaliation.

The shift from seeing Gaza as an isolated flashpoint to recognising it as one front in the wider Iran-Hezbollah contest paradoxically **opens a bargaining space that did not exist before**:

Israel wants breathing room to consolidate its new northern deterrence posture and avoid fighting two theatres at once([ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/0932f415-9b2d-4047-a9e5-1b1020216c39), [rand.org](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/06/the-israel-iran-conflict-qa-with-rand-experts.html)); Tehran and Hezbollah, reeling from a year-and-a-half of “withering setbacks,” need a pause to rebuild and avert a region-wide escalation that could jeopardise their local power bases ([The Century Foundation](https://tcf.org/content/report/the-axis-of-resistance-returns-to-its-local-roots), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollahs-retaliation-options-and-us-diplomatic-role)).

Gulf and Western diplomats can therefore frame a Gaza ceasefire as a **mutual de-escalation dividend**: Israel gets a verified arms-interdiction regime that frees forces for the northern front, while the Axis of Resistance preserves assets by trading Gaza calm for relief from sanctions and reconstruction aid—an idea already embedded in the U.S.–Egypt–Qatar 60-day truce blueprint now on the table ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-backed-ceasefire-plan-gaza-still-under-discussion-optimism-fading-2025-07-15/)). Actors such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, eager to lock in their own détente with Tehran and to protect energy corridors, suddenly have concrete security incentives to underwrite and police that deal ([Chatham House](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/us-and-gulf-should-not-get-distracted-grand-visions-peace-gaza-must-come-first)). In short, **the broader lens converts zero-sum local warfare into a multilateral risk-management problem—and that, history shows, is when diplomacy can bite.**Reality Check: Voices From Both Sides

| **Israeli voice** | **Palestinian voice** |
| --- | --- |
| “**Hamas is an idea … anyone who thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.**” — Rear Adm. **Daniel Hagari**, ([timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-spokesman-says-hamas-cant-be-eliminated-will-remain-in-gaza-if-no-alternative/), [Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/20/israeli-military-spokesmans-hamas-defeat-remarks-widen-rift-with-netanyahu), [Anadolu Ajansı](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/promising-to-eradicate-hamas-is-misleading-says-israeli-army-spokesperson/3253705), [ABC](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-20/idf-daniel-hagari-hamas-cannot-be-eliminated-gaza-netanyahu/104001430)) | “**If Israel accepts a fully sovereign state on the 1967 borders, Hamas will *lay down its weapons* and turn into a political party.**” — **Khalil al-Hayya**, [AP News](https://apnews.com/article/hamas-khalil-alhayya-qatar-ceasefire-1967-borders-4912532b11a9cec29464eab234045438), [PBS](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/top-hamas-official-says-group-would-agree-to-truce-if-independent-palestinian-state-established-along-pre-1967-borders), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-official-who-sought-endless-war-after-oct-7-says-it-could-put-down-arms-for-2-state-deal)) |

Times of Israel poll shows a **majority oppose annexing Gaza**, signalling pragmatic drift ([timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/times-of-israel-poll-majority-of-israelis-oppose-annexation-of-gaza-territory/)).

### **Why “Total Victory” Is a Mirage**

***And How the New Regional Lens Creates Diplomatic Leverage***

A **decisive battlefield win is structurally unattainable for either side**, and forty months of combat have made that clearer than ever:

1. **Insurgent resilience in dense urban terrain***IDF spokes­man Daniel Hagari* warned Israelis that “the idea we can make Hamas disappear is misleading” because thousands of militants remain embedded in tunnels the army cannot seal permanently ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-says-hamas-cant-be-destroyed-escalating-feud-with-netanyahu-c72f549e)). Independent assessments echo him: RAND calls Gaza “the land of no good options”, stressing that Hamas can rebuild cadres faster than Israel can clear labyrinthine subterranean networks ([rand.org](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/gaza-is-the-land-of-no-good-options.html)), while *The Times* notes that even full control of Rafah left hundreds of kilometres of tunnels intact and poised for protracted guerrilla war ([The Times](https://www.thetimes.com/comment/columnists/article/war-hamas-tunnels-israel-long-costly-gfwpnfwnp)).
2. **Recognition of limits  
   Hamas recognises its own military ceiling.** For example: Hamas senior official **Walid al-Kilan2 on Al-Hadath, quoted by** [**Ynetnews**](https://www.ynetnews.com/article/sjqvasbq0)**, 1 July 2025:** “*We cannot defeat Israel militarily, but we prevent it from achieving its goals*”.  
     
   Hamas now views hostage leverage and global opinion as their only strategic tools ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/12/depleted-hamas-focuses-on-desperate-new-aim-capturing-an-israeli-soldier), [jacobin.com](https://jacobin.com/2025/07/hamas-palestine-israel-sinwar-strategy), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/hamas-resistance-doctrine-hostage-deal-israel-sinwar/)). That candour signals an opening for bargains that trade disarmament for political survival, not battlefield gains. (Note: In the Unified State view, this is a major red line.)  
     
   The same week Israel’s own spokesman **Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari** warned on Channel 13 that “*whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong*,” calling total destruction “throwing sand in the eyes of the public” (Times of Israel, 20 June 2024) ([Times of Israel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-spokesman-says-hamas-cant-be-eliminated-will-remain-in-gaza-if-no-alternative/)). This mutually acknowledged stalemate underpins the U.S.–Egypt–Qatar **60-day truce blueprint** tabled on 4 July 2025, which couples phased IDF pull-backs and arms-interdiction to the staged reopening of Gaza ([Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/3/4/live-israel-blocking-gaza-food-medicine-is-a-clear-war-crime-hamas), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/can-hamas-be-defeated)).
3. **Multi-front overstretch limits Israeli staying-power**Hezbollah rocket barrages and Iranian missile exchanges have kept 90 000 northern Israelis displaced and compelled the IDF to rotate reserves between Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, straining manpower and munitions stocks ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-north-stress-resignation-deepen-missiles-fly-2024-09-24), [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-iran-air-war-enters-second-week-europe-pushes-diplomacy-2025-06-20/), [jewishfederations.org](https://www.jewishfederations.org/blog/all/federations-statement-on-israel-response-to-hezbollah-477564)). Defence outlays are already slated to hit **9 % of GDP** in 2026—levels not seen since the Second Intifada—prompting the Bank of Israel to warn of “macroeconomic trade-offs that will erode growth” if Gaza operations drag on ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-raise-defence-spending-meet-security-challenges-2025-07-17), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-adds-billions-to-defense-spending-amid-ongoing-wars-growing-challenges/), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-defense-spending-set-to-threaten-fiscal-stability-and-welfare-services-report/), [ap.org](https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2024/israels-wars-are-expensive-paying-the-bill-could-force-tough-choices/), [english.alarabiya.net](https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2025/05/27/israel-s-2026-budget-needs-balance-between-defense-civilian-spending-official), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-leads-global-surge-in-military-spending-with-steepest-increase-since-1967/)).
4. **Escalating diplomatic and legal exposure**Images of starvation have shifted even traditionally sympathetic actors: Germany’s foreign minister now speaks of looming “international isolation” for Israel if carnage continues ([Deutsche Welle](https://www.dw.com/en/middle-east-israel-risks-isolation-german-fm-says/live-73477363)), while the **ICJ genocide-case docket** guarantees months of courtroom scrutiny, whatever the final judgement ([International Court of Justice](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192)). Each additional week of bombing therefore carries a reputational price that no battlefield gain can offset.
5. **International fatigue pushes for a package deal**Washington, Cairo and Doha have converged on a **60-day truce blueprint** that links phased IDF pull-backs and arms-interdiction with hostage releases and gradual Gaza reopening. Saudi Arabia and the UAE—keen to protect their own détente with Tehran—signal readiness to bankroll enforcement once guns fall silent ([Anadolu Ajansı](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-faces-growing-global-isolation-over-gaza-war-experts/3644192)).

**Why that matters now.** Because both sides, however grudgingly, acknowledge the ceiling on battlefield gains, the centre of gravity has shifted to leverage tools—hostages, global opinion, and regional escalation threats. Hamas publicly brands world outrage as a key asset, saying it will “rely on hostages and world opinion to pressure Israel” rather than fire-power. Yet that strategy is bounded by the capacities and risk tolerance of its patron network:

* **Iran’s bandwidth is finite.** After the June 2025 “Twelve-Day War,” RAND and RUSI experts note Tehran must conserve missiles and avoid another direct clash that could jeopardise its strategic programs([rand.org](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/07/iran-and-the-logic-of-limited-wars.html)), while ISW tracking shows Iranian proxies already struggling to repair infrastructure under Israeli strikes ([understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-10-2025)).
* **Hezbollah’s calculus is deterrence, not occupation.** Its own commanders tell *Jerusalem Post* they refuse to disarm but equally do not seek a long war that would drain Lebanon’s economy([jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-862002), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-862769), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-860088)).

If Gaza violence continues unchecked, however, **those ceilings could be breached**: an un-ending siege risks triggering a broader Iran-Hezbollah response and, with Red-Sea corridors already under drone attack, a multi-theatre crisis that would demand a full international coalition to stabilise shipping lanes and nuclear flashpoints ([washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-built-army)). Diplomatically, this is the moment to lock in a ceasefire package: it leverages Hamas’s open admission of military limits, Israel’s fiscal and manpower strain (defence outlays heading toward 9 % of GDP) , and the newly convergent interest of Gulf, Western and Asian powers to avert a conflict spiral that could shove the global economy back into recession (World Bank warns a further 0.5 ppt cut to 2025 growth if Gaza fighting drags on) .

**In short, recognising the impossibility of a clean battlefield win—on *both* sides—creates diplomatic room to trade tangible concessions (hostage release, phased pull-backs, monitored disarmament) for political survival and regional de-escalation, before the window slams shut and local war mutates into an uncontrollable global crisis.**

### **Diplomatic Window Created by the New “Regional Lens”**

Because Gaza is now universally understood as one arena in the broader Iran-Hezbollah front, a ceasefire delivers **reciprocal strategic relief**:

* **Israel** buys time to harden its north and halt an economic bleed that is already knocking **0.5 percentage points off annual growth for every six-month campaign extension** ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-raise-defence-spending-meet-security-challenges-2025-07-17/)).
* **Tehran and Hezbollah** preserve their cadres after a year of “withering setbacks” that ruptured supply corridors to Lebanon and exposed Iranian parks and ports to retaliatory air-strikes ([Taylor & Francis Online](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2516979)).

In game-theory terms, both sides’ opportunity cost of continued combat now exceeds the expected payoff of escalation. **Convert that cost–benefit crossover into a Nash equilibrium**—by pairing verifiable disarmament and hostage release with staged opening of Gaza and regional de-escalation guarantees—and a sustainable ceasefire becomes the rational choice, not a concession. That is the logic the Memorandum must crystallise.

**Remark on the “global-opinion weapon” and why it magnifies risk**

Because Hamas now treats international outrage as a substitute for battlefield success—openly courting images that will “shift the court of world opinion” against Israel —every civilian tragedy in Gaza ricochets through social-media echo chambers, fueling campus sit-ins from New York to Nairobi [(Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/23/why-is-columbia-university-expelling-pro-palestine-students), [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/features/global-protest-tracker)) and sparking a documented surge in both antisemitism and Islamophobia worldwide ([Vision of Humanity](https://www.visionofhumanity.org/gaza-conflict-leads-to-rise-in-antisemitism-and-islamophobia), [Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/15/un-chief-warns-of-global-rise-in-anti-muslim-bigotry)). This feedback loop is already polarising a fractious international community, as the UN human-rights chief warns of “sharp rises in hatred” that threaten social cohesion far beyond the Middle East ([ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/11/un-human-rights-chief-condemns-rise-hatred)). Left unchecked, the weaponisation of global sentiment risks tipping local warfare into a broader clash of identities, hardening hard-line constituencies on all sides and closing the diplomatic space the Memorandum seeks to reopen. Capping the violence swiftly is therefore not only a humanitarian imperative; it is a firewall against a metastasising wave of global unrest and sectarian tension.

### **Why the “global-opinion weapon” also opens a window for peace**

The same dynamic that radicalises street sentiment is now **dragging governments, markets and security planners into the Gaza file in ways that neither Jerusalem nor Hamas can ignore**:

* **Public-order spill-overs are straining Western capitals.** UN human-rights monitors report “marked rises” in both antisemitism and Islamophobia since the Gaza escalation, warning of social-cohesion risks at home ([docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/59/63)). University encampments and mass rallies from New York to Nairobi have forced leaders onto a political tightrope between civil-rights law and campus security ([Vox](https://www.vox.com/politics/421954/columbia-brown-harvard-trump-settlement-antisemitism), [wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_University_pro-Palestinian_campus_protests_and_occupations_during_the_Gaza_war)). Washington, London and Berlin therefore have a **domestic incentive** to press urgently for a ceasefire that cools tempers abroad and at home.
* **Macro-economic shock waves are climbing the agenda.** A March 2025 World Bank brief shows Gaza-related supply shocks already pushing basic-food prices in the Strip up “by a factor of 100,” with knock-on effects for regional inflation ([The World Bank](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/0f21311c2ebb0df4bf9b493a8034997c-0280012025/original/82687546-6fc3-46fa-80ba-5ce29d2148bc.pdf)). Red-Sea drone and missile attacks—framed by Yemen’s Houthis as punishment for Israel—now endanger **$1 trillion in annual trade** through the Suez lane ([Straight Arrow News](https://san.com/cc/yemen-houthis-warn-they-will-escalate-attacks-on-ships-linked-to-israel/)), driving up freight premiums and prompting the G7 to link Gaza de-escalation to global supply-chain security in its July communiqué ([g7.canada.ca](https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-recent-developments-between-israel-and-iran)). The World Bank warns these shocks could shave **½ percentage-point off 2025 world-growth** forecasts if hostilities continue ([The World Bank](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/10/global-economic-prospects-june-2025-press-release), [The World Bank](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/8bf0b62ec6bcb886d97295ad930059e9-0050012025/original/GEP-June-2025.pdf)).
* **Regional powers now read Gaza through their own security-and-economy lens.** Riyadh, fresh from mending fences with Tehran, sees an opportunity to lock in its detente by underwriting a Gaza stabilisation force and shielding its Vision-2030 investment climate from Red-Sea turbulence ([fairobserver.com](https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/saudi-arabia-pushes-regional-diplomacy-after-iran-and-israel-clash/), [The World Bank](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/8bf0b62ec6bcb886d97295ad930059e9-0050012025/original/GEP-June-2025.pdf)). The UAE and Egypt share that calculus, while the EU frets that Suez disruptions could add yet another energy-price spike ([The Week](https://theweek.com/business/economy/why-the-worlds-busiest-shipping-routes-are-under-threat)).
* **Israel confronts a mounting cost curve.** Every extra six-month campaign extension knocks **0.5 percentage-points off its growth**, according to Bank-of-Israel models, and pushes the defence bill toward 9 % of GDP ([g7.canada.ca](https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/g7-leaders-statement-on-recent-developments-between-israel-and-iran/)). That budget squeeze makes international reconstruction and security guarantees far more attractive than indefinite self-funded operations.
* **Hamas faces dwindling leverage.** Internal polling and Wall Street Journal interviews confirm commanders know they cannot win militarily and instead “bank on international pressure” to convert suffering into concessions—an approach that loses potency once a verified ceasefire neutralises civilian casualties as a propaganda accelerant .

**Diplomatic leverage**

Because each additional week of violence now **raises domestic insecurities, dents global growth prospects and threatens new maritime choke-points**, outside actors finally have a convergent interest in **bundling Gaza calm into a broader regional de-escalation deal**:

* For Israel: a credible ceasefire plus robust arms-interdiction **frees resources for the northern front** and unlocks Gulf/EU reconstruction money.
* For Hamas (and its patrons): political survival and relief from blockade come **only by accepting disarmament terms inside a multilateral framework**, not by holding out for an unachievable battlefield victory.
* For the wider world: stabilising Gaza removes a dangerous accelerant of hate crime, shipping disruption and economic uncertainty at a moment when global growth is already projected to be the weakest of any decade since the 1960s ([The World Bank](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/10/global-economic-prospects-june-2025-press-release)).

In short, the conflict’s transformation from a “local war” into a **global economic-security liability** expands the coalition of states prepared to lean—politically, financially, even militarily—on the parties for a deal. **That collective weight is the diplomatic lever the Memorandum urges to seize *now*, before spiralling polarisation and supply-chain shocks raise the price of peace for everyone.**

### **Residual tensions**

* **Mirror-opposite master narratives:** Israeli discourse frames 7 Oct as a “war on terror” and cites self-defence in international law, while Palestinian and Global-South commentators cast the same events as anti-colonial resistance.
* **Existential dread on both sides:** 81% of Israeli Jews “expressed fear of a repeat of the October 7 attack originating from the West Bank” ([jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-853692), [jcpa.org](https://jcpa.org/poll-68-of-israeli-jews-concerned-over-possible-attack-by-west-bank-palestinians/)). Hamas leaders say blockade and starvation prove a “war of annihilation” and reject talks unless the siege ends ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-exiled-gaza-chief-says-ceasefire-talks-meaningless-under-blockade-2025-07-27)).
  + Worth noting: A survey by Israeli President Isaac Herzog's "Voice of the People" initiative (reported by [The Media Line](https://themedialine.org/top-stories/antisemitism-tops-global-concerns-for-jews-survey-finds/), citing the "2025 Jewish Landscape Report") found that 81% of baby boomers and 82% of the Silent Generation (older age groups of Jews globally) expressed the greatest concern about rising antisemitism and feared "history may be repeating itself."
* **Negligible institutional trust:** PCPSR polling shows the majority (88%) of Palestinians believe the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistent. “Among Israeli Jews a large majority of 72 percent believe the chances are low or very low – surprisingly, this is 16 points lower than 2020.“ ([jcpa.org](https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Summary%20Report_%20English_Joint%20Poll%2012%20Sept%202024.pdf), p12); Only **10% of Israeli Jews** and **6% of Palestinians** agree that it is possible to trust the other side([jcpa.org](https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Summary%20Report_%20English_Joint%20Poll%2012%20Sept%202024.pdf), p44).
* **Annexation vs. permanence of siege:** Israeli ministers float annexing the Netzarim/Philadelphi corridors to coerce Hamas ([timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-said-to-warn-hamas-it-will-annex-parts-of-gaza-if-no-hostage-deal-reached), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/canada-plans-recognize-palestinian-state-raising-allies-pressure-israel-2025-07-31/)); Palestinians cite this as proof of a stealth, permanent occupation ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-settler-pressure-west-bank-villages-stirs-annexation-fears-2025-03-05)).
* **Legal-accountability anxieties:** ICC arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant raise fears in Jerusalem of “international isolation,” while Hamas commanders worry the same docket could delegitimise them ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/legal-threats-close-israels-netanyahu-could-impact-ongoing-wars-2024-11-24), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-issues-warrant-arrest-mohammed-diab-ibrahim), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state), [ibanet.org](https://www.ibanet.org/Uncharted-territory:-Israel,-Hamas-and-the-International-Criminal-Court)).
* **Regional overlay:** Israeli security elites now describe Gaza as “only one front in the Iran-Hezbollah axis” ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-gaza-war-86a119f3)); WSJ notes Tehran’s proxies weigh escalation costs but keep the option alive ([wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/axis-of-resistance-iran-israel-strategy-103e6226)).
* **Global-opinion weaponisation:** Hamas publicly banks on “hostages and world opinion” to pressure Israel; Western unfavourability toward Israel hits 53 % in the U.S., a record high ([Pew Research Center](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/04/08/how-americans-view-israel-and-the-israel-hamas-war-at-the-start-of-trumps-second-term)), while antisemitism and Islamophobia spike worldwide ([institute.aljazeera.net](https://institute.aljazeera.net/en/ajr/article/3081)).
* **Human-security spiral:** Gaza’s blockade deepens famine risk—60 k children projected to need acute malnutrition treatment ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/millions-children-food-crises-heightened-risk-lifelong-damage-2025-01-31)) —fueling Palestinian conviction that only international guarantees, not Israeli pledges, can protect civilians.
* **Historical-struggle lens:** Reuters “75 years of woe” explainer frames Gaza as the latest chapter of an eight-decade liberation quest ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/brief-history-gazas-75-years-woe-2023-10-10/)), reinforcing Palestinian insistence that short truces are meaningless without an irreversible political horizon.

**Security–freedom trade‑off remains the only stable equilibrium.** The roadmap ties *calm for Israel* to *opening for Gaza*: hostage releases plus verifiable demilitarisation unlock aid corridors, reconstruction funds and a political horizon, all under a UN‑mandated enforcement & snapback regime.

These data depict societies exhausted by violence yet wary of recycled slogans; the moment resembles what conflict‑resolution scholars call a **“mutually hurting stalemate.”** Both populations are absorbing mounting costs with no credible path to outright victory.

**Negotiating implication**

Because **complete victory** is off the table and poll majorities prefer peace *if credible*, the mediator’s task is to engineer a package where:

1. **Hamas trades weapons for political relevance**;
2. **Israel swaps annexation ideas for enforceable quiet**; and
3. **International guarantors** lock both into a snap‑forward / snapback schedule that rewards cooperation and penalises defection.

**Conclusion of Positions:** The negotiating space is tricky but discernible. Israel will not ceasefire without hostages and assurance Hamas is neutralized; Palestinians (including Hamas) will not accept a ceasefire that leaves the siege or occupation untouched and simply disarms them without political gain. Therefore, the *only viable deal* is one that ties **security for Israel** to **freedom for Palestinians**. This means: Hamas gives up its capacity for armed aggression (either by agreement or by force of a united international front), and in exchange Israel (and Egypt) lift the yoke around Gaza’s neck and allow a new political chapter for Palestinians. All with international guarantees. The roadmap’s design is precisely to satisfy those core positions simultaneously: Israel gets *calm and the end of Hamas as a military threat*, Palestinians get *an open Gaza and trajectory to statehood*.

# **Public Opinion and Civil Society Perspectives**

Given the extensive analytical data presented earlier in “Demands and Core Positions of the Parties” section, this section distills those insights into a clear narrative framework designed explicitly to guide negotiators toward a unified peace plan.

## **Israeli Public Will**

In Israel, an overarching sentiment of fatigue and a profound desire for stability now clearly outweighs earlier wartime fervor. Israeli society, traditionally diverse and often divided, is currently united around a simple but powerful message: continued military escalation offers diminishing returns, both economically and socially. Across various sectors, including influential reservists, families of hostages, and broad-based civil initiatives, there is an unprecedented alignment advocating for negotiated solutions. The powerful voice emerging from within Israel underscores that the population no longer seeks abstract victories or symbolic gains; rather, it seeks tangible security, the immediate return of hostages, and a sustainable peace. Negotiators must recognize that the Israeli public has reached an inflection point—preferring pragmatic peace anchored in enforceable quiet over ideological maximalism. This consensus gives political leaders the domestic backing needed to compromise responsibly, provided the resultant calm is credible, verifiable, and enduring.  
  
**August protests.**

Over the first half of August, Israel saw its broadest anti-war mobilization since October 2023: a nationwide strike and mass demonstrations on August 17 blocked major arteries (Ayalon, Begin), with police detaining dozens as hostage families and allied groups demanded a ceasefire-for-hostages deal and an end to the Gaza war. Attitudes toward Gaza’s humanitarian crisis remain polarized: an early-August IDI item found most Jewish Israelis say they are not personally troubled by reports of famine, while Arab Israelis report the opposite—an opinion gap relevant to domestic legitimacy and coalition tactics. This grounds the political moment in which Hamas publicly accepted a U.S.-backed 60-day ceasefire proposal (Aug 18) and Israel confirmed it is studying the reply (Aug 19): the street pressure and opinion data together increase the payoff for Jerusalem to conclude a time-bound truce-for-hostages package while managing hard-right veto players.

## **Palestinian Public Will (Gaza and Beyond)**

On the Palestinian side, the narrative echoes similarly compelling clarity. The devastating humanitarian and economic toll in Gaza has reshaped public sentiment profoundly, galvanizing citizens toward pragmatic aspirations—freedom of movement, economic opportunity, and genuine political participation. While deep grievances and mistrust remain, significant segments of Palestinian society, including voices within Gaza itself, clearly indicate openness toward a new path forward, provided it guarantees real and immediate improvements in daily life. Civil society initiatives and street-level expressions, such as grassroots demonstrations explicitly calling for change, strongly signal that Palestinians are seeking a political horizon free from siege and cyclical violence. Importantly, the previously dominant discourse of resistance at all costs is gradually giving way to a pragmatic willingness to consider disarmament and governance arrangements, if matched by credible international guarantees and meaningful political concessions.

## **A Unified Peace Negotiation Narrative**

Negotiators now confront a historically rare alignment: both Israeli and Palestinian populations, weary of prolonged conflict and steep human costs, offer their leadership a unique window of legitimacy to pursue compromise-based peace. The essence of this opportunity lies in the clear mutual desire to exchange entrenched conflict narratives for mutual security, improved livelihoods, and political stability. The international mediation strategy outlined in this roadmap leverages precisely this convergence—transforming the profound weariness of conflict into a concrete, achievable path toward sustained peace and regional stability.

## **Global Public Opinion and the Media/Propaganda War**

*This digest synthesises the extensive polling and media ecosystem analysis already embedded in the memo, translating it into a strategic lens for negotiators who must now counter the information volatility undermining global stability.*

### **Shifting World Sentiment**

Around the globe, sympathy curves are tilting rapidly. A spring 2025 Pew survey across 24 countries finds Israel viewed more negatively than positively in every region, including pluralities in key Asian and Latin American swing states ([pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/03/most-people-across-24-surveyed-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-netanyahu)). In the United States — historically Israel’s message anchor — approval of the Gaza campaign has slipped to a record‑low 32 % in Gallup’s July tracking ([news.gallup.com](https://news.gallup.com/poll/692948/u.s.-back-israel-military-action-gaza-new-low.aspx)). These numbers move in tandem with surging skepticism toward any actor perceived as prolonging conflict and fuelling civilian suffering. Left unmanaged, this sentiment gap risks hardening into an ideological divide that fractures emerging multipolar alignments.

### **The Information Battleground**

The opinion churn is intensified by an unprecedented volume of digital distortion. UNESCO’s **World Press Freedom Day 2025** signature event—*Reporting in the Brave New World: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Press Freedom and the Media*—highlights how AI‑driven disinformation, including synthetic audio and video, is becoming a rapidly escalating threat that amplifies hate speech, erodes public trust, and compromises journalist safety alongside ongoing physical dangers ([unesco.org](https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/world-press-freedom-day-2025-signature-event-reporting-brave-new-world-impact-artificial), [unesdoc.unesco.org](https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000393627), [sanef.org.za](https://sanef.org.za/world-press-freedom-day-examines-the-impact-of-ai-in-journalism/), [unesco.org](https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/fostering-global-leadership-uphold-freedom-expression-age-artificial-intelligence)).

Both **UNESCO** and the **UN's International Telecommunication Union** (ITU) have raised significant alarms regarding AI-driven profound impact, highlighting its role in spreading misinformation, enabling surveillance, and threatening journalist safety, even as it serves as a central theme for discussions on the future of media. Separately, a July 2025 report from the ITU, unveiled at its **"AI for Good Summit"** explicitly called for the development of global watermarking standards. This initiative aims to combat the rapid proliferation of realistic AI-generated multimedia (like deepfakes) which poses mounting risks to information integrity and public trust, implicitly capable of quickly garnering millions of views in sensitive contexts, including conflict situations ([tech360.tv](https://www.tech360.tv/un-calls-stronger-global-standards-combat-ai-deepfakes), [indianexpress.com](https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/artificial-intelligence/un-report-urges-stronger-measures-to-detect-ai-driven-deepfakes-10121594/), [verdict.co.uk](https://www.verdict.co.uk/itu-stricter-controls-deepfakes/), [itu.int](https://www.itu.int/hub/publication/t-ai4g-ai4good-2024-7/)).

The EU's push to enforce the **Digital Services Act** illustrates how advanced democracies are scrambling to obligate platforms to **police foreign information manipulation**, as detailed by the European Parliament's agenda briefing on enforcing EU digital rules to protect democracy online ([europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/agenda/briefing/2025-01-20/1/enforcing-eu-digital-rules-to-protect-democracy-online)). Simultaneously, the **EEAS-Japan 2025 summit** explicitly placed **hybrid threats**, including narrative warfare, at the heart of its security agenda, as evidenced by the European Commission's statement on EU-Japan cooperation ([eeas.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_1890)). Furthermore, **Washington's sudden closure of its own Counter-Disinformation office** unequivocally underscores domestic backlash risks even within key NATO‑alliance hubs ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/us-state-department-closing-office-aimed-countering-foreign-disinformation-2025-04-16)).

### **A Narrow Strategic Window**

Paradoxically, the same networked connectivity that spreads outrage also reveals a shared, global fatigue with zero‑sum propaganda.

Effective communication often involves **acknowledging complexity** and **humanizing perspectives**, as research indicates these approaches can foster empathy and understanding among audiences ([ijoc.org](https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/23816), [researchgate.net](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370751075_Successful_Communication_of_Complex_Information), [researchgate.net](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320656557_The_Humanizing_Voice_Speech_Reveals_and_Text_Conceals_a_More_Thoughtful_Mind_in_the_Midst_of_Disagreement), [journals.sagepub.com](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10946705231190018)).

In game theory, transparent, repeated interactions reliably promote cooperation when benefits are framed as super-additive and reputations are on display. (for more context see: [atlantis-press.com](https://www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/icssed-22/125973776), [aeaweb.org](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/000282805775014434), [researchgate.net](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296847740_GAME_THEORY_2_REPETITION_AND_COOPERATION), [pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10901731/), [nature.com](https://www.nature.com/articles/s44271-025-00206-9), [mdpi.com](https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/12/12/335), [pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1560328/), [plos.org](https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007588)).

Taken together, these insights signal a fleeting but real opening: if regional actors can pivot from weaponised narrative to open‑source verification and inclusive messaging, they can anchor a new multipolar consensus supportive of a balanced end‑state.

### **Pathway to a Rules‑Based Future**

Seizing this moment requires codifying norms as well as winning the day‑to‑day media fight. The roadmap therefore endorses convening a Diplomatic Conference in Geneva to elaborate a **Fifth Geneva Convention on Hybrid and Information Warfare**, an idea long championed by the Unified State. Such an instrument would translate existing IHL protections into the digital domain, drawing on ICRC groundwork on cyber operations ([icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/cyber-and-information-operations)) and aligning with UNESCO’s media‑literacy action plan ([unesco.org](https://www.unesco.org/en/publication/action-plan-combatting-disinformation-and-misinformation-through-media-and-information-literacy-mil)). By placing data integrity and civilian digital safety under treaty‑level safeguards, negotiators convert today’s volatile narrative space into tomorrow’s cooperative security architecture — a global feedback loop where transparent dialogue crowds out hate and terror.

*For negotiators, the imperative is clear: move fast to lock in the shared desire for normalcy before propaganda‑driven polarisation calcifies, and make information security itself the cornerstone of the cease‑fire’s legitimacy.*

### **Gaza at the Crossroads – A Civilizational Pivot**

The threads woven through public‑opinion data, media‑war dynamics, and the proposed Fifth Geneva Convention all converge on one stark reality: **Gaza has become the epicentre of a global stress‑test for the twenty‑first‑century order.** The battle for truth in the infosphere and the battle for dignity on the ground are now inseparable; if either front collapses, the world risks cascading into an era of normalised impunity and weaponised narrative.

#### **Why Gaza Matters Beyond Gaza**

* **Symbolic gravity.** In every classroom, newsfeed, and diplomatic chamber, the siege of Gaza is shorthand for whether international law can still meaningfully constrain violence. If the cease‑fire roadmap fails, cynics everywhere will claim the rules are dead. If it holds, a new precedent for accountability and inclusion is born.
* **Information domino effect.** Deep‑fake footage of Gaza has already been recycled to stoke tensions from the Sahel to South‑East Asia. A verified, transparent peace process—streamed, audited, and archived—would flip that script, proving that facts can still outpace fiction.
* **Multipolar litmus test.** From Washington and Brussels to Beijing, Ankara, and Pretoria, major capitals acknowledge that the conflict’s after‑shocks now overlap with supply‑chain security, energy routes, and domestic polarisation. Coordinated de‑escalation in Gaza would signal that the emergent multipolar system is capable of collective responsibility, not just competitive power projection.

#### **A One‑Shot Window for Unified Action**

The overlap in Israeli–Palestinian public fatigue gives mediators a fleeting mandate to transform **war‑weariness into cooperative architecture**. Yet opinion can sour as quickly as viral lies spread. Every week without visible progress fuels extremist recruiting pipelines and disinformation campaigns that thrive on hopelessness.

To prevent that slide, the roadmap anchors **three mutually reinforcing pillars**:

1. **Immediate humanitarian relief** under a biometric aid‑tracking platform—demonstrating to every smartphone owner that integrity can trump diversion.
2. **Phased political horizon**—linking verifiable disarmament to incremental freedoms, so each side sees concrete dividends before spoilers can rewrite the narrative.
3. **Digital cease‑fire monitoring**—a publicly accessible “traffic‑light” dashboard pooling satellite, social‑media, and on‑ground sensors to expose violations in real time, pre‑empting propaganda loops.

#### **From Crossroads to Keystone**

If implemented, Gaza’s transition from open‑air battlefield to **prototype of rules‑based restoration** will ripple outward. It will validate multilateral game‑theory logic—showing that transparent, iterative cooperation yields super‑additive returns—while undercutting the economic logic of perpetual war. In that sense, Gaza is not merely a humanitarian imperative; it is the lever through which the international community can pivot from a brittle zero‑sum order to a resilient, feedback‑driven equilibrium.

Negotiators therefore carry more than regional hopes; they hold a civilizational hinge. **Missing this moment risks normalising both kinetic and information warfare as default tools of statecraft. Seizing it offers a legacy wherein the very technologies once used to divide become instruments of shared security and collective dignity.**

## **Role of Civil Society & Track** 2 **Initiatives**

Amid the polarized climate, there were also remarkable instances of cross-community solidarity: Israeli and Palestinian doctors coordinating care for injured Gazans via telemedicine, Jewish and Arab Americans together calling for ceasefire, international humanitarian workers risking their lives to deliver aid impartially. These efforts, though overshadowed by louder voices of hate, form the backbone of a future reconciliation infrastructure. For example, *“Parents Circle”* – a group of bereaved Israeli and Palestinian families – continued to meet and speak out even during the war, urging that “there must be another way” than endless revenge ([theparentscircle.org](https://www.theparentscircle.org/)). Such voices, once hostilities cease, can be amplified as ambassadors of reconciliation.

Women’s groups are especially crucial; in many conflicts, women have brokered community truces and advocated for peace across enemy lines. In Gaza and Israel, women (mothers, widows) can form a dialogue platform focusing on shared concerns like children’s wellbeing and ending cycles of violence.

Similarly, youth exchanges and trauma healing programs will be needed to undo the demonization fueled by war propaganda. The plan should thus allocate funding and space for **civil society peacebuilding** – e.g. joint workshops on trauma, interfaith dialogues, collaborative media ventures that produce factual, humanized narratives instead of propaganda. Over time, these bottom-up efforts will reinforce the top-down political agreements and help prevent relapse into hatred.

**In summary**, *public opinion globally is deeply polarized yet increasingly united on one point: the status quo is unacceptable.* Whether coming from anger at injustice or fatigue of war, people around the world are calling for a fundamentally new approach. While extremists’ narratives are loud, the silent majority of civilians simply want to live in peace and are open to reasonable compromise if it truly addresses their needs. Harnessing that majority’s voice is key – through inclusive communications and empowering civil society – to give political leaders the mandate and courage to follow through on this peace roadmap.

# **Positions of Key International Stakeholders**

The Gaza war has become a global stress-test of a fragmenting international order. Durable de-escalation cannot be midwifed by a single bloc; it requires a coalition that bridges Washington and Brussels, Moscow and Beijing, key Arab and Muslim capitals, and pivotal Global-South actors. In a world of “multipolarization”—more centers of power and more incompatible visions—the only credible pathway is one that aligns interests across rivals and codes enforcement in ways all sides accept. This section therefore treats stakeholder mapping as strategy: an evidence-based inventory of each actor’s interests, red lines, leverage, and potential contributions to a shared enforcement architecture.

Events underscore why this inclusive frame is not academic but urgent. The core mediators—Egypt and Qatar, with the United States—remain indispensable, even as talks lurch between stalls and restarts; today’s shuttle diplomacy to Doha and Cairo shows the channel is active and necessary. At the multilateral level, the UN General Assembly’s repeated calls for an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire,” and the International Court of Justice’s provisional measures, set a legal-normative floor that any deal must respect. Regionally, Saudi Arabia and others have tied normalization or broader regional integration to concrete progress on Gaza, making Arab and OIC roles central to any final package. This landscape demands a stakeholder chapter that is not a roll-call but a blueprint for orchestrating complementary roles.

What follows uses a single focal lens to transform polarization into an operational map: it synthesizes positions and public statements, domestic politics and street pressures, and material levers (aid, security guarantees, sanctions relief, monitoring technology) into a “who-needs-what-to-sign” matrix. The aim is to make cooperation beat defection for every principal—i.e., a Nash-style equilibrium where third-party verification, snap-back clauses, and shared guardrails replace unilateral gambits and proxy risk. Read this section as an interface: it shows each stakeholder how a constructive move plugs into a larger, rules-bound design—scientific in method, diplomatic in practice, and grounded in humanitarian and spiritual imperatives to protect life. It is the on-ramp to an enforceable, multipolar ceasefire-to-peace roadmap built from the unified dataset assembled in this memorandum.

## **United States and NATO Allies**

This section assesses European actors **as military/security stakeholders**, focusing on force posture, security unrest coming from cognitive and propaganda warfare, intelligence-sharing and deterrence mechanisms.

### **United States**

The United States remains the indispensable power‑broker in any Gaza settlement: no other actor can deliver Israeli acquiescence to outside guarantees—or unlock sufficient reconstruction funds—without Washington’s imprint. NATO allies amplify that leverage with logistics, intelligence, and the political ballast of a broad Western consensus, even as intra‑alliance nuances shape the toolbox on offer.

**Strategic interests (Washington’s four‑point compass)**

1. **Alliance credibility and Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME).** In addition to the standing **$38 billion 2018‑28 MOU**, Congress has approved two wartime supplementals: a **$14.3 bn** Israel‑only bill passed by the House in Nov 2023 ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-house-passes-republicans-israel-aid-bill-faces-dead-end-senate-2023-11-02/)) and a **$95 bn** national‑security package signed in Apr 2024 that channels **$26 bn** to Israel, including $1 bn for Gaza humanitarian aid ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-house-vote-long-awaited-95-billion-ukraine-israel-aid-package-2024-04-20/)). The Pentagon has shipped **over 14 000 2,000‑lb bombs, 6 500 500‑lb bombs and 3 000 Hellfire missiles** since Oct 2023 ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-has-sent-israel-thousands-2000-pound-bombs-since-oct-7-2024-06-28)), while fast‑tracking **Iron Beam** laser testing on Israeli soil ([jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-855783)).
2. **Escalation control and force‑protection.** Iran‑aligned militias have launched **180+ rocket and drone attacks** on U.S. positions in Iraq, Syria **and Jordan** since October 2023 ([FDD](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/18/iran-backed-militias-attack-3-us-bases-in-syria/); [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attacks_on_US_bases_during_the_Gaza_war)). These strikes triggered a series of U.S. retaliatory raids on militia sites and IRGC logistics hubs.   
   The **USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* Carrier Strike Group** remained in‑theatre from Oct 2023 until mid‑Jul 2024 ([The Aviationist](https://theaviationist.com/2024/07/15/uss-eisenhower-returns/), [USNI](https://news.usni.org/2024/06/21/uss-dwight-d-eisenhower-leaving-red-sea-pacific-carrier-heading-to-the-middle-east)), before handing off to the **USS *Theodore Roosevelt*** in July 2024 ([Navy Times](https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2024/07/12/theodore-roosevelt-carrier-strike-group-operating-in-the-middle-east/)). The USS Theodore Roosevelt departed the Middle East in September 2024 ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2024/09/12/uss-theodore-roosevelt-leaves-middle-east-carrier-headed-home-after-8-months-deployed)), having for a period operated concurrently with the **USS Abraham Lincoln**, which arrived in the region in August 2024 and completed its deployment by December 2024 ([cpf.navy.mil](https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/4015286/abraham-lincoln-carrier-strike-group-returns-to-san-diego-after-3rd-5th-and-7th/)). Subsequently, the **USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group** deployed to the Middle East in September 2024, relieving the USS Abraham Lincoln, and returned home in June 2025 ([c2f.usff.navy.mil](https://www.c2f.usff.navy.mil/Press-Room/Press-Releases/Article/4203172/uss-harry-s-truman-strike-group-returns-from-8-month-deployment/)). As of June 2025, the **USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group** has deployed to the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, with potential to operate in the Middle East ([news.usni.org](https://news.usni.org/2025/06/24/uss-gerald-r-ford-deploys-from-norfolk-for-european-theater-uss-nimitz-now-in-middle-east)).   
   To reinforce regional air defence, **Patriot missile battalions were forward‑deployed to CENTCOM** areas of responsibility in Feb–Apr 2025 ([Stars & Stripes](https://www.stripes.com/theaters/middle_east/2025-04-11/us-moves-patriot-to-centcom-17439738.html)).
3. **Integrated Middle East vision & Iran containment.** Secretary Blinken’s **Jan 2025 “Toward the Promise of a More Integrated Middle East”** speech framed a Gaza cease‑fire as the gateway to Saudi‑Israeli normalisation and regional economic corridors ([2021-2025.state.gov](https://2021-2025.state.gov/office-of-the-spokesperson/releases/2025/01/secretary-antony-j-blinken-toward-the-promise-of-a-more-integrated-middle-east/)). The **Feb 2025 National Security Presidential Memorandum‑2** vows to deny Iran “all paths” to a nuclear weapon, ensuring Gaza diplomacy dovetails with Iran containment ([whitehouse.gov](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-2/)).  
    As of August 2025, the situation remains dynamic:
   1. **Iran's Nuclear Program:** Iran continues to enrich uranium to 60%, significantly beyond JCPOA limits, with its stockpile over 40 times permitted levels. The IAEA formally found Iran to be non-compliant with its nuclear safeguards obligations in June 2025 ([parliament.uk](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10284/), [news.un.org](https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164291)).
   2. **International Pressure:** The E3 (UK, France, Germany) reiterated in July 2025 their intent to trigger the JCPOA "snapback" mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran by the end of August 2025 if no progress is made on a nuclear deal ([understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-9-2025)).
   3. **Military Actions and Negotiations:** Following Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, the U.S. launched military strikes against Iranian nuclear sites on June 21-22, leading to an Iranian response and a subsequent ceasefire announced by President Trump on June 23, 2025. Indirect U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations have been ongoing but a recent round in Oman was canceled after the June strikes ([defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4222533/hegseth-caine-laud-success-of-us-strike-on-iran-nuke-sites/), [newsonair.gov.in](https://www.newsonair.gov.in/u-s-iran-nuclear-talks-cancelled-amid-escalating-tensions/)).
   4. **New Iranian Proposals:** In July 2025, former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proposed a regional nuclear body (Menara) involving shared enrichment facilities, though the U.S. continues to insist Iran halt domestic enrichment ([understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-1-2025), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/31/former-iranian-foreign-minister-proposes-regional-nuclear-pact)).
   5. **Gaza Diplomacy:** Gaza ceasefire talks remained largely stalled in April-May 2025, with a UN official reiterating calls for a ceasefire in July 2025 as humanitarian conditions worsen. The UN is preparing for a conference around the Israel-Palestine two-state solution, while some experts view the U.S. retreat from recent talks as a tactical effort to gain leverage ([un.org](https://www.un.org/en/un-official-reiterates-call-gaza-ceasefire-%E2%80%98nightmare-historic-proportions%E2%80%99-unfolds), [ptinews.com](https://www.ptinews.com/story/international/india-reiterates-support-at-un-for-two-state-solution-to-israel-palestinian-conflict/2775062)).
   6. **U.S. Strategic Outlook:** The U.S. generally views Iran's weakened strategic position in early 2025 as an opportunity to enhance regional stability, with overall U.S. policy focusing on avoiding prolonged military engagements and supporting regional partners.
4. **Radicalisation damper via a credible two‑state horizon.** Brookings warns that without a reformed PA governing Gaza, Hamas—or a successor—will regenerate ([brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-the-israel-gaza-war-changing-us-public-attitudes), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/gazas-day-after-reconstruction-and-governance-challenges/), [israelpolicyforum.org](https://israelpolicyforum.org/blueprint-for-reforming-the-palestinian-authority/)). NSC talking points echo that assessment, linking Gaza governance reform to wider regional integration ([State Dept. briefing](https://2021-2025.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-january-15-2025/), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47828/R47828.15.pdf), [un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sgsm22631.doc.htm)).

**Domestic headwinds**

* A **May 2025** poll conducted by the **Chicago Council on Global Affairs** and Ipsos found that **55%** of U.S. adults believe the United States should support Israel militarily until all the hostages taken by Hamas are returned. **Among Democrats, 43%** agreed with this position ([globalaffairs.org](http://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-grow-more-divided-us-support-israel)). Campus encampments at 40+ universities and the 2024 special‑election backlash in Michigan’s Arab‑American districts sharpen electoral calculus ahead of 2026 mid‑terms ([themarshallproject.org](https://www.themarshallproject.org/2024/04/30/campus-protests-gaza-arrests-prosecutors-elections), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/nov/09/democrats-lose-michigan-arab-american-voters), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/michigan-primary-uncommitted-dearborn-arab-muslim-05f6a1099c00fe75823f77aaadbacf25)).
* The proposed "**National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2026**" (H. Rept. 119-217), submitted by the House Committee on Appropriations in July 2025, details U.S. appropriations that will significantly impact funding and policy related to the humanitarian situation and reconstruction efforts in Gaza, potentially exacerbating domestic debate over the allocation of resources and the nature of U.S. engagement in the region. ([congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/committee-report/119th-congress/house-report/217/1)).
* Adding to this complexity, recent polls (as shown in [gallup.com](https://news.gallup.com/poll/692948/u.s.-back-israel-military-action-gaza-new-low.aspx#:~:text=Politics-,Politics,July%2029%2C%202025)) indicate a significant decline in overall U.S. public approval for Israel's military action in Gaza, with only about **one-third** of Americans now approving, **a notable drop** from the beginning of the conflict. This growing public dissatisfaction, particularly among Democrats and younger adults, is fueling ongoing and widespread pro-Palestinian protests across major U.S. cities, including recent demonstrations at the offices of prominent political figures, further increasing pressure on policymakers to re-evaluate U.S. positions and aid to Israel ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/01/pro-palestine-protest-chuck-schumer#:~:text=Jeenah%20Moon%2FReuters-,Pro%2DPalestinian%20demonstrators%20gather%20at%20the%20office%20of%20Chuck%20Schumer,New%20York))

**Role in the roadmap**

* **Security shield:** U.S. guarantees would underwrite Israel’s acceptance of an international force around Gaza’s perimeter and port. Washington would pledge rapid‑response air‑support if Hamas breaches the arms‑draw‑down schedule.
* **Conditional lever:** The same supplemental funds empower Treasury to pause JDAM or fuel shipments should Israel renege on opening crossings or freezing settlement expansion.

### **NATO allies**

***Scope.*** *This subsection treats* ***NATO*** *as the operational arm (airlift, ISR, maritime, logistics) relevant to ceasefire verification and peace-support. The* ***EU overview****—distinct but overlapping with NATO—is handled elsewhere; we avoid duplication here.*

Although NATO as an organisation does not hold an explicit Gaza mandate, the capabilities provided by its European members—interoperable Command and Control (C2), maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), strategic airlift, and rapid-response logistics—are indispensable to any credible ceasefire enforcement. Without these European-sourced high-end enablers, the alliance simply cannot execute an effective mission. Politically, unified European stances signal clearly to Global-South swing states whether any resulting agreement constitutes a genuinely rules-based settlement rather than a Western-managed armistice. Furthermore, widespread domestic pressures stemming from war fatigue and significant grassroots mobilisation across major NATO capitals, from London and Paris to Berlin and Rome, underscore that European governments must respond convincingly to demands for humanitarian accountability and tangible conflict de-escalation. Recognising and explicitly addressing these dynamics will be critical to securing domestic legitimacy and sustaining international diplomatic credibility.

**Recent polling indicates significant and lasting public demand for de-escalation.**

For instance:

* **58%** of respondents support ending UK arms sales to Israel for the duration of the Gaza conflict [(](https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/survey-results/daily/2024/04/04/8aa72/1)[yougov.co.uk](http://yougov.co.uk), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/03/majority-of-voters-in-uk-back-banning-arm-sales-to-israel-poll-finds)).
* **55%** of UK adults favour both an immediate ceasefire **and** suspending arms exports; **73%** back an immediate ceasefire alone [(map.org.uk](https://www.map.org.uk/news/archive/post/1585-new-poll-shows-sustained-british-public-support-for-immediate-ceasefire-in-gaza-and-the-suspension-of-uk-arms-sales-to-israel)).
* Net favourability toward Israel hits record lows: UK –46, France –48, Germany –44 ([yougov.co.uk](https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/52279-net-favourability-towards-israel-reaches-new-lows-in-key-western-european-countries)).
* **55%** oppose supplying F-35 parts to Israel while the war continues ([savethechildren.org.uk](https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/news/media-centre/press-releases/2025/majority-uk-public-oppose-supplying-parts-f-35-fighter-jets), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/03/public-support-for-israel-in-western-europe-lowest-ever-recorded-yougov)).
* **54 % of Dutch voters now say The Hague should take a more critical stance toward Israel—up from 47 % six months earlier (**[ipsos-publiek.nl](https://www.ipsos-publiek.nl/actueel/nederlanders-kritischer-over-opstelling-kabinet-inzake-israel-gaza/), [dutchnews.nl](https://www.dutchnews.nl/2025/04/support-for-dutch-cabinets-israel-policy-is-falling-survey), [nltimes.nl](https://nltimes.nl/2025/04/22/voters-increasingly-dissatisfied-dutch-governments-israel-policy)).
* **92 % of Italians favour ending arms exports to Israel if humanitarian law is breached; 89 % would suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and Italy’s net favourability toward Israel has sunk to –52** ([eko.org](https://www.eko.org/media/eu-israel-germans-and-italians-overwhelmingly-back-ending-arms-sales-and-suspending-eu-israel-trade-deal/), [thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/europe/2025/06/20/germans-and-italians-want-arms-ban-on-israel-poll-shows/), [yougov.co.uk](https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/52279-net-favourability-towards-israel-reaches-new-lows-in-key-western-european-countries)).

### **July 2025 grass-roots & public-opinion pulse**

Across NATO capitals, July 2025 was marked by a visible escalation of pro-Palestinian grassroots activism. Large, largely peaceful demonstrations in the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands converged on a common call for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and tougher diplomatic leverage on Israel, while public-opinion polls and parliamentary debates began to mirror this civic pressure.

Grass-roots activism across key NATO members intensified in July 2025, with coordinated actions demanding a Gaza ceasefire and stronger diplomatic pressure on Israel. In the United Kingdom, “tens of thousands” marched through Westminster on 29 July and 55 people were detained under the Terrorism Act after the government’s proscription of Palestine Action ([Anadolu Ajansı](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/-our-spirits-fly-higher-than-f-35s-londoners-rally-again-for-palestine/3636091)); a Downing Street rally on 25 July likewise urged official recognition of a Palestinian state ([Al Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/25/uks-starmer-faces-mounting-pressure-to-recognise-palestinian-state)), and campaigners have since won High-Court leave to challenge the ban ([Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestine-action-wins-bid-challenge-uk-ban-under-anti-terrorism-laws-2025-07-30/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/london-police-arrest-more-than-40-supporters-banned-pro-palestinian-group-2025-07-12/)). In France, “thousands” filled central Paris on 31 July ([thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/video/oI0Tz2uW/thousands-march-in-paris-against-war-in-gaza/)) even after police had raided a pro-Palestine conference on 23 July ([cage.ngo](https://www.cage.ngo/articles/french-police-raid-and-fail-to-stop-pro-palestine-conference)), and President Macron pledged that France will recognise Palestine at the UN General Assembly in September ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/france-recognize-palestine-state-macron-800ed63143f0653a7f215ad96f7038d3), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/recognizing-palestine-would-deepen-french-muslim-jewish-rift/a-73493636), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-862701), [un.org](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2025-07-28/secretary-generals-remarks-the-wrap-session-of-the-high-level-international-conference-for-the-peaceful-settlement-of-the-question-of-palestine-and-the-implementation), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/un-palestinians-israel-twostate-solution-afd1fff5eb30062bbc6137643310f2b3)). A late-July Forsa survey showed 74 % of Germans favouring a tougher stance toward Israel’s campaign in Gaza ([Anadolu Ajansı](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/over-70-of-germans-urge-tougher-stance-on-israel-poll-says/3645151)), while Berlin demonstrations earlier in the season saw over 50 arrests ([DW](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-dozens-injured-at-berlin-pro-palestinian-protest/a-72568069)). Southern Europe registered similar momentum: Rome’s 7 June march drew up to 300 000 participants under a “Stop the massacre, stop complicity!” banner ([Arab News](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2603777/world)), and Madrid activists rallied outside the Health Ministry on 29 July to decry governmental “inaction” ([reutersconnect.com](https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/world-news-july-29-2025/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjU6bmV3c21sX01UMVpVTUEwMDBPU0VSUVg)). In the Netherlands, simultaneous sit-ins at more than a dozen train stations on 25 July attracted several thousand people and spilled into city-centre marches urging sanctions and an arms embargo ([DutchNews.nl](https://www.dutchnews.nl/2025/07/thousands-join-sit-ins-at-dutch-train-stations-in-gaza-protests/)). These mobilisations unfolded as EU members reiterated support for a two-state solution during UN consultations on 28 July ([EEAS](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-security-council-situation-middle-east-0_en)). Collectively, the breadth of participation—from commuter-station sit-ins to mass capital-city marches—signals sustained, pan-alliance pressure for policies that prioritise humanitarian relief and diplomatic settlement over continued military escalation.

While July’s rallies underscored a powerful humanitarian impulse, officials and community leaders across NATO capitals caution that unilateral recognition of Palestine could sharpen domestic tensions and diminish diplomatic leverage. In France, the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF) and the Grand Mosque of Paris both warned that President Macron’s plan could “drive the country’s two largest faith minorities further apart,” a fear echoed in a DW analysis and in Jewish-community commentary that reported a spike in inquiries about emigration to Israel ([dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/frances-jewish-and-muslim-groups-fear-the-move-to-recognize-a-palestinian-state-could-drive-them-even-further-apart/a-73493636), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-862969)). The backlash is already international: Israel has recalled or downgraded ambassadors after earlier recognitions and signalled it will do so again, while Washington publicly branded Paris’ move a “slap in the face” that could derail ceasefire diplomacy ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/israel-reprimand-irish-norwegian-spanish-envoys-over-palestine-move-2024-05-23), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-plan-recognise-palestinian-state-draws-fire-israel-us-2025-07-25), [politico.com](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/31/trump-palestinian-statehood-push-00487326)).

Security services are equally wary.

### United Kingdom – Domestic Security Clampdown & External Force Posture

*This subsection tracks the United Kingdom along the full security arc—from expanded counter-terror policing on its streets to the Royal Navy, RAF and intelligence assets that any Gaza ceasefire monitoring force would inevitably draw upon.*

#### UK unrest

Since the **Terrorism Act 2000 Order 2025** ([legislation.gov.uk](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2025/803/made), [cps.gov.uk](https://www.cps.gov.uk/crime-info/terrorism), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/three-groups-to-be-proscribed), [hansard.parliament.uk](https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2025-07-03/debates/68D819EC-99FA-4E11-B8B7-9B9370668F2D/Debate), [hansard.parliament.uk](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2025-07-02/debates/6C9338E8-E516-494A-81A2-B3FEF549DD48/PreventionAndSuppressionOfTerrorism)) came into force on 5 July 2025, police have repeatedly deployed Section 13 powers ([legislation.gov.uk](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11)) against pro-Palestinian demonstrations, arresting **29 people in central London on the first day of the ban** for placards referencing Palestine Action ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/jul/05/palestine-action-activists-arrested-london-gandhi-statue)); **more than 70 others nationwide on 13 July** during coordinated protests in London, Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool and Glasgow ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/07/13/more-than-70-arrested-at-uk-protests-in-support-of-banned-group-palestine-action_6743322_4.html), [wsws.org](https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2025/07/21/gyif-j21.html)); **55 in Westminster on 19 July**, with simultaneous **detentions of 17 in Bristol, 16 in Manchester and eight in Truro** that same weekend ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-police-arrest-55-parliament-rally-banned-palestine-action-group-2025-07-19/), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/jul/19/palestine-action-protests-uk-london-arrests?utm_source=chatgpt.com), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/19/protests-across-uk-supporting-banned-group-palestine-action-despite-arrests), [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20rvdexj8jo.amp), [standard.co.uk](https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/london-metropolitan-police-truro-bristol-edinburgh-b1239046.html)); and **four in Liverpool on 20 July** for simply displaying supportive signs ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/21/four-arrested-under-terrorism-act-during-liverpool-pro-palestine-protest)). A Metropolitan Police warning on 17 July had already stated that anyone “expressing support for Palestine Action will likely be arrested” signalling the expanded remit conferred by the July order ([news.met.police.uk](https://news.met.police.uk/news/met-reiterates-warning-on-support-for-proscribed-organisations-ahead-of-saturday-protests-499476)), while UN special rapporteurs later condemned the tactic as a misuse of counter-terrorism law ([ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/uk-palestine-action-ban-disturbing-misuse-uk-counter-terrorism-legislation)). By 30 July, court filings and press tallies put the cumulative figure at **“over 200” arrests** linked to the proscription, illustrating how counter-terror legislation reshaped protest policing within its first month of operation ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/jul/30/palestine-action-co-founder-wins-permission-to-challenge-ban), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/uk-police-have-arrested-more-than-100-people-at-pro-palestine-demonstrations-since-palestine-action-ban/3636081), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/london-police-arrest-more-than-40-supporters-banned-pro-palestinian-group-2025-07-12/)).

This happens amid what the Community Security Trust records as a 204 % year-on-year surge to 5 583 antisemitic incidents since October 2024 ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2025/jan/27/rise-in-antisemitic-abuse-means-uk-jews-more-likely-to-consider-move-to-israel-experts-say), [standard.co.uk](https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/bbc-community-security-trust-london-whitehall-metropolitan-police-b1205612.html), [SkyNews](https://news.sky.com/story/police-arrest-more-than-20-protesters-supporting-palestine-action-after-group-designated-as-terrorist-organisation-13392763)).

#### UK External-force footprint

While domestic policing dominates headlines, Britain is simultaneously one of the very few European states with ready, theatre-proximate assets that could underwrite a Gaza ceasefire:

* RAF **Akrotiri** in Cyprus is the hub for UK (and allied) aid-drop sorties into Gaza and hosts the leased surveillance jet that has been mapping tunnels, militant infrastructure and potential hostage sites ([raf.mod.uk](https://www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/stations/raf-akrotiri), [raf.mod.uk](https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/uk-participates-in-largest-international-aid-drop-into-gaza1), [thetimes.co.uk](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/gaza-spying-us-news-lp90mz062), [thetimes.com](https://www.thetimes.com/uk/defence/article/raf-flights-gaza-news-0sdmvvz70), [rlcconnect.com](https://rlcconnect.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/20240711-Operation-UNDERHILL_Cpl-Conroy_47_Air_Dispatch_RLC.pdf), [aoav.org.uk](https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/The-UK-Royal-Air-Forces-surveillance-flights-over-the-Occupied-Palestinian-Territory-examined.pdf), [raf.mod.uk](https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/a-look-back-on-2024), [uk.news.yahoo.com](https://uk.news.yahoo.com/uk-government-continues-share-gaza-151810485.html), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-863362)).
* A **Littoral Response Group** led by **RFA Lyme Bay** and **RFA Argus** deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean days after 7 October to deter escalation and later delivered >300 pallets of UK and Cypriot aid into Port Said ([lbc.co.uk](https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/uk-warships-royal-navy-israel), [royalnavy.mod.uk](https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2024/january/02/240102-rfa-lyme-bay-humanitarian-aid), [navalnews.com](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/10/royal-navy-deploys-response-group-to-eastern-mediterranean), [defensenews.com](https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2023/10/13/britain-sends-spy-planes-ships-to-mediterranean-amid-israel-hamas-war), [royalnavy.mod.uk](https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2024/january/02/240102-rfa-lyme-bay-humanitarian-aid), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/first-uk-maritime-shipment-of-lifesaving-aid-for-gaza-arrives-in-egypt), [maritime-executive.com](https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/royal-navy-delivers-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza), [army.mod.uk](https://www.army.mod.uk/news/soldiers-deliver-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza-1), [fleetairarmoa.com](https://fleetairarmoa.com/rfa-lyme-bay-delivers-tonnes-of-humanitarian-aid-for-gaza), [forcesnews.com](https://www.forcesnews.com/services/navy/rfa-ships-arrive-india-breaking-radio-silence-after-gaza-humanitarian-aid-mission)).
* Royal Navy support ship **RFA Cardigan Bay** helped assemble the US-built floating pier that now ferries relief trucks from Cyprus to Gaza’s shore [(](https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2024/april/26/20240426-cardigan-bay-gaza-aid-tasking?utm_source=chatgpt.com)[royalnavy.mod.uk](https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2024/april/26/20240426-cardigan-bay-gaza-aid-tasking), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/royal-navy-ship-joins-international-effort-to-build-pier-for-aid-delivery-into-gaza-by-sea), [janes.com](https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/sea/royal-navy-landing-ship-rfa-cardigan-bay-to-support-international-effort-to-build-gaza-pier), [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3756746/senior-officials-hold-a-background-briefing), [navylookout.com](https://www.navylookout.com/the-situation-in-the-middle-east-a-royal-navy-perspective), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-aid-en-route-to-temporary-pier-off-gaza), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-establishes-gaza-pier-try-boost-aid-hungry-enclave-2024-05-16), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/gaza-humanitarian-aid-pier-israel-us-7fd8cf63c60e4155479e761f3c79914d), [pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/the-u-s-is-building-a-pier-off-gaza-to-bring-in-humanitarian-aid-heres-how-it-would-work), [royalnavy.mod.uk](https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2024/september/10/240910-cardigan-bay-returns)).
* RAF Atlas and A400M crews have airdropped **>110 t of aid over 11 sorties** from Jordan since March 2024([gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-forces-airdrop-100-tonnes-of-aid-for-gaza-civilians), [ukdefencejournal.org.uk](https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-aircraft-drop-over-100-tonnes-of-aid-into-gaza), [forcesnews.com](https://www.forcesnews.com/services/raf/royal-air-force-completes-11th-gaza-airdrop-delivering-110-tonnes-vital-aid), [forcesnews.com](https://www.forcesnews.com/services/raf/how-rafs-largest-aid-drop-kept-west-berlin-sustained-using-air-power-alone)).
* HMS **Diamond** and other RN assets contribute to **Operation Prosperity Guardian**, the Red-Sea escort mission that secures the Suez-to-Cyprus aid corridor [(](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Prosperity_Guardian?utm_source=chatgpt.com)[royalnavy.mod.uk](https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2023/december/19/20231219-diamond-red-sea-task-force), [navylookout.com](https://www.navylookout.com/royal-navy-reveals-more-details-of-hms-diamonds-epic-deployment-in-the-red-sea), [royalnavy.mod.uk](https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news/2024/march/13/240313-richmond-completes-red-sea-mission-as-diamond-resumes-patrols), [gcaptain.com](https://gcaptain.com/hms-diamond-returns-to-operation-prosperity-guardian-in-red-sea)).

**Relevance to enforcement.** Those air-lift, sealift and ISR capabilities could pivot from unilateral UK operations to a UN-or multipolar-mandated ceasefire Monitoring Force within days—precisely the kind of quick-reaction backbone many EU members lack. Thus, London’s domestic invocation of Terrorism-Act powers and its forward-deployed hard-power toolkit are best read together: both illustrate how the UK’s security doctrine—home and abroad—will shape compliance and restraint once the guns fall silent.

***Taken together, the polling, protests and legal shifts create a domestic constraint that mission planners must treat as seriously as any logistics shortfall.***

### **Why this matters for the NATO-EU enforcement calculus**

A ceasefire mission can no longer be planned as a purely external operation. Mass protests, high-profile court challenges and widening information warfare have turned Gaza policy into a *domestic* stress-test for every major ally. Public majorities now demand humanitarian leverage, police are stretching counter-terror powers to contain demonstrations, hate-crime figures are rising and disinformation actors are amplifying every mis-step. Unless these currents are absorbed into strategy, parliaments may block deployments, bases may face disruption and alliance unity could fracture. Handled skilfully, however, the same civic energy can be channelled through transparent red-lines, deliberative citizen panels and joint fact-checking—turning a source of instability into a pressure-valve that nudges all parties toward an enforceable political settlement.

**Why this matters - key take-aways for planners and diplomats**

* **Domestic legitimacy is now a hard constraint.** Polls across the UK and Germany show clear pluralities calling for tougher humanitarian conditions on Israel, and these views are filtering into parliamentary debates and party platforms [(](https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/52694-british-attitudes-to-the-israel-gaza-conflict-july-2025-update?utm_source=chatgpt.com)[yougov.co.uk](https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/52694-british-attitudes-to-the-israel-gaza-conflict-july-2025-update), [Anadolu Ajansı](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/over-70-of-germans-urge-tougher-stance-on-israel-poll-says/3645151)).
* **Civil-liberties tension complicates force protection.** The UK’s July proscription of *Palestine Action* under the Terrorism Act triggered a rolling wave of arrests and UN criticism, illustrating how protest policing can become a global story overnight ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jul/25/uk-ban-palestine-action-odds-international-law-un-rights-volker-turk), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2607851/world), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/un-experts-urge-united-kingdom-not-misuse-terrorism-laws-against-protest), [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn0qn8vz00no), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/30/uk-court-rules-palestine-action-may-challenge-antiterrorism-ban)).
* **Alliance diplomacy is already being recalibrated.** EU leaders have tied any stabilisation mandate to a credible two-state pathway, while the Franco-Saudi declaration at the UN frames that pathway as “time-bound and irreversible,” signalling that field commanders will operate under intense political scrutiny ([consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/26/european-council-conclusions-on-the-middle-east/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-france-seek-support-declaration-two-state-solution-between-israel-2025-07-29/)).
* **Social cohesion risks raise the cost of inaction.** Community-security groups report sharp rises in antisemitic abuse and parallel spikes in Islamophobia, reinforcing the need for a security-*and*-dialogue approach rather than policing alone ([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2025/jan/27/rise-in-antisemitic-abuse-means-uk-jews-more-likely-to-consider-move-to-israel-experts-say), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/complaints-of-anti-muslim-anti-arab-incidents-in-us-jumped-7-4-in-2024-report/), [met.police.uk](https://www.met.police.uk/foi-ai/metropolitan-police/disclosure-2024/august-2024/anti-semitic-islamophobic-hate-crimes-7october2023-30april2024/), [visionofhumanity.org](https://www.visionofhumanity.org/gaza-conflict-leads-to-rise-in-antisemitism-and-Islamophobia/), [parliament.uk](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CDP-2023-0238/CDP-2023-0238.pdf), [parliament.uk](https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2024-02-19/debates/788C5AA8-47E6-4D42-916C-E569D0B260A5/AntisemitismInTheUK), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2025/feb/19/uk-islamophobic-assaults-surged-by-73-in-2024-anti-hate-charity-reports), [researchgate.net](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393557577_Community_Conversations_as_a_Strategy_to_Prevent_Hate_Crime_Facilitators'_Reflections), [columbia.edu](https://president.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Announcements/Report-2-Task-Force-on-Antisemitism.pdf), [harvard.edu](https://www.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/FINAL-Harvard-AMAAAPB-Report-4.29.25.pdf)).
* **The information space is weaponised—but also manageable.** Kremlin-linked outlets already conflate Gaza and Ukraine to erode Western solidarity, while the EU is invoking the Digital Services Act to compel platforms to down-rank false or extremist content ([euvsdisinfo.eu](https://euvsdisinfo.eu/never-let-a-crisis-go-to-waste), [politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/elon-musk-twitter-x-european-union-commissioner-thierry-breton-mark-zuckerberg-meta-facebook-deadline-address-hamas-isreal-war-illegal-content), [moderndiplomacy.eu](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/07/27/double-standard-between-russia-ukraine-and-israel-palestine-is-this-about-religion/), [open.bu.edu](https://open.bu.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/1ab8d917-2620-480b-ae1b-277bf0e03460/content), [szru.gov.ua](https://szru.gov.ua/en/news-media/news/the-kremlin-has-launched-a-largescale-information-operation-against-ukraine), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en), [digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-impact-platforms), [cogitatiopress.com](https://www.cogitatiopress.com/mediaandcommunication/article/view/9615), [mdpi.com](https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/14/1/28), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/7/25/meta-to-suspend-political-advertising-in-the-eu-as-transparency-law-looms)).

Because information flows now shape turnout, policing choices and perceptions of legitimacy, an allied ceasefire or stabilisation mission cannot succeed on military planning alone. Unchecked virality can turn a routine troop rotation into a flashpoint overnight; heavy-handed content removal can deepen the conviction that authorities “silence dissent,” while foreign disinformation keeps magnifying every mis-step. Skilled diplomacy therefore has to treat the information space as a co-theatre of operations: pre-bunking likely false claims, opening real-time fact-check channels with civil-society monitors, and publishing transparent red-lines on arms transfers and rules of engagement. Done well, the same networked activism that now unnerves planners can be recast as a feedback loop—providing early warning of abuses, reinforcing humanitarian norms and giving negotiators a domestically grounded mandate for a durable political settlement.

**Negotiations dividend:** By treating home-front sentiment as a planning variable—through real-time transparency on arms licences, rapid publication of arrest data, and EU-level citizen panels feeding into mission design—diplomats can convert protest momentum into a shared negotiating lever, bolstering both domestic consent and international credibility on the road to a lasting peace.

### **Strategic implications**

* **Dialogue deficit:** Protesters distrust “official” casualty figures or military assessments; governments distrust crowd-sourced headcounts. The result is a vacuum quickly filled by partisan or foreign-sourced content.
* **Policy whiplash:** Cabinet ministers keen to “stay ahead” of the street may over-promise symbolic moves (e.g., fast-tracked recognition) that alienate other voter blocs or key allies—exactly the split CRIF and Muslim councils warn about in France ([dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/recognizing-palestine-would-deepen-french-muslim-jewish-rift/a-73493636)).
* **Opportunity space:** The current gap can be channelled. EU Digital-Democracy pilots under the DSA already allow verified citizen panels to feed into Council working groups; widening that model to a Gaza monitoring mandate could give both grassroots and governments a seat at the table without surrendering operational discipline.

#### **A hard-headed, middle-way prescription**

1. **Transparent red-lines, jointly drafted.** Governments should publish clear criteria—legal and humanitarian—for any arms-export waivers or deployments, then invite civil-society review panels to audit compliance quarterly.
2. **Data-sharing protocols.** Civil-liberties monitors and police should co-publish anonymised arrest statistics (time, place, offence) within 48 hours; activists reciprocate by nominating stewards for liaison, lowering the arrest threshold triggered by uncertainty.
3. **Integrated info-ops cell.** A NATO StratCom-EUvsDisinfo (or similar) task-force should pre-bunk likely false narratives (e.g., “foreign troops to occupy Gaza”) before mobilisation days, using platform DSA channels and community radio alike.
4. **Iterative citizen panels.** Random-sample deliberative forums—already piloted on climate policy—can test support for ceasefire enforcement options and feed findings to parliaments, bridging the emotion-rationality divide.

There is **no quick fix**, but ignoring the home-front dynamics would be costlier still. A calibrated fusion of public scrutiny, professional analysis and rule-of-law policing can keep both emotions and strategy inside the same tent—exactly the equilibrium this memorandum argues is required to convert mass activism into durable, rules-based peace pressure.

*The July 2025 mobilisation thus reinforces European publics’ demand for a transparent, rights-centred ceasefire architecture—pressure that allied governments can neither ignore nor suppress without escalating domestic costs.*

## **Russia**

Russia’s posture in the Gaza war is a double-edged sword: Moscow alone maintains open channels to Hamas, Tehran, Damascus **and** Jerusalem, yet it has simultaneously wielded the conflict to undercut the West through disinformation and moral grand-standing. Harnessing the first quality while neutralising the second is therefore mission-critical.

Although Moscow has no formal Gaza mandate, it is the **only power** that still holds functional ties with every principal actor:

**Israel:** Roughly 1 – 1.3 million Russian-speaking Israelis (about 15 % of the population) sustain human, business and consular links that neither Washington nor Brussels can replicate ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/israels-el-al-airlines-resume-moscow-flights-may-2025-04-03), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/russian-immigration-streams-in-as-israel-predicts-uptick-in-western-newcomers)). A 2008 bilateral accord still enables **visa-free travel** between the two countries ([new.embassies.gov.il](https://new.embassies.gov.il/saintpetersburg/en/the-consulate/bilateral-relations)), and a 2015 **Syria de-confliction hotline** continues to function despite the war in Ukraine ([timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/accusing-idf-of-deception-russia-blames-israel-for-downing-of-spy-plane)).

**Hamas:** Moscow welcomed a senior Hamas delegation on 26 October 2023—underscoring a channel neither Washington nor Brussels can replicate ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/hamas-delegation-is-visiting-moscow-russian-foreign-ministry-2023-10-26)). Russian mediation later secured the release of dual-national captive **Roni Krivoi** on 26 November 2023 ([dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/israel-hamas-war-what-is-russias-role-as-mideast-mediator/a-68340753)).

**Iran:** Russia and Iran sealed a *20-year strategic partnership treaty* in January 2025; the Russian Duma ratified it on 8 April 2025, and Iran’s Majlis followed on 21 May 2025 ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-lower-house-parliament-ratifies-20-year-pact-between-russia-iran-2025-04-08/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/iran-parliament-approves-strategic-pact-with-russia-2025-05-21/)).

The pact commits both sides to “joint exercises on their own territory **and elsewhere**,” formalising regular trilateral naval drills with China—most recently a four-day manoeuvre in the Gulf of Oman that began on 11 April 2025 ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRCV007NAL), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/12/iran-russia-china-conduct-joint-naval-drills-in-gulf-of-oman), [tehrantimes.com](https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/510735/Iran-Russia-and-China-to-conduct-major-naval-drill-in-Indian)).

Tehran has touted a pact with Russia as a milestone in 'military-technical cooperation,' which includes the confirmed purchase of Russian Su-35 fighters and the acquisition of air-defence systems([al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/01/russia-iran-harden-military-and-trade-ties-new-pact), [thearabweekly.com](https://thearabweekly.com/iran-purchases-russias-sukhoi-35-fighter-jets-remedy-air-power-weaknesses), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/01/iran-confirms-purchase-russias-sukhoi-35-fighter-jets-what-we-know), [iranintl.com](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501273105), [airforce-technology.com](https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/iranian-russian-sukhoi-35), [nationalsecurityjournal.org](https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/russia-sold-to-iran-the-su-35-fighter-why-isnt-fighting-israel), [shafaq.com](https://shafaq.com/en/World/Iran-secures-Russian-Su-35-fighter-jets-in-strategic-deal), [armscontrol.org](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-11/news-briefs/russia-completes-s-300-delivery-iran), [kyivpost.com](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/57233), [militarywatchmagazine.com](https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/iran-receives-russian-s400-testing)).

For ceasefire planners, these ties mean Moscow can credibly lean on Iranian decision-makers to *halt rocket and drone shipments into Gaza* or to *restrain Hezbollah*—leverage the West presently lacks.

Conversely, excluding Russia would leave Iran free to portray any deal as a “Western diktat” and continue weapon flows under the cover of treaty-backed “joint operations.”

**Syria:** The **fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024** sharply reduced Moscow’s automatic sway in Damascus ([osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-12-09/fall-assads-regime-syria-implications-russia)).

Yet Russia still controls the *Khmeimim airbase* and *Tartus naval facility*, assets it insists are strategic points even after regime change ([newsukraine.rbc.ua](https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/putin-says-russia-to-back-syria-even-if-power-1754008055.html), [osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-29/russia-strives-to-retain-its-military-bases-syria), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/fate-of-russian-military-bases-in-syria-remains-open/a-71027207), [twz.com](https://www.twz.com/news-features/fate-of-russias-prized-syria-bases-what-we-know)).

A detailed August 2025 briefing notes ongoing talks with the new Syrian government on *renewed status-of-forces agreements* for those sites ([peace-ipsc.org](https://peace-ipsc.org/2025/08/02/future-of-russian-military-bases-in-syria)).

Foreign Minister **Asaad al-Shibani**’s 31 July 2025 visit to Moscow opened “a new negotiation track” over Russia’s future role and invited Damascus to a Russia–Arab League summit ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/russias-putin-meets-syrian-fm-moscow-sharaa-invited-russia-arab-summit-2025-07-31/), [syrianobserver.com](https://syrianobserver.com/foreign-actors/russia-faces-a-new-equation-in-syria-shibanis-visit-opens-the-door-to-negotiation.html), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/syrian-fm-meets-putin-and-lavrov-in-first-russia-visit-since-fall-of-assad-regime/)).

While Damascus publicly “calls for stronger Russian support to rebuild national unity”([caliber.az](https://caliber.az/en/post/syria-calls-for-stronger-russian-support-to-rebuild-national-unity)), policy institutes warn that the Russian deployment is now a *liability*, exposed to insurgent attacks and competing foreign patrons ([mei.edu](https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-military-presence-post-assad-syria-growing-security-liability-undermining)).

Consequently, **securing Russian buy-in is essential**: the S-300/S-400 umbrella centred on Khmeimim still gives Russia significant control over Syrian airspace and any UN verification or humanitarian over-flights into the eastern Mediterranean must de-conflict with Russian controllers ([DergiPark](https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/4738857), [understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2024)). At the same time, the Kremlin needs a politically face-saving “exit ramp” to keep those assets from becoming an open-ended drain—a gap a *rules-anchored, multilateral ceasefire framework* can fill by giving Moscow a share of credit while capping its exposure.

### **How the Kremlin has weaponised the war**

1. **Anti-Western narrative-building.** Within days of the October 7 attacks, Russian leadership blamed “the failure of U.S. policy” for the crisis ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-says-violence-israel-palestine-shows-us-failure-middle-east-2023-10-10/)) and repeatedly likened Israel’s siege of Gaza to Nazi Germany’s blockade of Leningrad ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-israeli-ground-operation-gaza-will-result-civilian-losses-2023-10-13/), [arabcenterdc.org](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/russia-and-china-on-gaza-sidelined-lurking-or-winning/)). Kremlin media amplified those tropes, saturating Arabic-language channels with images and narratives equating Israel to Nazis—a pattern logged by both EUvsDisinfo and independent investigators. ([EUvsDisinfo](https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-is-being-used-against-russia/), [ISD](https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/how-a-pro-kremlin-ad-campaign-used-the-israel-hamas-conflict-to-spread-propaganda-in-france-and-germany/), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russian-propaganda-arabic-hidden-west), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/at-icj-hearing-russia-blames-israel-us-allies-for-ongoing-gaza-conflict/3144190), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russia-warns-of-absolutely-unacceptable-civilian-casualties-in-case-of-israeli-ground-operation-in-gaza/3018292), [trt.globa](https://trt.global/world/article/15334660), [uacrisis.org](https://uacrisis.org/en/pro-russian-narratives-on-the-israel-hamas-war-in-indonesia-on-youtube), [wilsoncenter.org](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putin-hints-mediator-role-sides-hamas), [isca.indiana.edu](https://isca.indiana.edu/publication-research/research-paper-series/yaron-gamburg-research-paper.html), [inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/russia-disinformation/))
2. **Disinformation as hybrid warfare.** Kremlin propaganda has systematically exploited the conflict in Gaza to sow discord and advance its strategic agenda, weaponizing disinformation as a form of hybrid warfare. Through coordinated campaigns on state-funded media and social media platforms, Moscow has saturated information spaces with narratives that equate Israel's actions to those of the Nazis. This tactic is designed to not only fuel polarization and erode trust in Western media but also to deliberately weaken NATO cohesion and soften international support for Ukraine. The deliberate and strategic nature of this propaganda, documented by independent think-tanks, led the European Union to impose fresh sanctions in June 2024 on Russian "opinion-forming" outlets deemed responsible for these campaigns.  
   ([politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-sputnik-rt-russia-is-waging-a-disinformation-war-in-the-middle-east/), [understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2024), [ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_3425), [therecord.media](https://therecord.media/eu-sanctions-orgs-individuals-tied-to-russia-disinformation), [ashurst.com](https://www.ashurst.com/en/insights/russia-sanctions-tracker/eu-sanctions/), [hugheshubbard.com](https://www.hugheshubbard.com/news/eu-adopts-a-comprehensive-14th-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-enhancing-compliance-requirements-cracking-down-on-circumvention-and-targeting-high-value-sectors-of-the-russian-economy), [mayerbrown.com](https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2024/06/eu-adopts-14th-sanctions-package-against-russia), [icct.nl](https://icct.nl/publication/how-russia-uses-israel-gaza-crisis-its-disinformation-campaign-against-west), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/complicated-history-with-the-west-helps-russian-narratives-about-ukraine-find-a-foothold-in-the-middle-east/), [cpd.gov.ua](https://cpd.gov.ua/en/international-threats-en/global-south/russia-spreads-propaganda-in-the-middle-east-through-sexualized-content/), [bibliotekanauki.pl](https://bibliotekanauki.pl/articles/20436591), [dspace.cuni.cz](https://dspace.cuni.cz/bitstream/handle/20.500.11956/178359/120427340.pdf), [analytics.intsecurity.org](https://analytics.intsecurity.org/en/russian-influence-middle-east-africa/), [monitoring.bbc.co.uk](https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c203j4hs), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/1/27/the-social-media-myth-about-the-arab-spring), [spravdi.gov.ua](https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/how-russian-propaganda-works-in-arab-countries-distribution-channels-methods-and-narratives/), [oe.tradoc.army.mil](https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/russias-ukraine-narratives-find-appeal-in-arab-countries/), [finance.ec.europa.eu](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-sanctions-against-russias-disinformation-and-war-propaganda-2024-05-17_en)).
3. **Domestic blow-back risk.** Anti-Semitic riots at Makhachkala airport on 29 October 2023—sparked by Telegram rumours of arriving “Israeli refugees”—exposed how Kremlin-fuelled narratives can boomerang inside Russia’s own multi-confessional regions. ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/29/pro-palestinian-crowd-enters-dagestan-airport-to-protest-israel-flight), [specialeurasia.com](https://www.specialeurasia.com/2023/10/31/makhachkala-airport-protest/), [cbc.ca](https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-airport-dagestan-antisemitic-mob-1.7013688), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/30/russia-blames-ukraine-for-antisemitic-riot-at-airport-in-dagestan), [themoscowtimes.com](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/10/30/the-anti-israeli-mob-at-dagestans-makhachkala-airport-explained-a82935), [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/10/why-the-russian-authorities-failed-to-stop-pogroms-in-the-caucasus?lang=en), [besacenter.org](https://besacenter.org/spontaneous-protests-in-dagestan-potential-for-resistance-or-a-safety-valve/), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/24/dagestan-attack-highlights-russias-islamist-terror-threat-as-forces-are-engaged-in-ukraine), [fdd.org](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/11/17/russias-weaponization-of-antisemitism/), [tandfonline.com](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10758216.2025.2486233?src=))

### **Why Moscow must sit at the table**

| **Lever** | **Unique to Russia** | **Strategic Pay-off for the ceasefire** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Hostage channel** | Direct hotline to Hamas politburo enabled the November 2023 release of dual-national Roni Krivoi and subsequent Russian-Israeli captives. | Offers a parallel mechanism to the Qatar–Egypt track for the final tranche of hostages. ([fdd.org](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/11/27/hamas-releases-russian-hostage-in-appreciation-of-moscow/),[reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-meets-freed-russian-gaza-hostages-says-ties-with-palestinians-helped-2025-04-16)) |
| **Iran/Syria influence** | Joint ops rooms in Damascus and weapons-supply coordination mean Tehran listens when Moscow calls. | Secures commitments to halt rocket flows into Gaza and keeps the northern front dormant during implementation. ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/18/iran-russia-analysis-syria-setback)) |
| **UN-veto power** | Russia’s October 2023 draft ceasefire resolution (vetoed by the U.S.) proved it can table texts the Global South supports. | A co-sponsored UNSC mandate with the U.S. and China prevents either bloc from weaponising procedural vetoes later. ([press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15464.doc.htm)) |
| **Religious mediation optic** | Russian leadership routinely cites Gaza to court the Muslim world, yet presides over a state-controlled Orthodox establishment at home. | Inviting top Russian Muftis and Patriarch Kirill into a parallel inter-faith track turns a propaganda device into a bridge for tempering religious extremism. |

### **The cost of exclusion**

* **Spoiler capacity:** Absent a stake in enforcement, Moscow can intensify proxy activity—cheap for the Kremlin, costly for NATO shipping lanes and energy prices.
* **Radicalisation next door:** Continued Gaza blood-shed reverberates among Russia’s 20 million Muslims; another Dagestan-style incident risks destabilising the North Caucasus and spilling into Central Asia migration corridors that intersect the EU. ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/29/pro-palestinian-crowd-enters-dagestan-airport-to-protest-israel-flight))
* **Global-South optics:** Locking Russia out would feed the narrative that the ceasefire is a “Western-imposed armistice,” exactly the frame Kremlin outlets have weaponised since October 2023 ([euvsdisinfo.eu](https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-is-being-used-against-russia)).

### **Conditions for constructive Russian participation**

1. **Balanced mandate wording** – Moscow will insist any UNSC text condemns terrorism *and* protects civilians while avoiding direct censure of Iranian proxies. Negotiators should pre-agree symmetrical language paired with an explicit hostage-release clause.
2. **Visible peacekeeping role** – Limited Russian (e.g., Chechen military-police) units under a UN flag can monitor demilitarised zones alongside Turkish, Indian, and EU contingents, thereby fostering a collective responsibility for maintaining stability.
3. **Ukraine firewall** – Western partners must keep humanitarian cooperation in Gaza from eroding the broader sanctions regime that deters Russian aggression in Ukraine. To do so, we propose a **dual-track escrow ladder**:
   1. **Gaza Relief Corridor (GRC).** Micro-tranches of sector-specific waivers—e.g., agricultural equipment, shipping insurance—sit in escrow and “snap-forward” only when an independent monitor certifies that Russia has met a Gaza benchmark (hostage release, verified arms-flow interdiction, disinformation stand-down).
   2. **Ukraine Snap-Back Fuse (USBF).** Any material breach of the Ukraine ceasefire (Annex 2, [Unified State Advisory Memorandum No. 7](https://www.unifiedstate.us/unified-state-advisory-memorandum-07/)) *automatically* re-freezes all GRC tranches within 48 hours—mirroring the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism ([iranwire.com](https://iranwire.com/en/features/136431-how-the-snapback-mechanism-brings-back-sanctions-on-iran/), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/snapback-sanctions-iran-more-bark-bite)).  
        
      This design achieves three aims: **(1)** it denies Moscow the chance to use Gaza aid against Ukraine sovereignty; **(2)** it answers Global-South criticism that the West “chose Kyiv over Gaza” ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/9/western-leaders-accused-of-hypocrisy-over-response-to-palestine-ukraine), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/4/18/we-must-avoid-double-standards-in-foreign-policy)); **(3)** it turns the Kremlin’s own Gaza-Ukraine disinformation into a liability—every Gaza violation now risks fresh economic pain([icct.nl](https://icct.nl/publication/how-russia-uses-israel-gaza-crisis-its-disinformation-campaign-against-west), [securityconference.org](https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-brief/standard-deviation/main/)). Because each waiver is reversible in 48 hours, the West never sacrifices core Ukraine leverage, while Russia gains prestige *only* if it behaves responsibly in both theatres.
4. **Gaza-Ukraine escrow ladder** – A *mirror-image* of [Unified State Advisory Memorandum No. 7](https://www.unifiedstate.us/unified-state-advisory-memorandum-07/) “snap-forward / snap-back” annex will govern any sector-specific Gaza waivers. Relief sits in escrow until Russia hits a Gaza benchmark; any breach in either theatre triggers a 48-hour automatic re-freeze. OFAC–OFSI guidance already outlines how humanitarian channels can coexist with Russia-related sanctions ([ofac.treasury.gov](https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931946/download)). While a significant slice of sanctions scholarship—including the Lieber Institute piece—supports **escrow-style or otherwise ring-fenced waivers** as one of the most effective tools for shielding humanitarian flows. ([lieber.westpoint.edu](https://lieber.westpoint.edu/impact-sanctions-humanitarian-aid/)).
5. **Information-space accountability** – Include real-time fact-checking and transparency clauses that apply equally to RT, Sputnik, and Western outlets, stripping Russia’s cognitive-warfare playbook of its asymmetry ([understandingwar.org](https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare)).

### **Why a Unified Escrow / Snap‑Back Architecture is Strategically Indispensable**

Russia’s information campaign deliberately blends the war in Gaza and war in Ukraine, accusing the West of “double standards” to erode support for Kyiv and fragment Global-South opinion. A single **escrow / snap-back architecture** across both theatres blocks that narrative while upholding core humanitarian norms:

* **Keeps aid apolitical.** Humanitarian assistance must never be a bargaining chip—a principle reaffirmed by the ICRC’s neutrality doctrine ([blogs.icrc.org](https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2022/06/21/taking-action-not-sides-humanitarian-neutrality/)), UN OCHA appeals for unconditional Gaza access ([unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/news/un-relief-chief-calls-security-council-act-decisively-prevent-genocide-gaza)), and MSF’s criticism of using aid as leverage ([msf.org](https://www.msf.org/israeli-authorities-must-stop-use-aid-tool-war-gaza)). Under the dual-track model, life-saving relief flows regardless of sanctions mechanics; only **non-humanitarian, sector-specific waivers** (e.g., shipping insurance, farm machinery) sit in the escrow ladder.
* **Removes Kremlin talking points.** Because humanitarian aid is fenced off, Moscow cannot claim the West is “trading bread for concessions.” Instead, the mechanism shows that *any* economic rewards are tied solely to Russia’s behaviour across **both** Gaza and Ukraine, puncturing the propaganda that the West “chose Kyiv over Gaza.”
* **Synchronises accountability.** A single 48-hour snap-back fuse and cross-bloc voting rule guards against forum-shopping: if Russia violates ceasefire terms in **either** theatre, all escrowed waivers re-freeze automatically. That symmetry deters Moscow from playing a good actor in one arena while back-sliding in the other.
* **Preserves strategic leverage.** Western partners keep full sanctions pressure on core Ukraine issues; Russia gains prestige or limited economic relief *only* when it acts responsibly in Gaza **and** Ukraine—turning its interlinked cognitive-warfare gambit into a liability rather than an asset.

**In sum:** the unified escrow / snap-back design prevents Gaza relief from being weaponised, closes the narrative gap Russia exploits, and ties any sanctions flex to verifiable de-escalation in both conflicts—exactly the strategic coherence required to keep Moscow from gaming the system.  
  
(Any 3 of 5 principals may trigger tranche freeze upon a verified breach above threshold θ, see Annex 1.A)

### **Strategic dividend**

Re-engaging Moscow under a rules-anchored, multipolar guarantee converts a current **spoiler** into a **stakeholder**:

* For **Israel**: a channel that can lean on Tehran and Damascus in moments of crisis.
* For **Palestinians**: an additional great-power guarantor that cannot be written off as “Western bias.”
* For **NATO/EU**: a de-pressurised information environment at home and reduced risk of Iran-triggered escalation.
* For the **Global South**: a genuinely multipolar accord that shares enforcement authority and guarantees impartial, escrow-shielded humanitarian relief.
* For **Russia itself**: a face-saving path back into responsible diplomacy, reducing the probability that Gaza-fired radicalism ricochets into its own Muslim heartlands.

In short, bringing Russia inside an enforceable Gaza settlement is not appeasement; it is realpolitik insurance against a three-front failure—Middle-East instability, NATO disunity, and eventual Caucasus blow-back—that no stakeholder can afford.

## 

## **China**

### **Position & messaging**

Beijing’s public posture since the October 2023 war has been one of formally measured language but increasingly pro‑Palestinian substance. On 14 October 2023 Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Saudi counterpart that Israel’s operations had gone “beyond the scope of self‑defense” ([fmprc.gov.cn](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2878_663746/2880_663750/202310/t20231017_11162147.html), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-chinese-statements-hamas-israel-conflict)). Chinese diplomats consistently call for an immediate and permanent ceasefire, condemning violence on both sides while stressing that the “fundamental solution lies in establishing an independent State of Palestine”. At a press conference on 8 January 2024 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) noted that about 23 000 people had already been killed and urged Israel to exercise restraint, implement UN resolutions and agree to a ceasefire ([mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202405/t20240530_11347674.html), [english.news.cn](https://english.news.cn/20240109/947679c79870437d808503d10e0498ad/c.html)). Beijing’s statements framed Palestinian self‑determination as an “inalienable right” and argued at the International Court of Justice that armed struggle to achieve independence is legitimate under international law, while insisting that all parties must comply with international humanitarian law ([icj-cij.org](https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/186/186-20230725-wri-21-00-en.pdf), [mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zwbd/202409/t20240920_11493452.html), [mofa.go.jp](https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100638658.pdf), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/palestinians-use-of-force-to-resist-foreign-oppression-well-founded-in-international-law-china/3144798), [memri.org](https://www.memri.org/tv/china-fm-legal-advisor-ma-xinmin-icj-palestine-inalienable-right-force-resist-israel-armed-struggle-not-terrorism)). President Xi Jinping has repeated that a two-state solution and establishing an independent State of Palestine are the “only viable way” to resolve the conflict, and China vetoed US‑backed UN resolutions which did not demand an immediate ceasefire ([english.news.cn](https://english.news.cn/20231122/6cb5b137e0cd4b9d92cdb9275c869c2c/c.html), [brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-narratives-on-the-israel-hamas-war/)). These positions, echoed at BRICS and the UN Security Council, portray Beijing as a defender of the Global South and critic of Western “double standards” ([gov.cn](https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202410/25/content_WS671ada97c6d0868f4e8ec452.html), [business-standard.com](https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/brics-nations-reject-double-standards-vows-to-counter-terrorism-123082401136_1.html), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/7/brics-condemns-attacks-on-iran-gaza-war-trump-tariffs-key-takeaways), [fmprc.gov.cn](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202502/t20250219_11558555.html), [chinadailyhk.com](https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/613289), [americasquarterly.org](https://americasquarterly.org/article/controversy-over-brics-ramps-up-global-tensions/), [america.cgtn.com](https://america.cgtn.com/2017/01/18/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-speech-at-the-united-nations-office-in-geneva), [fmprc.gov.cn](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202503/t20250307_11570138.html), [moderndiplomacy.eu](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/27/chinese-media-in-shaping-public-opinion-towards-the-gaza-war-and-global-south/)).

**Diplomatic actions.** China has tried to translate its rhetoric into mediation. In July 2024 it invited representatives of fourteen Palestinian factions to Beijing; they signed a declaration reaffirming the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative, calling for an interim national reconciliation government, reconstructing Gaza and convening a UN‑sponsored international conference on the two‑state solution ([mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202407/t20240723_11458790.html), [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/23/china-mediates-between-palestinian-hamas-and-fatah-in-beijing-declaration_6696010_4.html)). Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented a three‑step initiative: (1) reach a comprehensive ceasefire with unimpeded humanitarian aid; (2) ensure post‑conflict governance under the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine”; and (3) admit Palestine as a full UN member and implement the two‑state solution ([mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202407/t20240730_11463266.html), [english.news.cn](https://english.news.cn/20240723/ee0e935f49864fc7a60c76c5226b397f/c.html), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/8/29/the-beijing-declaration-is-a-key-step-to-resolve-the-palestinian-question), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/hamas-fatah-meet-with-media-china-after-reconciliation-talks-2024-07-23/), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/23/palestinian-rivals-hamas-and-fatah-sign-unity-deal-brokered-by-china), [mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202405/t20240530_11332814.html)). Chinese diplomats welcomed January 2025 cease‑fire initiatives, condemned Israeli attacks on hospitals and urged Israel to lift restrictions and abide by international humanitarian law ([fmprc.gov.cn](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202501/t20250116_11536700.html), [english.news.cn](https://english.news.cn/20250116/db3f4f574fd34edea0395ac043b77dd1/c.html), [chinaglobalsouth.com](https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2025/01/16/china-says-welcomes-gaza-ceasefire-deal/), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-chinese-statements-hamas-israel-conflict), [mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zwbd/202501/t20250107_11528428.html), [globaltimes.cn](http://globaltimes.cn/page/202501/1326253.shtml), [socialistchina.org](https://socialistchina.org/2025/01/07/ambassador-fu-cong-condemns-israels-continuing-war-crimes-in-gaza/)). At a February 2025 press briefing, Beijing again insisted that post‑war governance must respect “Palestinians governing Palestine” and the ultimate goal of a two‑state solution; it announced that China was sending 60 000 food parcels to Gaza, with an initial 12 000 already dispatched ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-announces-fresh-humanitarian-aid-for-60-000-families-in-gaza/3485113), [mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202502/t20250219_11558920.html), [en.cidca.gov.cn](http://en.cidca.gov.cn/2025-02/18/c_1071169.htm)). These engagements show China’s desire to shape the diplomatic agenda while positioning itself as the protector of Palestinian rights.

**Humanitarian aid and economic involvement.** China has coupled its political messaging with tangible assistance. In March 2024 the China International Development Cooperation Agency announced cash aid and two shipments of food, medicine and medical supplies to Gaza; it sent 450 tons of rice via Egypt’s Port Said for distribution through the Rafah crossing ([africa.cgtn.com](https://africa.cgtn.com/chinese-aid-to-gaza-arrives-in-egypts-port-said/), [subsites.chinadaily.com.cn](https://subsites.chinadaily.com.cn/cidca/2024-03/22/c_973760.htm), [english.www.gov.cn](https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202403/21/content_WS65fb793fc6d0868f4e8e54c8.html), [english.www.gov.cn](https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202403/21/content_WS65fb793fc6d0868f4e8e54c8.html), [news.cgtn.com](https://news.cgtn.com/news/2024-03-21/Chinese-aid-to-Gaza-to-arrive-in-Egypt-s-Port-Said-next-week-1s9KATkSe4w/p.html)). By February 2025 Beijing pledged to provide 60 000 food parcels to Gazans, emphasising that humanitarian assistance would continue ([mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202502/t20250219_11558920.html), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-announces-fresh-humanitarian-aid-for-60-000-families-in-gaza/3485113)). Chinese officials have hinted that further aid and reconstruction funding could be channeled through UN agencies or consortia of emerging economies, consistent with China’s practice of tying aid to service contracts or Belt‑and‑Road projects rather than unconditional grants ([brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/can-china-fill-the-void-in-foreign-aid), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/news-releases/government-people%E2%80%99s-republic-china-provides-us-3-million-emergency), [english.news.cn](https://english.news.cn/20240805/2ccbe02bf79b401980a299b1765a7612/c.html), [mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zwbd/202502/t20250207_11551101.html), [chinadaily.com.cn](https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202503/16/WS67d6de30a310c240449db09c.html), [global.chinadaily.com.cn](https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202503/05/WS67c7ac02a310c240449d8b44.html), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/forecasting-chinas-strategy-in-the-middle-east-over-the-next-four-years/), [brixsweden.org](https://brixsweden.org/reconstruction-plan-for-gaza-in-the-context-of-the-belt-and-road-the-xinjiang-model/)). While still limited in scale relative to major Western pledges, Beijing’s assistance nonetheless secures it a tangible role in Gaza’s post-war reconstruction ([europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-announces-new-eu120-million-humanitarian-aid-package-gaza-2025-01-16_en), [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-humanitarian-support-to-palestinians/), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/18/new-report-assesses-damages-losses-and-needs-in-gaza-and-the-west-bank), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/2/for-china-war-in-gaza-a-chance-to-flex-diplomatic-muscle-at-little-risk), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/china-wants-ties-with-arab-states-that-will-be-model-world-peace-2024-05-30/)).

China also has significant economic interests to protect. Israel remains highly dependent on Chinese trade: in 2024 it imported goods worth roughly US$13.5 billion from China (up almost 20 % from 2023) and exported about US$2.8 billion there, making China Israel’s largest source of imports and third‑largest export destination ([inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-china-2024/), [eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn](https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/0TBMCK92.html), [tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/exports/china), [worldstopexports.com](https://www.worldstopexports.com/israels-top-trading-partners/)). When Hong Kong’s purchases are combined with those of mainland China, China is the second‑largest buyer of Israeli goods and the top seller of products to Israel, shipping about US$19 billion worth of electric vehicles, mobile phones, computers and metals in 2024 ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/22/which-countries-trade-the-most-with-israel-and-what-do-they-buy-and-sell), [tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports/hong-kong), [tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/israel/imports-by-category)). Beijing therefore seeks to avoid a rupture with Israel while cultivating solidarity with Palestinians—a balancing act that constrains its mediation efforts ([gjia.georgetown.edu](https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/10/28/the-israel-palestine-conflict-and-chinas-actorness-in-the-middle-east-a-challenge-to-us-influence/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/wang-touts-chinas-role-peacemaker-calls-mideast-ceasefire-2024-09-28/), [time.com](https://time.com/6989299/china-israel-relations/), [mecouncil.org](https://mecouncil.org/publication/chinas-approach-to-palestine-and-israel-towards-a-greater-role/), [mepc.org](https://mepc.org/commentaries/china-and-palestinians-strategic-partnership-or-message-west/)). China’s inability to broker a ceasefire during the 2025 Israel–Iran flare‑up underscored this limitation; it condemned Israeli strikes and urged de‑escalation but lacked direct influence and instead consulted Gulf states about international mediation ([behorizon.org](https://behorizon.org/between-tehran-and-tel-aviv-chinas-strategic-balancing-act-in-the-middle-east/), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/26/israel-iran-conflict-exposed-chinas-limited-leverage-say-analysts)).

**Public sentiment and global‑south narrative.** Domestic opinion has become increasingly sympathetic to Palestinians. Chinese social media users celebrated Palestinian “dandelion fighters” and framed the conflict as an anti‑colonial struggle, viewing Israel’s actions as akin to past foreign humiliations of China ([sciencedirect.com](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S073658532500005X), [thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/the-chinese-public-is-closely-watching-the-israel-hamas-war/), [tni.org](https://www.tni.org/en/article/from-global-anti-imperialism-to-the-dandelion-fighters), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/4/israel-gaza-war-fuels-online-anti-semitism-islamophobia-in-china)). State media amplified this narrative and portrayed the U.S. as obstructing peace, resonating with developing countries ([chinadigitaltimes.net](https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2024/03/contrasting-u-s-stances-on-gaza-xinjiang/), [scmp.com](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3279020/china-accuses-us-shielding-israel-blocking-gaza-ceasefire-efforts)). By aligning with Global South grievances while criticising Western interventions, Beijing has sought to enhance its moral authority and leadership among non‑Western states ([kinacentrum.se](https://kinacentrum.se/en/publications/what-is-chinas-message-to-the-global-south/), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/9/double-standards-world-reacts-to-us-vetoing-unsc-gaza-resolution)).

**Pro‑Palestinian online opinion** – After October 7th the Israeli embassy in China attempted to sway netizens by emphasising Israeli hostages, but the campaign backfired; Chinese users exposed misinformation and rallied around what they saw as an anti‑colonial Palestinian struggle ([newsweek.com](https://www.newsweek.com/china-israel-palestine-hamas-social-media-1833012), [voanews.com](https://www.voanews.com/a/antisemitic-comments-flood-china-s-censored-internet-after-hamas-attack-/7307404.html)). An academic analysis noted that Chinese public opinion has been shaped by a narrative of “dandelion fighters,” linking Palestinian resistance to China’s own historical struggles and reinforcing sympathy for armed liberation movements ([tni.org](https://www.tni.org/en/article/from-global-anti-imperialism-to-the-dandelion-fighters), [newarab.com](https://www.newarab.com/features/why-chinese-support-palestinian-liberation-struggle), [tni.org](https://www.tni.org/en/video/zhang-sheng-why-chinese-netizens-call-palestinian-fighters-dandelions)). A growing body of scholarly and policy analysis shows that Chinese state outlets systematically amplify domestic and trans-national anti-Israel sentiment—folding it into anti-colonial, “double-standards” story-lines—to project Beijing as the natural champion of the Global South and to enhance its normative leadership in that constituency ([moderndiplomacy.eu](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/27/chinese-media-in-shaping-public-opinion-towards-the-gaza-war-and-global-south/), [mei.nus.edu.sg](https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/mei-perspectives-series-33-chinas-strategy-in-gaza-a-quest-for-global-south-leadership-fraught-with-peril), [extremism.gwu.edu](https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2025-07/CCP%20Influence%20in%20US%20Pro-Palestinian%20Activism.pdf), [cna.org](https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2023/11/chinas-gaza-diplomacy), [chathamhouse.org](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/10/chinas-approach-war-gaza-not-anti-israel-its-designed-contain-us), [thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/chinese-social-media-platforms-are-now-awash-with-antisemitism/), [studies.aljazeera.net](https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/digital-occupation-pixelated-propaganda-censored-platforms-and-battle-narrative-gaza)). Late-2024 media-monitoring and influence-tracking studies show that some Chinese state outlets and government-linked social-media campaigns recycled antisemitic tropes—claiming, for example, that a ‘Jewish consortium’ or ‘Jewish political-business alliance’ controls U.S. wealth and opinion—thereby reinforcing conspiratorial narratives popular in parts of the Global South and bolstering domestic pressure on Beijing to adopt an overtly pro-Palestinian, anti-Western stance. ([moderndiplomacy.eu](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/27/chinese-media-in-shaping-public-opinion-towards-the-gaza-war-and-global-south/), [voanews.com](https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-state-media-support-protests-on-us-campuses-but-not-at-home/7592968.html), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/10/10/us-elections-china-influence-x), [jstribune.com](https://www.jstribune.com/gering-chinas-turn-toward-antisemitism/), [transcripts.cnn.com](https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/cnr/date/2024-01-26/segment/19), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/06/15/russia-china-iran-north-korea-antisemitism/)).

**Neutrality versus activism** – A CEIAS media watch report noted that China tried to remain formally “neutral” in the early months of the war, highlighting its two‑state solution advocacy while avoiding direct condemnation of Hamas ([ceias.eu](https://ceias.eu/chinese-media-watch-israel-palestine-conflict-lets-make-peace-in-a-decades-long-conflict-china-again-in-the-position-of-a-peace-seeking-superpower/), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/china-calls-concrete-roadmap-two-state-solution-solve-gaza-conflict-2023-11-30/), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinese-narratives-on-the-israel-hamas-war/)). Multiple monitoring studies conclude that Beijing’s self-styled “neutrality” is itself strategic: Chinese state outlets package the PRC as a “peace-seeking, fair and responsible” great power that contrasts with a militarised West, deliberately courting audiences in the Global South to reinforce China’s claim to moral leadership ([ceias.eu](https://ceias.eu/chinese-media-watch-israel-palestine-conflict-lets-make-peace-in-a-decades-long-conflict-china-again-in-the-position-of-a-peace-seeking-superpower), [moderndiplomacy.eu](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/27/chinese-media-in-shaping-public-opinion-towards-the-gaza-war-and-global-south/), [mei.nus.edu.sg](https://mei.nus.edu.sg/publication/mei-perspectives-series-33-chinas-strategy-in-gaza-a-quest-for-global-south-leadership-fraught-with-peril/), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/09/china-israel-pro-palestinian-history), [chinaglobalsouth.com](https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/what-can-we-learn-from-chinas-response-to-the-gaza-crisis/)). Modern Diplomacy and other monitors note that **during China’s month-long presidency of the UN Security Council in November 2023, Beijing tabled or backed successive ceasefire drafts and publicly chastised U.S. (and, by extension, Israeli) vetoes—actions it presented as proof of China’s “fair and peaceful” leadership on behalf of the Global South** ([moderndiplomacy.eu](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/27/chinese-media-in-shaping-public-opinion-towards-the-gaza-war-and-global-south), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-chinese-statements-hamas-israel-conflict), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/china-calls-concrete-roadmap-two-state-solution-solve-gaza-conflict-2023-11-30/), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/20/un-gaza-vote-veto), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15519.doc.htm)). Together, these sources show that Chinese public sentiment and media narratives reinforce the government’s pro‑Palestinian and anti‑Western messaging.

### **China’s leverage over Russia and its implications**

**Russia’s dependence on China**: Western restrictions since the 2014 Crimea annexation limited Russia’s access to Western capital, technology and export markets; when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered far broader 2022-25 sanctions, that partial isolation turned into near-total decoupling from the West. Multiple data sets show Russia rerouting fossil-fuel exports to China at discounted prices, switching more than a third of its foreign-trade settlements into yuan, and buying Chinese machinery, vehicles and dual-use electronics that can no longer be sourced from the EU, U.S. or Japan. Analysts at MERICS, CEPA, SWP, CSIS, Carnegie and OSW all conclude that the trade boom—which reached USD 245 bn in 2024, almost double the 2020 figure—has left Moscow far more dependent on Beijing than vice-versa ([merics.org](https://merics.org/en/china-russia-dashboard-facts-and-figures-special-relationship), [cepa.org](https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/going-steady-china-and-russias-economic-ties-are-deeper-than-washington-thinks/), [swp-berlin.org](https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024RP06/), [csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-sanctions-have-reshaped-russias-future), [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/china-russia-yuan?lang=en), [osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-07-30/china-russia-trade-early-2025-fueling-moscows-war-despite-headwinds)).

**Diplomatic leverage:** China’s leverage over Moscow is now broad, structural, and—if Beijing chooses to use it—potent enough to shape Russian behaviour in theatres far beyond Ukraine, including the Gaza crisis. Since successive Western sanctions in 2014 and 2022 severed Russia from most OECD markets and finance, trade, technology and diplomacy have been rerouted through Beijing. Scholars and watchdogs converge on four pillars of this leverage: (1) an ever-widening economic asymmetry; (2) unique, routine—and largely exclusive—leader-to-leader access; (3) Chinese supply lines that are keeping Russia’s war machine afloat; and (4) the readiness of Western and Middle-Eastern capitals to ask Xi Jinping to “lean in” on Vladimir Putin. Yet China has *not* spent this leverage to moderate the Kremlin; instead it shields and resupplies Russia while presenting itself as a neutral peace-broker. Understanding that gap is essential for any Gaza diplomacy that hopes to enlist Beijing in restraining Moscow’s spoiler capacity in the Middle East ([brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-and-russias-strategic-relationship-amid-a-shifting-geopolitical-landscape), [csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-sanctions-have-reshaped-russias-future), [merics.org](https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/Chatham%20House%20GMF%20MERICS%20Report%20China-Russia%20alignment_06-2024.pdf), [cepa.org](https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/going-steady-china-and-russias-economic-ties-are-deeper-than-washington-thinks)).

**Exclusive Xi–Putin Channel:** Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the **personal line between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin has become the densest head-of-state contact in contemporary diplomacy**. By **July 2025** the two leaders had **met in person more than 45 times**. No other foreign head meets either man with comparable frequency, giving Beijing a **privileged “hot-line” to the Kremlin** that Western capitals do not enjoy ([csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/analyzing-latest-xi-putin-meeting-and-chinas-belt-and-road-forum), [merics.org](https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/takeaways-xi-putin-meeting-manufacturing-overcapacity-agrifood-trade), [isdp.eu](https://www.isdp.eu/75-years-of-china-russia-relations-indeed-a-no-limits-partnership), [mfa.gov.cn](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202410/t20241025_11516002.html), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/xi-meets-putin-as-china-russia-strive-for-new-world-order/a-72491824), [thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/the-xi-putin-summit-a-display-of-china-russia-resilience-on-victory-day), [chinadailyhk.com](https://www.chinadailyhk.com/hk/article/611006), [thecipherbrief.com](https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/putin-is-relying-on-xi-to-help-recreate-the-russian-empire), [usip.org](https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/05/xi-and-putin-strengthen-strategic-ties-spurn-us-leadership), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/xi-meets-putin-kazan-chinese-state-media-says-2024-10-22)).

### **China-Russia Axis: a Combined Lever on the Middle East**

China and Russia together function as a strategically integrated lever across the Middle East: Beijing’s economic lifeline now fuels Moscow’s global posture, while Russia’s established networks connect it deeply to Tehran and Palestinian actors. China imports nearly **90 % of Iran’s oil exports**—about **1.4 mb/d**—giving it veto power over the financial lifeblood of Iran-aligned militias, while also supplying Russia with advanced microelectronics, drone engines, and machine tools that sustain its regional arms exports ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iran-hold-talks-with-chinese-russian-partners-summit-2025-07-15), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/trade-data-reveal-the-inner-workings-of-russia-and-chinas-defense-industrial-cooperation), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-heavy-reliance-iranian-oil-imports-2025-06-24), [trendsresearch.org](https://trendsresearch.org/insight/the-russia-iran-strategic-partnership-pact-energy-geopolitics-and-shifting-global-alliances/), [thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/the-xi-putin-summit-a-display-of-china-russia-resilience-on-victory-day), [finance.ec.europa.eu](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-15th-sanctions-package-against-russia-its-continued-illegal-war-against-ukraine-2024-12-16_en), [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/05/behind-the-scenes-chinas-increasing-role-in-russias-defense-industry), [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/05/05/xi-s-visit-to-france-china-s-crucial-support-for-russia-s-war-against-ukraine-at-heart-of-discussions_6670492_4.html), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/chinese-engines-shipped-cooling-units-power-russian-drones-used-ukraine-2025-07-23), [twz.com](https://www.twz.com/news-features/new-russian-drone-made-completely-of-chinese-components-ukrainian-intelligence), [bloomberg.com](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-29/china-cut-drone-sales-to-west-but-supplies-them-to-russia-ukraine-says), [static.rusi.org](https://static.rusi.org/winning-the-industrial-war-comparing-russia-europe-ukraine-2022-24.pdf), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/russias-digital-tech-isolationism)). Together, their joint influence offers a rare shape-shifting cluster: Beijing has economic sway; Moscow has regional access; both wield veto power and rhetorical influence in the Arab world—resources that, if realigned with Western and Gulf incentives, could rapidly coordinate ceasefires, humanitarian access routes, and reconstruction efforts across Gaza and its wider strategic zones.

### **Integrating the leverage angle into the peace roadmap**

1. **Engaging China to influence Russia** – Because Russia increasingly relies on China for trade, finance and diplomatic cover, Beijing holds unprecedented leverage. Encouraging China to use this leverage to nudge Moscow toward constructive diplomacy could stabilise the broader region. Beijing could reinforce the need for Russia to adopt a stabilising role rather than act solely as Tehran’s advocate.
2. **Coordinated diplomacy** – Russia’s ties to Iran and contacts with Hamas give it influence where China has gaps. By working through Moscow, Beijing can indirectly reach these actors. A combined Chinese‑Russian pledge to respect humanitarian law and to pressure Iranian‑aligned militias to adhere to a ceasefire would carry weight. In return, Moscow could leverage its role as a mediator to secure concessions in other theatres, creating incentives for both powers to cooperate on de‑escalation.
3. **Economic carrots** – Both China and Russia stand to gain economically from a stabilised Middle East. China is the largest importer of Iranian oil and a major trading partner of Israel; Russia seeks to expand energy and arms sales. A reconstruction boom in Gaza, funded by a multilateral trust fund, could provide Chinese and Russian firms with contracts, giving both governments a stake in maintaining peace. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and Moscow’s energy infrastructure projects could be aligned with reconstruction needs, provided they respect Palestinian sovereignty.
4. **Reputational benefits** – Acting as a bridge between Russia and the peace coalition would enhance China’s credibility as a responsible great power. Successfully leveraging its influence over Russia to restrain Iranian proxies would bolster this narrative and deliver reputational gains that could translate into political and economic benefits across the developing world.

By incorporating this leverage angle, the roadmap recognises that China cannot directly coerce Hamas or Iran but can, through its partnership with Russia, encourage Moscow to play a stabilising role. Engaging China on this basis not only reinforces the peace coalition but also incentivises Beijing and Moscow to pursue de‑escalation for their own strategic and economic interests.

**Potential contributions to the peace plan**

1. **Great‑power guarantor.** As a permanent UN Security Council member and promoter of multilateralism, China can support a Security Council resolution that enshrines a permanent ceasefire, authorises an international peacekeeping/observer mission and endorses a two‑state framework. Beijing’s insistence on UN centrality and its veto power mean any durable peace arrangement will require Chinese acquiescence.
2. **Humanitarian and reconstruction support.** China should be invited to co‑chair a reconstruction fund with Gulf and Western donors. Its experience with large‑scale infrastructure projects and desire to showcase the Belt‑and‑Road Initiative offer resources for rebuilding housing, power grids and transportation in Gaza. Chinese investments would likely be tied to service contracts or economic returns, but they could provide vital jobs and development if coordinated through a multilateral trust fund that ensures transparency. Beijing’s ongoing aid deliveries demonstrate it can mobilise food and medical supplies at scale.
3. **Peacekeeping/observer role.** China is one of the largest UN peacekeeping contributors, maintaining about ~480 troops in UNIFIL in Lebanon ([unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-troop-contributing-countries)). It could deploy unarmed observers or engineering units to support a demilitarisation and reconstruction mission in Gaza, especially if the mission is authorised by the UN and requested by Palestine. Participation would reinforce China’s image as a responsible great power and diversify the composition of international forces, which may increase acceptance among Hamas and Iran.
4. **Support for Palestinian unity.** Building on the 2024 Beijing Declaration, China can host follow‑up meetings to ensure implementation of a Palestinian national reconciliation government and to coordinate election preparations. By offering a neutral venue and respecting “Palestinians governing Palestine”, Beijing can help prevent internal fragmentation that could derail peace.
5. **Bridge to the Global South.** China’s credibility with emerging economies and its own historical narrative can help mobilise a coalition of non‑Western states to endorse and finance the peace plan. Organising a summit of emerging powers to pledge assistance to Gaza would demonstrate that the initiative is not solely Western‑led and could alleviate suspicion among Islamist movements and regional powers.

**Why engagement is crucial.** Beijing’s growing diplomatic weight means that any post‑war arrangement lacking Chinese support risks being portrayed as another Western imposition. Engaging China harnesses its desire to showcase an alternative to U.S. mediation, taps its resources for reconstruction and signals to the Global South that the peace framework is genuinely multilateral. At the same time, China’s major trade with Israel gives it an incentive to stabilise the situation. By inviting China as a guarantor and development partner while maintaining human rights benchmarks, the peace plan can broaden its legitimacy and create a more balanced international coalition.

## Key European States—Humanitarian, Political & Economic Roles

### EU Strategic Snapshot

This section is complementary to the NATO section, and shifts to the **humanitarian, diplomatic and economic instruments** those same actors wield—development aid, recognition policy, sanctions debates. Public opinion is presented in both sections, as current rifts in public opinion are rapidly shifting from public debates to security concern.

**Strategic stake and moral responsibility**

The European Union (EU) has deep historical and material stakes in ending the Gaza war. The bloc sits in the immediate neighbourhood and views the conflict through the lens of regional stability, energy flows, migration pressures and radicalisation risks. EU leaders cite a **moral obligation** stemming from Europe’s post‑war commitment to international humanitarian law and its role as a top aid donor: by July 2025 at least **60 000 Palestinians had been killed, 119,846 injured and over 1.9 million displaced**; **90% of school buildings** were damaged or destroyed and **nearly 470,000 people faced starvation conditions (**[europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/middle-east-and-northern-africa/palestine_en), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/29/gaza-death-toll-60000), [ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_GazaStrip_Alert_July2025.pdf), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-182-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/occupied-palestinian-territory), [savethechildren.net](https://www.savethechildren.net/blog/education-under-attack-gaza-nearly-90-school-buildings-damaged-or-destroyed), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/verification-damages-schools-based-proximity-damaged-sites-gaza-occupied-palestinian-territory-update-9-may-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/pictures/pictures-gazas-worsening-hunger-crisis-famine-warnings-intensify-2025-07-28), [redcross.org.uk](https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and-emergencies/world/whats-happening-in-gaza-humanitarian-crisis-grows), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/remarks-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-ep-plenary-session-topical-debate-rule-169-%E2%80%93_en)). The EU Commission stresses that this devastation, inflicted under a blockade and heavy bombardment, constitutes a **humanitarian emergency that threatens the entire region**. Europe’s proximity means refugee flows and heightened extremism could spill over its borders, while past colonial involvement and the Holocaust impose a special responsibility to uphold human rights and protect civilians ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eu-assessment-finds-significant-obstructive-factors-undermine-humanitarian-2025-08-07), [europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/statement-commissioner-crisis-management-janez-lenarcic-urgent-need-ceasefire-and-humanitarian-2024-06-11_en), [europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/joint-statement-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-and-commissioner-crisis-management-2024-07-05_en), [commission.europa.eu](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/middle-east-crisis_en), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-security-council-situation-middle-east-0_en), [icct.nl](https://icct.nl/publication/israel-hamas-war-spilling-over-europe), [ctc.westpoint.edu](https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-ilkka-salmi-eu-counter-terrorism-coordinator), [enlargement.ec.europa.eu](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/never-again-now-president-von-der-leyen-says-ahead-international-day-holocaust-remembrance-2024-01-26_en), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/defense-speech-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-forum-europa_en), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-eu-britain-international-pressure-condemnation-042b1bf0039543b4b01016a6fcd55058), [medecinsdumonde.org](https://www.medecinsdumonde.org/en/news/international-day-of-commemoration-and-dignity-of-the-victims-of-the-crime-of-genocide-and-of-the-prevention-of-this-crime)).

**Humanitarian response and aid mobilisation**

Europe has become the largest external provider of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Between October 2023 and mid‑2025 the EU contributed **€102 million in 2023, €237 million in 2024 and €170 million in 2025** in humanitarian assistance and co‑financed 72 flights delivering more than **4,700 tonnes of aid** through its Humanitarian Air Bridge ([europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/middle-east-and-northern-africa/palestine_en), [commission.europa.eu](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/middle-east-crisis_en), [snopes.com](https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/trumps-us-gaza-aid), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/eu-makes-major-step-forward-delivery-2024-humanitarian-aid-palestinians-gaza), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eu-launch-humanitarian-air-bridge-bring-aid-gaza-2023-10-16)). The bloc evacuated injured children to European hospitals and coordinated food, medical supplies and shelter materials via Cyprus and Egypt. In a joint donor statement, European and other donors accused Israel of blocking aid flows for months, insisting that shipments remained stacked in Egypt and urging the **“full resumption of assistance in accordance with international humanitarian law”** ([eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-donor-statement-humanitarian-aid-gaza%C2%A0_en), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/majority-medical-equipment-supplies-stock-zero-gaza-who-says-2025-05-26), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/world-central-kitchen-halts-work-gaza-supplies-run-out-2025-05-07), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eu-assessment-finds-significant-obstructive-factors-undermine-humanitarian-2025-08-07), [enlargement.ec.europa.eu](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eus-first-medical-evacuation-operation-palestinians-transfers-children-egypt-spain-2024-07-24_en), [who.int](https://www.who.int/europe/news-room/photo-stories/item/medical-evacuations-to-spain-provide-life-saving-care-to-palestinian-children), [europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-organises-further-medical-evacuation-gaza-european-countries-2024-12-05_en), [europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-mobilises-assistance-gaza-cyprus-maritime-corridor-2024-05-17_en), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/food-bound-gaza-rots-sun-egypts-rafah-crossing-stays-shut-2024-05-24)). These efforts underscore the EU’s view that humanitarian relief is not a favour but a legal duty and that any political settlement must start with unfettered aid access.

**Official EU positions and the two‑state horizon**

At the diplomatic level the EU has consistently called for an **immediate ceasefire**, **unconditional release of all hostages**, and **lifting of Israel’s blockade**. In a statement to the United Nations Security Council in July 2025 the EU stressed that Israel must ensure **“full, unimpeded, safe and sustainable humanitarian access”** and that all parties must comply with international law and protect civilians ([eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-donor-statement-humanitarian-aid-gaza%C2%A0_en), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eu-leaders-call-gaza-ceasefire-discussion-critical-israel-report-2025-06-26), [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2024/12/19), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uk-france-germany-urge-gaza-ceasefire-ask-israel-restore-humanitarian-access-2025-03-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-urges-israel-lift-gaza-blockade-warns-against-new-aid-delivery-plan-2025-05-07), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-security-council-briefing-humanitarian-situation-gaza_en)). EU institutions and leaders frame that the only sustainable solution is **two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side**, and expressed readiness to support mediators from the **United States, Egypt and Qatar**. EU leaders have repeatedly endorsed a **high‑level international conference** to launch a political process and have signalled willingness to support a **multinational stabilisation mission** once a ceasefire holds. Such positions are not mere rhetoric; they are anchored in EU treaties that commit member states to upholding international law and the **Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court**, including support for accountability and complementarity ([eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-security-council-situation-middle-east-0_en), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/04/eu-should-defend-icc), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-security-council-briefing-humanitarian-situation-gaza_en), [europa.eu](https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/israelpalestine-statement-high-representativevice-president-kaja-kallas-2025-07-11_en), [thesoufancenter.org](https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-june-2), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/05/letter-eu-foreign-ministers-ahead-un-conference-two-state-solution-and-peace-middle), [diplomatie.gouv.fr](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/israel-palestinian-territories/news/2025/article/united-nations-high-level-international-conference-new-york-declaration-on-the), [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/26/european-council-conclusions-on-the-middle-east), [swp-berlin.org](https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C04), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/gaza-ceasefire-what-role-could-the-eu-play-after-the-war/a-71318951), [eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2008/art_21/oj/eng)).

**Diverging national positions and internal fault‑lines**

Despite common declarations, EU member states are far from united. Spain, Ireland, **Malta and Slovenia** publicly committed in March 2024—and Spain, Ireland and **Norway** formally acted in May—to recognise a Palestinian state, with **Belgium declaring it was prepared to follow**. All four (Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Malta) had already demanded an immediate ceasefire and EU sanctions on violent West-Bank settlers in December 2023 ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/spain-ireland-belgium-malta-want-eu-summit-call-gaza-ceasefire-2023-12-09), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/britain-partners-call-israel-tackle-settler-violence-2023-12-15), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/prague-budapest-hold-up-eu-move-sanction-violent-israeli-settlers-2024-02-09), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/inside-the-eus-stalled-plan-to-penalize-israel-over-gaza-violations/a-73503955), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/spain-ireland-norway-set-recognise-palestinian-statehood-2024-05-28), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/spain-ireland-malta-slovenia-agree-work-towards-palestinian-state-recognition-2024-03-22), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/spain-ireland-recognise-palestinian-state-may-21-eus-borrell-2024-05-10)). **France** warned in May 2025 that it might **“toughen its stance”**—including sanctions against Israeli settlers—if humanitarian access did not improve ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/france-may-toughen-stance-israel-if-it-continues-blocking-gaza-aid-macron-says-2025-05-30)). In contrast, **Germany, Austria and Hungary** remained among Israel’s staunchest allies, citing historical guilt and security concerns. A 2025 internal review of the **EU‑Israel Association Agreement** documented suspected breaches—blocking aid, attacking hospitals and journalists, and expanding illegal settlements—yet proposals to restrict Israel’s access to EU research funds or halt visa‑free travel stalled because Berlin and Budapest insisted on more dialogue ([dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/inside-the-eus-stalled-plan-to-penalize-israel-over-gaza-violations/a-73503955), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/prague-budapest-hold-up-eu-move-sanction-violent-israeli-settlers-2024-02-09), [europarleuropa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/772892/EPRS_ATA%282025%29772892_EN.pdf), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/israel-attacks-put-pressure-on-germanys-middle-east-policies/a-72900451), [bmeia.gv.at](https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/ministerium/presse/aktuelles/alle/2025/06/austria-supports-suffering-palestinian-civilian-population-in-gaza)). Hungary opposed any punitive measures, while Germany’s position reflects domestic sensitivities and fears of undermining its historic responsibility toward Jewish communities. This division illustrates how domestic politics, historical memory and trade ties shape national stances ([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-eu-britain-international-pressure-condemnation-042b1bf0039543b4b01016a6fcd55058), [politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/why-angela-merkel-cant-stop-apologizing-germany-foreign-policy), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/hungarys-orban-welcomes-netanyahu-vows-to-fight-anti-semitism-idUSKBN1A31G8)).

Beyond government halls, public opinion across Europe increasingly sympathises with Palestinian suffering, while antisemitism and Islamophobia are rising. Surveys by the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency found that incidents of antisemitic harassment surged **over 400 %** after October 2023, with **three‑quarters of European Jews feeling blamed for Israel’s actions and 34 % avoiding public events out of fear (**[dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/jews-in-europe-face-rising-antisemitism-report/a-69623345), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2603209/amp), [thepipd.com](https://www.thepipd.com/resources/polling-2024), [yougov.co.uk](https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/52279-net-favourability-towards-israel-reaches-new-lows-in-key-western-european-countries), [vocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu](https://vocesdelsur.prensa-latina.cu/public-support-for-israel-collapses-across-western-europe-and-us), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/antisemitic-incidents-europe-rise-gaza-war-rages-survey-shows-2024-07-11), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-sees-sharp-rise-in-incidents-of-islamophobia/live-72941511), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/anti-muslim-incidents-double-germany-overlooked-by-authorities-ngo-says-2024-06-24), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/alarming-islamophobia-in-germany-every-second-person-agrees-with-anti-muslim-statements-/3609924)). These social tensions feed populist narratives, polarise politics and complicate consensus on foreign policy, making European unity both ethically urgent and politically fragile.

**Recognition of Palestine and national diplomacy**

Diplomatic recognition of Palestine remains a litmus test for Europe’s resolve. Historically, **Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Poland and Romania** recognised Palestine in 1988, and **Sweden** became the first EU member to do so in 2014. After the Gaza war escalated, **Spain and Ireland** coordinated with Norway to recognise Palestine on **28 May 2024**, followed by **Slovenia** on **4 June 2024** ([euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/07/28/which-eu-countries-recognise-palestine-amid-frances-decision), [diplomaticspectrum.com](https://www.diplomaticspectrum.com/en/receptions/2000-33-years-since-the-declaration-of-independence-of-the-state-of-palestine.html), [maannews.net](https://www.maannews.net/news/783829.html), [mofa.pna.ps](https://www.mofa.pna.ps/en-us/mediaoffice/countries-recognized-the-state-of-palestine), [web.archive.org](https://web.archive.org/web/20181224170551/http://www.wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx), [web.archive.org](https://web.archive.org/web/20181002160529/http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000827/082711eo.pdf), [en.palestine.hu](https://en.palestine.hu/palestine-and-hungary/diplomatic-relations), [gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/palestine/bilateral-relations), [notesfrompoland.com](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/07/31/poland-says-it-can-serve-as-example-for-countries-considering-recognising-palestine), [ramallah.mae.ro](https://ramallah.mae.ro/node/221), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-203405), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/spain-ireland-norway-set-recognise-palestinian-statehood-2024-05-28), [pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovenia-becomes-4th-european-country-to-recognize-palestinian-state-after-parliamentary-vote)). In a landmark shift, **France announced that it will recognise the State of Palestine at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025**, becoming the first G7 country and permanent UN Security Council member to take that step. President Macron argued that recognition is both a moral duty and a political necessity to achieve a viable two‑state solution. **Belgium** voiced *readiness* but has **not yet** issued a recognition decree. Meanwhile **Germany and Italy** insist that recognition should follow negotiations, fearing premature recognition could reduce leverage. This staggered recognition reveals how Europe’s normative power operates through a patchwork of national decisions rather than a unified diplomatic front ([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/24/macron-says-france-will-recognise-palestinian-state-in-september), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-plan-recognise-palestinian-state-draws-fire-israel-us-2025-07-25), [franceintheus.org](https://franceintheus.org/spip.php), [newarab.com](https://www.newarab.com/news/which-countries-will-recognise-palestinian-state-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-dismisses-macrons-plan-recognize-palestinian-state-2025-07-25), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/belgiums-socialist-party-head-urges-immediate-recognition-of-palestinian-state/3644333), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/germany-respond-any-unilateral-israeli-moves-palestinian-territories-minister-2025-07-31), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/german-foreign-minister-tones-down-palestinian-recognition-talk-west-bank-trip-2025-08-01), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/meloni-italy-will-not-recognize-palestinian-state-move-could-be-counterproductive), [esteri.it](https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2025/07/tajani-dolore-in-prima-persona-per-gaza-la-palestina-va-costruita-no-agli-slogan-avvenire), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/10/mapping-which-countries-recognise-palestine-in-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/france-says-un-conference-work-post-war-gaza-palestinian-state-recognition-2025-07-15), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/how-gaza-exasperation-pushed-three-israel-allies-towards-recognising-palestinian-2025-08-01)).

**Role of key European states**

**France** has positioned itself as Europe’s most active diplomatic actor. President Macron initially floated an international coalition to fight Hamas, later championed an expanded two‑state initiative and threatened sanctions on settlers blocking aid. Paris co‑hosted an **international conference** with Saudi Arabia calling for a ceasefire, halting settlements and establishing a **time‑bound pathway toward a sovereign Palestinian state (**[reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-france-seek-support-declaration-two-state-solution-between-israel-2025-07-29), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/high-level-conference-two-state-solution-july2025), [diplomatie.gouv.fr](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/israel-palestinian-territories/news/2025/article/united-nations-high-level-international-conference-new-york-declaration-on-the), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/france-may-toughen-stance-israel-if-it-continues-blocking-gaza-aid-macron-says-2025-05-30), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/un-palestinians-israel-twostate-gaza-france-saudi-af7910977b9d17a03e7785039303c84f), [ispionline.it](https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/reviving-the-two-state-solution-the-un-conference-and-the-recognition-of-palestine-215330), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/frances-macron-says-he-stands-solidarity-with-israels-fight-against-terrorism-2023-10-24), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/commodities/frances-macron-looking-to-build-humanitarian-coalition-regarding-gaza-in-ta-idUSFWN3BX2P3), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/france-wants-palestinian-two-state-solution-macron-says-2025-05-28), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-announces-new-west-bank-settlements-despite-sanctions-threat-2025-05-29)). France’s upcoming recognition of Palestine signals a desire to anchor European leadership in the post‑war settlement. **Spain and Ireland** have consistently advocated for ceasefire and recognition and spearheaded EU discussions on sanctioning Israel, enhancing their influence within EU councils ([politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/pedro-sanchez-spain-humanitarian-ceasefire-gaza-israel-hamas-war), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/spain-ireland-belgium-malta-want-eu-summit-call-gaza-ceasefire-2023-12-09), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/corrected-spain-favour-humanitarian-ceasefire-gaza-the-very-short-term-2023-11-23), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/26/divided-eu-summit-backs-off-from-pressurising-israel-over-gaza), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/spain-wants-eu-to-block-israel-trade-deal-over-gaza-war-human-rights/a-73055177), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/spain-ireland-norway-set-recognise-palestinian-statehood-2024-05-28)). **Germany** remains Europe’s largest economy and one of Israel's largest trading partners; its cautious approach stems from Holocaust memory and domestic debates on antisemitism ([ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-30072025-ap), [wits.worldbank.org](https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/ISR), [oec.world](https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/deu/partner/isr), [policy.trade.ec.europa.eu](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/israel_en), [bundesregierung.de](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/service/archive/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-2230254), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/german-government-takes-tougher-tone-with-israel/a-73509246), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/4/30/germanys-crackdown-on-criticism-of-israel-betrays-european-values)). **Hungary** under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán uses its veto power to shield Israel from EU penalties, aligning with right‑wing populist narratives ([hungarianconservative.com](https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/hungary-against-eu-sanctions-against-israel), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/inside-the-eus-stalled-plan-to-penalize-israel-over-gaza-violations/a-73503955), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/how-might-eu-respond-israel-over-gaza-aid-crisis-2025-07-30), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/16/eu-cruel-unlawful-betrayal-palestinians-failure-sanctions-israel), [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/18/eu-fms-due-to-discuss-political-solutions-to-end-israel-gaza-conflict-as-violence-surges-o)). **Belgium** hosts Brussels and therefore plays a brokerage role; its government has publicly condemned Israeli settlement expansion and is considering recognition ([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/belgium-to-impose-sanctions-on-israeli-settlers-in-west-bank-foreign-minister/3177630), [belganewsagency.eu](https://www.belganewsagency.eu/foreign-minister-belgian-position-on-recognition-of-palestine-to-be-defined-in-september), [diplomatie.belgium.be](https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/policy/policy-areas/highlighted/brussels-international-capital-city-asset-our-country)). **Italy**, though critical of settlements, prefers to act within the trans‑Atlantic consensus and is reluctant to move ahead of the United States ([jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/international/article-862245), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/meloni-italy-will-not-recognize-palestinian-state-move-could-be-counterproductive), [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/07/28/which-eu-countries-recognise-palestine-amid-frances-decision)). The **United Kingdom**, although outside the EU, remains a key European actor; London has joined calls for a ceasefire and supports the two‑state framework but faces domestic divisions similar to the continent ([gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-words-on-gaza-29-july-2025), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/we-are-determined-to-protect-the-viability-of-the-two-state-solution-foreign-secretary-statement-at-the-un-two-state-solution-conference-on-gaza-and), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-occupied-palestinian-territories), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/starmer-recognize-palestinian-state-israel-peace-a08e929a9459e9160992f84dc73b6638)).

### Overview of Key European States

***Country Profiles: Divergent National Postures***

The European Union is not a monolith – individual member states have markedly different historical experiences, political interests and domestic constituencies. This section highlights the positions of several key European governments on the Gaza conflict and the proposed peace plan. It summarises their public statements, recognition policies and potential roles, grounding each assessment in publicly reported facts.

#### France

France has positioned itself at the forefront of European diplomatic activism. President Emmanuel Macron announced that France would **officially recognise the State of Palestine at the September 2025 United Nations General Assembly**. Macron told Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that France’s decision was driven by its historic commitment to a just peace and that recognition would be formally proclaimed in New York. The French move is intended to create momentum among hesitant Western partners and to prevent the two‑state solution from being “eroded before our eyes”. Paris sees recognition as a lever to push both Israelis and Palestinians back to negotiations and to signal to Arab partners that Europe is willing to match words with action. France is also pressing for a **high‑level international conference** and has co‑hosted meetings with Saudi Arabia to rally support for a time‑bound, internationally guaranteed two‑state process. Israel and the United States have condemned Macron’s initiative, arguing that it rewards Hamas and undermines Israel’s security, but France appears determined to proceed.  
([france24.com](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250724-french-president-macron-says-france-will-recognize-palestine-as-a-state-in-september), [pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/france-will-recognize-palestine-as-a-state-president-macron-says), [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/07/25/macron-decides-to-recognize-state-of-palestine-amid-diplomatic-impasse-and-humanitarian-disaster-in-gaza_6743706_4.html), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-plan-recognise-palestinian-state-draws-fire-israel-us-2025-07-25), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-july-24-2025), [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2025/07/24/france-palestine-state-macron-abbas-israel), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/25/us-israel-condemn-frances-move-to-recognise-palestinian-state), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/un-palestinians-israel-twostate-gaza-france-saudi-af7910977b9d17a03e7785039303c84f), [reutersconnect.com](https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/un-conference-hosted-by-france-and-saudi-arabia-to-work-towards-a-two-state-solution-between-israel-and-the-palestinians-in-new-york/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjU6bmV3c21sX1JDMlBWRkFLSlNIVg), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-saudi-arabia-leading-push-for-palestinian-statehood/a-73536683), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/how-gaza-exasperation-pushed-three-israel-allies-towards-recognising-palestinian-2025-08-01))

#### Germany

Germany remains one of Israel’s closest allies in Europe and has **ruled out recognising a Palestinian state in the short term**. A German government spokesperson emphasised that “Israel’s security is of paramount importance” and said Berlin’s priority is to make long‑overdue progress towards a two‑state solution rather than premature recognition. Germany’s hesitance reflects deep domestic sensitivities: the government cites its special responsibility to atone for the Holocaust and insists that any peace arrangement must guarantee Israel’s security. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has nonetheless joined calls for an immediate cease‑fire and has announced an air‑bridge with Jordan to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza, saying that Germany wants to “end the humanitarian suffering … as quickly as possible”. Germany supports EU humanitarian funding but has resisted punitive measures against Israel; in May 2025 it joined Hungary in blocking EU sanctions on violent Israeli settlers, prompting the EU to consider only a review of the Association Agreement. Berlin’s cautious stance suggests it could support post‑war reconstruction and governance reforms but is unlikely to endorse unilateral recognition or sanctions without broad consensus.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-not-planning-recognise-palestinian-state-short-term-2025-07-25), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/middle-east-germany-announces-plan-to-airlift-aid-to-gaza/live-73433944), [arabcenterdc.org](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/once-again-germany-is-on-the-wrong-side-of-history), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/germanys-merz-announces-gaza-aid-airlift-mulls-upping-ante-israel-2025-07-28), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/inside-the-eus-stalled-plan-to-penalize-israel-over-gaza-violations/a-73503955), [politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-merz-economic-ties-israel-eu-humanitarian-gaza-palestine-human-rights-iran-strikes), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/22/which-countries-trade-the-most-with-israel-and-what-do-they-buy-and-sell))

#### United Kingdom

*Complementing the NATO chapter, the box below shifts from military posture to the UK’s* ***domestic politics, aid budget and recognition debate***

The United Kingdom under Prime Minister Keir Starmer has aligned itself with France on recognition but attached **conditionality**. Starmer told parliament and partner governments that **Britain would recognise the State of Palestine at the September 2025 UN General Assembly unless Israel took substantive steps to allow greater humanitarian access, renounced annexation and committed to a credible two‑state pathway**. He described the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza as “unacceptable” and said recognition was necessary to keep the peace process alive and respond to public anger. London has coordinated closely with Paris and Berlin, with Starmer speaking to Macron and Chancellor Merz about a sustainable route to a two‑state solution. If Israel cooperates on aid and diplomacy, Britain may delay recognition; if not, London appears poised to join France and Canada in a landmark diplomatic shift.

*This chapter feeds back into the UK security calculus outlined earlier, demonstrating the continuum from street pressure to alliance policy.*

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/uks-starmer-hold-urgent-talks-over-gaza-humanitarian-catastrophe-2025-07-24), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jul/29/uk-to-recognise-state-of-palestine-in-september-unless-israel-holds-to-a-ceasefire), [abcnews.go.com](https://abcnews.go.com/International/mass-starvation-looms-gaza-european-leaders-hold-emergency/story), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-uk-france-say-gaza-humanitarian-crisis-must-end/live-73407430), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-statement-on-the-occupied-palestinian-territories), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-pledges-lifesaving-aid-for-gaza), [libdems.org.uk](https://www.libdems.org.uk/press/release/ed-davey-calls-for-uk-airdrops-to-get-aid-to-gazans), [thetimes.com](https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/palestine-action-targeted-jewish-businesses-keir-starmer-m6r2xxmsb), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/canada-gaza-israel-palestinian-state-0c7dfc4b9985491bc1cbaac9e5d954a3))

#### Italy

Italy’s right‑wing government has made clear that it **supports a Palestinian state in principle but opposes premature recognition**. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni argued that recognising a state “before it is established could be counterproductive,” cautioning that a purely symbolic gesture might create the illusion that the problem has been solved when it has not. She insisted that recognition should occur simultaneously with the new Palestinian entity’s recognition of Israel and with concrete institutional arrangements. Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani echoed this position, saying that a Palestinian state that does not acknowledge Israel would not resolve the conflict. Italy therefore remains sceptical of unilateral moves, focusing instead on humanitarian support, protection of civilians and diplomatic pressure for reforms in the Palestinian Authority.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/italys-meloni-recognising-palestinian-state-before-it-is-established-may-be-2025-07-26), [agenzianova.com](https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Tajani-are-available-to-recognize-Palestine-but-first-there-must-be-a-state-to-recognize), [usnews.com](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2025-07-26/italys-meloni-recognising-palestinian-state-before-it-is-established-may-be-counterproductive), [esteri.it](https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2025/07/tajani-dolore-in-prima-persona-per-gaza-la-palestina-va-costruita-no-agli-slogan-avvenire), [aacom.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/italy-reiterates-opposition-to-illegal-israeli-settlements-in-west-bank/3652124), [plenglish.com](https://www.plenglish.com/news/2025/08/02/italy-to-begin-airdrops-of-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza), [esteri.it](https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/07/dichiarazione-congiunta-su-gaza-e-i-territori-palestinesi-occupati), [thetimes.com](https://www.thetimes.com/world/europe/article/germany-palestine-state-friedrich-merz-063f7skhr), [esteri.it](https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2025/07/tajani-dolore-in-prima-persona-per-gaza-la-palestina-va-costruita-no-agli-slogan-avvenire))

#### Spain

Spain has emerged as a **leading European advocate for Palestinian statehood**. In May 2024, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez formally recognised a Palestinian state under the Palestinian Authority with East Jerusalem as its capital. Sánchez argued that recognition is “the only way to achieve peace” in which an independent Palestinian state lives alongside Israel. Spain also called for an international peace conference and said it would not accept any changes to pre‑1967 borders unless agreed by both parties. Recognition was backed by a majority of Spaniards and by cross‑party consensus; it sought to preserve the viability of a two‑state solution and to encourage other EU members to follow. Spain continues to pressure Israel to lift the blockade and respect international law and is one of the EU’s loudest voices in favour of sanctions on violent settlers and a review of EU‑Israel agreements. Madrid intends to play a prominent role in post‑conflict reconstruction and has proposed cooperating with Arab partners to revitalise the Palestinian Authority.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/spain-ireland-norway-set-recognise-palestinian-statehood-2024-05-28), [realinstitutoelcano.org](https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/commentaries/spanish-public-opinion-regarding-recognition-of-the-state-of-palestine), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/european-muslim-countries-meet-spain-eyeing-schedule-palestinian-statehood-2024-09-13), [gmfus.org](https://www.gmfus.org/news/triple-message-spains-recognition-palestine), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-meets-urge-support-two-state-solution-us-israel-boycott-2025-07-28), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/norway-spain-ireland-recognize-palestinian-state-live-updates-2024-05-22), [lamoncloa.gob.es](https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/actividades/Documents/2025/290525-Joint_Statement_SI_ES_on_Gaza_Final.pdf), [business-humanrights.org](https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/spain-foreign-minister-calls-for-suspension-of-eu-israel-association-agreement-arms-embargo), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/25/spain-hosts-european-arab-nations-to-pressure-israel-to-halt-gaza-assault))

#### Ireland

Ireland, along with Spain and Norway, also recognised Palestine in May 2024. Taoiseach Simon Harris explained that although Ireland would normally wait until the conclusion of a peace process, **delaying recognition could doom the “miracle of peace”; therefore Ireland recognised Palestine to keep hope alive**. Dublin views recognition as a moral imperative and a political necessity to counteract extremist narratives. It has advocated for a lasting cease‑fire, unconditional release of hostages and accountability for violations of international humanitarian law. Ireland also supports sanctions on violent settlers and the suspension of preferential trade with Israel if humanitarian conditions do not improve. Civil society in Ireland is strongly mobilised; public protests and opinion polls show overwhelming sympathy for Palestinian civilians and support for the International Criminal Court.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/ireland-officially-recognises-palestinian-state-2024-05-28), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ireland-files-a-declaration-of-intervention-in-the-proceedings-under-article-63-of-the-statute-application-of-the-convention-on-the-prevention-and-punishment-of-the-crime-of-genocide-in-the-gaza-str), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/irish-premier-calls-for-eu-sanctions-on-israeli-settlers-in-occupied-west-bank-far-right-ministers/3613889), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/20/eu-suspend-trade-agreement-with-israel), [oireachtas.ie](https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/press-centre/press-releases/20250731-committee-on-foreign-affairs-and-trade-publishes-report-of-the-general-scheme-of-the-israeli-settlements-in-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-prohibition-of-importation-of-goods-bill), [business-humanrights.org](https://www.business-humanrights.org/es/%C3%BAltimas-noticias/ireland-govt-approves-drafting-of-bill-to-ban-import-of-goods-from-illegal-israeli-settlements), [oireachtas.ie](https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2025-05-29/66), [irishtimes.com](https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2025/07/19/this-war-took-my-entire-life-from-me-thousands-attend-pro-palestine-march-in-dublin), [ngo-monitor.org](https://ngo-monitor.org/reports/decade-of-lobbying-ngo-mobilization-for-the-irish-occupied-territories-bill))

#### Belgium

Belgium is **considering recognition but remains divided**. The government postponed its decision to early September 2025 while awaiting the outcome of the UN General Assembly. Opposition parties and Francophone coalition partners urge the government to follow France’s lead, while Flemish parties, including the liberal MR and nationalist N‑VA, oppose recognition and sanctions. King Philippe has described the humanitarian situation in Gaza as a “disgrace to humanity” and has called for sanctions against violent settlers. The debate reflects Belgium’s complex federal politics and the electoral weight of its Jewish and pro‑Israel communities. Regardless of the decision, Belgium continues to support substantial humanitarian aid and has joined calls for an immediate cease‑fire and the release of hostages.

([belganewsagency.eu](https://www.belganewsagency.eu/foreign-minister-belgian-position-on-recognition-of-palestine-to-be-defined-in-september), [brusselstimes.com](https://www.brusselstimes.com/1680562/leader-of-ps-addresses-party-presidents-calling-to-recognize-palestine), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/belgiums-socialist-party-head-urges-immediate-recognition-of-palestinian-state/3644333), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/belgium-must-recognize-palestinian-state-now-says-minister/3226161), [brusselstimes.com](https://www.brusselstimes.com/1567768/n-va-supports-french-plan-for-palestine-recognition-via-two-state-solution), [politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/gaza-israel-war-belgian-king-philippe), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/belgian-foreign-minister-reiterates-support-for-more-sanctions-on-israel/3600565), [politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/gaza-israel-spain-belgium-ireland-malta-ceasefire), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/news-releases/belgium-signs-new-eur-275m-agreement-unrwa), [diplomatie.belgium.be](https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/news/belgium-supports-mandate-unrwa-and-renews-its-flexible-and-multi-year-humanitarian-contribution), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/spain-belgium-ireland-malta-call-for-decisive-eu-stance-on-gaza/3078925), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-842167))

#### Hungary

Budapest has become the EU’s most reliable shield for Israel. It blocked the Union’s first attempt to blacklist violent West-Bank settlers in February 2024, with Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó declaring that “now is definitely not the time to sanction Israel”. Hungary was likewise the *only* member state to veto EU statements urging a Gaza ceasefire in both May 2021 and again during the October 2023 escalation. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán rejects any recognition of Palestine “imposed from Brussels” and frames criticism of Israel as liberal overreach, consistent with his right-populist narrative of defending sovereign allies against EU elites. Budapest argues that punitive measures would embolden Hamas and “undermine Israel’s security,” and therefore calls on the EU to prioritise humanitarian assistance and quiet diplomacy instead of sanctions or recognition.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/prague-budapest-hold-up-eu-move-sanction-violent-israeli-settlers-2024-02-09), [dailynewshungary.com](https://dailynewshungary.com/hungary-against-sanctioning-israel), [euractiv.com](https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/hungary-blocks-eu-declaration-on-israel-palestine-ceasefire), [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/02/19/all-eu-countries-bar-hungary-call-for-eventual-gaza-ceasefire), [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/10/09/viktor-orban-and-ursula-von-der-leyen-clash-in-fiery-debate-at-european-parliament), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/viktor-orban-anti-woke-resistance-obstructs-eu-decisions-c713e4f492292e8854afa0b0993ad1fe), [haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-05-22/ty-article/.premium/hungary-blocks-eu-sanctions-on-israeli-settlers-without-equal-measures-on-hamas-affiliates/00000196-f81a-db1f-a7b6-fabacdd40000), [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/06/05/war-in-gaza-the-eu-s-diplomatic-failure_6673792_4.html))

#### Austria

Vienna’s centre-right coalition echoes many Hungarian lines but with softer rhetoric. In public statements after 7 October, the Foreign Ministry said **“Israel’s right to self-defence is beyond discussion”** and labelled Austria’s support for Israeli security a *raison d’être*. Chancellor Christian Stocker reiterated in June 2025 that Austria would **“firmly demand the release of all hostages”**, back a sustainable ceasefire and maintain humanitarian aid to Gaza, yet he **“has not committed to recognising Palestine,”** warning that unilateral steps could legitimise extremist actors. While Vienna condemns civilian suffering and supports EU relief funding, it aligns with Budapest in cautioning that sanctions or premature recognition risk deepening intra-EU splits and jeopardising Israel’s security interests.

([bmeia.gv.at](https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/ministerium/presse/aktuelles/2024/02/foreign-minister-schallenberg-in-israel-overcoming-difficult-times-together-as-close-partners), [bmeia.gv.at](https://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/ministerium/presse/aktuelles/2023/10/austria-stands-in-solidarity-with-israel), [governo.it](https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-press-statement-federal-chancellor-austria-christian-stocker/29272), [thelocal.at](https://www.thelocal.at/20240523/explained-why-austria-does-not-recognise-the-state-of-palestine), [middleeastmonitor.com](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250520-austria-says-gaza-must-remain-palestinian-urges-ceasefire-ahead-of-call-with-netanyahu), [brusselssignal.eu](https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/07/austrian-minister-claims-state-tv-interview-manipulated-regarding-israel))

#### 

#### Poland

Poland’s policy blends its early recognition of Palestinian statehood in 1988 with a post-7-October posture that condemns Hamas, backs Israel’s right to self-defence, yet repeatedly urges restraint and humanitarian access.Public pressure is tangible—polls show majority of poles believe Poland should remain neutral in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Warsaw has air-lifted six-plus tonnes of medicines, baby formula and blankets to Gaza (April 2025) and top up UNRWA, UNICEF and WFP with fresh grants after 7 October. Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski has summoned Israel’s ambassador over a Polish aid-worker’s death and later branded Israel’s response “excessive” while calling for a ceasefire.Yet Poland also blocked EU moves to freeze political dialogue with Israel in November 2024, arguing engagement is essential for hostage releases and de-escalation, underscoring its pragmatic, EU-centric calculus.In sum, Warsaw casts itself as a humanitarian contributor and candid critic-friend of Israel—anchored in historic support for Palestinian statehood but wary of rupturing EU unity or its own strategic ties.

([notesfrompoland.com](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/08/03/no-one-has-the-right-to-make-children-starve-poland-tells-israel), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-will-not-suspend-dialogue-with-israel-polands-sikorski-says-2024-11-18), [prospernetwork.eu](https://prospernetwork.eu/polands-shifting-middle-east-policy-continuity-and-change-after-october-7th), [cbos.pl](https://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/cbos_news_text.php), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/18/in-poland-where-criticising-israel-remains-taboo-gaza-solidarity-rises), [gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/mfa-statement-on-inviting-ambassadors-of-egypt-israel-and-palestine), [cbos.pl](https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2023/12_2023.pdf), [gov.pl](https://www.gov.pl/web/un/poland-makes-two-contributions-of-usd-2-million-in-total-for-un-agencies-operating-in-gaza-as-humanitarian-situation-of-local-civilians-becomes-dramatic), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/poland-israel-gaza-ambassador-summoned-bc27434c7a8e5eb828867c17d4e884db), [businessinsider.com.pl](https://businessinsider.com.pl/polityka/polacy-wobec-izraela-ponad-polowa-krytykuje-operacje-wojskowe/t4w1cyg), [cbos.pl](https://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/raporty_tekst.php), [vivapalestyna.pl](https://vivapalestyna.pl/sondaz-rzeczpospolitej-polacy-za-sankcjami-wobec-izraela), [pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/03/most-people-across-24-surveyed-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-netanyahu), [researchgate.net](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392352935_Poland's_Attitudes_and_Policy_Towards_Israel_and_Palestine_after_October_7th_Continuity_and_Change))

#### Switzerland

True to its long-standing “good offices” diplomacy and policy of permanent neutrality—Switzerland has taken a carefully balanced line on Gaza. The Federal Council **demands an immediate ceasefire and unrestricted humanitarian access** in the Strip, as restated on 28 May 2025.While deeply engaged in humanitarian relief, **Bern declines to recognise a Palestinian state until a comprehensive, negotiated peace is in place**, arguing that early recognition would impede its ability to mediate and to fulfil its special role as **depositary of the Geneva Conventions**.

On 21 May 2025 the Federal Council approved a **CHF 20 million package**: **CHF 9 million** for four partner organisations working in Gaza/West Bank—UNICEF, WFP, WHO and the Swiss Red Cross/Palestine Red Crescent—and **CHF 10 million** to **resume UNRWA funding** in neighbouring countries, plus **CHF 1 million** to implement the Colonna audit on UNRWA impartiality.This package replaced the earlier draft figure of CHF 21 million and confirmed that Switzerland’s humanitarian focus would precede any political move on state recognition.

([news.admin.ch](https://www.news.admin.ch/en/newnsb/uTK8BTCDvZeuberd5bfgQ), [news.admin.ch](https://www.news.admin.ch/en/newnsb/uTK8BTCDvZeuberd5bfgQ), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/switzerland-pledges-24m-to-help-support-palestinians/3575406), [swissinfo.ch](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-diplomacy/why-switzerland-does-not-recognise-palestine/89779442), [eda.admin.ch](https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/representations-and-travel-advice/palestinian-authority/switzerland-palestinian-authority.html), [eda.admin.ch](https://www.eda.admin.ch/countries/israel/fr/home/aktuell/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2025/5/30/RpSs7reTL9F6czQvu6WTf), [eda.admin.ch](https://www.eda.admin.ch/countries/lebanon/en/home/news/news.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2025/7/25/if-RzGvNK4kNwjDPTGBdI), [eda.admin.ch](https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-offices.html))

**Domestic landscape: On 13 January 2024, a national march in Basel drew an estimated 15 000 participants according to organisers (police put the crowd at 2 000–2 500).** Throughout **May 2024, university occupations and encampments spread from the University of Lausanne (UNIL) to ETH Zurich and the University of Bern**, galvanising headlines as police negotiated or cleared the sites.Tensions have periodically spiked: **during an unauthorised city-centre march in Zurich on 13 June 2025, police deployed tear gas and water cannon, detaining 11 people**.The episodes highlight the friction between Switzerland’s robust protest culture and its doctrine of strict neutrality.

([euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/2024/01/13/switzerland-pro-palestinian-activists-bash-the-countrys-neutrality-during-new-protest), [theswisstimes.ch](https://theswisstimes.ch/3000-people-at-palestine-rally-in-basel), [srf.ch](https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/pro-palaestinensische-proteste-polizei-greift-in-basel-ein-protest-endet-in-lausanne-und-bern), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/08/pro-palestine-student-protests-campuses-europe-arrests-police), [swissinfo.ch](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/foreign-affairs/eleven-arrests-following-pro-palestine-demonstration-in-zurich/89509146), [swissinfo.ch](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-politics/police-clear-out-pro-palestinian-students-protesting-in-geneva/77499008))

**Security posture.** As Parliament edges toward loosening Switzerland’s century-old War-Materiel Act—the Council of States voted on 11 June 2025 to let 25 trusted Western countries re-export Swiss kit without prior approval—the **Federal Council has kept the existing re-export ban in force**, citing neutrality and the risk of escalation.In Brussels fora where Switzerland sits as an EFTA observer, Bern’s diplomats **champion EU humanitarian envelopes for Gaza**—for example through pledges and panel work at the European Humanitarian Forum in May 2025—yet **steer clear of EU discussions on punitive measures such as sanctions**, consistent with the government’s preference for humanitarian and legal tools over coercive economics.Reflecting that stance, Switzerland has so far **declined to join US- or EU-led sanctions on extremist Israeli settlers**, even while reserving the right to do so later.Overall, Bern continues to brand itself a humanitarian heavyweight and treaty guarantor rather than an early recogniser of Palestinian statehood or a sanctions frontrunner.

([swissinfo.ch](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-senate-eases-arms-export-rules-amid-industry-struggles/89496745), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swiss-arms-exports-fall-government-mulls-looser-curbs-after-ukraine-war-2025-03-11), [civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-pledges-eu23-billion-european-humanitarian-forum-2025-2025-05-20_en), [news.admin.ch](https://www.news.admin.ch/en/nsb))

#### Other European States

Several other EU members have long recognised Palestine or have signalled openness to recognition. Sweden became the first EU member to recognise Palestine in 2014; Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria recognised it decades ago. Norway (not an EU member but a key European state) joined Spain and Ireland in recognising Palestine in May 2024. The Netherlands spearheaded the May 2025 initiative to review the EU‑Israel Association Agreement and was joined by 16 other members in calling for an inquiry into Israel’s human rights compliance. Countries like Portugal, and Luxembourg support recognition in principle and emphasise accountability at the International Criminal Court, but they have not yet announced official moves. Collectively, these states signal growing impatience with the status quo and a willingness to use trade and diplomatic tools to push for a negotiated two‑state settlement.

In short, Europe’s pro-recognition bloc is no longer a symbolic minority: it is an expanding coalition using diplomatic recognition, treaty-law mechanisms, and international-justice forums to press all parties toward a genuine two-state framework.  
([un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-207042), [notesfrompoland.com](https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/07/31/poland-says-it-can-serve-as-example-for-countries-considering-recognising-palestine), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/sweden-officially-recognises-state-palestine), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/10/30/sweden-recognises-state-of-palestine), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/spain-ireland-norway-set-recognise-palestinian-statehood-2024-05-28), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/22/palestinian-state-recognition-ireland-spain-recognise-palestine), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovenia-becomes-latest-eu-country-recognise-palestinian-state-2024-06-04), [pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/slovenia-becomes-4th-european-country-to-recognize-palestinian-state-after-parliamentary-vote), [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/07/31/portugal-considering-recognition-of-palestinian-state-in-september_6743951_4.html), [presstv.ir](https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2025/07/26/751863/Portugal-Open-To-Recognizing-Palestinian-State), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/israel-palestinians-settlements-eu/eu-should-recognise-palestinian-state-after-us-backs-israeli-settlements-luxembourg-idUSKBN1XU2IN), [gouvernement.lu](https://gouvernement.lu/en/actualites/toutes_actualites.gouv2024_maee%2Ben%2Bactualites%2Barticles%2B2019%2BAsselborn-support-ICC.html), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-001865_EN.html), [business-humanrights.org](https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/israelopt-netherlands-urges-review-of-eu-israel-trade-deal-over-catastrophic-gaza-aid-block), [daphnefoundation](https://www.daphne.foundation/en/2025/05/16/review-eu-israel-association-agreement), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/01/friday-briefing-has-the-recognition-of-a-palestinian-state-gathered-an-unstoppable-pace), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/772892/EPRS_ATA%282025%29772892_EN.pdf), [business-humanrights.org](https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/israelopt-netherlands-urges-review-of-eu-israel-trade-deal-over-catastrophic-gaza-aid-block), [gouvernement.lu](https://gouvernement.lu/en/actualites/toutes_actualites.gouv2024_maee%2Ben%2Bactualites%2Barticles%2B2019%2BAsselborn-support-ICC.html), [buildingtrust.si](https://buildingtrust.si/joint-statement-in-support-of-the-international-criminal-court-icc))

#### Implications for the Unified State Peace Plan

This patchwork of positions illustrates the **multiplicity of European voices**. France and Spain seek to lead a coalition of willing states towards recognition and a renewed peace process; Germany and Italy caution against premature moves; Britain positions itself as a conditional supporter; Belgium hesitates; and Hungary remain obstinate defenders of Israel. These divergences matter because any EU involvement in the Unified State peace plan will require consensus or at least a broad coalition.

European states with proactive stances (France, Spain, Ireland) could act as champions, mobilising resources and political momentum for international guarantees and reconstruction funds.

Skeptical states (Germany, Italy) may moderate the pace of recognition but still provide significant humanitarian and financial support.

Obstructionist actors (like Hungary) could dilute EU sanctions and complicate unified diplomacy.

Understanding these national dynamics is essential for designing a peace plan that leverages supportive governments while navigating internal EU fault lines.

### Potential EU contributions to the peace plan

The European Union and its member states have both a moral imperative and a strategic interest in ensuring that any ceasefire in Gaza evolves into a durable peace. Europe’s contribution must therefore go beyond emergency aid; it should encompass monitoring, governance support, reconstruction financing, accountability and civil‑society engagement. The following sub‑sections outline concrete ways the EU can help operationalise a Unified State peace plan while respecting Palestinian self‑determination and Israeli security.

**Secure the humanitarian ceasefire and fund immediate relief**

* **Maintain large‑scale humanitarian assistance and multi‑year recovery funds.** The EU has already provided hundreds of millions of euros in humanitarian aid since the war began. For 2025 the Commission proposed a multi‑annual **Comprehensive Support Programme** worth up to **€1.6 billion**. The programme will run from 2025 to 2027 and is built around three pillars: (1) grants of around **€620 million** to support the Palestinian Authority’s budget and public services; (2) about **€576 million in grants** for recovery and stabilisation projects in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza; and (3) loans of up to **€400 million** from the European Investment Bank to help rebuild the Palestinian private sector. The package also commits **€82 million per year** to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) so that refugees continue to receive education, health care and social services. These commitments lay the financial groundwork for a “day‑after” recovery that can sustain a ceasefire and prevent a humanitarian relapse.  
  ([ec.europa.eu](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/middle-east-crisis_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com), [ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055))
* **Mobilise an international donor platform.** Building on its €1.6 billion Comprehensive Support Programme for 2025-27, the European Commission will **activate a dedicated Palestine Donor Platform** that lets the Palestinian Authority present reforms and gives outside funders a single dashboard for pledges and progress tracking.At the **High-Level Conference on Palestine (28-30 July 2025)**, EU and Arab-League co-chairs positioned this platform as the **financial backbone of a “phased, conditional and multidimensional” Peace Supporting Package** and linked it to a **Global-Alliance follow-up mechanism and a future regional security architecture.** Donor-coordination research underlines that such shared forums boost transparency and curb overlap—benefits the Commission now wants to lock in for Gaza’s recovery.

([north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu](https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-announces-multiannual-programme-palestinian-recovery-and-resilience-worth-eu16-billion-2025-04-14_en), [en.royanews.tv](https://en.royanews.tv/news/61669), [enlargement.ec.europa.eu](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-and-palestinian-authority-agree-emergency-financial-support-and-principles-2024-07-19_en), [north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu](https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/remarks-commissioner-suica-high-level-conference-two-state-solution-palestine-2025-07-30_en), [europeansting.com](https://europeansting.com/2025/07/30/remarks-by-commissioner-suica-at-the-high-level-conference-on-the-two-state-solution-for-palestine), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-money-trail-ranking-donor-transparency-in-foreign-aid), [oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2006/04/harmonising-donor-practices-for-effective-aid-delivery-volume-2_g1gh6076/9789264035843-en.pdf))

* **Press for unimpeded humanitarian access and build a humanitarian corridor.** EU statements at the UN Security Council urge an immediate ceasefire and call on Israel to lift the blockade and allow unimpeded humanitarian access. The EU should use its diplomatic leverage to ensure that aid convoys can move safely through land and sea corridors and that Israel complies with international humanitarian law. Europeans must also continue financing UNRWA and support Norway’s initiative to hold Israel accountable at the International Court of Justice for obstructing aid ([regjeringen.no](https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-asks-the-un-to-clarify-israels-obligations-under-international-law/id3066928), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/publication/dealing-with-trump-israel-and-hamas-the-path-to-peace-in-the-middle-east), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-security-council-situation-middle-east-0_en)).

**Enforce and monitor the ceasefire**

* **Expand the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) at Rafah.** The EU’s civilian border mission, established in 2005, was redeployed to the Rafah crossing in January 2025 at the request of both Palestinians and Israelis (). The mission’s mandate is to provide a **neutral, third‑party presence** to build trust, support coordination and help the Palestinian Authority manage the crossing. Strengthening EUBAM with more personnel and an expanded mandate could stabilise the crossing and serve as a monitoring mechanism for any ceasefire, provided that both Israel and the Palestinians consent.  
  ([euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/01/28/what-we-know-about-the-eus-revived-rafah-border-mission), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-restarts-rafah-border-crossing-mission-says-eu-foreign-policy-chief-kallas-2025-01-31), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-ministers-agree-revive-rafah-border-mission-2025-01-27))
* **Deploy a dedicated EU special envoy and a civil monitoring mission.** Analysts urge the EU to appoint a **special envoy for Gaza** tasked with monitoring conditions, reporting on violations and ensuring humanitarian access. A civilian monitoring mission could document abuses by all sides and track aid distribution, drawing on lessons from Bosnia. The envoy should report directly to the EU Council and collaborate with the UN, Egypt, Qatar and Arab League mediators.

([wsls.com](https://www.wsls.com/news/2025/01/27/middle-east-latest-israel-allows-palestinians-to-return-to-gaza-for-the-first-time-in-over-a-year), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0051_EN.html), [friendsofeurope.org](https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-beyond-sanctions-five-strategic-tools-the-eu-must-use-to-end-the-war-in-gaza-and-rebuild-for-peace), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/feb/01/middle-east-crisis-live-hamas-hostages-release-israel-gaza), [iss.europa.eu](https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/reports/ten-years-after-lessons-eupm-bosnia-and-herzegovina-2002-2012), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_csdp_missions_and_operations_may2019_web.pdf))

* **Support regional security arrangements.** Analysts broadly agree that any durable ceasefire architecture must marry **militant stand-down, Israeli military pull-back, and the re-emergence of a legitimate Palestinian policing force** to keep streets safe and aid flowing. One ECFR proposal floats **re-mobilising Gaza’s 15 000-strong civil police under Palestinian-Authority command**—an idea that could recycle existing manpower yet would require strict vetting to exclude anyone implicated in the 7 October attacks and to satisfy Israeli security fears. The European side could operationalise such a bargain through its **EUBAM Rafah border mission**, while coordinating tightly with Egypt, Qatar, the UN and the Arab League. **Risks remain acute**: Israel’s leadership debates longer-term re-occupation or buffer-zone options, Arab states warn of external control without real Palestinian buy-in, and International-Crisis-Group modelling shows that rushed security transitions can trigger splinter violence and erode public trust; hence any EU-backed policing scheme must build regional consent, include robust oversight, and carry a clear exit timeline to avoid becoming yet another flash-point.  
  ([crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/gaza-time-greatest-peril), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/publication/dealing-with-trump-israel-and-hamas-the-path-to-peace-in-the-middle-east), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-rafah_en), [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/26/eu-csdp-civilian-missions-council-renews-mandates-of-eubam-rafah-and-eupol-copps), [north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu](https://north-africa-middle-east-gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/remarks-commissioner-suica-high-level-conference-two-state-solution-palestine-2025-07-30_en), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-news-05-05-2025-d22caabfd2cf89e83fe06e649e6438ba), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/25/hamas-blasts-israels-plan-to-create-buffer-zone-in-gaza-as-a-crime), [arabcenterdc.org](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/an-arab-plan-for-gaza-obstacles-and-possibilities))

**Support governance reform and a credible political track**

* **Leverage EU funding to revitalise the Palestinian Authority (PA).** The success of any peace plan depends on a unified and inclusive PA that can extend its governance umbrella to Gaza. The EU is the PA’s largest donor, in return, Brussels requires from PA reforms in fiscal sustainability, democratic governance, private‑sector development and public services. Conditional support should encourage the PA to restore judicial independence, tackle human‑rights abuses and hold long‑overdue elections.  
  ([enlargement.ec.europa.eu](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-and-palestinian-authority-agree-emergency-financial-support-and-principles-2024-07-19_en), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-boost-financial-support-palestinian-authority-2025-04-14), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fearing-palestinian-authority-collapse-eu-promises-435-mln-aid-2024-07-19), [enlargement.ec.europa.eu](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2017-04/aap-2016-palestine-part_1-ad1.pdf), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/publication/house-in-disorder-how-europeans-can-help-palestinians-fix-their-political-system))
* **Coordinate with Arab partners to pressure Israel.** A joint European‑Arab mobilisation can signal that reconstruction funds and normalisation incentives are conditional on respect for Palestinian rights and a genuine two‑state horizon.
* **Link recognition and diplomatic incentives to reforms.**   
  The emerging consensus among European policy circles is that **diplomatic recognition should be treated as a calibrated lever, not a blank cheque**: EU and like-minded states could phase in recognition of a Palestinian state only as key reforms and security benchmarks are demonstrably met, thereby marrying political momentum to real governance gains. “Friends of Europe” frames this as turning the two-state solution “from promise to reality” by tying recognition to democratic renewal and rule-of-law commitments in a future unity government; ECFR argues the same logic, but stresses it must be coupled with measures that curb negative dynamics on both Israeli and Palestinian sides. Parallel precedents exist: the EU’s conditional approach to Kosovo’s recognition and EU-accession track linked status rewards to institutional overhauls, while current EU budget-support to the Palestinian Authority already comes with results-oriented frameworks on fiscal governance and human-rights performance —a conditionality model Brussels knows well.

At the same time, think-tank and civil-society voices caution that **recognition must be part of a wider incentive package**: a credible Article 2 review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement to uphold human-rights clauses, sustained financial support for reform inside the PA to avoid a “cash-for-corruption” trap, and international-law pathways—including the ICC—to deter backsliding by all parties. The International Crisis Group adds that premature or unconditional recognition risks entrenching factionalism and should be sequenced alongside guarantees for Israeli security and regional buy-in.

**In practice, a unified EU stance could therefore:**

1. **Offer staged recognition**—initially political endorsement and embassy upgrades, moving to full bilateral recognition once electoral, judicial and security milestones are certified by an EU-UN monitoring mechanism.
2. **Synchronise incentives**—pair recognition milestones with the phased unfreezing of EU budget-support tranches to the PA and with an Article 2 compliance scoreboard for Israel, maintaining leverage on both sides.
3. **Anchor the process in international law**—link each stage to ICC and ICJ benchmarks so that recognition rewards measurable adherence to humanitarian and human-rights obligations.

By embedding recognition inside a **results-based framework familiar from Kosovo and the EU’s own budget-support tools**, Brussels can apply its diplomatic weight without abandoning conditionality—keeping the door open for statehood while ensuring the institutions that must run that state are worthy of the name.  
([friendsofeurope.org](https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-beyond-sanctions-five-strategic-tools-the-eu-must-use-to-end-the-war-in-gaza-and-rebuild-for-peace), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/article/recognising-palestine-how-europeans-can-support-a-post-gaza-war-political-track), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/772892/EPRS_ATA%282025%29772892_EN.pdf), [amnesty.eu](https://www.amnesty.eu/news/eu-must-suspend-the-eu-israel-association-agreement-joint-statement), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/shikaki20031201.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document-source/international-criminal-court-icc), [crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/europe-gaza-words-are-not-enough))

**Finance reconstruction and economic resilience**

* **Ring-fenced Transitional Governance & Reconstruction Fund.**The fund could channel money straight to frontline professionals and municipalities, mirroring the World Bank’s Community Development Fund in Kosovo and Bosnia’s post-conflict facility. Gaza’s needs justify the model: The Gaza and West Bank Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (IRDNA), conducted by the World Bank, EU, and UN in February 2025 estimated total physical damages incurred around US$29.9 billion, with housing, water and power the hardest-hit sectors. Essentially, policy research shows women-led co-operatives in Palestine deliver higher social-return scores than male-run equivalents—evidence for giving them seats on the fund’s governing board. ([worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/04/02/joint-world-bank-un-report-assesses-damage-to-gaza-s-infrastructure), [worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/323831468753320169/pdf/29032.pdf), [ieg.worldbankgroup.org](https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/bosnia_post_conflict.pdf), [openknowledge.worldbank.org](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/37d24d31-85fa-5b0a-bc2a-6a5d0c86a5ae/content), [worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/967011468777577384/pdf/266890Conflict0prevention0wp0no-06.pdf), [link.springer.com](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-88500-6_6))
* **Deploy a regional “Marshall Plan” for Gaza and the wider Middle East.** Such a plan would scale that fund’s impact by locking Gaza rebuilding into wider trade-and-energy corridors. Brookings and other think-tanks urge a reconstruction compact that ties grant money to cross-border green-energy grids and climate-resilient logistics, arguing it can replicate the integrative logic of post-war European coal and steel accords. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), endorsed by the EU, India, Saudi Arabia and the U.S., offers the rail-port-power spine for such a scheme and a forum for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian-regional commission on shared assets.  
  ([brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/gazas-day-after-reconstruction-and-governance-challenges), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-case-for-a-regional-reconstruction-strategy-for-the-middle-east), [friendsofeurope.org](https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-beyond-sanctions-five-strategic-tools-the-eu-must-use-to-end-the-war-in-gaza-and-rebuild-for-peace), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/07/rebuilding-gaza-new-marshall-plan), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-pan-arab-electricity-market-can-promote-regional-cooperation-and-economic-recovery), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Keys-to-Climate-Action-PDF-web.pdf), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/An-energy-and-sustainability-road-map-for-the-Middle-East.pdf), [publications.europa.eu](https://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f5a82742-2a44-11e7-ab65-01aa75ed71a1.0001.01/DOC_1), [eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769496/EPRS_BRI%282025%29769496_EN.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-approves-9-billion-port-boost-trade-with-europe-2024-06-19))
* **Targeted capital for private-sector revival** is already on the EU’s ledger: that liquidity is urgent—considering Gaza's unemployment, with youth joblessness the world’s highest. This can be amplified by the EU’s €2.3 billion pledge at the 2025 European Humanitarian Forumplus the EIB’s Economic Resilience Initiative blueprint for fragile states. Together, these three tracks convert emergency aid into long-term resilience and give all parties a tangible stake in keeping the ceasefire alive.  
  ([ec.europa.eu](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1055), [thedocs.worldbank.org](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/0f21311c2ebb0df4bf9b493a8034997c-0280012025/original/82687546-6fc3-46fa-80ba-5ce29d2148bc.pdf), [civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/eu-pledges-eu23-billion-european-humanitarian-forum-2025-2025-05-20_en), [eib.org](https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/eib_strategic_approach_to_fragility_and_conflict_en.pdf), [south.euneighbours.eu](https://south.euneighbours.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Palestine-recovery-2025.pdf), [eib.org](https://www.eib.org/attachments/registers/247200983.pdf))

**Uphold accountability and rule of law**

* **Support investigations and targeted sanctions.**True to the principle—shared across legal codes and faith traditions—that peace rests on just accountability, the EU should shield the ICC’s Gaza investigation and, where evidence meets the threshold, trigger its Global-Human-Rights sanctions to penalise any commander or official, Israeli or Palestinian, whose orders incite violence or obstruct aid; person-specific measures both reaffirm the Union’s Rome-Statute commitment and deter fresh atrocities without collective punishment, demonstrating that dignity and restraint are inseparable from security.  
  ([carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2021/05/judy-asks-can-europe-do-anything-to-de-escalate-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict), [icj.org](https://www.icj.org/eu-joint-statement-calls-for-strong-defense-of-the-icc-amid-rising-geopolitical-tensions), [debevoise.com](https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications/2020/12/eu-introduces-magnitsky-style-human-rights), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2025/754474/EXPO_STU%282025%29754474_EN.pdf))
* **Strengthen legal pathways for accountability.** Brussels can weave accountability and de-escalation together by **backing Norway’s case for an ICJ advisory opinion on any party that blocks life-saving aid** while simultaneously triggering the **Article 2 human-rights clause in the EU-Israel Association Agreement** to nudge compliance without rupturing dialogue.To address Israel’s security fears and ensure Palestinian transparency, the EU should **upgrade EUBAM Rafah and remodel the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism into a real-time, digital-tracking platform**, as Carnegie analysts recommend.If these avenues stall, **targeted Global-Human-Rights sanctions on individuals who incite violence or impede relief—never on populations—underscore that civilian protection is a shared, non-negotiable duty.**([regjeringen.no](https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-asks-the-un-to-clarify-israels-obligations-under-international-law/id3066928), [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/26/eu-csdp-civilian-missions-council-renews-mandates-of-eubam-rafah-and-eupol-copps), [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/07/destruction-disempowerment-and-dispossession-disaster-capitalism-and-the-postwar-plans-for-gaza))

**Empower civil society and foster coexistence**

* **Invest in people‑to‑people initiatives and diaspora engagement.** Europe should fund cross‑community dialogue programs, trauma counselling, youth exchanges and partnerships between Palestinian and Israeli civil society organisations. Similar to the International Fund for Ireland, a dedicated EU‑supported fund could empower grassroots peacebuilders.
* **Promote cultural preservation and education.** Reconstruction must preserve Gaza’s cultural heritage and support educational institutions. The EU’s funding package already includes support for schools via UNRWAec.europa.eu, and member states should expand scholarships for Palestinian students and cultural exchanges that foster understanding.

In sum, Europe’s potential contributions to the peace plan are multidimensional. Humanitarian aid and multi‑year recovery funds can alleviate suffering and establish a financial anchor for reconstruction. Monitoring missions can enforce ceasefire provisions and guarantee humanitarian access. Political and governance support, tied to reforms and conditional recognition, can revitalise Palestinian institutions and coax Israel toward a rights‑based political track. Reconstruction funds and a regional reconstruction plan can turn rebuilding into a catalyst for cooperation. Accountability measures, including support for the ICC and targeted sanctions, can deter violations. Finally, sustained investment in civil society can build the trust necessary for coexistence.

Harnessing these tools will require European unity and coordination with Arab partners and global actors. If executed holistically, the EU’s contributions can transform its current role from that of a cautious donor into a genuine guarantor of a just and lasting peace in Gaza and the region.

### 

### Why Europe matters in the multipolar guarantee

Europe’s role goes beyond moral condemnation; it will be central to **post‑war reconstruction, justice and peacekeeping**. The EU is likely to be the largest donor to rebuild Gaza’s infrastructure and economy, and its **economic leverage**—as Israel’s largest trading partner—offers tools ranging from conditionality in association agreements to sanctions on settlement products. The bloc’s commitment to the ICC provides a platform for accountability and transitional justice. If a **multinational stabilisation mission** is agreed, European militaries (France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Scandinavia) could contribute troops under a UN or Arab‑led mandate while integrating Muslim‑majority countries for legitimacy. Such a mission would protect civilians, supervise disarmament and support Palestinian Authority governance in Gaza.

From a **Unified State** perspective, Europe embodies a unique bridge between the trans‑Atlantic alliance and the Global South. Its historical entanglements, legalistic culture and soft‑power tools allow it to push for a peace plan that is **both realistic and visionary**. To align with the unified principle of balance, the EU must **transcend parochial divides**, confront internal racism and antisemitism, and act with **boundless empathy** toward both Israelis and Palestinians. By leveraging its humanitarian leadership, normative frameworks and diplomatic influence, Europe can help anchor a **multipolar guarantee**—with the United States, Global South and international institutions—to ensure a just ceasefire, reconstruction and a roadmap to truly sovereign Palestinian state.

## **Turkey**

### Geopolitical context and unique capabilities

Turkey occupies a rare junction between East and West. It is a long‐standing NATO member and candidate for EU accession, yet it also cultivates deep ties with Russia, China and much of the Global South. Ankara’s ambitions have evolved from reactive regional crisis management to what some analysts call “middle‑power autonomy.” By leveraging its population, diversified economy and geography, Turkey has pursued independent policies in the Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia that do not align completely with either the U.S. or China–Russia camps. Examples include facilitating the Black Sea grain corridor during the Russia‑Ukraine war, brokering prisoner exchanges, mediating Sweden’s NATO accession and helping Saudi Arabia and Iran reopen relations. However, critics note that this activism often lacks strategic coherence; to convert visibility into lasting influence, Turkey must evolve from a reactive “crisis fixer” into a predictable, principled actor and rebuild trust with Europe.   
([globalpanorama.org](https://www.globalpanorama.org/en/2025/06/the-concept-of-middle-power-and-turkiyes-foreign-policy-karel-valansi/#:~:text=For%20T%C3%BCrkiye%20to%20achieve%20genuine,digital%20transition%2C%20and%20infrastructure%20protection), [nato.int](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_84445.htm), [mfa.gov.tr](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/ii_---turkey_s-contributions-to-international-peace-keeping-activities.en.mfa), [enlargement.ec.europa.eu](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/turkiye_en), [foreignaffairs.com](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/turkey/turkeys-middle-power-dilemma), [cfr.org](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/turkeys-growing-foreign-policy-ambitions), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-offered-turkey-partner-country-status-turkish-trade-minister-says-2024-11-14), [nato.int](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_191048.htm), [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/05/16/a-brief-history-of-turkeys-long-tortuous-road-to-join-the-european-union), [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/05/turkeys-dwindling-international-role), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/20/what-was-the-black-sea-grain-deal-and-why-did-it-collapse), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-hails-commanders-freed-prisoner-swap-superheroes-2022-09-22), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-sweden-locked-talks-break-impasse-over-nato-membership-2023-07-10), [hurriyetdailynews.com](https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkiye-welcomes-riyadh-tehran-decision-to-restore-ties-181533), [mondediplo.com](https://mondediplo.com/2025/05/02turkey), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/can-turkey-play-a-role-in-ukraines-future/a-71691084#:~:text=Volodymyr%20Zelenskyy%20%20traveled%20to,in%20building%20new%20security%20architecture), [turkishgoods.com](https://www.turkishgoods.com/post/blog/the-effect-of-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-on-turkey), [insightturkey.com](https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/the-belt-and-road-initiative-and-the-middle-corridor-complementarity-or-competition), [insightturkey.com](https://www.insightturkey.com/commentaries/turkiyes-middle-corridor-and-chinas-bri-identification-and-assessment), [dailysabah.com](https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2019/07/01/turkey-strong-supporter-of-belt-and-road-erdogan-tells-chinese-press), [mfa.gov.tr](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_s-multilateral-transportation-policy.en.mfa), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/there-are-signs-that-turkey-is-growing-closer-to-indonesia-and-to-asean), [mfa.gov.tr](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_africa_-solidarity-and-partnership.en.mfa), [lesclesdumoyenorient.com](https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Turkiye-the-new-regional-power-in-Africa-1-3-African-solutions-for-African.html), [trt.global](https://trt.global/afrika-english/article/472cf6c04261))

This balancing act gives Ankara leverage in multiple arenas. It maintains cordial relations with Moscow—purchasing the S‑400 air defence system, hosting gas pipelines and expanding trade—while simultaneously providing Ukraine with drones and hosting early peace. It is only Muslim‑majority states that belongs to NATO and seeks EU membership. Turkey’s “Asia Anew” initiative deepens ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and India, while its application to join the BRICS bloc signals a desire to engage with Beijing and Moscow as an economic hedge. Because EU markets still account for roughly half of Turkish exports, Ankara’s strategic autonomy hinges on skilful diplomacy: it must reap the benefits of BRICS without alienating its Western partners.

([dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/can-turkey-play-a-role-in-ukraines-future/a-71691084#:~:text=Volodymyr%20Zelenskyy%20%20traveled%20to,in%20building%20new%20security%20architecture), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/article/building-brics-what-erdogans-geopolitical-gamble-could-mean-for-the-west/#:~:text=Given%20the%20rhetoric%20and%20actions,dominated%20by%20the%20authoritarian%20regimes), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/how-close-are-turkeys-erdogan-russias-putin-2024-10-23), [forbes.com](https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2024/08/27/stored-and-inspected-turkeys-latest-reported-s-400-proposal-isnt-new), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/16/turkey-tests-russian-made-s-400-defence-system-reports), [turkishvibe.com](https://www.turkishvibe.com/turkey/game-changer-turkish-drones), [policy.trade.ec.europa.eu](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/turkiye_en), [pravda.com.ua](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/06/9/7516377), [edition.cnncom](https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/23/europe/russia-ukraine-peace-talks-third-round-turkey-latam-intl), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-talk-about-peace-are-still-far-apart-2025-06-02), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/11/turkey-drones-use-ukraine), [odessa-journal.com](https://odessa-journal.com/the-turkish-foreign-minister-spoke-in-kyiv-about-the-results-of-his-visit-to-moscow), [kyivpost.com](https://www.kyivpost.com/post/41039), [mfa.gov.tr](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-policy.en.mfa), [mfa.gov.tr](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/asia-anew-initiative.en.mfa), [mfa.gov.tr](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-india-relations.en.mfa), [tandfonline.com](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2025.2497869), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/russia-turkey-brics-bloc-developing-economies-525b68836de1301187c5805ead872b65), [thecradle.co](https://thecradle.co/articles/turkiyes-brics-bid-strategic-shift-or-diplomatic-leverage))

### Position on the Israel–Palestine (Gaza) war

**Government policy**

Since the outbreak of the 2023 Gaza war, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has framed the conflict as a struggle between oppressors and the oppressed. He refuses to designate Hamas a terrorist organisation. Instead, Erdoğan calls Hamas “freedom fighters”. Ankara sharply condemns Israel’s military operations, accusing its government of genocide. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan declared that Israel “is killing more and more innocent Palestinians every day” and asserted that Turkey “will make every effort” to stop what he termed genocide.  
([brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-turkeys-response-to-the-israel-gaza-crisis/#:~:text=Public%20criticism%20of%20Hamas%20in,States%E2%80%99%20blank%20check%20for%20Israel), [politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-south-africa-israel-genocide-international-court-justice/#:~:text=Turkey%20has%20submitted%20its%20intervention,Minister%20Hakan%20Fidan%20announced%20Wednesday), [trt.global](https://trt.global/afrika-english/article/18238151), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-says-hamas-is-not-terrorist-organisation-2023-10-25), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/15/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israel-a-terror-state-criticises-the-west), [nytimes.com](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/25/world/middleeast/erdogan-turkey-hamas-israel.html), [turkishminute.com](https://www.turkishminute.com/2023/10/27/22-percent-of-turks-consider-hamas-a-terrorist-organization-survey), [insightturkey.com](https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/public-opinion-and-reaction-to-israels-war-on-gaza-after-october-7-in-turkiye), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-770084), [terrorism-info.org.il](https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/turkey-as-a-center-for-hamas-activity), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/turkey-said-to-grant-citizenship-to-hamas-brass-planning-attacks-from-istanbul), [pism.pl](https://www.pism.pl/publications/t%C3%BCrkiye-seeks-mediator-role-in-israel-hamas-war), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/turkey-gave-hamas-members-passports-israel-says-idUSKBN25M1Z1), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/international-community-must-act-to-stop-genocide-in-gaza-turkish-foreign-minister/3297880), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/04/turkey-istanbul-mayor-faces-backlash-after-calling-hamas-terrorist-organization), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-officials-booted-by-qatar-last-week-now-hosted-in-turkey-diplomat-says))

Turkey backs international legal action against Israel. In August 2024 it formally joined South Africa’s genocide case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Fidan emphasised that the path to peace requires establishing a real Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, arguing that the international community must pressure Israel and its supporters to stop the war. Ankara has also pressured Israel by restricting economic ties: in April 2024 the Turkish Ministry of Trade suspended exports of 54 product categories—ranging from iron, steel, cement and construction materials to jet fuel—and later halted all trade with Israel until a permanent ceasefire is agreed, costing Ankara several billion dollars in lost commerce. The government framed the embargo as a humanitarian step, protesting Israel’s refusal to allow Turkish airdrop aid into Gaza and demanding greater access for relief convoys.  
([mondediplo.com](https://mondediplo.com/2025/05/02turkey#:~:text=growing%20number%20of%20observers%20see,to%20trade%20ties%20with%20Israel), [voanews.com](https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-formally-asks-to-join-genocide-case-against-israel-at-un-court-/7733419.html), [politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-south-africa-israel-genocide-international-court-justice), [mfa.gov.tr](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-hakan-fidan-in-14-buyukelciler-konferansi-acilisinda-yaptigi-konusma--7-agustos-2023.en.mfa), [iletisim.gov.tr](https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/minister-of-foreign-affairs-fidan-speaks-at-international-strategic-communication-summit), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/04/turkey-restricts-exports-54-products-israel-until-gaza-cease-fire), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/04/turkey-take-series-measures-against-israel-after-gaza-aid-drop-denied), [swissinfo.ch](https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/turkey-imposes-export-restrictions-on-israel-until-gaza-ceasefire/75388184), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/9/turkey-restricts-exports-of-54-products-to-israel-until-gaza-ceasefire), [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68945380), [nytimes.com](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/05/02/world/israel-gaza-war-hamas), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/turkey-says-trade-halt-with-israel-will-continue-until-permanent-gaza-ceasefire), [boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/box-from-the-forthcoming-bank-of-israel-annual-report-for-2024-the-impact-of-the-turkish-embargo-on-israels-economy), [osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-05-07/turkey-severs-its-trade-relations-israel), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/video/inside-story/2024/5/4/how-effective-is-turkeys-ban-on-trade-with-israel), [turkishminute.com](https://turkishminute.com/2025/05/23/turkey-was-the-5th-largest-exporter-to-israel-in-2024-despite-trade-ban-un-data), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-slams-israels-refusal-to-allow-gaza-bound-aid-ship-to-dock-as-heinous-act/3592130), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/3/2/live-israel-us-propose-terms-to-extend-gaza-ceasefire-hamas-yet-to-reply), [nbcnews.com](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israel-halts-aid-entry-gaza-rcna194378), [trt.global](https://trt.global/world/article/e8d87f4648bd))

Simultaneously, Turkey has been among the largest providers of humanitarian assistance to Gaza. By March 2024 it had shipped more than 40 000 tons of food, medicine and supplies via Egypt. By August 2025 Turkey has significantly increased its humanitarian aid shipments - the total volume of aid delivered to Gaza has exceeded **100,000 tons**. Erdogan urged Western governments to increase pressure on Israel to allow more aid through the Rafah crossing. Turkey's strong condemnation of Israel's actions has intensified in recent months, particularly in response to any suggestion of a long-term Israeli occupation of Gaza. President Erdoğan has been vocal about his opposition to this idea, framing it as a direct violation of international law and a threat to regional stability.  
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-calls-pressure-israel-allow-more-aid-into-gaza-2024-03-12/#:~:text=ANKARA%2C%20March%2012%20%28Reuters%29%20,Muslim%20holy%20month%20of%20Ramadan), [dailysabah.com](https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkiye-largest-humanitarian-assistance-provider-in-gaza), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-continues-delivering-most-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza/3214839), [trt.global](https://trt.global/world/article/7e658a27307c), [trt.global](https://trt.global/afrika-english/article/17802896), [iletisim.gov.tr](https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/turkiye-is-the-top-provider-of-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-largest-aid-provider-in-besieged-gaza/3186663), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-calls-pressure-israel-allow-more-aid-into-gaza-2024-03-12), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israel-should-allow-humanitarian-aid-into-gaza-through-egypt-s-rafah-crossing-turkish-president/3018878), [straitstimes.com](https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/turkeys-erdogan-calls-for-pressure-on-israel-to-allow-more-aid-into-gaza), [aacom.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-dispatched-40-000-tons-of-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza-so-far-president-erdogan/3160053), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/scenes-in-gaza-worse-than-nazi-camps-turkish-president-erdogan/3645610), [qna.org.qa](https://qna.org.qa/en/news/news-details), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/8/how-the-world-is-reacting-to-israels-plan-to-take-over-gaza-city), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkish-president-condemns-israel-s-attacks-on-iran-calling-for-international-action/3596982), [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8ryekj1m1do), [middleeastmonitor.com](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250807-erdogan-steps-up-diplomatic-campaign-to-isolate-israel), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/21/netanyahu-biggest-obstacle-to-regional-peace-says-erdogan-at-oic-meet))

**Domestic public opinion**

Surveys reveal overwhelming Turkish sympathy for Palestinians. Pew Research Center’s 24‑nation poll conducted January–April 2025 found that the majority (over 80%) of adults in Turkey have an unfavourable view of Israel and have little or no confidence in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Domestic polling by Optimar in late 2023 showed that only 22 % of Turkish respondents considered Hamas a terrorist organisation; 20 % described it as an Islamic formation and 19 % as an independence movement. A Metropoll survey found that 60.9 % of Turks wanted their government to remain neutral or play a mediating role, while 18 % preferred supporting Palestine but not Hamas, 11.3 % backed Hamas openly and just 3 % favoured Israel. These figures indicate that while anti‑Israel sentiment is high, many Turks prefer diplomacy over direct confrontation. ([pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/03/most-people-across-24-surveyed-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-netanyahu/#:~:text=Greece%2C%20Indonesia%2C%20Italy%2C%20Japan%2C%20the,have%20no%20confidence%20in%20him), [turkishminute.com](https://turkishminute.com/2023/10/27/22-percent-of-turks-consider-hamas-a-terrorist-organization-survey/#:~:text=A%20recent%20survey%20conducted%20in,Dalga%20news%20website%20reported%20Friday), [pism.pl](https://www.pism.pl/publications/t%C3%BCrkiye-seeks-mediator-role-in-israel-hamas-war#:~:text=Recep%20Tayyip%20Erdo%C4%9Fan%2C%20a%20poll,should%20actively%20support%20Hamas%20or), [balcanicaucaso.org](https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Turkey/Turkey-Echoes-of-Gaza-227834), [internationalaffairs.org.au](https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/understanding-turkiyes-attitude-towards-the-israel-hamas-conflict))

Public anger at perceived government hypocrisy has also grown. When the trade embargo was implemented in stages, activists from Islamist and leftist groups accused Erdoğan of “talking the talk” while profiting from commerce with Israel (Turkey rejected this claim), leading to large pro‑Palestinian demonstrations in Istanbul. The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) criticised the sanctions, with some leaders defining Hamas as a terrorist organisation and emphasising Turkey’s need for balanced foreign policy.  
([medyanews.net](https://medyanews.net/turkish-government-accused-of-hypocrisy-over-israel-trade-as-police-block-gaza-protest-in-istanbul), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-firmly-rejects-claims-of-continued-trade-with-israel/3576949), [bianet.org](https://bianet.org/haber/court-arrests-nine-pro-palestinian-activists-who-protested-erdogan-over-trade-with-israel-302354), [dailysabah.com](https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkiye-rejects-claims-on-trade-activities-with-israel), [turkiyetoday.com](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/nation/turkiye-rejects-allegations-against-palestine-support-policy-vows-continued-backing-3204471), [bianet.org](https://bianet.org/haber/sixteen-activists-detained-for-chanting-murderous-israel-complicit-erdogan-309732), [bianet.org](https://bianet.org/haber/protests-call-for-turkeys-ports-to-halt-trade-with-israel-301593), [stockholmcf.org](https://stockholmcf.org/protesters-detained-at-istanbul-rally-over-banners-condemning-trade-with-israel), [bianet.org](https://bianet.org/haber/activists-jailed-for-protesting-turkeys-trade-with-israel-call-for-support-for-palestine-302428), [rfi.fr](https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20240921-turkish-youth-finds-common-cause-in-protests-against-trade-with-israel), [dailysabah.com](https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/ak-party-accuses-turkish-main-opposition-of-israeli-propaganda/news), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-joins-hague-group-s-joint-statement-on-palestine/3645453), [turkiyetoday.com](https://www.turkiyetoday.com/nation/chps-ozgur-ozel-strategically-escalates-foreign-policy-criticism-of-government-3204887), [phmovement.org](https://phmovement.org/hague-group-states-announce-unprecedented-measures-halt-gaza-genocide-bogota-conference), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-legal-crackdown-main-opposition-party-chp-2025-07-10), [dw.com](https://www.dw.com/en/turkeys-largest-opposition-party-chp-set-for-showdown/a-73067791), [trt.global](https://trt.global/world/article/3fbad1a3419d), [osw.waw.pl](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-04-09/turkey-consolidation-within-opposition-party-amid-anti-government), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-erdogan-rival-october-7-deeply-saddening-hamas-a-terrorist-organization), [inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/did-erdogan-really-cut-turkeys-ties-with-israel))

**Limitations on Ankara’s mediator role**

Despite Ankara’s desire to mediate, its harsh rhetoric and embrace of Hamas have undermined its credibility with Israel and the United States. Analysts note that Turkey’s refusal to call Hamas a terrorist organisation, coupled with anti‑American rhetoric, has largely frozen it out of the core Gaza talks. Qatar and Egypt have instead spearheaded ceasefire negotiations and hostage‑exchange efforts. Yet Ankara retains channels to Hamas that could be leveraged to influence the movement toward moderation, particularly if combined with incentives from Qatar, Egypt and Western powers.  
([brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-turkeys-response-to-the-israel-gaza-crisis/#:~:text=Public%20criticism%20of%20Hamas%20in,States%E2%80%99%20blank%20check%20for%20Israel), [trt.global](https://trt.global/afrika-english/article/24ab8814c570), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/can-turkey-help-resolve-the-israel-hamas-war), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-warns-turkey-against-harboring-hamas-leaders-who-left-qatar), [cfr.org](https://www.cfr.org/article/turkey-united-states-and-israel-hamas-war), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/erdogans-rhetoric-on-the-conflict-in-gaza-puts-much-more-than-the-israel-turkey-relationship-at-risk), [foreignpolicy.com](https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/20/erdogan-turkey-hamas-ties-israel-war-normalization), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/us-official-clarifies-turkey-not-considered-a-mediator-in-gaza-truce-efforts-after-hamas-leaders-relocation), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/can-turkey-help-resolve-the-israel-hamas-war), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/turkey-israel-diplomatic-relations-erdogan-6227e5d3d8e6e6f1b1cc5a595c18cf79), [ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/7b90a0de-d449-4a62-aa78-07281c527341), [globalpanorama.org](https://www.globalpanorama.org/en/2025/04/israel-turkey-relations), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israel-turkey-relations-nearing-rupture), [fdd.org](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/04/30/turkey-cannot-be-a-mediator-in-the-gaza-war), [newarab.com](https://www.newarab.com/analysis/turkeys-gaza-israel-tightrope-fiery-rhetoric-wary-realpolitik), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/article/nato-gaza-and-the-future-of-us-turkish-relations), [en.protothema.gr](https://en.protothema.gr/2024/11/18/israel-excludes-turkey-as-a-mediator-for-any-hostage-deal-hamas-members-in-ankara), [newarab.com](https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-refuses-turkish-mediated-gaza-ceasefire-deal-report), [rfi.fr](https://www.rfi.fr/en/podcasts/international-report/20241130-turkey-seeks-gaza-ceasefire-role-despite-us-criticism-over-hamas-ties), [worldview.stratfor.com](https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/rising-anti-israel-anger-tests-turkeys-ability-serve-mediator-gaza), [voanews.com](https://www.voanews.com/a/seeking-mediator-role-turkey-courts-hamas/7592343.html), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/qatar-and-egypt-intensifying-efforts-to-reach-gaza-ceasefire-and-hostage-release-deal), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/qatar-and-egypt-intensifying-efforts-to-reach-gaza-ceasefire-and-hostage-release-deal), [english.ahram.org.eg](https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/1234/547322/Egypt/Foreign-Affairs/Egypt%2C-Qatar-intensify-efforts-to-broker-Gaza-ceas.aspx), [newyorker.com](https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-qatar-became-the-worlds-go-to-hostage-negotiator), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/mediators-present-updated-gaza-ceasefire-proposal-israel-hamas-axios-reports-2025-07-17))

### Opportunities for Turkey to play a unifying role

1. **Bridge between geopolitical axes.** Turkey is uniquely positioned to balance the China–Russia axis with the U.S.–Europe bloc. It maintains robust energy and trade ties with Russia while remaining a NATO ally and EU candidate. It also engages with China through the Belt and Road Initiative and is exploring BRICS membership. By joining the “multipolar guarantee and reconciliation framework” envisioned in this memorandum, Ankara could help persuade Moscow and Beijing to endorse a comprehensive peace settlement in Gaza and support broader East–West cooperation.
2. **Channel to Hamas and the Arab world.** Turkey hosts Hamas’s political bureau and many of its leaders. Ankara should use this leverage to press Hamas to release hostages, accept a permanent ceasefire and eventually demilitarise. Close coordination with Qatar and Egypt would amplify this pressure. Turkey’s strong relations with Gulf states, Indonesia and much of Africa—enhanced through its “Asia Anew” initiative and humanitarian diplomacy—allow it to rally Global South support for a two‑state solution and reconstruction fund. As a majority‑Muslim nation, it can also reassure Palestinians that any international peacekeeping presence is not dominated by Western interests.
3. **Host and co‑chair peace conferences.** Turkey has experience hosting difficult negotiations; it convened Russia–Ukraine talks and orchestrated the Black Sea grain corridor. Istanbul could serve as a neutral venue for a Gaza Peace Conference involving Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Hamas (via intermediaries), the U.S., EU, Egypt, Qatar, Russia, China, India and Saudi Arabia. Co‑chairing such a conference with the UN and another non‑Western power (e.g., India or Brazil) would symbolise multipolar partnership and mitigate perceptions of bias.
4. **Contribute to a multinational peacekeeping force.** A sustainable ceasefire will require a credible monitoring mission. Turkey’s modern military and familiarity with the region can make it a prime contributor to a Multinational Truce Assurance Force. Turkish and Egyptian logistics could facilitate the deployment of a significant number of peacekeepers to Gaza, as envisioned elsewhere in this roadmap, building trust among Palestinian civilians while signalling to Israel that the mission has professional discipline. Participation would also bolster Turkey’s standing within NATO and the UN.   
   *Although this would require a significant rebalance of international politics, it's a shift Turkey is uniquely positioned to manage. The nation's history of navigating between the East and West, coupled with its assertive and autonomous foreign policy, has given it the experience and leverage to operate as a cross-bloc liaison. This dynamic role, while often controversial, positions Ankara to bridge the gap between competing international interests and lead a new peace framework. Therefore:*
5. **Recalibrate rhetoric and restore credibility.** To become a genuine mediator, Ankara must temper anti‑Israel and anti‑U.S. language and unequivocally condemn attacks on civilians by all sides. Balanced criticism—acknowledging Hamas’s October 7 atrocities while decrying Israel’s disproportionate response—would increase trust among Western actors without alienating its domestic base. Turkey should also clarify that support for Palestinian statehood does not equate to endorsing Hamas’s ideology. A shift toward principled neutrality would align with the majority of Turks who prefer mediation over partisan alignment.
6. **Support humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.** Ankara’s Red Crescent and state agencies have delivered tens of thousands of tons of aid to Gaza. After a ceasefire, Turkey could lead in building field hospitals, desalination plants and power projects—leveraging its expertise from earthquake responses and floating power stations. It should coordinate with donors from the U.S., EU, Gulf, China and India to ensure aid is transparent and not diverted. Turkey can also revive long‑discussed energy projects—such as a pipeline from Israel’s Leviathan gas field to Ceyhan—once peace takes hold, creating shared economic incentives for Israel, Palestine and neighbouring states.
7. **Reengage with Europe and strengthen democratic governance.** Turkey’s influence is constrained by its transactional approach to the West and weak institutional capacity. To maximise its unifying role, Ankara should resume democratic reforms, improve relations with the EU and address human rights concerns. Closer alignment with European norms would enhance Turkey’s legitimacy as a peace guarantor and could unlock financial support for Gaza reconstruction. It would also reassure Israel and the U.S. that Turkey’s engagement is anchored in a rules‑based order.

### Strategic recommendations

1. **Formalizing Turkey’s role in the multipolar guarantee framework.** This roadmap aims to assign Turkey a defined seat on the Oversight Council, reflecting its cross‑bloc connections. Ankara could be tasked with liaising between Russia/China and NATO/EU to ensure coordinated enforcement of ceasefire terms.
2. **Develop a Turkey–Egypt–Indonesia humanitarian corridor.** Building on its ties with Egypt and Indonesia—which have jointly called for a two‑state solution —Turkey should propose a tri‑national humanitarian temporary corridor through the Rafah crossing and the Mediterranean. This temporary corridor would deliver aid, facilitate evacuation of the wounded and support reconstruction, with oversight from the UN and ICRC.
3. **Leverage BRICS aspirations as a bargaining chip.** Ankara’s application to BRICS can be used to encourage China and Russia to invest in peace. Turkey could signal that continued engagement with BRICS depends on these powers supporting the Gaza peace plan, thereby aligning their interests with a stable Middle East.
4. **Promote interfaith diplomacy.** Given Jerusalem’s religious significance, Turkey should convene an interfaith summit with Sunni, Shiite, Jewish and Christian leaders to endorse the peace framework. This initiative would complement political negotiations and address the conflict’s spiritual dimensions.

**Conclusion**

Turkey’s unique geostrategic position enables it to serve as a linchpin between competing global axes. To fulfill this potential, Ankara must balance its domestic politics, humanitarian impulses and strategic ambitions. By moderating its rhetoric, acting as a bridge between Hamas and international mediators, hosting inclusive peace talks and contributing to a multinational peacekeeping mission, Turkey can help hold the world together in the proposed unified peace plan. Achieving this will require patience, diplomatic skill and a renewed commitment to principled, consistent foreign policy.

## Arab States & Key OIC Partners

Here we treat **Arab States & Key OIC Partners** not as a bloc but as *co-designers and co-guarantors* of a workable equilibrium: a tiered, minimum-winning coalition that trades **hostages-for-access**, **corridors-for-calm**, and **reconstruction-for-verifiable demilitarization**, with automatic snap-back corrections if commitments slip. We map each actor by **operational levers**—Egypt’s crossings and Suez routing; Qatar, KSA, and UAE finance; Jordan’s holy-sites custodianship; Lebanon/Iraq/Syria militia de-escalation channels; Turkey’s logistics; Iran’s influence over allied networks; Pakistan/Afghanistan’s OIC politics and refugee spillovers; Oman’s quiet mediation; Gulf energy and maritime lanes—then sequence those levers into a ceasefire-to-recovery pipeline. Faith authorities are integrated for **sacred-sites deconfliction** and societal buy-in; economic and access incentives supply **enforcement through automaticity** rather than rhetoric. The result is a pragmatic, game-theoretic architecture that harnesses regional interdependence to reduce escalation risk and make compliance the most rewarding path for all parties.

### Egypt

**Geopolitical context and unique capabilities**

Egypt anchors both Africa and the Middle East, bridging two continents via the Sinai Peninsula. It controls the **Rafah crossing**—the only Gaza exit into non-Israeli territory—though Israel has, at times, exerted influence over operations. Egypt also oversees the **Suez Canal**, a critical maritime chokepoint through which approximately 12–15 percent of global trade—and some 30 percent of container traffic—passes. Cairo’s diplomatic reach extends across the Arab League, the African Union, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Additionally, it is home to **Al-Azhar University**, the preeminent institution of Sunni Islamic scholarship.  
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/why-gazas-rafah-border-crossing-matters-why-egypt-is-keeping-it-shut-2023-10-17), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/feb/01/middle-east-crisis-live-hamas-hostages-release-israel-gaza), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world), [britannica.com](https://www.britannica.com/topic/al-Azhar-University))  
  
**Government policy**

President **Abdel Fattah al‑Sisi** has sought **equilibrium**: he joined South Africa’s genocide case against Israel, called for an immediate ceasefire and humanitarian access, and categorically rejected any plan to relocate Gazans into Sinai. At the same time Cairo insists on upholding its **1979 peace treaty with Israel** and quietly coordinates security in the **Philadelphi Corridor** to prevent ISIS or arms smuggling. Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry has warned against military action in Rafah, signaling Cairo’s vested interest in any operations there. Egypt’s peace-building vision was affirmed in a three-phase Gaza reconstruction plan—supported by the Arab League and key European partners—which rejects displacement, prioritizes rubble clearance, temporary housing, and ultimately the rebuilding of Gaza with infrastructure such as ports and an airport under Palestinian-led administration. Together, these policies reflect Egypt’s twin purpose: protect its sovereignty while steadfastly advocating for Palestinian dignity and mediation.([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/16/why-egypt-backed-south-africas-genocide-case-against-israel-in-the-icj), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-hopeful-gaza-talks-waiting-response-foreign-minister-says-2024-04-29), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/03/arab-states-propose-gaza-reconstruction), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-us-should-make-clear-israel-consequences-rafah-operation-2024-03-18), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/mar/04/arab-league-summit-gaza-strip-donald-trump-middle-east-crisis-live-news), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/rafah-border-crossing-cant-reopen-unless-israeli-forces-quit-gaza-side-egypt-2024-06-03))

**Egypt’s oversight of the Rafah crossing places it at the heart of Gaza’s humanitarian lifeline.** With Rafah’s Gaza side under Israeli control, aid has been funneled through Kerem Shalom, where Israeli inspections introduced logistical congestion. Since July 27, 800 out of 1,000 aid trucks—carrying 14,500 tonnes—have entered Gaza (80 percent), while more than 3,000 tonnes remain stalled. This underscores Egypt’s indispensable capacity to deliver relief and enhances its diplomatic influence both as a humanitarian gateway and a mediator in the region.  
([africanews.com](https://www.africanews.com/2025/08/07/egypt-says-800-aid-trucks-sent-for-gaza-as-more-await-clearance), [eastleighvoice.co.ke](https://eastleighvoice.co.ke/rafah/192690/nearly-800-aid-trucks-enter-gaza-through-kerem-shalom-after-israel-eases-restrictions), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-says-it-will-allow-aid-hostages-if-israel-halts-airstrikes-opens-permanent-2025-08-04))

Egyptian officials warn that famine could trigger an **exodus into Sinai—a ‘red line’ for Cairo**—so it has pressed Israel and international partners to **reopen Rafah** and has resumed convoys after months of closure. At the same time, the Suez Canal’s global importance underscores the broader stakes: **instability in Sinai or Gaza could disrupt 15% of world trade.** To mitigate these risks, **Egypt has welcomed EU monitors at Rafah and accepted European funding to improve border infrastructure and screening.**([pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/israeli-attack-on-rafah-would-have-severe-repercussions-egypts-foreign-minister-says), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-says-displacement-is-unacceptable-will-deal-with-civilians-humanely-2024-02-17), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/threat-israeli-operations-preventing-rafah-crossing-aid-deliveries-says-egypt-2024-05-20), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/aid-trucks-move-egypt-gaza-after-israel-said-it-began-airdrops-2025-07-26), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/freight-through-suez-canal-down-45-since-houthi-attacks-unctad-2024-01-26), [unctad.org](https://unctad.org/news/red-sea-black-sea-and-panama-canal-unctad-raises-alarm-global-trade-disruptions), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-rafah_en), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/17/eu-announces-8bn-package-for-egypt-as-part-of-deal-to-check-migrant-flows), [globaldetentionproject.org](https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/egypt))

**Domestic public opinion**

Egyptian sentiment remains strongly pro-Palestinian. In a Washington Institute survey (Nov–Dec 2023), roughly **75%** of Egyptians viewed Hamas positively; **97%** wanted Arab states to **sever ties with Israel**, and **96%** backed **more humanitarian aid** even if it required coordination with Israel. Majorities also favored politics over force (**86%** said the conflict cannot be solved militarily) and prioritized **domestic reforms** over foreign wars (**84%**). These attitudes push Cairo to condemn Israeli actions and facilitate aid—yet the state also polices dissent: rights groups and Reuters documented **at least 125 arrests** of pro-Palestinian activists since Oct 2023 (rising to about **150** detainees across cases by mid-2025), and authorities **deported dozens** of foreign marchers in June 2025.   
([dohainstitute.org](https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-full-report-en.pdf), [arabindex.dohainstitute.org](https://arabindex.dohainstitute.org/EN/Pages/APOIsWarOnGaza.aspx), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/egypt-polling-shows-rise-positive-views-hamas-iran-backed-groups-and-muslim), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-extends-crackdown-gaza-activism-with-student-arrests-2024-05-31), [eipr.org](https://eipr.org/en/press/2025/06/new-arrests-charges-solidarity-palestine-total-number-detainees-reach-150-outbreak), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-deports-dozens-planning-pro-palestinian-march-organisers-say-2025-06-12))

**Limitations on Egypt’s mediator role**

Despite its centrality, Cairo operates under real constraints. **Israel distrusts Egypt’s ties to Hamas and focuses on smuggling risks**, insisting on control of the **Philadelphi Corridor** to counter tunnels, while **Egypt warns that such control could undermine the 1979 peace treaty**. Meanwhile, **aid via Rafah requires Israeli clearances**, feeding public criticism and protest campaigns that Cairo is facilitating a blockade. At home, **repression of pro-Palestinian activism** weakens Egypt’s soft power; abroad, a fragile economy under an **IMF program** limits how much Cairo can self-finance reconstruction. In diplomacy, **Qatar—alongside Egypt and the U.S.—has often fronted negotiations**, with **Turkey** seeking a supporting role. Even so, **Egypt’s control of its side of Rafah and its intelligence channels keep it indispensable** to any durable arrangement.  
([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-egypt-philadelphi-corridor-cd15c27cecffe70322becd933cf38909), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/egypt-israel-relations-explained-tensions-rise-rafah-border-2024-05-28), [sis.gov.eg](https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/191152/Egypt-warns-Israeli-retaking-of-Philadelphi-Corridor-would-violate-peace-treaty), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/security-council-briefing-tom-fletcher-under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-middle-east), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025), [freedomhouse.org](https://freedomhouse.org/country/egypt/freedom-world/2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/more-than-100-detained-egypt-after-pro-palestinian-protests-lawyers-2023-10-24), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/markets/egypt-signs-expanded-8-billion-loan-deal-with-imf-2024-03-06), [crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/egypt-israelpalestine/b91-egypts-gaza-dilemmas))

**Opportunities for Egypt to play a unifying role**

Egypt can leverage its geography and religious authority to **unify the peace process.** By co‑chairing talks with the UN and a non‑Western power, **Cairo can showcase a multipolar coalition for Gaza.** It should **partner with Turkey and Indonesia** to develop a tri‑national humanitarian corridor, while **mobilising Al‑Azhar to issue fatwas endorsing ceasefire, prisoner exchanges and reconciliation**. Through the African Union and COMESA, Egypt can rally Global South support and channel investment into Gaza and Sinai. Working with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on reconstruction financing and with Russia and China on guarantees will enable Cairo to bridge South–North divides and embed the Gaza peace plan within a wider multipolar order.

**Strategic recommendations**

* Formalise Egypt’s role as co‑chair of negotiations and lead on Gaza reconstruction with a seat on the Oversight Council.
* Establish an Egypt‑Qatar‑Turkey task force to coordinate convoys.
* Manage the Al‑Arish hub and implement early reconstruction projects.
* Negotiate an EU‑Egypt‑Palestinian agreement to reopen Rafah under EUBAM monitors, ensuring Israeli security through scanning rather than closure.
* Launch a Suez‑Sinai security initiative with international funding to stabilise Sinai, protect the canal and create jobs.
* Use Al‑Azhar’s authority to convene interfaith dialogues and endorse the peace plan.
* Allow limited peaceful pro‑Palestinian activism to build domestic legitimacy while preventing mobilisation by opposition groups.
* Coordinate with major powers to guarantee Egyptian sovereignty in any Philadelphi
* Corridor monitoring and ensure reconstruction funds are transparent and accountable.   
    
  These steps would enable Egypt to transform its geographic curse into a diplomatic blessing—anchoring Gaza stability and advancing a multipolar peace.

### Qatar

**Geostrategic context and unique capabilities.** Compact yet pivotal, **Qatar sits on the Persian/Arabian Gulf** at the mouth of energy trade routes that funnel through the **Strait of Hormuz (≈20% of global petroleum liquids)**. Within **3,000 km**, Qatar can reach **≈2 billion consumers with ~US$6 trillion GDP**, anchoring a hub strategy built on world-class gateways. **Hamad International Airport** now connects to **~197 destinations / 55 airlines**, with **41 contact gates + 65 remote stands** and cargo throughput of **~2.3 million tonnes in 2023** (current terminal capacity ~**1.4 m t/yr**, with **Cargo Terminal 2** designed to lift capacity above **3 m t/yr**). **Hamad Port** operates at **~5 m TEU** today, scaling to **>7.5 m TEU**, and is described as connecting to **40–60 international ports**. Free-zones at **Ras Bufontas** (airport-adjacent) and **Umm Alhoul** (port-adjacent) provide integrated warehousing and **streamlined customs**, shortening end-to-end times. Abundant **LNG revenues** give Doha the fiscal room to fund this infrastructure and sustain an **independent foreign policy**.   
([britannicacom](https://www.britannica.com/place/Qatar), [eiagov](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php), [qfz.gov.qa](https://qfz.gov.qa/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/QFZA_Brochure.pdf), [sev.org.gr](https://www.sev.org.gr/Uploads/Documents/53767/Qatar_country_report_2021.pdf), [dohahamadairport.com](https://dohahamadairport.com/press-releases/news/hamad-international-airport-reports-record-breaking-year-2024), [dohahamadairport.com](https://dohahamadairport.com/faq/about-hia), [dohahamadairport.com](https://dohahamadairport.com/cargo), [stattimes.com](https://www.stattimes.com/air-cargo/hamad-international-airport-welcomes-dhls-new-flight-1350930), [bnpassociates.com](https://www.bnpassociates.com/project/cargo-terminal-2-cargo-handling-system-at-hamad-international-airport-doh), [mwani.com.qa](https://www.mwani.com.qa/English/Ports/HamadPort/Pages/default.aspx), [qfz.gov.qa](https://qfz.gov.qa/industries_/logistics), [fdiintelligence.com](https://www.fdiintelligence.com/partner-content/a528dbd1-bf4c-509d-957c-8c09e6b72838), [qfz.gov.qa](https://qfz.gov.qa/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/SR_QATAR20-RELEASED.pdf), [imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/02/24/Qatar-2024-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-562636))

**Government policy and actions in the Gaza war.** Qatar has positioned itself as a high-stakes mediator, with a track record that includes the **2008 Doha Agreement on Lebanon**, hosting the **U.S.–Taliban** negotiations, and the current **Israel–Hamas** talks. Its ability to broker hostage releases rests on long-standing channels with **Hamas’ political bureau in Doha** and the **Taliban office** opened in 2013. In this war, **Qatar, Egypt and the United States** tabled a **“bridging proposal”** to narrow gaps on a ceasefire-and-hostages deal (Aug 2024). By **January 2025**, Doha said talks were at their **closest point** in months, and mediators circulated a **final draft** to both sides. Financially, Qatar has **pledged at least $1 billion** for Gaza reconstruction since 2014 and has **regularly underwritten assistance**—including mechanisms that provided **~$30 million/month** for poor families, fuel and partial public-sector pay. Doha has continued humanitarian programming even while **hosting Hamas leaders** and the **U.S. CENTCOM forward headquarters** at **Al Udeid**. Analysts note that Qatar’s mediation style aligns with Gulf traditions of the **majlis** (informal dialogue space) and **sulh** (amicable settlement), privileging reconciliation and confidentiality.  
([securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Lebanon%20S2008392.pdf), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/arab-approach-mediation-reshaping-diplomacy-multipolar-world), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/afghan-taliban-opens-qatar-office-says-seeks-political-solution-idUSBRE95H0NU), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47467/R47467.2.pdf), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/21/why-is-qatar-often-a-mediator-and-what-is-its-role-in-israel-hamas-war), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/blinken-egypt-seeking-progress-towards-ceasefire-gaza-deal-2024-08-20), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/16/israel-gaza-war-ceasefire-news-hamas), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/21/israel-hamas-ceasefire-deal-negotiations-antony-blinken-middle-east), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatars-foreign-ministry-says-drafts-possible-agreement-sent-both-hamas-israel-2025-01-14), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatars-foreign-ministry-says-drafts-possible-agreement-sent-both-hamas-israel-2025-01-14), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatars-foreign-ministry-says-drafts-possible-agreement-sent-both-hamas-israel-2025-01-14), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/al-udeid-air-base-military-qatar-iran-501e9e64e80480ef3aa4ee43c1243235), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-considers-future-hamas-office-doha-whether-keep-mediating-2024-05-04), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/final-pdf-english.pdf))

**Domestic public opinion and social context.** Reliable **Qatar-only polling is limited and intermittent**, but the **ACRPS 16-country survey (which includes Qatar)** captures the regional mood after Oct 7. Across the Arab region, **35%** said Hamas’ attack was driven by the **continuing Israeli occupation**, **24%** cited **Israel’s targeting of al-Aqsa**, and **82%** rejected comparisons between **Hamas and ISIS**. **50%** identified **US military/political support** as the chief factor enabling Israel to continue the war, while **only 13%** still believed **peace with Israel** remained possible. This broad solidarity with Gaza and skepticism of US policy helps frame public discourse in Qatar and supports **Doha’s pro-Palestinian posture**.   
([dohainstitute.org](https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-full-report-en.pdf), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/frequently-asked-questions), [freedomhouse.org](https://freedomhouse.org/country/qatar/freedom-world/2024), [arabcenterdc.org](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-public-opinion-about-israels-war-on-gaza))

**Limitations and challenges.** Qatar’s role attracts scrutiny because it hosts **Al Udeid Air Base**, the **forward headquarters of U.S. CENTCOM**, while also hosting **Hamas’s political office** in Doha—fuel for critics who say it “plays both sides.” In **April 2024**, Prime Minister **Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani** said Doha was **re-evaluating** its mediation amid “**politicians with narrow interests**,” adding that **mediators cannot offer what the parties themselves refuse**. In **May 2025**, Israel’s government accused Qatar of “**double talk**”; Doha **rejected** the comments as **inflammatory** and noted—by its count—that **at least 138 hostages** were freed **via mediation** rather than force. When talks **stalled in late 2024**, Qatar publicly **paused** its efforts **until both Hamas and Israel showed “willingness and seriousness.”** Together, these episodes highlight both the **indispensability** of Qatar’s channel to Hamas and the **limits of external leverage** when principals remain uncompromising.   
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-military-facilities-middle-east-2025-06-22), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/04/qatar-reevaluating-hamas-israel-mediation-role-amid-mounting-criticism), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-says-gaza-ceasefire-talks-delicate-phase-2024-04-17), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-calls-qatar-stop-playing-both-sides-gaza-talks-2025-05-03), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2599459/middle-east), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-qatar-playing-both-sides-doha-hes-trying-to-justify-crimes-against-civilians), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatar-pull-out-gaza-ceasefire-mediation-source-says-2024-11-09), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/9/qatar-suspends-mediation-efforts-on-gaza-officials-say))

**Relationship networks and regional role.** Since the **Al-Ula reconciliation (2021)**, Qatar’s ties with Saudi Arabia have translated into real business: Qatari firms have won **at least $10 billion** in Saudi contracts, **including NEOM**, as cross-border commerce revived. Riyadh has also **publicly backed** the trilateral mediators (**Qatar, Egypt, U.S.**) seeking a Gaza ceasefire and hostage deal. Qatar’s **strategic partnership with Türkiye** has produced **110+ agreements** since 2014; trade has **peaked around $2.3 billion** and both sides target **$5 billion**. Regionally, Doha joined **Iraq–Türkiye–UAE** in an MoU on the **$17 billion Development Road**, underscoring its cross-border integration push. These networks—along with Qatar’s functional ties to **Iran** (the shared **North Dome/South Pars** gas field)—enable Doha to bridge **Gulf monarchies, Türkiye, Iran** and wider Global-South fora. And because Qatar hosts **USCENTCOM’s Forward HQ** while maintaining political channels to **Hamas** and the **Taliban**, it can engage **Washington, Tehran and Kabul** while retaining credibility with Gaza’s leadership.  
([qna.org.qa](https://qna.org.qa/en/news/news-details?id=0046-qatar-and%C2%A0turkiye-historical-relations,-growing-strategic-partnership&date=13/11/2024), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/business-boom-builds-qatar-saudi-entente-gulf-rift-fades-2024-06-12), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/7/closing-statement-of-41st-gulf-cooperation-council), [gcc-sg.org](https://www.gcc-sg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news2025-6-2-3.aspx), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2565811/saudi-arabia), [gulf-times.com](https://www.gulf-times.com/article/694493/qatar/qatar-and-turkiye-historical-ties-growing-strategic-partnership), [dailysabah.com](https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/qatari-investments-in-turkiye-flourish-as-bilateral-trade-hits-23b), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkiye-qatar-economic-trade-cooperation-deal-to-enter-into-force-on-friday/3647465), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-turkey-qatar-uae-sign-preliminary-deal-cooperate-development-road-project-2024-04-22), [motgovqa.](https://www.mot.gov.qa/en/news/minister-signs-mou-co-op-between-states-participants-development-road-project-al-faw-port), [mei.edu](https://www.mei.edu/publications/gulf-states-fluid-post-war-middle-east), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/qatar-says-its-output-gas-field-shared-with-iran-is-steady-following-israeli-2025-06-17), [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-qatar), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-political-office-doha-has-not-been-permanently-closed-qatar-says-2024-11-19))

**Adaptability and logistical agility.** During the **2017 Gulf blockade**, Qatar kept trade flowing by rapidly launching **new direct sea routes** and shifting imports through **Hamad Port**, which became a resilience linchpin. Today the port is a **technology-forward gateway** with capacity scaling from **~5m TEU toward >7.5m TEU** and connectivity to **~60 international ports**, underpinning Qatar’s role as a trans-shipment hub. **Hamad International Airport** runs **24/7 cargo operations**; it handled **~2.3m tonnes in 2023** (current terminal capacity ~**1.4m t/yr**) with a **new facility designed for ~3.3m t/yr**. **GWC’s** integrated fleet, logistics parks and cross-border products provide **end-to-end** services that plug directly into port/airport free-zones. Paired with Doha’s flexible diplomacy, this infrastructure makes Qatar a **“silent soft vector”**—an agile transit-and-negotiation hub able to reroute cargo, deliver humanitarian aid, or convene talks **faster than many larger neighbours**.  
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/gulf-crisis-a-blessing-in-disguise-for-qatar-seaport-idUSL8N1JC2LJ), [thepeninsulaqatar.com](https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/17/09/2017/Two-new-shipping-lines-to-Hamad-Port-launched-today), [zawya.com](https://www.zawya.com/en/business/transport-and-logistics/transshipments-through-hamad-port-up-23-in-2024-deyhubel), [internationalairportreview.com](https://www.internationalairportreview.com/article/183215/continuing-to-put-hamad-international-airport-on-the-map), [qataraviation.com](https://www.qataraviation.com/page/ground-handling/ground-handling), [gwclogistics.com](https://www.gwclogistics.com), [argaamplus.s3.amazonaws.com](https://argaamplus.s3.amazonaws.com/7316797b-fee4-4eb3-9aa6-6d149b536c26.pdf))

**Strategic recommendations.**  
**Qatar’s mission-critical role** in this peace plan is to *keep the channel open, keep the borders flowing, and keep incentives aligned.* Under UNSC **2720/2735**, Doha co-chairs a Contact Group with Egypt, the US and UN/EU to sequence hostage releases and ceasefire steps; backs **EUBAM Rafah** with a joint deconfliction cell; and turns **Hamad Port/HIA** into the rear logistics base feeding Egypt’s crossings. A Qatar-EU-World Bank **Recovery Window** escrows reconstruction tranches that unlock only on verified compliance, while **majlis/sulh** side-rooms in Doha defuse spoilers as formal talks progress. The **Al-Ula-enabled** axis with Riyadh and the strategic partnership with **Türkiye** extend guarantees and finance, tying regional prestige to success. KPIs—hostage tranches met, inspection dwell-time cut, daily trucks/fuel up, utilities restored—keep this effort measurable and credible.

### Jordan

**Geostrategic context and infrastructure.** Jordan sits at the **crossroads of Asia, Africa and Europe**, giving it outsized logistical relevance in the Levant. The **Port of Aqaba**—the kingdom’s only seaport—anchors supply chains into **landlocked and conflict-affected neighbors** and **can handle over 20 million tonnes** of cargo annually, supporting both commercial flows and **humanitarian operations**. **Queen Alia International Airport** and the national road network connect **north–south Jordan** and feed transit corridors toward **Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian territories** (including **Jordan–to-Gaza** convoys when authorized). A **~900 km National Railway Network** is under preparation to link **Aqaba–Amman–northern Jordan** and ultimately **interconnect with Saudi Arabia and Iraq**, strengthening the country’s hub role. Within the **Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ)**, **≈US$20 billion** in investment has modernized the ancient port city with streamlined regulation and logistics services. International institutions and ratings agencies underscore **Jordan’s relative stability** in a turbulent neighborhood, and the kingdom is **positioned along the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)**, whose northern segment envisages freight rail across the **UAE–Saudi–Jordan–Israel** axis before onward shipment to Europe.  
([lca.logcluster.org](https://www.lca.logcluster.org/21-jordan-port-aqaba), [themaritimestandard.com](https://www.themaritimestandard.com/new-monthly-container-handling-record-set-by-aqaba-container-terminal), [aci-asiapac.aero](https://www.aci-asiapac.aero/media-centre/news/queen-alia-international-airport-records-highest-ever-h1-traffic-with-4-4-million-passengers-in-2025-alongside-strategic-developments-led-by-airport-international-group), [caa.gov.qa](https://caa.gov.qa/en/news/queen-alia-international-airport-serves-88m-passengers-2024), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-6-19-july-2025), [mot.gov.jo](https://www.mot.gov.jo/EN/ListDetails/Projects/48/1), [dar.com](https://www.dar.com/work/project/jordan-national-railway-project-aqaba-amman-railway-line-), [adc.jo](https://www.adc.jo/UploadFiles/Aqaba%20Development%20Corporation%20Brochure.pdf), [siteselection.com](https://siteselection.com/aqabathe-key-to-the-kingdom), [fitchratings.com](https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/fitch-affirms-jordan-at-bb-outlook-stable-07-05-2025), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview), [elibrary.imf.org](https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2025/155/article-A001-en.xml), [bidenwhitehouse.archivesgov](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/memorandum-of-understanding-on-the-principles-of-an-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-infinite-connection-how-to-make-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-happen))

**Political stand and actions in the Gaza war.** From the outset, Jordan cast itself as a humanitarian lifeline and a vocal critic of Israel’s conduct, with King Abdullah repeatedly urging an **immediate ceasefire** and easier access for aid. He **personally took part** in Royal Jordanian Air Force airdrops over Gaza and pressed partners—especially Washington—to expand **ground** access.By **late 2024**, the army said Jordan had carried out **around 400 operations** (airdrops with partners plus overland convoys) and was maintaining **land and air corridors** into Gaza, even as the king accused Israel of placing obstacles on deliveries and stressed that airdrops cannot replace ground routes. In **summer 2025**, Amman **re-scaled** the effort: **since the resumption on 27 July**, the Jordan Armed Forces report roughly **150 Jordanian** and **314 joint** airdrops—**~570 tonnes** delivered—with regular multinational missions (e.g., **52–67 tonnes** in single-day drops). London and Amman publicly reaffirmed that airdrops **“are not a substitute”** for trucks by land. Under international pressure (including Jordan’s advocacy), Israel **announced** the reopening of the **Erez (Beit Hanoun) crossing** and **temporary use of Ashdod port** in **April 2024**; UN/cluster updates later recorded **WFP consignments routed Ashdod**—**Zikim** to reach northern Gaza.

Diplomatically, Amman has consistently called for an **immediate ceasefire**, a **political horizon** toward a Palestinian state on the **1967 borders**, and the **return of displaced Gazans**—flatly **rejecting** annexation or any plan to **resettle Palestinians in Jordan**.In **August 2024**, King Abdullah reminded President Biden of the **Hashemite custodianship** over Jerusalem’s Muslim and Christian holy sites and warned against **“hostile acts”** that threaten the status quo.  
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordans-king-abdullah-participates-gaza-aid-airdrop-2024-02-11), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-airdrops-aid-northern-gaza-first-time-five-months-official-source-2024-11-26), [petra.gov.jo](https://petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp), [jordantimes.com](https://jordantimes.com/news/local/jaf-delivers-aid-through-new-airdrops-with-international-participation-1219639), [bna.bh](https://www.bna.bh/en/jordanconductsnewairdropdelivering67tonnesofaidtoGaza.aspx), [fananews.com](https://www.fananews.com/language/en/jordan-armed-forces-conduct-new-airdrop-operation-with-international-partners-to-deliver-aid-to-gaza), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-king-abdullah-ii-of-jordan-29-july-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-approves-reopening-erez-crossing-into-gaza-use-ashdod-port-aid-2024-04-05), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/5/israel-to-temporarily-reopen-north-gaza-crossing-for-aid-after-biden-call), [fscluster.org](https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/FSS%20National%20Meeting%20%20_%2025%20June%202025.pdf), [wfpusa.org](https://www.wfpusa.org/news/gaza-conflict-timeline-aid-humanitarian-crisis), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordans-king-abdullah-warns-dangers-israels-planned-rafah-assault-2024-02-26), [english.news.cn](https://english.news.cn/20250806/d6702b02d3c24753b3cfae0792cbb20c/c.html), [jordantimes.com](https://jordantimes.com/news/local/foreign-minister-reaffirms-jordans-rejection-displacement-palestinians), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/jordans-king-warns-call-with-biden-israeli-hostile-acts-jerusalem-2024-08-05))

**Domestic public opinion and social context.** Jordan’s population—**~11.6 million** in 2024 and nearing **11.8 million** by April 2025—includes **millions of citizens of Palestinian origin** (often estimated at **~55–70%**, though the state does not publish an official share), and solidarity with Gaza runs deep. In **Arab Barometer’s 2024 Jordan survey**, **44%** described Israel’s actions in Gaza as **“genocide”** and **28%** as **“massacre.”** **Two-thirds (66%)** named **Jordan** as the top defender of Palestinian rights (vs **Qatar 34%**, **Egypt 24%**), while **81%** said the **United States** defends Israeli rights. The crisis coincided with a rise in government evaluations: overall satisfaction reached **45%**, and respondents gave **very high marks to security and order (89%)** and **civil defense (96%)**—even as **57%** cited the **economy** as the country’s biggest challenge. Pro-Palestine demonstrations have been large and at times confrontational: in **October 2023**, police **dispersed crowds** marching toward the border and **clashed with protesters** near the Israeli embassy amid calls to close it. Meanwhile, authorities say security services have **foiled Iranian-linked weapons-smuggling efforts** from Syria—part of wider attempts to destabilize the kingdom—reinforcing Amman’s view that it must balance public solidarity with Gaza against acute security threats.  
([data.worldbank.org](https://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan), [fred.stlouisfed.org](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/POPTOTJOA647NWDB), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33546), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/arab-barometer-reveal-findings-from-major-jordan-survey), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-disperses-pro-palestinian-protesters-heading-border-with-west-bank-2023-10-13), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-foils-arms-plot-kingdom-caught-iran-israel-shadow-war-2024-05-15), [jordantimes.com](https://jordantimes.com/news/local/jordan-foils-arms-smuggling-plot-state-sponsored-militia-march-%E2%80%94-official-source))

**Limitations and challenges.** Jordan’s **fiscal space is tight** and much of its budgetary room depends on **external support—especially U.S. assistance of $1.45 billion annually under the 2023–2029 MOU**—with the IMF underscoring the need for continued international backing as fiscal consolidation proceeds. **Logistics are robust but imperfect:** **road congestion in Amman** and **limited rail connectivity** (with new **Aqaba-linked freight rail** and a **~900 km national network** still in preparation) constrain throughput, while **customs processes**, though reformed, **still produce delays and procedural frictions** for traders. The kingdom’s strategic location also **invites interference**: authorities report **Iran-linked smuggling** of weapons and drugs via Syria, highlighting the risk of regional spillover. Domestically, Amman **walks a tightrope**—balancing public anger at Israel with long-standing ties to Washington—as **large protests** demanded **scrapping the peace treaty** and closing Israel’s embassy.  
([2021-2025.state.gov](https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-signing-of-the-bilateral-memorandum-of-understanding-on-strategic-partnership-between-the-united-states-and-the-hashemite-kingdom-of-jordan), [imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2024/12/17/Jordan-2024-Article-IV-Consultation-Second-Review-Under-the-Extended-Arrangement-Under-the-559656), [jordantimes.com](https://jordantimes.com/news/local/experts-suggest-use-intelligent-transportation-systems-address-ammans-traffic-congestion), [railwaygazette.com](https://www.railwaygazette.com/infrastructure/jordan-and-uae-to-co-operate-on-aqaba-railway-project/67326.article), [lca.logcluster.org](https://lca.logcluster.org/24-jordan-railway-assessment), [ifc.org](https://www.ifc.org/content/dam/ifc/doc/mgrt/cpsd-jordan-main-report.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordanians-protest-against-peace-treaty-with-israel-fresh-rallies-2024-03-29))

* **Opportunities and unified peace role.**   
  **Jordan can be the region’s “stabilizing buffer” and a practical engine for Gaza’s recovery.** Its location at the Levantine crossroads, proven humanitarian corridors, and investible logistics base position the kingdom to stage early reconstruction while de-risking spillover.
* **Staging hub for Gaza aid & rebuild.** Since late-2023 the **Aqaba–Nuweiba/Al-Arish–Kerem Shalom** chain and **QAIA air bridge** have repeatedly moved WFP/JHCO convoys and air cargo into Gaza; Jordan resumed truck convoys in **July 2025** after months of closures. This makes **Aqaba** (Jordan’s sole seaport) and **Queen Alia International Airport** reliable launchpads for relief and reconstruction flows.
* **Logistics capacity that scales.** UN logistics assessments credit the **Port of Aqaba** with **>20 million tonnes/year** capacity across modernized terminals—suitable for both commercial and humanitarian throughput. QAIA’s 2025 traffic bulletins confirm an active cargo operation (e.g., **27,912 t** handled Jan–May 2025), underlining air-freight redundancy when ground routes slow.
* **Railway to knit the corridor.** Jordan’s **National Railway** (Aqaba–Amman–north; links to **Saudi Arabia & Iraq**) is in preparation, with a **UAE–Jordan $2.3 bn** investment announced in **Sept 2024** to connect Aqaba to key mining/logistics nodes. As IMEC planning advances, a GCC–Jordan–Israel rail spine could **save 5–7 days** to Europe versus sea alone—useful for time-sensitive construction materials and power-grid kit.
* **Aqaba SEZ as capital magnet.** **Committed investment >$20 bn** in the **Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ)**—with streamlined regulation and land for **logistics parks/warehousing**—signals capacity to absorb and co-finance reconstruction supply chains (prefab housing, WASH, transformers).
* **PPP firepower.** Authorities are pushing a larger PPP program (MoI flags **~$42 bn over 10 years**) and list **39 invest.jo opportunities worth JOD 4 bn**; EBRD’s 2025 diagnostics emphasize PPPs to fund transport, energy and water—exactly the sectors Gaza recovery will pull on.
* **Digital corridors that complement IMEC.** The **IMEC MoU (G20, Sep 2023)** envisions a **UAE–Saudi–Jordan–Israel** northern leg to Europe; in parallel, Google/Sparkle’s **Blue–Raman** system lands in **Aqaba/Jordan** and links via **Saudi–Oman** to India—creating a resilient data path that Jordan can host as a **secure planning & procurement backbone** for reconstruction.
* **A stabilizer against spillover.** Repeated **Iran-linked weapons-smuggling attempts from Syria** underscore Jordan’s value as a **buffer shield**: a secure rear-area where aid staging and contractor mobilization can proceed with lower risk while borders are policed.
* **Custodianship that can legitimize a peace architecture.** Jordan’s **Hashemite custodianship over Jerusalem’s Muslim & Christian holy sites** gives Amman unique convening legitimacy for any Gaza-to-status-quo discussions that touch the holy places—useful for community buy-in alongside material reconstruction.

([wfp.org](https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-delivers-first-aid-convoy-jordan-gaza), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2607511/middle-east), [jordantimes.com](https://jordantimes.com/news/business/qaia-receives736709-passengers-during-may-2025), [memr.gov.jo](https://www.memr.gov.jo/EBV4.0/Root_Storage/EN/EB_Info_Page/3NEEAP2024-2026.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-jordan-sign-23-bln-agreement-build-railways-jordan-pms-office-says-2024-09-04), [aseza.jo](https://aseza.jo/EN/Pages/Investment_In_Aqaba), [invest.jo](https://www.invest.jo/public-private-partnership-ppp), [arabfund.org](https://www.arabfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/CPS-Jordan-2025-2029.pdf), [ebrd.com](https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebrd_dxp/assets/pdfs/country-strategies/jordan/EBRD-Jordan-diagnostic-2025.pdf) (direct pdf link), [bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/fact-sheet-world-leaders-launch-a-landmark-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/762471/EPRS_BRI%282024%29762471_EN.pdf), [cloud.google.com](https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/infrastructure/announcing-the-blue-and-raman-subsea-cable-systems))

**Strategic recommendations.**

1. **Embed Jordan in Gaza’s reconstruction strategy.** Prioritise the **Aqaba–Amman–northern Jordan rail corridor** as the principal artery for moving reconstruction materials and humanitarian aid. Create a **Gazawest Bank–Jordan free‑trade zone** linked to ASEZ, encouraging Palestinian entrepreneurs to integrate into Jordan’s export value chains.
2. **Secure sustainable financing.** Mobilise a coalition of international donors—leveraging the EU, Gulf sovereign funds, China’s Belt and Road institutions and Russia’s Eurasian funds—to finance Jordan’s logistics upgrades and the Gaza reconstruction. Use **public–private partnerships** in ASEZ, where regulatory regimes and infrastructure are already investor‑friendly.
3. **Support humanitarian corridors and ceasefire diplomacy.** Ensure land crossings and air corridors from Jordan remain open and shielded from political pressure. Expand the role of Jordanian and international monitors at new crossings to guarantee transparency, preventing unilateral blockades. Jordan’s repeated air‑drop missions underscore its credibility as a humanitarian partner.
4. **Harness religious custodianship for de‑escalation.** The Hashemite custodianship of Muslim and Christian holy sites gives Jordan moral authority in Jerusalem. Institutionalise a trilateral forum where Jordan, Israel and Palestinian representatives jointly oversee access and security at holy sites, with international observers, to reduce flashpoints and support the status quo.
5. **Balance foreign relations and public opinion.** To maintain domestic stability, the monarchy must continue opposing forced displacement while coordinating with the U.S. and Arab partners. Regional powers should refrain from pressuring Jordan into hosting refugees; instead, they should invest in Jordan’s economy and infrastructure to relieve fiscal strain and reinforce its role as mediator.
6. **Anchor Jordan within a wider balancing axis.** Integrate Jordan into the **Turkey–Egypt–Qatar–Indonesia–China–Russia** framework: Turkey and Egypt provide military and logistical depth; Qatar offers mediation and capital; China and Russia bring infrastructure finance and multipolar diplomacy; Indonesia supplies Global‑South legitimacy. Such a coalition can present a unified development vision linking the **IMEC** and **Belt and Road** corridors, turning Jordan into a **gateway to a broader Global‑South/EU hub** and drawing Gaza along with it.

By leveraging Jordan’s logistical capabilities, religious authority and public legitimacy, this approach converts the kingdom into a **Nash‑equilibrium actor** whose prosperity and stability depend on peace. A carefully crafted economic vortex centred on Jordan can pull Gaza and the broader Palestinian economy into a new orbit of integration, reducing incentives for violence and anchoring the region in a forward‑looking, collaborative future.

### Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is **uniquely positioned** to simultaneously convene the Islamic world (via OIC leadership and summit diplomacy), speak credibly to Washington, and keep channels open to Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran. Saudi Arabia—home to the OIC General Secretariat in Jeddah and host of the Nov. 11, 2023 Joint Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit in Riyadh—retains distinctive convening power across the Islamic world, while explicitly tying any Israel normalization to a real pathway toward Palestinian statehood. In July 2025, Paris and Riyadh co-chaired a high-level U.N. conference that issued the ‘New York Declaration’ on a two-state horizon, and they’ve since worked to broaden U.N. support for its implementation. These moves, plus a sustained humanitarian air-and-sea bridge into Gaza via KSrelief, position the Kingdom as the custodian of a pragmatic, dignity-first peace that has Arab legitimacy and Western buy-in.  
  
The 2002 **Arab Peace Initiative** offered pan-Arab recognition in return for withdrawal and Israel's recognition of a Palestinian state. When Mohammed bin Salman said in **September 2023** that “every day we get closer” to normalization, he paired it with the condition that Palestinian needs must be addressed. After **Oct 7**, Riyadh paused normalization and fronted a joint Arab-Islamic summit in **Riyadh (Nov 11, 2023)** calling for an immediate end to hostilities and accountability—evidence of principled “active neutrality” rather than alignment with any camp.

([oic-oci.org](https://www.oic-oci.org/contact), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-host-extraordinary-joint-islamic-arab-summit-riyadh-saturday-2023-11-10), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-saudi-arabia-nearing-agreement-security-pact-sources-say-2024-05-02), [politico.com](https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/19/biden-national-security-adviser-saudi-arabias-crown-prince-discuss-security-deal-00158787), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-saudi-arabia-agree-resume-ties-re-open-embassies-iranian-state-media-2023-03-10), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-host-extraordinary-joint-islamic-arab-summit-riyadh-saturday-2023-11-10), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/11/saudi-arabia-to-host-arab-islamic-summit-to-unify-efforts-on-gaza), [oic-oci.org](https://www.oic-oci.org/topic), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-crown-prince-says-getting-closer-israel-normalization-fox-interview-2023-09-20), [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2023/09/21/saudi-crown-prince-mbs-fox-news-interview), [ynetnews.com](https://www.ynetnews.com/article/byn0bcgs6), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-france-seek-support-declaration-two-state-solution-between-israel-2025-07-29), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/un-palestinians-israel-twostate-gaza-france-saudi-af7910977b9d17a03e7785039303c84f), [press.unorg](https://press.un.org/en/2025/pal2250.doc.htm), [onu.delegfrance.org](https://onu.delegfrance.org/new-york-declaration), [spa.gov.sa](https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2370133), [spa.gov.sa](https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2122937), [usip.org](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/beirut_declaration.pdf), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empa/dv/1_arab-initiative-beirut_/1_arab-initiative-beirut_en.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say-2023-10-13))

**Posture in the Gaza war: “active neutrality,” high leverage**

Riyadh’s line since Oct 7 has been consistent: condemn mass civilian harm, demand a ceasefire and unfettered humanitarian access, and insist on a political horizon—while avoiding escalatory spirals.In April 2024, after Iran’s direct strike on Israel, and again through 2025 flare-ups, Saudi statements urged restraint and de-escalation—signaling a stabilizer’s posture rather than a camp-follower.This is leverage, not fence-sitting: the Kingdom can speak to all sides—via the Arab-Islamic ministerial contact group that shuttled to Beijing, Moscow, Washington and other capitals—while keeping the focus on outcomes (hostages released, siege ended, governance re-based).Analysts describe this calibrated stance as **active/positive neutrality** within a broader multi-alignment strategy.

Saudi officials reiterated in **Jan–Feb 2024** that there can be **no normalization** with Israel **without a credible path to Palestinian statehood**—a public constraint that turns normalization into an enforcement asset, not a concession.

([spa.gov.sa](https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2168630), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/14/iran-israel-conflict-jordan-saudi-arabia), [wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-iran-strikes-live-coverage/card/saudi-arabia-expresses-concern-over-military-escalation-UYErvizbUK499nBbi13o), [spa.gov.sa](https://spa.gov.sa/en/N2343977), [spa.gov.sa](https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2353623), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/beijing-arab-muslim-ministers-urge-end-gaza-war-2023-11-20), [fmprc.gov.cn](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/2675_665437/2878_663746/2880_663750/202312/t20231204_11194160.html), [spa.gov.sa](https://www.spa.gov.sa/w2001847), [oic-oci.org](https://www.oic-oci.org/topic), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudis-could-recognise-israel-if-palestinian-issue-resolved-foreign-minister-2024-01-16))

**Public opinion**

* **Normalization faces strong headwinds.** After Oct 7, *opposition to recognizing Israel* surged among Saudis: the **Arab Opinion Index (Jan 10, 2024)** reports a jump from **38% (2022)** to **68%** opposing recognition in 2024 (with a large non-response share in 2022, underscoring latent sensitivity).
* **Near-consensus for distancing from Israel during the war.** A nationally representative **WINEP** survey of **n=1,000** Saudi citizens (Nov 14–Dec 6, 2023; **face-to-face; ≈±3 pp**) found **96%** agree Arab states should “immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel” over Gaza, and **91%** say the war is a “win” for Palestinians/Arabs/Muslims.
* **Transactional ties lost appeal in the short term.** Support for allowing *business* contacts with Israelis fell from **43% (Nov 2022)** to **17% (Dec 2023)** as the war progressed—reducing political space for overt economic steps absent a credible political horizon.
* **But Saudis still prefer a political end-state over endless conflict.** **86%** agree there is “no military solution” and that political negotiations will be necessary “some day,” suggesting public tolerance for **diplomacy** if tied to tangible Palestinian rights.
* **Attitudes toward spoilers align with Riyadh’s framing.** Around **90%** hold unfavorable views of Hezbollah, and **81%** say Iran/its allies are reluctant to help Palestinians—reinforcing Saudi messaging that *regional adventurism* hurts Palestinians and stability.
* **Region-wide activism adds constraint.** **Arab Barometer**’s 2023–24 wave shows post-Oct 7 collapses in support for normalization **(≤13% in all seven countries surveyed)** and widespread activism—e.g., in March 2024 data: **84% boycotts**, **62% donations**, **40% online solidarity**, **22% public solidarity activities**—patterns Riyadh must factor into sequencing.

**Implications for the Roadmap.** Public sentiment narrows acceptable pathways to those that: (1) **condition** any Saudi-Israel steps on verifiable, time-bound movement toward Palestinian statehood; (2) front-load **humanitarian gains** and service delivery in Gaza; (3) keep Saudi action within **Arab/Islamic multilateral umbrellas** (OIC/Arab League) to preserve legitimacy; and (4) convert normalization into a **peace-enforcement lever** (a runged “Normalization-for-Compliance” ladder) rather than a prior concession. These moves are consistent with measured Saudi public preferences for *diplomatic resolution*, skepticism toward spoilers, and resistance to “business-as-usual” ties absent political justice.

([dohainstitute.org](https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/News/Pages/arab-public-opinion-about-the-israeli-war-on-gaza.aspx), [arabcenterdc.org](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-opinion-index-2022-executive-summary), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-poll-sheds-light-saudi-views-israel-hamas-war), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/press-release-foreign-affairs-article-how-arab-public-opinion-constrains-normalization-with-israel), [arabindex.dohainstitute.org](https://arabindex.dohainstitute.org/EN/Pages/APOIsWarOnGaza.aspx), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/2025/01/14619))

**Strategic incentives: why Riyadh needs a stable Nash equilibrium**

* **Vision 2030 execution now drives statecraft.** Saudi diversification and giga-projects—plus **Riyadh Expo 2030** preparations—require a calmer region, predictable Suez–Red Sea shipping, and lower sanctions/war-risk premia. The **IMF’s 2025 Article IV** says non-oil activity “continues to expand” as diversification advances; the **World Bank** likewise reports robust non-oil growth in 2024, led by services. Expo 2030 was formally **registered by the BIE in June 2025**, underscoring timelines that turbulence can derail. By contrast, Red Sea disruptions since late 2023 have lifted insurance and freight costs and forced costly reroutings, per **UNCTAD** and **Reuters**. Market coverage also notes financing/delivery pressure on mega-projects when oil prices soften—another reason Riyadh prizes regional stability. A Gaza **ceasefire-to-peace** compact would lower volatility and protect the Vision-2030 calendar.
* **Red Sea security**: **Houthi attacks**—explicitly framed by the group as solidarity with Gaza—have strained shipping and raised insurance premia; traffic has repeatedly rerouted around Africa. Riyadh has **publicly prioritized de-escalation** in Yemen/the maritime corridor while **keeping channels with the Houthis open** through Oman-mediated talks (2023 onward). Because the attacks are tied to the Gaza war narrative, a sustained Gaza truce that cools that trigger is a **direct Saudi interest** (the Houthis themselves signaled limits if a ceasefire is implemented).

([imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/08/02/Saudi-Arabia-2025-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-569252), [thedocsworldbank.org](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-sau.pdf), [bie-paris.org](https://www.bie-paris.org/site/en/news-announcements/world-expo/bie-general-assembly-grants-registration-to-world-expo-2030-riyadh), [expo2030riyadh.sa](https://www.expo2030riyadh.sa/en/insights/expo-2030-riyadh-registration-dossier-receives-bie-final-approval-at-paris-general-assembly), [unctadorg](https://unctad.org/publication/navigating-troubled-waters-impact-global-trade-disruption-shipping-routes-red-sea-black), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/red-sea-insurance-soars-after-deadly-houthi-ship-attacks-2025-07-10), [ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/631838c8-a86a-44d2-86cc-587288eb089f))

**Unique assets Riyadh can bring**

1. **Finance at scale.** Arab-led reconstruction concepts advanced in Feb–Mar 2025 put Gulf money—Saudi included—at the core: estimates cluster around **$53 billion** overall, with reporting that **up to $20 billion** could come from Arab contributors if governance and protection guarantees are in place.
2. **Legitimacy & convening power.** Riyadh can underwrite an Arab political umbrella via OIC/Arab formats and the **July 2025** France–Saudi **high-level U.N. conference**, which produced the **“New York Declaration”** on a two-state horizon and launched follow-on diplomacy to expand U.N. backing.
3. **Humanitarian credibility.** **KSrelief’s sustained air-and-sea bridge** into Gaza gives Riyadh operational standing with Gazans—**58 aircraft, 8 ships, ~7,188 tons** of aid by late July 2025—along with **20 ambulances** and **power generators** delivered to support critical services.
4. **Normalization leverage.** Saudi officials have repeatedly stated there will be **no normalization with Israel without a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood**, converting recognition into a **peace-enforcement tool** rather than a pre-war concession; in parallel, **U.S.–Saudi security and civil-nuclear talks** continue, amplifying leverage without requiring Riyadh to move first.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-summit-adopts-egyptian-gaza-reconstruction-plan-2025-03-04), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-summit-focus-egypts-alternative-trumps-gaza-riviera-2025-03-04), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-states-scramble-counter-trumps-gaza-riviera-plan-2025-02-21), [oic-oci.org](https://www.oic-oci.org/topic), [press.unorg](https://press.un.org/en/2025/pal2250.doc.htm), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/un-palestinians-israel-twostate-gaza-france-saudi-af7910977b9d17a03e7785039303c84f), [englishaawsat.com](https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/5170111-saudi-arabia-sends-additional-relief-convoy-gaza), [saudigazette.com.sa](https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/653801))

**Constraints and credibility risks**

Riyadh is unlikely to lead frontline mediation—those tracks remain anchored in **Cairo** and **Doha** with U.S. involvement—so Saudi diplomacy will continue to move in parallel rather than at the table edge. It also has strong incentives to **avoid any direct troop deployment** that could be framed as occupation: Arab governments have publicly rejected schemes to insert Arab forces, and Saudi officials have kept the focus on achieving a **permanent Gaza ceasefire** rather than discussing boots on the ground.Expect Riyadh instead to favor **fund-and-guarantee models**, **multilateral monitoring**, and **Arab League/OIC badges**—an approach consistent with the OIC/Arab League ministerial contact group shuttles and the **France–Saudi U.N. conference** that produced the “New York Declaration” on a two-state horizon.Calibrating this posture also means **not undercutting Jordan’s Hashemite custodianship in Jerusalem**—a long-standing, internationally acknowledged role—while still giving the broader Islamic world a seat at any enforcement table.*(The foregoing is an inference from the pattern of Saudi statements and chosen multilateral formats.)*

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-cairo-gaza-ceasefire-deal-expected-coming-days-sources-say-2024-12-17), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/mediators-present-updated-gaza-ceasefire-proposal-israel-hamas-axios-reports-2025-07-17), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-foreign-ministers-reject-transferring-out-palestinians-under-any-2025-02-01), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordanian-official-says-arabs-will-only-support-what-palestinians-agree-decide-2025-08-07), [oic-oci.org](https://www.oic-oci.org/topic), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-meets-urge-support-two-state-solution-us-israel-boycott-2025-07-28), [onu.delegfrance.org](https://onu.delegfrance.org/new-york-declaration), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/jordans-king-warns-call-with-biden-israeli-hostile-acts-jerusalem-2024-08-05))

**How Saudi Arabia “closes the circle” in a Nash-equilibrium peace**

In game-theory terms, Riyadh can change payoffs so cooperation dominates defection:

* **For Israel**: a conditional, stage-gated **normalization pathway** with the Kingdom (plus EU/Gulf reconstruction finance) in exchange for verifiable ceasefire compliance, hostage releases, weapons interdiction, and a clear statehood horizon. The prize — regional integration with the largest Arab economy and U.S.-anchored guarantees — outweighs any short-term “hold out” payoff.
* **For Palestinians/PA**: **reconstruction-for-disarmament** funding, Arab umbrella for interim governance, and a U.N. two-state track re-energized by Riyadh’s July 2025 diplomacy — converting suffering into institutions and services rather than propaganda cycles.
* **For Iran-aligned spoilers**: a Gaza calm reduces the legitimacy of Red Sea attacks and lowers escalation incentives; continued disruption would risk unified Arab and great-power countermeasures that threaten their own equities — a costlier path than compliance.

**Recommended Saudi-anchored package**

1. **Riyadh Reconstruction Compact**: Saudi-led fund with ESCROW/SNAPBACK clauses — every tranche is unlocked by verified milestones (hostages ↔ prisoner phases; tunnel neutralization; border-interdiction tech online). Tranches auto-pause upon serious breach. (Use KSA, UAE, Qatar, EU, U.S., Japan, China as co-contributors; World Bank fiduciary.)
2. **Normalization-for-Compliance Timeline**: Publish a Saudi “Path-to-Normalization” note with dated rungs (liaison office → trade facilitation → full recognition), each contingent on U.N./multilateral verification of ceasefire and governance benchmarks — explicitly citing the two-state horizon referenced in the July 2025 Saudi-French push.
3. **OIC/Arab League Oversight Cell (Riyadh)**: A standing cell that co-chairs with the U.N. Special Coordinator and Egypt/Qatar — giving Arab/Islamic legitimacy to inspections, humanitarian corridors, and media de-escalation standards.
4. **Red Sea De-Escalation Understanding**: Saudi-brokered pledge (with Oman) that maritime attacks linked to Gaza cease during the truce; in return, aid corridors and fuel flows are guaranteed at scale. Violations trigger automatic escrow freezes.
5. **Vision-2030 Peace Dividend Metrics**: Joint Saudi-World Bank scoreboard (electricity hours restored, potable water, jobs created) published monthly from Riyadh — tying donor confidence and domestic Saudi interests to visible civilian gains in Gaza.

### United Arab Emirates

**Why Abu Dhabi/Dubai matter for this plan.** The UAE normalized relations with Israel via the **Abraham Accords** signed at the White House on **September 15, 2020**.The **UAE–Israel CEPA** then **entered into force on April 1, 2023**, removing or reducing tariffs on **over 96% of product lines** (covering about **99%** of the value of traded goods).Although the Gaza war cooled the **pace and publicity** of commercial deals, **diplomatic relations were not suspended**—Abu Dhabi maintained ties and channels throughout.

([state.gov](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/UAE_Israel-treaty-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf), [mofa.gov.ae](https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2022/5/30/30-05-2022-uae-growth), [mfatgovt.nz](https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-General/Trade-Market-reports/UAE-Israel-Free-Trade-Deal-enters-into-force-May-2023.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-war-cools-israels-once-red-hot-business-ties-with-uae-2024-05-08), [2017-2021.state.gov](https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-abraham-accords), [pwc.com](https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/tax/documents/2023/uae-israel-cepa.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-plans-maintain-ties-with-israel-despite-gaza-outcry-sources-say-2023-11-11), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RS/PDF/RS21852/RS21852.156.pdf))

**Posture in the Gaza war: humanitarian surge, de-escalation messaging.** On **August 5, 2025**, the UAE’s eighth aid ship **Khalifa**—the **largest** dispatched under *Operation Chivalrous (Gallant) Knight 3*—**arrived at Egypt’s Al-Arish Port** carrying **7,166 tonnes** of assistance; official and press reporting note the cargo includes a **fully-equipped field hospital**, and the shipment pushed total UAE aid to Gaza **above 80,000 tonnes**. Meanwhile, the UAE-run field hospital in Gaza (operational since **Dec 2, 2023**) had **treated over 51,000 cases by April 2025**, and Abu Dhabi continued patient evacuations in early August (**188 patients and family members** airlifted).

([thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2025/07/21/uaes-largest-ever-aid-ship-sets-off-for-gaza), [thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2025/03/28/uae-evacuates-188-palestinians-from-gaza-in-latest-humanitarian-mission), [thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2024/12/03/uae-field-hospital-gaza), [mofa.gov.ae](https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/mediahub/news/2024/11/6/6-11-2024-uae-uae), [thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2025/08/05/uaes-largest-gaza-aid-ship-carrying-field-hospital-arrives-in-egypt), [emiratitimes.com](https://emiratitimes.com/uae-aids-gaza-health-sector), [emiratitimes.com](https://emiratitimes.com/uae-aids-gaza-health-sector), [asianlite.com](https://asianlite.com/2025/top-news/lifeline-from-uae-to-gaza))

**Public opinion**

Public sentiment in the UAE must be read cautiously: civic space is tightly managed, and during COP28 the only visible protests were small, pre-approved actions inside the U.N.-administered Blue Zone—underscoring that attitudes tend to surface via consumer behavior rather than street protest.Pre–Oct 7 polling of Emirati **citizens** shows a pragmatic but conditional stance toward ties with Israel: in April 2023, **45%** said business deals with Israeli companies are acceptable **if they help the economy**, just **27%** saw the Abraham Accords’ regional effects as positive, only **21%** favored Arab cooperation with Israel against Iran, and **76%** said rockets fired at Israel from Gaza harm the region—signals that economic pragmatism does not equal a blank-check normalization. Since Oct 7, nationally representative UAE-citizen polling is limited, but reputable market surveys show very high “activist consumer” tendencies—**~9 in 10** in the UAE say they’re **willing to boycott** brands over objectionable actions, and **about two-thirds** in the UAE/KSA say they **have boycotted** a brand (≈**60%** in the UAE)—so policymakers should expect reputational blowback if optics look like “business as usual” absent tangible gains for Palestinians. Region-wide benchmarks also matter: Arab Barometer’s 2023–24 wave finds that in **all seven** polled countries, **no more than 13%** support normalization post–Oct 7—an external constraint Abu Dhabi will weigh even though the UAE wasn’t surveyed in that wave.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/activists-stage-rare-uae-politics-protest-during-cop28-climate-summit-2023-12-09), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/cop28-climate-summit-protests-ahmed-mansoor-alaa-abdel-fattah-79b2e3180385bb54ca1cc4b6cb4ae4d2), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/uae-public-opinion-still-friendly-united-states-split-israel-hostile-iran), [business.yougov.com](https://business.yougov.com/content/49831-me-brand-boycott-report), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/2025/01/14619))  
  
**Strategic incentives: keep trade lanes open, lower war premiums.** DP World’s global footprint—anchored by **Jebel Ali**, the Middle East’s largest container port and a **top-10** global hub in 2023 per Alphaliner—means Red Sea disruptions directly hit Emirati logistics and profits; UNCTAD documents how the Red Sea rerouting has driven up freight and insurance costs across 2024–25  
**And the price signal is clear:** DP World’s deputy CEO said at Davos that if Houthi attacks are curbed, **ocean-freight rates could fall “at least 20–25%” within two to three months**—and the Houthis themselves have tied their attacks to the Gaza war and indicated limits/cessation under a ceasefire—making a Gaza truce a **direct UAE economic interest**.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/dp-world-says-sea-freight-prices-could-fall-20-if-red-sea-attacks-curbed-2025-01-22), [asiacargonews.com](https://asiacargonews.com/e/news/detail), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/dp-world-says-sea-freight-prices-could-fall-20-if-red-sea-attacks-curbed-2025-01-22), [unctad.org](https://unctad.org/publication/review-maritime-transport-2024), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/red-sea-trade-route-will-remain-too-risky-even-after-gaza-ceasefire-deal-2025-01-17), [supplychainbrain.com](https://www.supplychainbrain.com/articles/41087-dp-world-says-curb-on-red-sea-attacks-could-bring-ocean-freight-rates-crashing-down), [safety4sea.com](https://safety4sea.com/dp-world-deputy-ceo-says-freight-rates-could-come-crashing-down), [supplychain247.com](https://www.supplychain247.com/article/red-sea-calm-could-cut-freight-prices-by-25-says-dp-world))  
  
**Unique assets the UAE can bring.**

* **Finance & delivery at scale.** Across Abu Dhabi’s three big sovereign investors—**ADIA, Mubadala, ADQ**—total assets are **~$1.7 trillion** (Reuters, May 8, 2025), giving the UAE exceptional capacity to anchor multi-year reconstruction and utilities programs. That firepower increasingly targets advanced tech and infrastructure—e.g., **Microsoft’s $1.5 billion strategic investment in G42** (April 2024), pairing capital with cloud/AI capability.UAE convening credibility from **COP28** also matters: the summit **operationalized the Loss & Damage Fund** with **~$700–800 million** in initial pledges—useful political ballast for a Gaza recovery compact.
* **Global-South bridges.** The UAE **joined BRICS on January 1, 2024**, adding formal links into an expanded Global-South forum, and it co-leads the **I2U2** economic track (India–Israel–UAE–US) that advances concrete projects (e.g., a **300 MW** hybrid renewables project in Gujarat). Its **CEPA with India** has been **in force since May 1, 2022**, deepening trade/supply-chain integration that can be steered toward Gaza’s reconstruction ecosystem.
* **Megaproject muscle.** The **Barakah** plant—**the Arab world’s first commercial nuclear power station**—now provides roughly **a quarter of UAE electricity**, showing delivery at scale.The **Taweelah** reverse-osmosis complex is **the world’s largest RO plant** (~**909,000 m³/day**), a direct analogue for rapid water-infrastructure build-outs.The **Etihad Rail** network spans **~900 km** linking all seven emirates, indicative of integrated EPC + O&M capability; **construction is complete** per the operator.On seaborne logistics, **Jebel Ali (DP World)** remains the **Middle East’s largest container port** and, per Alphaliner reporting, **re-entered the global top-10** in 2023.
* **Tech & data-center hub.** The UAE hosts **Microsoft Azure regions (UAE North/Central, launched 2019)** and the **AWS Middle East (UAE) Region** (opened **Aug 2022**), plus the **MBZUAI** research university and the **G42** ecosystem—useful for standing up aid-logistics platforms, payments rails, and compliance monitoring tied to ceasefire benchmarks.
* **A distinct “Israel vector.”** Beyond diplomacy, Emirati capital has executed **real-economy deals** with Israel—e.g., **Mubadala’s 22% stake in the Tamar gas field** (finalized 2021)—and the **UAE–Israel CEPA** (in force **Apr 1, 2023**) **removed/reduced tariffs on >96% of product lines** (≈**99%** of trade value), institutionalizing bilateral trade.During the Gaza war, ties **cooled but were not suspended**, preserving channels others lack.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/abu-dhabi-wealth-fund-mubadalas-assets-under-management-rise-9-2024-2025-05-08), [unfccc.int](https://unfccc.int/cop28/5-key-takeaways), [blogs.microsoft.com](https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2024/04/15/microsoft-and-g42-partner-to-accelerate-ai-innovation-in-uae-and-beyond), [news.microsoft.com](https://news.microsoft.com/source/2024/04/16/microsoft-invests-1-5-billion-in-abu-dhabis-g42-to-accelerate-ai-development-and-global-expansion), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/microsoft-g42-ai-uae-abu-dhabi-jais-8a9e3f9840a10f151e2421efb195c9b6), [unfccc.int](https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era), [cop28.com](https://www.cop28.com/en/the-uae-consensus-foreword), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2024/760368/EPRS_BRI%282024%29760368_EN.pdf), [bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/14/joint-statement-of-the-leaders-of-india-israel-united-arab-emirates-and-the-united-states-i2u2), [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/i2u2), [pib.gov.in](https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx), [enec.gov.ae](https://www.enec.gov.ae), [acwapower.com](https://acwapower.com/en/projects/taweelah-ro-desalination-iwp), [idom.com](https://www.idom.com/en/project/seawater-desalination-plant-with-associated-photovoltaic-installation-taweelah-909000-m3-day-and-70-mw), [etihadrail.ae](https://www.etihadrail.ae/en/network), [container-news.com](https://container-news.com/jebel-ali-returns-to-top-10-busiest-container-ports), [news.microsoft.com](https://news.microsoft.com/en-xm/2019/06/19/microsoft-cloud-datacenter-regions-now-available-in-the-uae-to-help-fuel-the-middle-easts-future-economic-ambitions), [azure.microsoft.com](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/first-microsoft-cloud-regions-in-middle-east-now-available), [aws.amazon.com](https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/aws/now-open-aws-region-in-the-united-arab-emirates-uae), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-get-3-amazon-web-services-data-centres-2022-2021-05-26), [mbzuai.ac.ae](https://mbzuai.ac.ae), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-delek-says-finalised-deal-sell-tamar-gas-stake-uaes-mubadala-2021-09-02), [pwc.com](https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/services/tax/me-tax-legal-news/2023/uae-israel-cepa.html), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/uae-did-not-suspend-ties-with-israel-diplomats-say-2024-04-10), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/abu-dhabi-wealth-fund-mubadalas-assets-under-management-rise-9-2024-2025-05-08))

**Constraints & credibility risks.** The Gaza war dented public tolerance for visible UAE–Israel business, and Red Sea insecurity hit UAE logistics income—reasons Abu Dhabi prefers **quiet deal-making** under multilateral umbrellas while it front-loads **humanitarian optics**. Keeping the Emirati role squarely on **delivery (aid, utilities, ports) + conditional economics**, not frontline mediation, preserves legitimacy at home and abroad.

**Possible UAE role in the Roadmap.**

* **“Silent economic track.”** Let Abu Dhabi lead a **Gaza Reconstruction & Utilities SEZ** (ports/logistics, power, desal, housing), with **escrow/snap-back** disbursements tied to ceasefire and governance benchmarks; DP World, TAQA, Masdar, and Mubadala can underwrite EPC + O&M. (Precedent: UAE’s **$10 bn** regional *Industrial Partnership* with Egypt–Jordan–Bahrain.)
* **Corridors & monitoring tech.** Use UAE logistics (Jebel Ali → Al-Arish), rail/port integration, and cloud capacity (AWS/Azure) to stand up a transparent **aid and materials pipeline**, with IoT tagging and dashboards accessible to UN, Egypt, Israel, and the PA.
* **Normalization-for-Compliance ladder (parallel to KSA).** Because the UAE already recognizes Israel (and has **CEPA** mechanisms), it can help structure **sequenced economic benefits** that unlock *only as* verifiable steps toward a Palestinian state and durable calm are met—complementing Riyadh’s “statehood-first” stance without undercutting it.

### Lebanon

**Why Lebanon matters to the Roadmap.** The Israel–Hezbollah front is the fastest-moving spillover channel from the Gaza war—analysts and UN briefings flagged it as the most likely vector of wider escalation—and renewed fighting would quickly derail shipping, reconstruction flows, and investor confidence. It has already displaced large populations on **both sides** (about **60,000** Israelis evacuated from the north at points during the war), and in Lebanon the numbers were far larger.UN and IOM reporting show that even **after the late-2024 truce**, roughly **113,000** people in Lebanon were **still displaced outside their cadasters of origin** in mid-January **2025**, easing toward **~90,000** by late **Q1–Q2 2025** as returns accelerated; at the **peak**, nearly **900,000** were internally displaced and **~1.3 million** people were affected.The World Bank’s **Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA)** puts **recovery and reconstruction needs at ~US$11 billion** for the 14-month war period (**Oct 8, 2023–Dec 20, 2024**), and estimates **real GDP contracted 7.1% in 2024**, bringing the **cumulative output collapse since 2019 to nearly 40%**—underscoring the macro stakes of keeping the northern front quiet.

([crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/lebanon-israelpalestine/preventing-escalation), [crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/watch-list-2024-spring-update), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/costs-israel-hezbollah-conflict-lebanon-israel-2024-11-26), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-53-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-02-january-2025), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-55-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-16-january-2025), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-58-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-06-february-2025), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/internally-displaced-persons-lebanon-perspectives-return-and-future-intentions-dtm-lebanon-march-2025), [dtm.iom.int](https://dtm.iom.int/dtm-insights/april-2025-edition/data-update-durable-solutions-lebanon), [who.int](https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/public-health-situation-analysis---lebanon), [civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/middle-east-and-northern-africa/lebanon_en), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/03/07/lebanon-s-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-estimated-at-us-11-billion), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/19/fragile-stabilization-fuels-growth-in-lebanon), [documents1.worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099030125012526525/pdf/P506380-f58e9761-b29e-4d62-97c3-ebf5a511c4e1.pdf), [thedocs.worldbank.org](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/65cf93926fdb3ea23b72f277fc249a72-0500042021/related/mpo-lbn.pdf))

**Posture in the Gaza war**

1. **Linked front, then conditional decoupling.**
   * **Opened the “support front”:** Hezbollah began firing from south Lebanon on **Oct 8, 2023**, explicitly “in solidarity” with Gaza/Hamas.
   * **“We’ll halt if Gaza halts”:** On **Feb 29, 2024**, Hezbollah signaled it would stop attacks if Israel’s Gaza offensive stopped (while saying it would keep fighting if Israel continued).
   * **Condition dropped (separate track possible):** On **Oct 8, 2024**, senior Hezbollah figures stopped insisting a Gaza truce was a precondition for a Lebanon ceasefire.
2. **2024–25 escalations and leadership change.**
   * **Deep strikes & limited incursions (late Sept 2024):** Israel told Washington it was conducting **limited ground operations** in south Lebanon; reporting also noted troops pushed **~6 km** into Lebanon before the truce.
   * **“Pager” blasts:** **Sept 17–18, 2024** mass detonations of rigged pagers (and then walkie-talkies) injured **3,000+** and killed at least **a dozen**; widely attributed to Israel.
   * **Leadership change:** Hezbollah leader **Hassan Nasrallah** was killed on **Sept 28, 2024**; **Naim Qassem** named successor on **Oct 29, 2024**.
   * **Post-transition tone:** Qassem backed ceasefire efforts without tying them to a Gaza deal (Oct 8, 2024), and in 2025 warned Israel against resuming major operations—both consistent with engaging de-escalation tracks while keeping leverage.
3. **Ceasefire, fragile calm, and compliance wrangling.**
   * **Truce in force:** A **U.S.–France–brokered** ceasefire took effect **Nov 27, 2024**; terms included **Israeli withdrawal within ~60 days** and Hezbollah **north of the Litani**, with LAF/UNIFIL roles.
   * **Fragility & UNIFIL warnings:** UNIFIL repeatedly urged restraint amid incidents (e.g., March 18 & 22, 2025 escalations; May 14, 2025 fire hitting a UNIFIL post).
4. **Current diplomatic lane (mid-2025): disarmament for normalization.**
   * **Political context:** **Joseph Aoun** elected president (**Jan 18, 2025**) and **Nawaf Salam** designated PM (**Jan 13–14, 2025**; cabinet formed **Feb 8, 2025**).
   * **Latest U.S. plan (Aug 7, 2025):** Reuters’ exclusive describes a proposal to **disarm Hezbollah by year-end 2025** in exchange for **Israeli withdrawal/cessation of operations** and an **economic/reconstruction track**; during cabinet discussion **Hezbollah-aligned ministers walked out**.
   * **Cabinet friction:** Separate reporting the same week notes the government **tasked the army** to draft a plan to **limit arms to the state**; Hezbollah/Amal ministers **exited the session** in protest.
5. **Humanitarian and security footprint.**
   * **Scale of displacement:** At peak in 2024, **~900,000** people were internally displaced in Lebanon (IOM/OCHA).
   * **Returns & those still displaced after the truce:** Following the **Nov 27, 2024** ceasefire, **>918,000** people returned to the south, while **~110k–115k** remained displaced through **Jan–Feb 2025** (IOM/OCHA/ACAPS).
   * **Damage & 1701 frame:** World Bank’s **March 7, 2025** RDNA estimates **US$11B** in recovery needs and extensive destruction of housing/public assets; implementation is anchored in **UNSCR 1701** with UNIFIL/LAF roles.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-is-lebanons-hezbollah-2023-10-08), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-lebanon-after-hezbollah-hits-shebaa-farms-2023-10-08), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-signals-it-will-cease-fire-when-israel-stops-attacking-gaza-2024-02-29), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/halt-gaza-fighting-would-trigger-lebanon-ceasefire-talks-pm-says-2024-02-29), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-officials-drop-gaza-truce-condition-lebanon-ceasefire-2024-10-08), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-has-told-us-ground-operations-against-hezbollah-are-limited-state-dept-2024-09-30), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/photo-essay/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-pagers-attack-survivors-photos-187318e3f8df72d15e89b8d955f20ba2), [lieber.westpoint.edu](https://lieber.westpoint.edu/well-it-depends-explosive-pagers-attack-revisited), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-israeli-strikes-point-precarious-ceasefire-2025-03-18), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-new-president-stresses-urgency-israeli-withdrawal-south-under-truce-2025-01-18), [dtm.iom.int](https://dtm.iom.int/lebanon), [humanitarianaction.info](https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1286/article/lebanon-fa-2025), [acaps.org](https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/lebanon), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-56-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-23-january-2025), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/03/07/lebanon-s-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-estimated-at-us-11-billion))

**Public opinion**

**Solidarity with Gaza is broad; appetite for war is not.**

* A **Statistics Lebanon** survey fielded **Oct 13–17, 2023** found **~73% opposed** Lebanon entering war with Israel; this figure is widely cited in mainstream francophone Lebanese coverage.
* Arab Barometer’s **Lebanon Country Report (Wave VIII, fielded Feb 12–Apr 2, 2024)** shows the conflict in Gaza dominates international views; **“genocide” (36%)** and **“massacre” (25%)** were the most chosen labels, underscoring solidarity with Gaza while not implying support for opening a broader war.
* A nationally representative poll (WINEP, **Nov 14–Dec 6, 2023**) found a **slim majority** agree Lebanon should focus on domestic reform and **“stay out of foreign war,”** with strong agreement among Sunnis and Christians.

**Low national trust in Hezbollah, with sharp sectarian variance.**

* Arab Barometer (Wave VIII) reports **~30%** of Lebanese say they trust Hezbollah; trust is **overwhelmingly concentrated among Shia (85%)** and **single-digits** among Sunnis/Christians/Druze.
* In the same period, a separate nationally representative poll (WINEP) shows **79%** of Lebanese hold a **positive opinion of Hamas** (Christians are split), illustrating high sympathy for Gaza while trust in Hezbollah as a party remains a minority, cross-nationally uneven stance.

**Gaza war refracts through identity and great-power views.**

* Arab Barometer (Wave VIII) notes a **15-point drop in U.S. favorability** in Lebanon **(from 42% to 27% from 2022 to early-2024)**, explicitly linking the slide to U.S. alignment with Israel in Gaza. It also records that most Lebanese view the U.S. as **the chief defender of Israeli rights (72%)** and only **6%** as a defender of Palestinian rights.
* The same report documents the **“genocide/massacre”** framing above and a modest **rise in favorability toward Iran** (esp. among non-Shia from 2022 to 2024), capturing identity and geopolitical lenses through which Gazan events are interpreted.
* Arab Barometer’s regional syntheses reinforce that **Lebanon is among the countries most likely to describe Israel’s actions as “genocide.”**

**War-weariness backed by lived costs.**

* **IDMC (May 2025)**: the 2024 conflict produced **nearly 1.1 million displacement movements** in Lebanon and left **~985,000 living in internal displacement** at year’s end—the highest on record for the country.
* **IOM DTM / OCHA**: after the **Nov 27, 2024** ceasefire, **~900,000** people **returned** to areas of origin; **~179,000** remained displaced by mid-Dec 2024, with **~110–125k** still displaced into **early 2025**. Cross-border flows also ran **from Lebanon into Syria** (OCHA: **~562,000** crossings reported through late Nov 2024). These series document the mass human toll underpinning broad public demand for a ceasefire that holds.

**Hezbollah’s base vs. the national median.**

* Polling/fieldwork show **persistent sectarian divergence**: WINEP’s late-2023 poll finds **broad Hamas sympathy** yet a **national plurality preferring to avoid foreign war**, with **Shia** much more supportive of Hezbollah/Hamas and **Sunnis/Christians** markedly more risk-averse.
* Analytical reporting in **International Crisis Group (2025)** and **Carnegie (2025)** describes a **post-2024 pattern**: Hezbollah’s **core base** still frames the southern front as leverage for Gaza, while the **broader public mood** trends toward **de-escalation and a durable rules-based border fix**, especially amid devastation in the south.
* Lebanese outlets mirror the mood: senior officials publicly emphasize “**no return to the language of war**,” reflecting wider fatigue and preference for stability.

([mondediplo.com](https://mondediplo.com/2024/08/02lebanon), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB8-Lebanon-Country-Report-EN.pdf), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/shadow-hezbollah-israel-escalation-poll-shows-slim-majority-lebanese-still-want), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/AB8-Lebanon-Country-Report-EN.pdf), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/2024/07/irans-position-on-palestine-is-not-enough-to-win-the-favor-of-mena-citizens), [internal-displacement.org](https://www.internal-displacement.org/spotlights/lebanon-escalating-conflict-triggers-record-displacement), [crisisresponse.iom.int](https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/documents/IOM%20Lebanon%20External%20Update%205%2029%20Nov%20-%20%2012%20Dec%202024.pdf), [crisisresponse.iom.int](https://crisisresponse.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1481/files/appeal/documents/10.%20IOM%20Lebanon_ExtSitRep10.pdf), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/iom-lebanon-emergency-response-update-9-1-28-february-2025), [crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/lebanon-israelpalestine-united-states/reinforcing-shaky-israel-lebanon-ceasefire), [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2025/08/hezbollahs-margin-is-tightening), [today.lorientlejour.com](https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1470746/there-will-be-no-return-to-the-language-of-war-in-lebanon-aoun-says.html))

**Current status & leverage points.** A **U.S.- and French-brokered** cessation-of-hostilities arrangement took effect on **November 27, 2024**, launching a 60-day truce and an **International Monitoring and Implementation Mechanism (IMIM)** **chaired by the United States, hosted by UNIFIL, and joined by France, the LAF and the IDF**, to drive steps aligned with **UNSCR 1701** (quiet along the Blue Line, LAF/UNIFIL presence south of the Litani, and pullbacks of armed forces).Implementation continued into **2025** with **tripartite/liaison** work resuming and regular IMIM meetings, but **violations and slippage on timelines persisted**: Israel publicly said it would remain in parts of **southern Lebanon** beyond the 60-day deadline while withdrawal/pullback terms were still being implemented; UNIFIL reiterated calls for **full compliance with 1701** (IDF withdrawal from Lebanese territory, removal of unauthorized weapons south of the Litani, and LAF redeployment).The **Security Council renewed UNIFIL** on **Aug 28, 2024** (**Resolution 2749**) through **Aug 31, 2025**, keeping 1701’s de-escalation demands front-and-center.Crucially for leverage, **Hezbollah has repeatedly tied the northern front to Gaza**—senior officials said they would **halt fire if there is a Gaza ceasefire**—a linkage this Roadmap can convert into a stabilizer if Gaza moves first.  
  
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-takes-effect-2024-11-27), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/what-does-us-brokered-truce-ending-israel-hezbollah-fighting-include-2024-11-27), [lb.usembassy.gov](https://lb.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-from-the-united-states-and-french-embassies-in-lebanon-and-unifil), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/so-far-so-good-israel-lebanon-ceasefire-largely-holding), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-07/lebanon-33.php), [securitycouncilreportorg](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-08/lebanon-34.php), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-voices-concerns-about-implementation-ceasefire-with-hezbollah-ahead-2025-01-23), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanese-army-says-israel-procrastinating-withdrawal-2025-01-25), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-26-january-2025), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unifil-statement-26-january-2025), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2749%282024%29), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15801.doc.htm), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/hezbollah-israel-hamas-lebanon-gaza-b75185ba722bf31c4982e579541a12f0), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-will-halt-fire-if-hamas-oks-gaza-truce-sources-say-2024-02-27), [latimes.com](https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2024-07-02/hezbollahs-deputy-leader-says-group-would-stop-fighting-with-israel-after-gaza-cease-fire))

**Spoiler profile (capabilities & risks).** Hezbollah retains one of the world’s largest non-state rocket/missile stockpiles—**often estimated in the 120,000–200,000 range**—now paired with a **maturing precision-guided munitions component** and extensive **UAS** use, which together create multiple escalation ladders even during “truce” periods.Forward **Radwan** special-operations units have been deployed along the border since 2023–24 and, despite attrition, reappeared in **areas south of the Litani** during 2025—sustaining infiltration and ATGM risks near the Blue Line.In this environment, **UNIFIL’s liaison and tripartite mechanisms** remain indispensable for deconfliction **when empowered and resourced**: the **Secretary-General’s July 2025 report** urges all sides to use UNIFIL’s long-standing **liaison/coordination channels**, and UNIFIL notes its **Liaison Branch**—the only UNIFIL unit with a permanent presence **on both sides of the Blue Line**—**resumed regular patrols in January 2025** as conditions allowed; UNIFIL leadership has long emphasized that these **tripartite meetings at Naqoura** reduce tensions and resolve contentious issues.  
  
([csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/coming-conflict-hezbollah), [iiss.org](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/06/fighting-precision-with-precision), [csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-war-between-israel-hezbollah-and-iran), [israel-alma.org](https://israel-alma.org/radwan-unit-operative-eliminations-reveal-deployment-south-of-litani-and-operational-rebuild), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/461), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/evolving-role-unifil%E2%80%99s-liaison-branch), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unifil-head-chairs-tripartite-meeting-with-lebanese-and-israeli-military-officials))

**Inclusive de-escalation design — indicative options**

* **Linkage to Gaza benchmarks (sequenced ratchets).** One option is to structure the Lebanon file as an automatic dividend of progress in Gaza: as Gaza moves from verified pause → phased truce → monitored calm, the Lebanon track would ratchet accordingly (quiet along the Blue Line, LAF/UNIFIL posture south of the Litani, and stepwise pullbacks consistent with 1701 and the **U.S./France-brokered Nov 27, 2024 arrangement** and its **U.S.-led IMIM**).
* **“LAF-plus” enforcement package under UNIFIL auspices.** A calibrated security posture could involve a reinforced **LAF** deployment south of the Litani with comms/ISR/counter-UAS and border-observation technology, under **UNIFIL** oversight and using the **IMIM** and **Tripartite** forums as first-resort conflict-management channels. (UN materials describe UNIFIL’s liaison/Tripartite mechanisms and the Liaison Branch’s resumed patrols in 2025.)
* **Returns & reconstruction tied to verified calm.** Recovery support could be disbursed through a **Lebanon Recovery Window** within the broader regional fund—releasing tranches for IDP returns, housing repair and basic services in the south as verified calm persists—aligned with the **World Bank RDNA 2025** and subsequent operational financing.
* **Targeted penalties with safeguards (guardrails).** Where serious, verified breaches occur (e.g., precision systems south of the Litani or sustained cross-border fire), targeted measures could be considered alongside **humanitarian/essential-services carve-outs**. *(Analytic inference based on ceasefire enforcement practice; to be calibrated with UNSCR 1701 obligations.)*
* **Political-economic incentives linked to stabilization.** International support (IMF-linked reform milestones, concessional windows) could be timed to durable de-escalation, widening the coalition for calm inside Lebanon; recent **IMF staff engagement (June 2025)** and **World Bank** updates provide a platform for such linkages.

**Context signals (Aug 2025):** Reporting continues to note debates over timelines and withdrawals under the truce architecture, underscoring the value of keeping **1701** and the **IMIM/Tripartite** mechanisms central as implementation moves forward.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/what-does-us-brokered-truce-ending-israel-hezbollah-fighting-include-2024-11-27), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-poised-approve-ceasefire-with-hezbollah-israeli-official-says-2024-11-26), [unsco.unmissions.org](https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_res_17012006.pdf), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/evolving-role-of-unifils-liaison-branch), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas), [digitallibrary.un.org](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/581053), [imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/05/pr-25182-lebanon-imf-staff-concludes-mission-to-lebanon), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/prospect-lebanon-ceasefire-leaves-gazans-feeling-abandoned-2024-11-26))

### Yemen

**Why Yemen matters to the Roadmap.** The Red Sea/Bab al-Mandab front is the most immediate maritime spillover from the Gaza war: since mid-November 2023, Houthi strikes on commercial shipping have repeatedly disrupted Suez-bound traffic, forcing reroutes around the Cape of Good Hope and pushing up freight and insurance costs. UNCTAD notes the Red Sea crisis has driven sustained rerouting and higher premiums into 2024–25, with ship transits through the corridor down sharply versus normal trends.Disruption spiked again in **July 2025** when two cargo ships—**Magic Seas** and **Eternity C**—were attacked and sunk off Yemen, prompting fresh jumps in **war-risk premiums** and renewed salvage/response operations.Crews have been **killed or gone missing**, and seafarer risk remains elevated, as documented by the **IMO**, industry bodies, and major outlets reporting on casualties and hostage-taking since 2024. Inside Yemen, humanitarian needs remain vast in **2025**—**~19.5 million** people need assistance—underscoring how maritime de-escalation supports wider regional recovery.

([unctad.org](https://unctad.org/news/unprecedented-shipping-disruptions-raise-risk-global-trade-unctad-warns), [unctad.org](https://unctad.org/news/high-freight-rates-strain-global-supply-chains-threaten-vulnerable-economies), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/crew-greek-ship-hit-off-yemen-safe-vessel-risks-sinking-operator-says-2025-07-07), [sdgpulse.unctad.org](https://sdgpulse.unctad.org/sustainable-transport), [un.org](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2025-07-11/statement-attributable-the-spokesperson-for-the-secretary-general-%E2%80%93-attacks-the-red-sea), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rescuers-rescue-four-more-mariners-houthi-struck-ship-11-still-missing-2025-07-10), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/greece-send-salvage-ship-red-sea-after-latest-houthi-attacks-2025-07-24), [imo.org](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/red-sea.aspx), [wwwcdn.imo.org](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/Documents/Red%20Sea%20Incidents%20update%209%20July%202025.pdf), [bimco.org](https://www.bimco.org/news-insights/bimco-news/2025/07/09-industry-statement), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/10/houthi-ship-seafarers-red-sea-philippines-filipino-attack-filipinos-sailors), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/10/another-four-people-rescued-in-red-sea-after-houthi-attack-on-greek-cargo-ship-eternity-c), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2025-january-2025), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/yemen), [humanitarianaction.info](https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1262))

**Posture in the Gaza war.**

Ansar Allah (the Houthis) positioned Yemen as a **Gaza-linked “support theater,”** publicly framing their Red Sea campaign against commercial shipping—and occasional launches toward Israel—as acts of solidarity with Palestinians. Regional and extra-regional actors responded with **UN Security Council pressure** and **multinational maritime protection**, alongside **limited strikes** on Houthi capabilities, while **Muscat/UN channels** kept de-escalation talks alive in parallel. Yemen’s **internationally recognized government** condemned the maritime campaign as damaging to the peace track and economy, and UN trade bodies flagged broader disruptions to global lanes and aid flows.

([washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/10/houthi-ship-seafarers-red-sea-philippines-filipino-attack-filipinos-sailors), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15561.doc.htm), [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3652569/us-forces-allies-conduct-joint-strikes-in-yemen), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/3/us-led-coalition-warns-houthis-of-consequences-after-red-sea-attacks), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/18/houthis-to-halt-israel-red-sea-attacks-if-gaza-truce-comes-into-force), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-biden-retaliation-attacks-0804b93372cd5e874a0dd03513fe36a2), [osesgy.unmissions.org](https://osesgy.unmissions.org/un-special-envoy-yemen-concludes-visit-muscat-0), [mofa-ye.org](https://www.mofa-ye.org/Pages/33073))

**Public opinion.**

Nationwide independent polling inside Yemen is scarce due to the war, but the best available indicators point in one direction: **very high solidarity with Gaza** alongside **mixed views on Houthi escalation**. Repeated, well-documented **mass rallies in Sana’a** (thousands to **tens of thousands** on many Fridays) show broad pro-Palestine sentiment, yet a **Sana’a Center** rapid survey (July–Sept 2024) found **76%** of Yemenis believed the Red Sea escalation **harmed the peace process** and that **support for the maritime operations did not equal favorability toward the Houthis**. Region-wide polling that **included Yemen** likewise recorded overwhelming solidarity actions (boycotts, donations) and a sharp downturn in views of the U.S. amid the Gaza war, trends consistent with Yemen’s street mood.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/large-protests-break-out-yemen-after-us-british-attacks-2024-01-12), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW945517032025RP1), [newsroom.ap.org](https://newsroom.ap.org/editorial-photos-videos/detail), [reutersconnect.com](https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/thousands-of-protesters-rally-in-sanaa-in-support-of-palestinians-in-gaza/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjU6bmV3c21sX1JDMk9URkFBQjRYSQ), [sanaacenter.org](https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/july-sept-2024/23516), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/press-release-foreign-affairs-article-how-arab-public-opinion-constrains-normalization-with-israel))

**Current status & leverage points (Aug 2025).** A UN-mediated **nationwide truce** launched on **April 1, 2022** formally lapsed on **Oct 2, 2022**, yet a **de facto** lull largely held into 2024–25 while **Oman-facilitated Saudi–Houthi talks** continued in parallel to UN efforts.In response to Houthi **maritime attacks** in and near the Red Sea, the **Security Council adopted Resolution 2722** on **Jan 10, 2024**, demanding an immediate halt to strikes on merchant shipping; the U.S. and partners then mounted **maritime security operations** (e.g., Operation Prosperity Guardian) and conducted **limited strikes** aimed at degrading launch capability through early-to-mid-2025 (e.g., Jan 2024 coalition strikes; Jan 8 2025 and Apr 27 2025 CENTCOM actions).Insurance and freight **costs surged in July 2025** after the **Magic Seas** and **Eternity C** sinkings, with **war-risk premiums** jumping from ~0.3–0.4% to **~0.7–1.0%** of hull value—reinforcing the economic logic for a **Gaza-linked maritime de-escalation** given the Houthis’ stated linkage to Gaza.

([un.org](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2022-04-01/note-correspondents-press-statement-the-un-special-envoy-for-yemen-hans-grundberg-two-month-truce), [acleddata.com](https://acleddata.com/report/violence-yemen-during-un-mediated-truce-april-october-2022), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15258.doc.htm), [crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/catching-back-channel-peace-talks-yemen), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/9/saudi-omani-envoys-in-yemen-for-peace-talks-with-houthi-leaders), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/07/yemen-monthly-briefing-and-consultations-2.php), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15561.doc.htm), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2722%282024%29), [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3644027/us-partners-forces-strike-houthi-military-targets-in-yemen), [news.usniorg](https://news.usni.org/2025/01/08/u-s-central-command-launches-first-2025-strikes-against-houthis), [centcommil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4167047/uscentcom-forces-continue-to-target-houthi-terrorists))  
  
**Spoiler profile (capabilities & risks).** The Houthis field a mixed anti-ship arsenal—**UAVs, USVs, coastal cruise missiles, and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)**—and independent assessments plus U.S. incident reporting document **USVs/UUVs** and **ASBMs** in use; analysts also assess continuing **Iranian support** to Houthi production and supply lines.Since late-2023/2024 they have **fired ASBMs** and attempted **long-range strikes** beyond the Red Sea (e.g., Indian Ocean/Socotra approaches), with capability improvements tracked through **2024–25** by defense institutes.Maritime-security advisories **tally 140+ attacks** on commercial vessels since **Nov 2023**; notably, **Jan–Feb 2025** saw a lull after the group **announced a conditional pause** tied to the **Gaza ceasefire**, before activity later resumed—illustrating the operational linkage between the two files.

([maritime.dot.gov](https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2024-008-southern-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-and-gulf-aden-houthi-attacks-commercial-vessels), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3680306/feb-17-summary-of-red-sea-activities), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3799646/june-6-red-sea-update), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3805237/june-12-us-central-command-update), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3662725/houthi-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-and-iranian-uavs-shot-down-in-gulf-of-aden), [iiss.org](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/04/made-in-yemen-assessing-the-houthis-arms-production-capacity), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3662725/houthi-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-and-iranian-uavs-shot-down-in-gulf-of-aden), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3805237/june-12-us-central-command-update), [iiss.org](https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2024/12/navigating-troubled-waters.pdf), [maritime.dot.gov](https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2025-005-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-persian-gulf-and-somali-basin), [ukmto.org](https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic-week-06-dashboard-02---08-feb-2025.pdf), [ukmto.org](https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/jmic-week-07-dashboard-10---16-feb-2025.pdf), [seatrade-maritime.com](https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/security/houthis-to-end-red-sea-attacks-except-against-israeli-ships), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/20/yemens-houthis-to-only-target-israel-linked-ships-following-gaza-ceasefire))

**Inclusive de-escalation design**

* **Gaza-linked maritime ratchet.** One option is to stipulate that, as Gaza moves pause → truce → monitored calm, the Yemen/Red Sea file advances in parallel: graded cessation of maritime attacks, a verifiable stand-down of coastal launch assets, and a measured drawdown of coalition strikes—benchmarked to **UNSCR 2722 (10 Jan 2024)**, which demands an immediate halt to Houthi strikes on merchant shipping. Public Houthi signaling in Jan 2025 tied reductions in attacks to a Gaza ceasefire, providing a leverage point for conditional sequencing.
* **Economic-humanitarian quid pro quos (inside Yemen).** Quid pro quos can draw on parameters already used in the **April 2022 UN truce** and the **UN roadmap track**: sequenced **civil-service salary** arrangements, **phased civil-aviation openings** via Sana’a, **Hodeidah fuel/revenue arrangements**, and road openings—each **escrowed** and **snap-back** conditioned on sustained maritime calm and verified by the UN.
* **Maritime deconfliction mechanism.** A **Red Sea Maritime Deconfliction Cell** (UN-cohosted with a regional coastal state) could time-stamp incidents, interface with **UKMTO/MSTC** and naval coalitions, issue routing advisories, and certify compliance tiers that insurers can use for **war-risk premium** adjustments—aligning commercial incentives with calm. July 2025 attacks (sinkings of **Magic Seas** and **Eternity C**) saw premiums jump from ~0.3–0.4% to **~0.7–1.0%** of hull value, demonstrating price sensitivity to security signals.
* **Targeted interdiction + technology controls.** Maintain narrowly tailored interdiction of **guided components/USV kits** and related enablers, as documented in UN reporting and defense assessments (alongside public interdiction disclosures), while preserving **humanitarian carve-outs** and third-party monitoring to avoid broad economic harm.
* **Communication frame.** Emphasize **protection of seafarers and global trade** rather than concessionary narratives; July 2025 statements and reporting highlight crew **fatalities**, **missing mariners**, and hostage releases as salient concerns for industry and publics.
* **Context note: enforcement backdrop.** The **U.S.-led maritime security operations** (distinct from OPG) conducted **limited strikes** against Houthi launch nodes through early-to-mid-2025; any drawdown can be calibrated to verified maritime de-escalation.

([docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2722%282024%29), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15561.doc.htm), [digitallibrary.un.org](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4033392), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-continue-attacks-if-gaza-ceasefire-breached-2025-01-16), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/18/houthis-to-halt-israel-red-sea-attacks-if-gaza-truce-comes-into-force), [osesgy.unmissions.org](https://osesgy.unmissions.org/truce-agreement-april-2022), [osesgy.unmissions.org](https://osesgy.unmissions.org/press-release-implementation-truce-and-prospects-its-renewal), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/briefing-special-envoy-hans-grundberg-un-security-council-11-dec-2024), [yemen.un.org](https://yemen.un.org/en/260762-briefing-un-special-envoy-yemen-hans-grundberg-security-council), [gard.no](https://gard.no/insights/red-sea-update-resumption-of-houthi-campaign), [maritime.dot.gov](https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2025-005-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-arabian-sea-persian-gulf-and-somali-basin), [ukmto.org](https://www.ukmto.org/recent-incidents), [lloydslist.com](https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1154175/The-Daily-View-Eternity-C-and-Magic-Seas-shipping-and-marine-insurance-in-shock), [documents.un.org](https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/259/53/pdf/n2425953.pdf), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2140/panel-of-experts/work-and-mandate/reports), [dia.mil](https://www.dia.mil/News-Features/Articles/Article-View/Article/3834111/dia-report-showcases-iranian-origin-of-houthi-weapons-interdicted-at-sea), [iranwatch.org](https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/international-enforcement-actions/us-interdictions-highlight-irans-continuing-arms-transfers-yemen), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-rebels-galaxy-leader-crew-3638ab8e31c9c97b2ef5f9079dfbb6c0), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/igphoto/2003399524), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4167047/uscentcom-forces-continue-to-target-houthi-terrorists))

### Oman

**Why Oman matters to the Roadmap.** Muscat maintains working channels to the **Houthis, Tehran, Washington, and Riyadh**, and has converted that access into outcomes: on **May 6, 2025**, Oman publicly **confirmed it mediated a ceasefire understanding between the Houthis and the United States** over Red Sea attacks. In parallel, **indirect U.S.–Iran talks** have been running on the **Oman track** in 2025—rounds have been scheduled and occasionally postponed, and Muscat announced further sessions would **resume in Muscat on June 12, 2025**, underscoring its role as an accepted venue.Muscat also keeps **technical channels open with Israel**—notably **opening Omani airspace to Israeli carriers in February 2023** while avoiding formal normalization—signaling balanced access without alignment. On logistics, Oman offers **Arabian Sea alternatives** that complement Suez/Red Sea routes: **Salalah** is ranked **#2 globally for container-port efficiency** (World Bank **CPPI 2023**) and is expanding capacity (APM Terminals’ 2024–25 upgrades).**Sohar** handled **≈0.94 million TEU in 2024** (official/industry reporting), and **Duqm’s new container terminal** opened in **January 2024** under **Asyad Ports**—together giving the Roadmap credible staging/verification hubs for rerouted cargoes and relief outside the Red Sea chokepoint.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/oman-says-it-has-mediated-ceasefire-deal-between-yemens-houthis-us-2025-05-06), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-agrees-fourth-round-indirect-nuclear-talks-with-us-sunday-2025-05-09), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/oman-confirms-next-round-us-iran-nuclear-talks-amid-fears-regional-risks-2025-06-12), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/oman-opens-airspace-joining-saudi-de-facto-israeli-airline-corridor-2023-02-23), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/politics-persian-gulf-tensions-israel-oman-54d4cfda96ce9ffb023c38cd4e118113), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/23/oman-joins-saudi-in-opening-its-airspace-for-israeli-carriers), [openknowledge.worldbank.org](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/6cebb847-6f46-44e7-9533-12ac893b3693/content), [apmterminals.com](https://www.apmterminals.com/en/news/news-releases/2024/240611-salalah-expansion), [zawya.com](https://www.zawya.com/en/press-release/companies-news/sohar-port-and-freezone-driving-sustainable-growth-and-global-connectivity-for-oman-hejb48iv), [hellenicshippingnews.com](https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/cargo-volumes-at-omani-ports-grow-15-to-137mn-tonnes-in-2024), [asyad.om](https://asyad.om/davos2020/news/2024/01/22/asyad-container-terminal-duqm), [porttechnology.org](https://www.porttechnology.org/news/asyad-ports-unveils-new-container-terminal-in-oman))

**Posture in the Gaza war.**

Muscat has framed Gaza through international-law language—**calling for an immediate ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian aid, and a two-state solution**—and has leveraged its mediator reputation with Western and regional actors to press de-escalation. The Foreign Minister **reiterated this line at the UN General Assembly on Sept 28, 2024** and in major media interviews, including calls for the West to apply greater pressure on Israel; Oman also underscores its facilitation role in regional diplomacy. The Foreign Ministry **has continued issuing statements in 2025** condemning Israeli actions in Gaza—most recently denouncing a decision to **“entrench” the occupation**—and urging adherence to international law and humanitarian access. Oman has paired diplomacy with **government humanitarian support**, notably a **US$1 million contribution to UNICEF for Gaza’s children on Apr 1, 2024**.

([gadebate.un.org](https://gadebate.un.org/en/79/oman), [webtv.un.org](https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1c/k1cwwfvo3v), [rusi.org](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/oman-assertive-diplomacy-and-gaza-crisis), [ft.com](https://www.ft.com/content/e30f0233-de22-4c18-9547-8a621ed8575e), [unicef.org](https://www.unicef.org/oman/press-releases/oman-donates-us1-million-support-children-gaza-strip))

**Public opinion**

We did not find any **Oman-only, nationally representative poll on Gaza** publicly available from 2023–2025; a review of Oman’s National Centre for Statistics & Information (NCSI) shows multiple opinion surveys on domestic topics (e.g., service satisfaction, local-content awareness) but none focused on Gaza. The best regional yardstick that **includes Oman** is the **Arab Center’s 16-country phone survey** (Dec 12, 2023–Jan 5, 2024; **n=8,000 ~500/country**), which found **92% solidarity with Palestinians**, **89% rejecting recognition of Israel**, and **94% negative views of the U.S. position**; Oman was explicitly in-sample. In **Muscat**, authorities allowed **public rallies** in Oct 2023—flagged by **U.S. Embassy demonstration alerts**—and local analysis notes a Palestine-solidarity gathering outside the U.S. Embassy 11 days after Oct 7, consistent with strong societal sympathy for Gaza. Meanwhile, **official humanitarian drives** continued into **2025** (e.g., Omani air-bridges and shipments in 2024; Omani Charitable Organization updates in July 2025 stating **16 airlifts** to Egypt/Jordan and readiness despite crossing closures), underlining sustained public and state support.

([arabindex.dohainstitute.org](https://arabindex.dohainstitute.org/EN/Pages/APOIsWarOnGaza.aspx), [arabcenterdc.org](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-public-opinion-about-israels-war-on-gaza), [omusembassy.gov](https://om.usembassy.gov/demonstration-alert-u-s-embassy-muscat-oman-october-18-2023), [om.usembassy.gov](https://om.usembassy.gov/demonstration-alert-reports-of-planned-protests-october-18-20-2023), [arabcenterdc.org](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/oman-gaza-and-relations-with-the-united-states), [muscatdaily.com](https://www.muscatdaily.com/2024/02/11/oman-establishes-airbridge-to-send-aid-to-gaza), [muscatdaily.com](https://www.muscatdaily.com/2024/02/26/oman-continues-to-send-aid-to-gaza-with-third-airbridge), [m.timesofoman.com](https://m.timesofoman.com/article/142481-oman-sends-third-relief-aid-to-palestinians-in-gaza), [zawya.com](https://www.zawya.com/en/world/middle-east/oman-sends-third-relief-aid-to-palestinians-in-gaza-vvinatb9), [timesofoman.com](https://timesofoman.com/article/160786-oco-issues-clarification-regarding-humanitarian-aid-to-gaza-strip), [omanobserver.om](https://www.omanobserver.om/article/1173886/oman/community/only-oco-responsible-for-delivering-humanitarian-aid-outside-oman), [muscatdaily.com](https://www.muscatdaily.com/2024/05/06/ncsi-implements-poll-on-satisfaction-with-government-services), [thearabianstories.com](https://www.thearabianstories.com/2024/05/06/are-you-happy-with-the-government-services-omans-ncsi-to-conduct-opinion-poll),

**Current status & leverage points.**

**Yemen/Red Sea.** The Oman-facilitated Houthi–U.S. ceasefire channel operates alongside UN Security Council pressure (**Res. 2722**) and coalition maritime security efforts. Oman publicly confirmed brokering a U.S.–Houthi ceasefire understanding on **May 6, 2025**; shipping data and monitoring note a subsequent lull that lasted into early July before renewed attacks (including **Magic Seas** and **Eternity C**) spiked risk again—evidence that Muscat’s channel has, at times, measurably reduced attack tempo and is relevant to any Gaza-linked maritime ratchet.

**U.S.–Iran crisis management.** Muscat continues to serve as a discreet venue for indirect U.S.–Iran talks in **2025**—with rounds scheduled (e.g., announced for **June 12**) and occasionally postponed—underscoring that the Omani track remains available and acceptable to both sides when escalation risks rise.

**Regional connectivity.** By **keeping overflight channels open**—notably opening Omani airspace to all carriers (including Israeli airlines) in **February 2023**—while avoiding high-visibility political gestures, Oman sustains access without alignment, useful for indirect messaging and technical fixes.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ship-risk-sinking-after-first-houthi-red-sea-attack-this-year-2025-07-07), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15561.doc.htm), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/sundays-us-iran-nuclear-talks-cancelled-oman-says-2025-06-14), [acleddata.com](https://acleddata.com/expert-comment/yemen-us-airstrikes-test-limits-houthi-restraint-red-sea-expert-comment), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/oman-opens-airspace-joining-saudi-de-facto-israeli-airline-corridor-2023-02-23), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-thanks-oman-opening-its-airspace-2023-02-23))

**Unique assets Muscat can bring.**

**Back-channel credibility.** Oman’s working channels to the **Houthis, Tehran, Washington, and Riyadh** are demonstrated by: Muscat’s **May 6, 2025** public confirmation that it **mediated a U.S.–Houthi ceasefire understanding** over Red Sea attacks; the **Saudi–Omani** joint talks with Houthi leaders in **Sana’a** (April 2023); and the **2025 Muscat track** for **indirect U.S.–Iran talks** (scheduled and at times postponed), underscoring Oman’s accepted venue status.   
  
**Staging & verification logistics.** Oman offers **Arabian Sea alternatives** outside the Red Sea chokepoint: **Salalah Port** ranks **#2 globally** in the World Bank’s **CPPI 2023** and is expanding capacity; **Sohar Port** handled **~943,000 TEU in 2024**; and **Duqm’s new container terminal** opened in **January 2024** under **Asyad Ports**—all nested within **Asyad Group’s** national logistics platform. These nodes can host pre-clearance, scanning, and **IoT-tracked** consignments for relief and reconstruction flows.  
  
**Macro stability for custodianship roles.** **IMF** assessments (2024 Article IV, Jan. 22, 2025) highlight continued fiscal/external surpluses, ample banking-sector buffers, and disciplined policy under **Vision 2040**; **Fitch** revised **Oman’s outlook to Positive** while affirming **‘BB+’** in 2024/25—together suggesting Muscat can sustain a **low-profile guarantor/host** function without overextension.   
  
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-omani-delegations-arrive-sanaa-hold-talks-with-houthi-leader-2023-04-09), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/second-round-us-iran-talks-be-held-oman-iranian-media-says-citing-foreign-2025-04-14), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/06/01/regional-disruptions-drive-changes-in-global-container-port-performance-ranking), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/06/01/regional-disruptions-drive-changes-in-global-container-port-performance-ranking), [aero-news.net](https://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm), [seatrade-maritime.com](https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/terminals/asyad-ports-unveils-new-container-terminal-in-duqm-oman), [asyad.om](https://asyad.om/davos2020/news/2024/01/22/asyad-container-terminal-duqm), [asyad.om](https://asyad.om/who-we-are/building-a-legacy), [imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/01/22/Oman-2024-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-561155), [fitchratings.com](https://www.fitchratings.com/entity/oman-88305864))

**Constraints & credibility risks.**

Oman’s foreign-policy brand is **neutrality and discretion**; highly visible roles or coercive enforcement would cut against its comparative advantage. Fiscal space, while improved, remains **prudently managed** (per **IMF 2025 Article IV**), so any custodial function should be **light-footprint** and cost-shared.  
  
**Inclusive de-escalation design — indicative options with Oman (neutral framing).**

* **Host the “maritime ladder.”** Salalah (or Muscat) could host a **UN-co-chaired Red Sea/Arabian Sea Deconfliction Cell** that time-stamps incidents, verifies stand-downs of coastal launch assets, and interfaces with insurers for **war-risk premium** adjustments—leveraging Oman’s accepted neutrality.
* **Guarantee channel for Gaza-linked steps.** As Gaza moves pause → truce → monitored calm, Muscat can **carry synchronized messages** and **verification notes** to the Houthis and Tehran, building on the **May 2025 Houthi–U.S. ceasefire mediation** to lock in graded reductions.
* **Pre-clearance & staging.** Use **Salalah/Sohar/Duqm** as **pre-clearance nodes** for relief and dual-use materials bound for Egypt/Gaza, with Asyad-hosted data rooms for **shared visibility** (UN/Egypt/Israel/PA).
* **Quiet facilitation of side-payments.** Where the Yemen file requires **salary/payment** mechanics or aviation openings (Sana’a), Oman can provide **escrow/air services facilitation** under UN technical verification, consistent with past truce practice.

### Iran

**Why Iran matters to the Roadmap (August 2025).** Tehran sits at the nexus of three escalation ladders: (1) a **regional proxy network**—Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, and the Houthis—that Iran organizes and supports, giving it multi-theater leverage,(2) a **nuclear program** now in a tense standoff with the IAEA after the **June 2025 Israel–Iran 12-day war**, when **U.S. and Israeli strikes** hit nuclear facilities and Iran subsequently **suspended cooperation with the IAEA** in early July,and (3) an **industrial partnership with Russia**—from Iranian-designed **Shahed/Geran-2 drones** now produced at scale in Russia’s Alabuga complex to **ballistic-missile transfers/launchers**—that feeds the Ukraine battlefield.The June conflict **ended under a U.S.-brokered ceasefire** (with Qatar’s help),and as of **this week** Tehran says a **senior IAEA official will visit** for talks **without site access**—a narrow but real opening to set a new framework after inspections were halted.

([congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R47321/R47321.21.pdf), [foreign.senate.gov](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/0217a85a-ae50-89b2-e9d2-a20d47ffabbc/022824_Maloney_Testimony.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-images-indicate-severe-damage-fordow-doubts-remain-2025-06-22), [home.treasury.gov](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2117), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/russian-tv-shows-teenagers-worlds-biggest-drone-factory-making-arms-hit-ukraine-2025-07-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-send-russia-launchers-short-range-missiles-sources-say-2025-05-09), [iiss.org](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2024/09/iranian-missile-deliveries-to-russia-escalating-military-cooperation-in-ukraine), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/qatari-prime-minister-secured-irans-agreement-us-ceasefire-proposal-after-call-2025-06-23), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-us-war-nuclear-program-tehran-43365ba495100c55a8d876ba67cf0ccd), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-iaea-official-visit-talks-no-access-nuclear-sites-planned-2025-08-10), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/iran-iaea-nuclear-energy-un-9d1bb1ef59ee0f772a5e7765f17a1e57))

**Posture in the Gaza war**

Tehran has repeatedly framed the Gaza war in **international-law** terms—using **“genocide”** language and calling for an **immediate ceasefire** and **unhindered humanitarian access**—in official MFA/IRNA communications and UNGA remarks by Iran’s leadership (2023–2025). At the same time, Iran positions itself as patron of a wider **“Axis of Resistance”**—providing longstanding support to **Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Yemen’s Houthis**—as documented by U.S./UK government research and independent analysis. Yet Iranian officials **insist these actors decide independently.**([en.mfa.gov.ir](https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/773024), [en.mfa.ir](https://en.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/773063), [enirna.ir](https://en.irna.ir/news/85901629/Iran-calls-for-ceasefire-in-Gaza-and-full-Palestinian-membership), [gadebate.unorg](https://gadebate.un.org/en/79/iran-islamic-republic), [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2023), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12587), [researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk](https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9504/CBP-9504.pdf), [csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-networks-middle-east), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-leader-khamenei-warns-us-against-action-against-tehran-2025-03-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-axis-resistance-against-israel-faces-trial-by-fire-2023-11-15), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-says-tehran-was-not-behind-hamas-attack-israel-2023-10-10), [rferl.org](https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-s-axis-of-resistance-different-groups-same-goals/32826188.html), [bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov](https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/10/23/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-22))

**Public opinion**

* **Data & methodology.** The most recent *national probability* surveys publicly available are **Mar 8–18, 2024 (n=1,009, MOE ±3.1%)** and **Oct 10–16, 2024 (n=1,011, MOE ±3.1%)**, run by **UMD/CISSM with IranPoll** via nationwide RDD phone interviewing. No newer probability-sample release has been published as of **Aug 2025**.
* **Solidarity with Palestinians / sense of responsibility.** **71.3%** say *“the issue of Palestine is not only an Arab matter and all countries, including Iran, have a responsibility.”* (Q11, Mar 2024).
* **How much Iran *should* help.** Preferences cluster around **“somewhat”** rather than “a lot” across aid types; those wanting Iran to provide **“a lot”** are **pluralities** (not majorities) only for **food & medicine (42.6%)**—even there **“somewhat”** is higher (46.1%). Politics/diplomacy 32.4% “a lot,” training 32.2%, military equipment 21.1%, financial help 14.9% (Q14, Mar 2024).
* **Who decides—Iran or Hamas?** In **Oct 2024**, **about half** of Iranians say **Hamas ultimately makes its own decisions** (49.9% combining “Hamas decides” + “together, Hamas mostly has the final say), versus **35.2%** for Iran-led (Q38). This is best described as a **plurality (≈half)** for Hamas autonomy.
* **Recognition of Israel.** **67.4%** say Iran **should not** recognize Israel, even if recognition eased sanctions; **24.9%** say it should (Q12, Mar 2024).
* **Preferred end-state.** **60.6%** favor a **one-state** solution **with right of return**; **18.7%** back two states; **9.5%** one-state without return (Q15, Mar 2024)
* **Views of the U.S.** **“Seven in ten Iranians view the United States very unfavorably,”** per UMD’s 2025 synthesis of the Mar/Oct 2024 waves; related March toplines show 63.5% describe America as a *“dangerous country that seeks confrontation and control.”*
* ***Views of non-state actors.*** *UMD’s report notes* ***majorities favorable*** *toward* ***Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis******as of Mar 2024****.*
* ***Nuclear weapons attitudes.*** *Support for developing* ***atomic weapons******rose after the Gaza war****: by* ***Oct 2024*** *there was* ***no longer a majority against*** *(46.5% “develop bombs + power” vs. 44.8% “power only,” 3.7% “no program”; Q36). The UMD report summarizes the same trend.*

([cissm.umd.edu](https://cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/2025-07/2024-March-%20CISSM%20-%20Trend%20Tables%20-%20final.pdf), [sppumd.edu](https://spp.umd.edu/research-impact/publications/iranian-public-opinion-early-days-pezeshkian-administration))

**Post-war reset inside Tehran.** After June’s 12-day Israel–Iran war, President **Masoud Pezeshkian** began reshaping the national-security apparatus, appointing **Ali Larijani** as **secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)**—a veteran, pragmatically inclined conservative who previously served as Iran’s **chief nuclear negotiator**—as part of a broader security reorganization. In parallel, **Parliament approved legislation to suspend/curtail cooperation with the IAEA**, and officials now say any renewed inspections would require **SNSC approval**; Tehran has allowed a senior IAEA visit **without site access** to explore a new framework.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/ali-larijani-reappointed-secretary-irans-top-security-body-2025-08-05), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-parliament-approves-bill-suspend-cooperation-with-un-nuclear-watchdog-2025-06-25), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-pulls-inspectors-iran-standoff-over-access-drags-2025-07-04), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/iran-secretary-high-security-council-419e208288776503fdddfffdb9eb7fa5), [englishkhamenei.ir](https://english.khamenei.ir/news/11841/Dr-Ali-Larijani-appointed-Leader-s-representative-in-Iran-s), [politico.com](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/10/un-nuclear-watchdog-official-to-visit-iran-00502597))

**Nuclear file — facts and friction.** The IAEA’s May–June 2025 Board reports document a **rising stockpile** and continued production: as of **May 17, 2025**, Iran held **408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% U-235** (part of an overall stock of ~9,248 kg). In parallel, the Agency’s **NPT safeguards** reporting concluded that **three undeclared locations (Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, Turquzabad)** were part of an **undeclared structured program** and that **undeclared nuclear material/activities** were not credibly accounted for—leaving **safeguards issues unresolved**.Following the **June 2025 strikes** on Iranian nuclear sites, the IAEA noted **visible cratering at Fordow** and stressed that it **lacks access** to fully assess underground damage; more broadly, years of **removed cameras and halted JCPOA monitoring** have produced a **loss of continuity of knowledge**, now compounded by Tehran’s July suspension of cooperation.Tehran has since **linked any renewed cooperation to political guarantees and high-level approval** (SNSC), with officials confirming a senior IAEA visit **without site access** as of **August 10, 2025**, to explore a new framework.

([iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf), [iaeaorg](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-june-2025), [isis-online.org](https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-may-2025), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-38.pdf), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/director-general-briefs-board-on-iran-developments-syria-ukraine-and-more), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iaea-board-declares-iran-breach-non-proliferation-duties-diplomats-say-2025-06-12), [un.dk](https://un.dk/iran-israel-crisis-iaea-chief-calls-for-access-to-damaged-nuclear-sites), [isis-online.org](https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/limits-un-nuclear-watchdogs-oversight-iran-2025-06-23), [pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/irans-president-suspends-cooperation-with-un-nuclear-watchdog-after-u-s-and-israeli-strikes))

**Economic pressure points.** Iran’s macro squeeze remains acute: headline inflation is running in the **mid-to-high 30s** (SCI/Tehran Times put it at **35.3%** in July; external trackers showed **~38.9%** in April), while the **rial** is hovering near **record lows** on the free market (≈**0.91–0.93 million rials per USD** in mid-August) after repeatedly breaching the **1,000,000** mark in spring 2025; lawmakers have consequently **revived a redenomination** plan to **remove four zeros** from the currency.At the same time, **China remains the critical buyer of Iranian crude**, with **June 2025** import estimates clustering around **~1.4–1.8 mb/d** (ship-tracker data from Vortexa/Kpler and wire reports), underscoring Beijing’s exposure to supply shocks and the leverage available in any de-risking deal that stabilizes flows.

([tehrantimes.com](https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/516196/Monthly-inflation-rate-stands-at-35-3), [tradingeconomics.com](https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi), [alanchand.com](https://alanchand.com/en/currencies-price/usd), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-currency-drops-record-low-1039000-rial-dollar-bonbastcom-says-2025-03-25), [iranintl.com](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202508041057), [fortune.com](https://fortune.com/2025/08/03/iran-currency-value-us-dollar-rial-four-zeros), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-iran-oil-imports-surge-june-rising-shipments-teapot-demand-2025-06-27), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/international/article-859242), [kpler.com](https://www.kpler.com/blog/china-backs-off-peak-iranian-crude-buys-but-a-steep-drop-looks-unlikely),

**Russia vector — cooperation with limits.** Open-source and institute reporting confirms that Russia is **mass-producing Iranian-designed Shahed/“Geran” drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone**: satellite analyses by the **Institute for Science and International Security** located the production halls in 2023, and **Reuters** showed the giant plant on Russian state TV in July 2025.The **U.S. Treasury** has since **sanctioned JSC SEZ Alabuga**, describing it as **Russia’s main plant** for one-way attack UAVs, and has targeted logistics nodes feeding the project (e.g., **Pouya Air** flights carrying UAV cargo “intended for SEZ Alabuga”).Independent defense institutes note **rapid scaling of Shahed-type output** through 2024–25. Analytically, post-June war assessments characterize the **Russia–Iran alignment as a transactional entente, not a mutual-defense pact**: the **January 2025** strategic partnership **omitted any mutual-aid clause**, and Moscow offered **limited tangible support** to Tehran during the June Israel–Iran war—signals of **cooperation with clear limits** that can be leveraged.

([isis-online.org](https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/visible-progress-at-russias-shahed-drone-production-site), [isis-online.org](https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/satellite-imagery-update-on-alabuga-shahed-136-drone-factory), [home.treasury.gov](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2785), [home.treasury.gov](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2295), [iiss.org](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/04/russia-doubles-down-on-the-shahed), [understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israel-iran-war-rebalances-adversary-entente), [russiamatters.org](https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-analytical-report/russia-analytical-report-june-16-23-2025), [wsj.com](https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-putin-israel-iran-trump-4c89855e))

**Strategic assessment.**

**Spoiler capacity.** Iran can scale pressure via **precision missiles/UAVs and partners**—Hezbollah on the northern front and the **Houthis’ Red Sea** campaign—while also **accelerating the nuclear file** under reduced monitoring. The **CFR** maps Iran’s regional armed network (Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Houthis) as core instruments of Tehran’s leverage; meanwhile, Red Sea attacks have repeatedly **spiked war-risk premiums** and disrupted Suez-bound traffic, and **Reuters/UN trade coverage** tracks the resulting freight/insurance costs. If escalation resumes, **renewed strikes on nuclear assets** remain a stated risk. Together, these tools impose **visible cost channels** (shipping rates/insurance, oil flows, domestic economic stress, and strike-risk against nuclear sites).   
  
**Window of opportunity (Aug 2025).** The **U.S.-brokered ceasefire** that ended the **12-day Israel–Iran war** in late June, **Ali Larijani’s** appointment to lead the **SNSC**, and a **tentative IAEA re-engagement** (a senior official visiting **without site access**) together create a narrow opening to convert risk into a **least-cost off-ramp**. This window is buttressed by **China’s stake in Iranian crude** and **Oman’s shuttle diplomacy** (Muscat hosting U.S.–Iran rounds, albeit with occasional postponements)—giving Tehran incentives to cooperate because it is **cheaper than escalation**.   
  
([cfr.org](https://www.cfr.org/article/irans-regional-armed-network), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/all-crew-muslim-ships-look-dodge-red-sea-attacks-with-messages-2025-07-11), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/iaea-chief-returning-iranian-sites-is-top-priority-2025-06-25), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-will-strike-iran-again-if-threatened-defence-minister-says-2025-07-10), [supplychainbrain.com](https://www.supplychainbrain.com/articles/42134-red-sea-insurance-premium-spikes-as-houthi-risks-return), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-brokered-ceasefire-agreement-contact-with-israel-iran-white-house-official-2025-06-23), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/big-questions-loom-over-trumps-announcement-israel-iran-ceasefire-deal-2025-06-24), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chinas-heavy-reliance-iranian-oil-imports-2025-06-24))

**Inclusive de-escalation design — indicative options (Aug 2025)**

**1) Nuclear stabilization ladder (Oman-hosted, IAEA-verified).**

**Step 0 (immediate):** Iran permits **IAEA equipment servicing/data retrieval** at declared sites and **re-installs monitoring cameras** on key lines (precedent: Iran allowed IAEA camera reinstallation at centrifuge-parts workshops in 2022/23); in parallel, a narrow **humanitarian/aviation-parts** channel reopens (precedent: the **Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement**) while Washington/Brussels signal no new strikes during talks.

**Step 1 (30–45 days):** **Freeze at current 60%** (no stock growth, no new cascades) and allow **limited in-field verification**; in return, unlock **escrowed oil receivables for medicine/food** via vetted channels. (IAEA May–June 2025 reports detail the 60% stock and loss of continuity of knowledge that a freeze/verification would address.)

**Step 2 (60–90 days):** **Down-blend or export** defined tranches of **60%/20%** under IAEA seal; in return, calibrated **energy/shipping-insurance waivers** tied to compliance. (IAEA sets out verification tools; **Additional Protocol** re-adoption can be sequenced later for graduated relief with **automatic snap-backs**.)

**2) Regional conduct guardrails (Lebanon–Yemen linkage).**

Make **1701** the north-front baseline (LAF/UNIFIL south of the Litani; tripartite liaison) and **UNSCR 2722 (10 Jan 2024)** the maritime benchmark for **graded Houthi stand-down**, verified by a **UN-co-hosted deconfliction cell** (Oman as venue). UN materials document UNIFIL’s **tripartite/liaison** value for de-escalation; 2722 **demands** an immediate halt to Houthi attacks on merchant shipping.

**3) Russia channel (cost-imposing clarity + off-ramp).**

State that any **additional Iranian long-range systems** transferred to Russia (Ukraine) will trigger **automatic, coordinated penalties** on the **Alabuga** UAV supply chain (precedent: OFAC designations of **SEZ Alabuga** and feeder networks in 2024–25). Offer limited, **escrowed economic relief** for visible nuclear/regional de-escalation, exploiting the **transactional (not mutual-defense)** nature of the Russia–Iran entente.

**4) China lever (quiet but central).**

Anchor **assurance corridors** (energy + shipping insurance) to **Iranian compliance/Red Sea de-escalation**, aligning them with Beijing’s exposure as **the critical buyer of Iranian crude** (≈**1.38–1.46 mb/d** in June 2025 data windows; even higher on some trackers).

**5) Domestic economics (face-saving dividends).**

Pair verified steps with **low-visibility economic gains** (civil-aviation parts, **medical imports**, targeted **FX access**) that Iran can sell domestically under high inflation and a weak rial; keep all benefits **escrowed and reversible** (again, SHTA provides a sanctioned humanitarian-payments template).

**Context notes (August 2025):** IAEA confirms the **60% stock** and records **lost continuity of knowledge** post-June strikes; these steps directly target that verification gap. UNSCR **2722** sets the legal bar for the Red Sea, while UNIFIL’s **tripartite liaison** is the proven deconfliction forum on the Blue Line.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-moves-centrifuge-parts-production-karaj-isfahan-iaea-says-2022-01-31), [isis-online.org](https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/analysis-of-the-iaeas-iran-npt-safeguards-report-may-2023), [armscontrol.org](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-01/news/iran-iaea-resolve-access-dispute), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran), [ofac.treasury.gov](https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/824), [news.admin.ch](https://www.news.admin.ch/en/nsb), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf), [politico.com](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/31/iran-nuclear-weapons-un-report-00378773), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol), [iranwatch.org](https://www.iranwatch.org/library/multilateral-organizations/international-atomic-energy-agency/june-2025-board-report-verification-monitoring-islamic-republic-iran-light), [unsco.unmissions.org](https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_res_17012006.pdf), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unifil-head-chairs-tripartite-meeting-with-lebanese-and-israeli-military-officials), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unifilpresskit.pdf), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2722%282024%29), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15561.doc.htm), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-res-2722.php), [home.treasury.gov](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2295), [home.treasury.gov](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0217), [ofac.treasury.gov](https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/824))

### Iraq

**Why Iraq matters to the Roadmap.** Iraq is the hinge between the Levant, the Gulf, and Türkiye: if stabilized, it anchors overland trade via the **Development Road** corridor linking **Grand Faw** to Türkiye and onward to Europe, and it underpins regional energy flows (north via **Ceyhan**, east/west via power interconnections).In **April 2024**, **Iraq–Türkiye–UAE–Qatar** signed a **preliminary cooperation deal** on the Development Road, and in **July 2025** Ankara and Baghdad were still advancing the file—evidence the project remains on the 2025 agenda.After a two-year halt, Baghdad and Erbil **signaled a restart** of **Ceyhan** exports in **August 2025** (initially **~80 kb/d** through **SOMO**), though traders cautioned preparations were still catching up—illustrating both the upside and fragility of the northern corridor.On power, the **Jordan–Iraq interconnection** is slated to lift imports to **~150 MW** by **end-July/August 2025** (with scope to **~500 MW** in later phases), and the **GCC–Iraq 400 kV link** is moving toward phased deliveries (targeting **~600 MW** to southern Iraq)—both reducing Baghdad’s exposure to shocks and sanctions politics.   
  
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/iraq-launches-17bn-road-rail-project-link-asia-europe-2023-05-27), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-turkey-qatar-uae-sign-preliminary-deal-cooperate-development-road-project-2024-04-22), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-submits-draft-proposal-iraq-renew-expand-energy-agreement-2025-07-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iraqi-oil-exports-via-turkey-pipeline-yet-resume-sources-say-2025-08-06), [jordantimes.com](https://jordantimes.com/news/business/2nd-phase-jordan-iraq-electrical-interconnection-project-final-stages-%E2%80%93-official), [jordantimes.com](https://jordantimes.com/news/business/jordan-iraq-electrical-interconnection-expected-complete-end-july), [petra.gov.jo](https://www.petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp), [agbi.com](https://www.agbi.com/infrastructure/2025/03/next-phase-of-jordan-iraq-power-link-due-by-late-july), [gccia.com.sa](https://gccia.com.sa/gccia-grid/projects-under-construction-2))

**Posture in the Gaza**

Baghdad condemned Israel’s campaign in Gaza in legal-humanitarian terms—Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani publicly labeled it “genocide”—and called for a ceasefire and aid access, while balancing relations with Washington and Tehran. In parallel, Iran-aligned Iraqi factions operating under the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” banner carried out scores of rocket/drone strikes on U.S. and (occasionally) Israeli targets tied to the Gaza war, including the **Jan 28, 2024** Tower-22 attack in Jordan that killed three U.S. troops; **Kataib Hezbollah** then announced a **suspension** of attacks on **Jan 30–31, 2024**, though incidents later resumed (e.g., launches from **Zummar, Iraq** on **Apr 21, 2024**). The U.S. answered with strikes on Iran-backed targets in **Iraq/Syria** beginning **Feb 2, 2024**, which Baghdad condemned as violations of sovereignty. Meanwhile, U.S.–Iraq talks set a **timeline to conclude the Coalition mission by end-Sep 2025**, even as the government has tried to rein in militias (e.g., **July 27, 2025** PMF disciplinary shake-up) and continued security coordination—with **Aug 11, 2025** meetings in Baghdad underscoring Iraq’s bid to keep a lid on spillover while voicing solidarity with Gaza.

([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/17/gaza-likely-to-dominate-agenda-as-arab-league-meets-in-baghdad), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/islamic-resistance-iraq-collates-200-day-attack-scoreboard), [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3659809/3-us-service-members-killed-others-injured-in-jordan-following-drone-attack), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-suspends-military-operations-us-forces-statement-2024-01-30), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/31/kataib-hezbollah-says-it-suspends-attacks-on-us-forces), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/five-rockets-fired-iraq-towards-us-military-base-syria-security-sources-say-2024-04-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-denies-saying-it-resumes-attacks-us-forces-2024-04-22), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria), [afgsc.af.mil](https://www.afgsc.af.mil/News/Press-Releases/Article/3665710/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/attack-military-iran-iraq-houthis-229a735edbb7759ba9ade543013917df), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2453051/middle-east), [capradio.org](https://www.capradio.org/news/npr/story), [2021-2025.state.gov](https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-announcing-the-timeline-for-the-end-of-the-military-mission-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis-in-iraq), [usnews.com](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-09-27/coalition-military-mission-in-iraq-to-end-by-sept-2025-us-and-iraq-say), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kataib-hezbollah-pmf-karkh-9055097ec559a23677a36d1f8a9fa80a), [abcnews.go.com](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iraqi-prime-minister-removes-paramilitary-commanders-after-deadly-124514107), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/iran-iraq-security-deal-larijani-8b89956de9c043703a1c3253de981f86), [newarab.com](https://www.newarab.com/news/iraq-iran-agree-border-security-despite-us-opposition))

**Public opinion**

Reliable Iraq-wide polling during the war shows **strong solidarity with Palestinians** and deep skepticism toward escalation. **Arab Barometer Wave V3** (fieldwork **May–Jul 2024**, published **Dec 13, 2024**) reports that **32%** of Iraqis describe Israel’s actions in Gaza as **“genocide”** and another **26%** as a **“massacre,”** with large majorities labeling specific actions as **terrorism**—including **bombing/killing civilians (71%)**, **assaults on civilian infrastructure (61%)**, and **blockade (55%)**. Street signals matched the data: on **Oct 13, 2023**, **tens of thousands** rallied in **Baghdad’s Tahrir Square** at protests **called by Muqtada al-Sadr**; major wire services and AP/VOA coverage placed Baghdad among the day’s largest regional demonstrations. Region-wide polling that **includes Iraq** (Arab Center’s **16-country** phone survey, **Dec 12, 2023–Jan 5, 2024**) finds **near-consensus—92%—that the Palestinian question concerns all Arabs**, not Palestinians alone; the full report shows **Iraq above 90%** on this item.

([arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/amid-persistent-challenges-iraqis-express-cautious-optimism-in-latest-survey), [voanews.com](https://www.voanews.com/a/tens-of-thousands-protest-after-muslim-prayers-across-mideast-over-israeli-airstrikes-on-gaza/7309304.html), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-friday-prayers-mideast-8474ed730294a1c2299bdaef58a17142), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/supporters-palestinians-israel-protest-pray-war-intensifies-2023-10-13), [arabcenterdc.org](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-public-opinion-about-israels-war-on-gaza), [dohainstitute.org](https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/arab-opinion-war-on-gaza-full-report-en.pdf))

**Current status & leverage points (Aug 2025).**

* **International footprints winding down.** At Baghdad’s request, the Security Council extended **UNAMI** for a **final period through 31 Dec 2025** and asked the Secretary-General to complete a **transition and liquidation plan**; UN budget documents detail the drawdown footprint that will remain solely to liquidate the Mission.In parallel, Washington and Baghdad announced that the **Global Coalition’s military mission will conclude no later than end-September 2025**, transitioning to a bilateral security partnership via the Higher Military Commission (HMC) track.
* **State authority vs. militias.** After a **July 27, 2025** lethal clash in Baghdad involving PMF elements, Prime Minister **Mohammed Shiaʿ al-Sudani** ordered the **removal of two PMF brigade commanders**, referred those involved to the **judiciary**, and opened a probe into command failures—an explicit move to police the state/militia gray zone.
* **Residual terrorism risk.** UN/coalition and media reporting note that **ISIS** continues to **reactivate sleeper cells** in Syria/Iraq and that Iraqi services are **foiling plots**, underscoring the need for calibrated security and intel cooperation as the Coalition transitions.
* **Macro vulnerability.** The **IMF’s 2025 Article IV** warns that **declining oil prices** alongside **rapid spending growth** and emerging financing constraints have **aggravated fiscal and external risks**, sharpening the premium on predictable export routes and power supplies.

([iraq.un.org](https://iraq.un.org/en/133480-unami-mandate), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/gaab4493.doc.htm), [2021-2025.state.gov](https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint-statement-announcing-the-timeline-for-the-end-of-the-military-mission-of-the-global-coalition-to-defeat-isis-in-iraq), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/coalition-military-mission-iraq-end-by-sept-2025-us-iraq-say-2024-09-27), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kataib-hezbollah-pmf-karkh-9055097ec559a23677a36d1f8a9fa80a), [abcnews.go.com](https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/iraqi-prime-minister-removes-paramilitary-commanders-after-deadly-124514107), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/islamic-state-reactivating-fighters-eying-comeback-syria-iraq-2025-06-12), [media.defense.gov](https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jul/31/2003767903/-1/-1/1/OIR_Q3_JUN2025_FINAL_508.PDF), [imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/07/11/Iraq-2025-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Informational-Annex-568569))

**Spoiler profile (capabilities & risks).** Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq retain the capacity to harass U.S. and Iraqi targets and have **explicitly threatened to resume attacks** if withdrawal timelines or regional red lines shift; in **June 2025** Kataib Hezbollah warned it would target U.S. forces if Washington intervened in the Israel–Iran fighting, and U.S. security alerts for **Iraq** reflected the heightened risk. These threats coincided with **actual June incidents**, including reported militia drone strikes against a U.S. base in western Iraq (and additional cross-border attacks around the same period). The **Ceyhan corridor** remains exposed to **legal/political friction**—the Iraq-Turkey pipeline was shut from 2023 pending arbitration and appeals—and even as Baghdad/Erbil signaled an **August 2025** restart (~**80 kb/d** via SOMO), traders cautioned readiness lagged, underscoring fragility. Operationally, the north is also vulnerable to **drone activity**: in **July 2025** a series of strikes on **five KRI oilfields** forced shutdowns and cut output by **~140–150 kb/d**, significantly damaging facilities. Meanwhile, Iraq’s **grid stability** is sensitive to **Iranian gas/electricity flows** and U.S. **sanctions waivers**: in **March 2025** Washington **kept the gas waiver but ended the power exemption**, and Baghdad scrambled to line up alternatives—explicitly warning of power-supply risk if Iranian flows are curtailed.   
  
([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqs-kataib-hezbollah-warns-us-against-intervening-israel-iran-conflict-2025-06-15), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-issues-security-alerts-iran-iraq-israel-jordan-warns-missile-attacks-2025-06-13), [longwarjournal.org](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/06/iran-backed-shiite-militias-attack-us-forces-based-in-iraq.php), [longwarjournal.org](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/06/iran-backed-militias-attack-3-us-bases-in-syria.php), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/why-oil-flows-through-iraq-turkey-pipeline-have-been-halted-2025-02-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/turkey-asks-iraq-ensure-full-use-oil-pipeline-talks-new-deal-2025-07-29), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oilfields-iraqi-kurdistan-attacked-by-drones-third-time-this-week-2025-07-16), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/29/iraq-damage-to-kurdistan-region-oil-fields-puts-rights-at-risk), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-keeps-iran-gas-waiver-ends-power-exemption-says-iraqi-pm-adviser-2025-03-12), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/after-us-move-iraq-iran-power-trade-baghdad-looks-replace-iranian-gas-2025-03-10))

**Inclusive de-escalation design — indicative options**

* **Corridor-for-calm trade-off.** Treat **Development Road + Ceyhan restart** as “dividends for de-escalation”: publish milestone-based disbursements and insurance facilitation as security incidents diminish (Blue Line calm; Red Sea attacks down).
* **Electricity hedges that lower Iran risk, not ties.** Fast-track **Jordan–Iraq** and **GCC–Iraq** interconnectors with transparent pricing to crowd in private providers; this cushions shocks from sanctions waivers or gas cuts and supports summer peak demand.
* **PMF compliance path.** Pair **security-sector integration benchmarks** (force registry, payroll hygiene, munitions controls) with **budgeted service projects** in PMF-heavy provinces—**reward measurable compliance, sanction verified breaches**—in line with the government’s **July 27, 2025** disciplinary actions (removal of PMF brigade commanders, judicial referrals) after a deadly Baghdad clash.
* **Counter-ISIS continuity.** As **UNAMI** winds down **(mandate ends 31 Dec 2025)** and the **Global Coalition’s military mission concludes by end-Sep 2025**, stand up a **light, Iraqi-owned intel fusion cell** (with vetted liaisons) and fund targeted stabilization in ISIS-affected districts (**Sinjar/Ninewa**) via proven mechanisms (e.g., **UNDP’s Funding Facility for Stabilization**). SKP’s **external operations** capability has been demonstrated by mass-casualty attacks beyond Afghanistan underscoring transnational risk vectors. On **water**, the **Qosh Tepa Canal** on the **Amu Darya** continues to advance, drawing explicit concern from **Uzbekistan** and **Turkmenistan**—and more recently **Kazakhstan**—about downstream supply and **Aral Sea** impacts.

([middleeasteye.net](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-iraq-qatar-and-uae-sign-transportation-deal-would-connect-gulf-europe), [iraqinews.com](https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/jordan-to-increase-power-supply-to-iraq-to-150-megawatts), [utilities-me.com](https://www.utilities-me.com/news/jordan-to-quadruple-power-supply-to-iraq-by-august), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building-2025-07-27), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15714.doc.htm), [media.un.org](https://media.un.org/unifeed/en/asset/d321/d3213449), [undp.org](https://www.undp.org/iraq/projects/funding-facility-stabilization))

### Afghanistan

**Why Afghanistan matters to the Roadmap.** Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of South–Central Asia, where shocks spill into **refugee flows** (new deportation waves out of **Pakistan** and **Iran**), **terror risk** (ISKP’s transnational reach), **narcotics markets**, and **water/security** for down-river neighbors. UN planning projects **~22.9 million** Afghans in need of humanitarian assistance in **2025**, with funding tight. In **August 2025**, Pakistan **resumed deportations**, including **registered** Afghan refugees with Proof-of-Registration (PoR) cards, while also extending a short grace period to **Sept. 1**—moves the UNHCR criticized amid reports of early expulsions; Iran has simultaneously been expelling large numbers of Afghans through summer 2025.

([unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2025-december-2024), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-humanitarian-update-march-2025), [fts.unocha.org](https://fts.unocha.org/countries/1/summary/2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-starts-deporting-registered-afghan-refugees-says-unhcr-2025-08-06), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/returned-reeling-afghans-expelled-iran-struggle-start-over-2025-08-07), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-afghan-refugees-deadline-return-un-fe4a63a110fdb4d7528352cf9e5b1d9b), [data.unhcr.org](https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan), [osce.usmission.gov](https://osce.usmission.gov/on-the-terrorist-attack-at-the-crocus-city-hall-in-moscow), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/leader-isis-group-linked-moscow-attack-has-global-ambitions-2024-03-25), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/kerman-us-warning-isisk-bombings-bcb47f04165b3eb7b9bc7b4868c8399c), [intellinews.com](https://www.intellinews.com/kazakhstan-joins-uzbekistan-turkmenistan-in-warning-taliban-canal-could-hit-water-security-381623), [euronews.com](https://www.euronews.com/2025/05/27/is-the-future-qosh-tepa-canal-in-afghanistan-the-final-nail-in-aral-seas-coffin), [amu.tv](https://amu.tv/174129))

**Posture in the Gaza war**

The Taliban’s Foreign Ministry has consistently condemned Israel’s campaign—repeatedly using **“genocide”** language, urging a **ceasefire** and **unhindered aid**, and calling on Muslim states/OIC and the wider international community to act. Kabul has paired that rhetoric with highly visible **state-approved solidarity displays** (e.g., nationwide rallies and official statements by senior leaders), while **stopping short of any direct military involvement** and publicly **denying** claims it would send fighters to Gaza. Additional signals include the **Prime Minister’s** and **Supreme Leader’s** condemnations and support messages through 2025, and symbolic gestures such as inaugurating a **“Gaza Mosque”** in Kabul in **January 2025**.

([mfa.gov.af](https://mfa.gov.af/en/15437), [mfa.gov.af](https://mfa.gov.af/en/16374), [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250530-thousands-protest-in-afghanistan-to-support-gaza), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/05/thousands-protest-afghanistan-support-gaza), [voanews.com](https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-deny-claims-they-are-trying-to-join-hamas-on-the-battlefield/7303501.html), [longwarjournal.org](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/06/taliban-emir-decries-zionist-assaults-and-acts-of-oppression-in-gaza.php), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2587772/world))

**Public opinion**

There is **no credible, nationally representative Gaza-specific polling** from inside Afghanistan under Taliban rule; major survey work (e.g., the Asia Foundation’s nationwide series) ceased before 2021, and UN/HRW reporting documents **severe restrictions on civil society, media, assembly, and research**, making rigorous measurement impracticable. Observable signals nevertheless point to **broad, regime-sanctioned solidarity**: **state-organized mass rallies** were held across multiple cities on **May 30, 2025** after Friday prayers, with Taliban authorities publicly promoting the events; earlier, on **Oct 13, 2023**, gatherings in **Kabul and Jalalabad** were likewise organized by the de facto authorities. Given **tight constraints on expression**, these demonstrations are best read as **signals of official mobilization and popular sympathy**, not substitutes for independent national polling.   
  
([asiafoundation.org](https://asiafoundation.org/publication/afghanistan-in-2019-a-survey-of-the-afghan-people), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/afghanistan), [unama.unmissions.org](https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_pvpv_report_10_april_2025_english.pdf), [france24.com](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250530-thousands-protest-in-afghanistan-to-support-gaza), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/05/thousands-protest-afghanistan-support-gaza), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/gaza-not-alone-taliban-stages-anti-israel-demonstrations-across-afghanistan), [english.alarabiya.net](https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2023/10/13/Protests-across-Pakistan-Afghanistan-in-support-of-Palestinians))

**Current status & leverage points (Aug 2025)**

* **Engagement track.** The UN-convened Doha platform **reconvened in late June 2025 with Taliban participation** (the third “working-group” round), confirming that the venue exists for issue-specific talks; in parallel, the Security Council’s June 23 briefing cautioned that engagement must **not normalize restrictive, discriminatory policies** absent concrete rights progress.
* **Human rights baseline.** In 2025, **UN Women** documents that no Taliban edicts curbing women’s rights have been reversed; reporting also notes **death threats against Afghan female UN staff** in May (now under investigation), reinforcing that intimidation of Afghan women in UN/NGO roles remains a live risk.
* **Corridors & energy.** The **World Bank** confirms **CASA-1000 implementation has resumed in Afghanistan** under an adjusted modality, while northern segments continue toward a **2026 completion / 2027 operations** target; **TAPI** discussions and limited on-ground works **re-opened in 2025**.
* **China/Russia vectors.** **China** has signaled **tariff-free access** and explored **CPEC extensions toward Afghanistan**, while **Russia** in 2025 both **removed the Taliban from its terrorist list** and publicly **offered counter-ISIS-K cooperation**—all of which shape incentives but do not remove the need for strict conditionality in any engagement.

([afintl.com](https://www.afintl.com/en/202506305461), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/06/afghanistan-briefing-and-consultations-11.php), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16096.doc.htm), [unwomen.org](https://www.unwomen.org/en/articles/faqs/faqs-afghanistan), [politico.com](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/10/taliban-investigating-death-threats-against-uns-afghan-female-staff-report-says-00501350), [documents1.worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099041525100041094/pdf/P145054-82085865-118f-4633-b6e6-77b232374b2d.pdf), [moderndiplomacy.eu](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/06/14/regional-connectivity-tajikistans-race-to-finish-casa-1000-by-2026), [amu.tv](https://amu.tv/170523), [tolonews.com](https://tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan-175243), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-offer-taliban-tariff-free-trade-inches-closer-isolated-resource-rich-2024-10-25), [arabnews.pk](https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2601745/world))

**Inclusive de-escalation design — indicative options**

* **Refugees-for-stability bargain (Pakistan/Iran link).** Tie **orderly, voluntary** returns and protection against **forced refoulement** to a donor-funded **reintegration window** inside Afghanistan (housing/jobs/WASH), verified by **UNHCR/IOM** and supported by **border hotlines**. Rationale: Pakistan has **begun deporting registered PoR holders** ahead of a **Sept 1, 2025** deadline; UNHCR has formally objected and reported arrests/detentions of PoR holders. Iran has simultaneously surged expulsions through summer 2025. For practical mechanics: UNHCR and IOM already run **hotlines/flow-monitoring** and publish weekly returns updates—structures that can scale for verification.
* **Counter-ISKP floor.** Use **Doha** working groups to codify a **verifiable non-export** commitment (incident time-stamps, detainee/expulsion reporting), leveraging **Russia’s and China’s** shared concern about ISIS-K to widen monitoring buy-in. Recent **U.S. and FATF** materials also flag ISIS-K external plotting/financing. Russia has moved to **suspend the Taliban’s terrorist designation**, signaling a channel that can be harnessed for CT assurances.
* **Conditional corridor support.** Sequence technical help for **CASA-1000** and **Trans-Afghan (UAP) rail** plus trade facilitation **against rights and CT benchmarks**—benefits unlock only as women’s access and CT performance improve. CASA-1000 **resumed** on the Afghan segment under a World Bank approach in 2024/25; UAP rail partners **signed a framework** in July 2025 to fund a feasibility study (Termez–Naibabad–Maidan Shahr–Logar–Kharlachi).
* **Water-risk management.** Stand up an **Amu–Helmand hydrology cell** (neutral technical host) for **data-sharing, satellite flow monitoring, and gate-audit protocols**; pair **Qosh Tepa** works with **downstream impact caps** and **seasonal release rules** to reassure Central Asia and Iran. Concern about Qosh Tepa’s downstream effects is explicitly voiced by **Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan (and Kazakhstan)**; **Helmand water** remains a live Iran–Afghanistan dispute in 2025.
* **Narcotics substitution with guardrails.** Expand **licensing & livelihoods** that scale (irrigation-saving crops; off-farm cash-for-work) while **interdicting meth precursors and lab kits**, aligned with **UNODC** findings: opium output remains **~90%+ below** pre-ban levels, but **methamphetamine** production/trafficking has **expanded** and remains resilient in 2024–25.

([unhcr.org](https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-urges-pakistan-exempt-afghans-international-protection-needs-involuntary), [iom.int](https://www.iom.int/news/record-256000-afghan-migrants-return-iran-iom-warns-dire-funding-shortfall), [helpunhcr.org](https://help.unhcr.org/pakistan/information-regarding-voluntary-repatriation), [data.unhcr.org](https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/117913), [pakistan.iom.int](https://pakistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1121/files/documents/2025-05/pak_quarterlyreport_q1_2025_final.pdf), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/4/confusion-speculation-in-iran-after-twin-blasts-kill-more-than-80-people), [fincen.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2025-04-01/FinCEN-Advisory-ISIS-508C.pdf), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/russia-taliban-designation-court-change-986619152dae1eeb5123deea22fc4633), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/02/15/world-bank-group-announces-next-phase-of-support-for-people-of-afghanistan), [intellinews.com](https://www.intellinews.com/breakthrough-moment-for-trans-afghan-railway-project-hailed-by-uzbekistan-afghanistan-and-pakistan-392314), [caliber.az](https://caliber.az/en/post/trans-afghan-corridor-a-new-pivot-in-eurasian-transit-networks), [thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2025/01/could-afghanistans-qoshtepa-canal-worsen-water-scarcity-in-central-asia), [timesca.com](https://timesca.com/afghanistans-qosh-tepa-canal-sparks-water-security-concerns-in-central-asia), [amu.tv](https://amu.tv/158255))

### Syria

**Why Syria matters to the Roadmap.** Syria is the **crossroads theatre** where multiple ladders intersect: **Israeli–Iranian friction** (regular Israeli strikes on Iran-linked targets in Syria), **Jordan’s border security and the Captagon flow** (Amman’s interdictions and cross-border strikes; a joint Jordan–Syria security committee), **Türkiye’s northern deployments** (Ankara says troops will remain and operations continue), and one of the **world’s largest humanitarian operations** (OCHA). The **Arab League’s readmission of Syria on May 7, 2023** reopened a channel for structured Arab engagement, but progress has remained uneven and humanitarian needs are still massive and underfunded.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-shifts-deadlier-strikes-iran-linked-targets-syria-2024-01-08), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-strikes-iran-linked-drug-dealers-syria-intelligence-sources-2024-01-04), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-syria-combat-arms-drugs-smuggling-resurgence-islamic-state-2025-01-07), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-backing-syrias-military-has-no-immediate-withdrawal-plans-defence-2025-06-04), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-operations-against-kurdish-militants-northern-syria-continuing-official-2025-03-12), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/arab-league-set-readmit-syria-relations-with-assad-normalise-2023-05-07), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-humanitarian-response-priorities-january-june-2025-march-2025))

**Posture in the Gaza war**

Damascus has framed Gaza war using **“genocide”** language and calling for an **immediate ceasefire** and **unhindered aid**—as set out in **President Bashar al-Assad’s remarks at the Riyadh Arab-Islamic summit on Nov 11, 2024** and echoed in **2025 government statements** following new strikes in Syria. At the same time, Syria has been a primary **theater of the shadow conflict** around Gaza: Israel repeatedly struck **airports and Iran-linked targets** in 2023–24—**Damascus and Aleppo airports on Oct 12 and Oct 22, 2023**; **IRGC figures killed on Dec 25, 2023** and **Jan 20, 2024**; and the **Apr 1, 2024** strike that demolished **Iran’s consular building in Damascus**—all widely reported by international media and officials. Cross-border **rocket fire from Syria toward the Golan on Oct 14, 2023** drew Israeli artillery responses the same day. In response to militia attacks linked to the Gaza war, the **United States struck IRGC-QF and affiliated groups in Syria on Feb 2, 2024**, as confirmed by CENTCOM and wire reporting. **After the Dec 8, 2024 change of authority in Damascus**, official messaging in **mid-2025** has continued to **condemn Israeli actions and assert Syrian sovereignty**, including during and after the **July 2025** airstrikes around Damascus and the **Suwayda** crisis.

([sana.sy](https://sana.sy/en), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/syria-condemns-israel-s-treacherous-aggression-after-attacks-on-suwayda/3631213), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/07/syria-emergency-briefing-following-israeli-airstrikes.php), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/22/syria-says-israel-hit-damascus-aleppo-airports-again-amid-gaza-bombing), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-attack-syrian-aleppo-airport-puts-it-out-service-2023-10-14), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/25/israeli-air-strike-in-syria-kills-top-iranian-general), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/syria-israel-iran-irgc-damascus-airstrike-7ee8496d727ba69834002f0444515a36), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-damascus-killed-4-iranian-revolutionary-guards-source-2024-01-20), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-damascus-kills-iranian-guards-official-source-regional-pro-syria-2024-01-20), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-syria-airstrike-iranian-embassy-edca34c52d38c8bc57281e4ebf33b240), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-back-after-shooting-syria-sets-off-sirens-military-2023-10-14), [crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/golan-14-october-2023-2), [centcom.mil](https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3665602/centcom-statement-on-us-strikes-in-iraq-and-syria), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/attack-military-iran-iraq-houthis-229a735edbb7759ba9ade543013917df), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-does-not-support-israels-syria-strikes-sharaa-vows-protect-druze-2025-07-17), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/17/syrian-president-vows-to-protect-druze-after-israeli-strikes-on-damascus), [securitycouncilreportorg](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-08/syria-82.php))

There is **no nationally representative, Syria-wide polling** on Gaza in the public domain: **Arab Barometer Wave V3** did **not** include Syria and explicitly notes some countries were excluded due to **instability or government restrictions** that prevent fair survey access.

Given Syria’s constrained civic space—documented by **Freedom House** (assembly severely restricted; only marginal improvement post-Dec 2024) and **Human Rights Watch**—rigorous, independent measurement remains impracticable. Still, observable signals point to **broad, state-sanctioned solidarity**: documented pro-Palestine rallies in **Yarmouk** and a large march in **Jaramana camp** (**Oct 27, 2023**), with renewed mobilization in **2025**—including **Damascus** rallies on **July 16, 2025**([arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-viii), [freedomhouse.org](https://freedomhouse.org/country/syria/freedom-world/2024), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/10/22/it-is-our-duty-the-syrian-aid-organisations-rushing-to-gaza), [wehda.alwehda.gov.sy](https://wehda.alwehda.gov.sy), [gettyimages.com](https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/man-addresses-demonstrators-on-july-16-2025-in-damascus-news-photo/2225441421), [gettyimages.com](https://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/activists-in-yarmouk-camp-in-the-syrian-capital-of-damascus-news-photo/2206758488), [gettyimages.co.uk](https://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/news-photo/men-carry-a-banner-during-a-demonstration-against-israeli-news-photo/2224713386), [gettyimages.ae](https://www.gettyimages.ae/detail/video/thousands-gathered-in-damascus-and-other-syrian-cities-on-news-footage/2225431810), [nurphoto.com](https://www.nurphoto.com/photo/12585716))

**Current status & leverage points**

* **Aid access (consent-based).** After the 2023 Council impasse, **UN cross-border aid via Bab al-Hawa has continued under Damascus’ consent**, with successive extensions noted by OCHA/Logistics Cluster—e.g., **extended to 13 Jan 2025** and then **for a further six months to 7 Aug 2025**; field minutes in **July 2025** record operations still moving hundreds of UN trucks through the corridor.
* **Southern front risk.** The Israel–Syria contact line remains a **flashpoint**; **Turkey confirmed technical “deconfliction” talks with Israel for Syria (Apr 9, 2025)**—a reminder that incidents in Syria can rapidly drag the region back toward escalation and why deconfliction channels matter.
* **Borders & Captagon.** **Jordan has conducted pre-emptive strikes and routine interdictions** against cross-border smuggling networks in southern Syria since 2023–25 (e.g., **airstrikes in Suwayda, Jan 14 2025**; regular **JAF/Petra** notices of foiled attempts in 2025), while the **EU has targeted the Captagon economy** financing armed actors through dedicated listings and measures. Together, these provide sanction/inspection levers alongside border security cooperation.

([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/syria-grants-un-extension-to-use-turkiye-crossing-to-deliver-humanitarian-aid/3272885), [s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com](https://s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/logcluster-web-prod-files/public/2025-02/Logistics%20Cluster_SYR_Dam_Coordination_Meeting%20Minutes_20250225.pdf), [logcluster.org](https://www.logcluster.org/en/document/syria-meeting-minutes-damascus-15-july-2025), [lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/04/10/turkey-holds-technical-talks-with-israel-to-avoid-clashes-in-syria_6740042_4.html), [monitoring.bbc.co.uk](https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0003ov0), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-talks-with-israel-about-deconfliction-syria-when-needed-foreign-minister-2025-04-09), [npasyria.com](https://npasyria.com/en/120943), [petragov.jo](https://petra.gov.jo/Include/InnerPage.jsp), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2608170/middle-east), [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/04/24/syria-eu-sanctions-drug-trade-benefitting-the-regime), [diplomatie.gouv.fr](https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/syria/news/2023/article/syria-adoption-of-new-sanctions-by-the-eu-council-of-foreign-ministers-24-apr))

**Spoiler profile (capabilities & risks).**

* **Precision/rocket/UAV escalation risk.** Iran-aligned networks operating in Syria, together with Syrian security elements, retain **rocket, missile, and UAV** options that routinely draw Israeli responses; open-source mapping and strategic analyses show sustained Israeli strike activity against Iran-linked sites across Syria through 2025, keeping the front volatile and tightly coupled to the Gaza/Lebanon files.
* **Deconfliction signal.** **Turkey’s public confirmation (Apr 9, 2025)** that it holds **technical deconfliction talks with Israel regarding Syria** underlines how entangled the Syria theatre is with regional escalatory ladders—even among states with strained political ties.
* **Captagon as a regional destabilizer.** Despite Arab re-engagement tracks, credible investigative and policy work—and sanctions actions—indicate **resilient Captagon production/transit** networks tied to Syria/Lebanon in 2024–25, with **Jordan** bearing frontline interdiction and occasional cross-border strike burdens.
* **Humanitarian fragility.** OCHA reports that **needs remain massive** and **funding deeply insufficient** in 2025; cross-border operations via **Bab al-Hawa** continue under **Damascus’ consent** with periodic short extensions—leaving aid flows vulnerable to any political or security shock in the northwest.

([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/4/mapping-israels-expanding-air-attacks-across-syria), [iiss.org](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2025/06/ballistics-after-bashar), [iiss.org](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/06/israels-attack-and-the-limits-of-irans-missile-strategy), [turkishminute.com](https://www.turkishminute.com/2025/04/17/turkey-says-deconfliction-talks-with-israel-not-aimed-at-diplomatic-normalization4), [newlinesinstitute.org](https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20240425-Special-Report-Captagon-NLISAP_.pdf), [home.treasury.gov](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2648), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/news/security-council-ocha-calls-urgent-funding-syria-crisis-stressing-civilians-cannot-endure), [media.un.org](https://media.un.org/unifeed/en/asset/d333/d3336998))

**Inclusive de-escalation design — indicative options**

* **Aid-for-access ladder.** Expand **consent-based UN access** (longer tenors, streamlined visas/convoys, potential additional crossings) **as verified quiet holds** on the southern front and as Captagon interdiction benchmarks are met; **snap-backs** if access narrows or fire resumes. *Grounding:* the UN’s cross-border operation via **Bab al-Hawa** has been running under **Damascus’ consent** with **extensions through 7 Aug 2025**, and Logistics Cluster field minutes in **May/July 2025** confirm continued movements under that arrangement.
* **Southern border compact (Jordan–Syria–Arab partners).** Formalize the **joint security committee** and pair **air/ground interdiction, forensics/intel sharing**, and **targeted listings** against named Captagon actors with **funded border livelihoods** to reduce recruitment. *Grounding:* Amman and Damascus announced a **joint border/security committee** in **Jan 2025**, while the **EU** has a dedicated **Captagon sanctions track** targeting financiers, facilitators, and logistics nodes.
* **Deconfliction guardrails.** Keep **Türkiye–Israel technical deconfliction** available “on call” and route incidents through a **logbook** (modeled on UNIFIL’s Tripartite/Blue Line practice) to lower miscalculation risk that could derail Gaza/Lebanon progress. *Grounding:* **Türkiye and Israel** publicly confirmed **technical talks to avoid clashes in Syria** in **April 2025**; UNIFIL’s Blue Line/Tripartite mechanism is the standing regional template for this kind of day-to-day deconfliction.
* **Economic conditionality (Arab track).** Use the **Arab normalization framework** (post-**May 7, 2023** readmission) to tie any high-visibility economic steps to **cumulative gains**: (i) **sustained aid access**, (ii) **measurable Captagon suppression**, (iii) **verifiable calm** along the Israel/Jordan borders. *Grounding:* the **Arab Ministerial Contact Group** articulated “**step-for-step**” engagement with benchmarks in **May 2023**, providing a policy scaffold for conditionality today.
* **Implementation context (southern file).** Jordan’s **pre-emptive strikes/interdictions** against cross-border smuggling networks in **southern Syria** have continued into **2025** alongside frequent tactical clashes—illustrating why a structured compact and listings are needed to complement kinetic measures.

([logcluster.org](https://www.logcluster.org/en/document/syria-meeting-minutes-damascus-15-july-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-syria-combat-arms-drugs-smuggling-resurgence-islamic-state-2025-01-07), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-israel-have-begun-talks-avoid-clashes-syria-turkish-sources-say-2025-04-10), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/10/turkiye-and-israel-hold-talks-to-avoid-clashes-in-syria), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/delegate/how-unifil-meet-challenge-escalating-conflict-lebanon), [spa.gov.sa](https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/da880c2eaei), [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2023/05/07/arab-league-readmit-syria-assad-normalization), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordanian-border-forces-clash-with-smugglers-killing-four-2025-03-06))

**Complexity note.** Syria concentrates **kinetic, economic, and information** battlespaces: border interdictions, sanction design, aid access, and disinformation spikes overlap. Treat it as a **buffer exit node**: progress here **multiplies** gains from Gaza/Lebanon and Red Sea tracks; neglect **magnifies** the region’s negative feedback loop (polarization → escalation → aid shocks).

### Pakistan

**Why Pakistan matters to the Roadmap.** Pakistan sits at the hinge of the Gulf–Levant–South/Central Asia corridors and is a nuclear state whose crisis dynamics with India can upend any de-escalation sequence; major references place Pakistan at a pivotal geo-economic crossroads and warn of elevated global nuclear risks in 2025. In **May 7–10, 2025**, a four-day **India–Pakistan** clash ended under a **U.S.-brokered ceasefire**, with the DGMO hotline central to de-escalation; subsequent analysis describes a fragile but largely holding LoC managed through routine hotline contacts. Pakistan also carries outsized humanitarian and corridor stakes: in **August 2025** authorities **resumed deportations of Afghan refugees**—including registered **PoR** holders—over **UNHCR** objections, raising cross-border pressures just as the Roadmap seeks stability with Afghanistan and Iran. On the macro side, a **37-month IMF EFF** is in force; on **May 9, 2025** the Executive Board **completed the 1st review**, allowing a **~US$1 bn** disbursement, and **approved an RSF** arrangement of **~US$1.4 bn**—levers that can tie corridor support and social spending to de-escalation milestones.

([openknowledge.worldbank.org](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstreams/ddb936ac-9cb0-57a9-b707-6928125662df/download), [sipri.org](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/yb25_summary_en.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-india-pakistan-pulled-back-brink-with-us-brokered-ceasefire-2025-05-13), [csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-led-recent-crisis-between-india-and-pakistan), [chathamhouse.org](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/india-pakistan-ceasefire-remains-shaky-relations-unlikely-return-status-quo), [openthemagazine.com](https://openthemagazine.com/cover-stories/the-all-weather-hotline), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-afghan-refugees-deadline-return-un-fe4a63a110fdb4d7528352cf9e5b1d9b), [imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/09/pr-25137-pakistan-imf-completes-1st-rev-of-eff-arrang-and-approves-req-for-arrang-under-rsf))

**Posture in the Gaza war**

Islamabad has stayed on a clear legal-humanitarian line: repeated calls for an immediate ceasefire, protection of civilians, and unhindered aid, paired with denunciations of Israeli actions as unlawful. Prime Minister **Shehbaz Sharif** framed the war as “systematic slaughter” from the UNGA podium in Oct 2024, while the **Foreign Office** has continued condemning new Israeli moves—most recently calling plans to “take control” of Gaza a **“flagrant violation of international law.”.** Pakistan’s **National Assembly** has passed multiple unanimous resolutions reaffirming support for Palestinians and decrying occupation/collective punishment. In parallel, Pakistan has moved substantial **humanitarian aid** via NDMA/PAF airlifts and charters to **Al-Arish/Jordan**—including its **24th consignment** by Feb 2025 and additional **100–200-ton** shipments in early Aug 2025. Diplomatically, Islamabad has aligned with OIC/GCC efforts for de-escalation and publicly denied reports of supplying missiles to Iran while saying it **supports all efforts to prevent regional war**.   
  
([arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2611312/pakistan), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/1/un-general-assembly-what-did-world-leaders-say-about-israels-war-on-gaza-2), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/1/un-general-assembly-what-did-world-leaders-say-about-israels-war-on-gaza-2), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2611312/pakistan), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2597009/pakistan), [dawn.com](https://www.dawn.com/news/1929104), [englishahram.org.eg](https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/540506.aspx), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2610497/pakistan), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistan-dispatches-17th-relief-consignment-for-gaza/3650409), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/pakistan-says-it-will-support-all-efforts-prevent-middle-east-escalation-2024-08-09).

**Public opinion**

Independent, **national** polling in Pakistan *specifically on Gaza* is limited; even **Pew’s 2024 South Asia study** explicitly notes it was **unable to survey in Pakistan**, and Pakistan is also absent from Pew’s **Spring 2025 Global Attitudes** country list. Still, the behavioral and available survey signals point the same way: **very broad public solidarity with Palestinians** plus sustained mobilization. Pakistan saw **repeated mass rallies** from **Oct 2023** onward (e.g., Islamabad’s large October marches), and they **continued into 2025**—including **Lahore on Apr 11, 2025** and further mobilization in mid-April and **Apr 20** in Islamabad. Snapshot polling by **Gallup & Gilani Pakistan** (Aug 6, 2024) found **62% of Pakistanis reporting they are boycotting “Israeli brands”** in response to the Gaza war (with additional local outlets echoing those figures). Taken together—**Pew’s non-coverage**, **recurrent large demonstrations**, and **documented boycott behavior**—the public mood is best characterized as **high-salience solidarity with Gaza**, aligning with Islamabad’s **longstanding non-recognition policy** (reaffirmed repeatedly in 2025).   
  
([pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/08/22/how-people-in-south-asia-view-other-south-asian-countries), [pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/20/2025/07/pg_2025.07.08_allies-threats_report.pdf), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/10/29/people-march-in-support-for-gaza-as-death-toll-surpasses-8000), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-rally-gaza-israel-21932a7e4c73d62bce5d5c0ed2b5a870), [radio.gov.pk](https://radio.gov.pk/11-04-2025/nationwide-rallies-show-solidarity-with-palestine), [reuters.screenocean.com](https://reuters.screenocean.com/record/2004724), [gallup.com.pk](https://gallup.com.pk/post/37033), [dialoguepakistan.com](https://dialoguepakistan.com/en/must-read/over-60--pakistanis-support-boycott-of-israeli-products--survey), [samaa.tv](https://www.samaa.tv/2087337023-deputy-pm-rules-out-israel-recognition-backs-palestine-s-un-bid), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2611312/pakistan))

**Current status & leverage points (Aug 2025)**

* **Ceasefire & water friction with India.** The **May 7–10, 2025** truce is holding but remains brittle, with both sides relying on the **DGMO hotline** after the ceasefire call and warning over violations. India has paired the truce with **visa suspensions** for Pakistani nationals and **revocation of existing visas** (effective **Apr 27, 2025**), and has **put the Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance”**—steps New Delhi framed as security measures. Islamabad publicly **disputes any unilateral suspension**, insisting the treaty remains **legally binding** and that water talks must stay within its terms.
* **IMF anchor & Gulf/China capital.** The **IMF Executive Board** on **May 9, 2025** **completed the 1st EFF review** (≈US$1 bn disbursement) **and approved an RSF** (~US$1.4 bn), praising improved financing conditions and disinflation—useful macro anchors for conditional support. In parallel, **China–Pakistan** agreed in **Feb 2025** to deepen cooperation on **rail upgrades and Gwadar**, while **UAE** confirmed a **US$10 bn** investment intent and **Saudi** officials trailed multi-year packages—capital that can be aligned to calm along the **LoC** and the Afghan border.
* **Corridors & power.** For **CASA-1000**, **all EPC contracts are awarded**; public timelines now cluster around **late-2026 completion** and **operations in 2027** (with Afghanistan works resumed under a ring-fenced approach)—keeping a clean-power bridge to Pakistan on the table if security cooperates.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/fragile-ceasefire-holds-between-india-pakistan-trump-offers-more-help-2025-05-11), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm), [indiatoday.in](https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/operation-sindoor-india-pakistan-military-officials-dgmos-hotline-ceasefire-2723677-2025-05-12), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm), [ey.com](https://www.ey.com/en_gl/technical/tax-alerts/india-suspends-all-visa-services-and-indian-visas-issued-to-pakistani-nationals), [clingendael.org](https://www.clingendael.org/publication/indus-water-treaty-2025-pause-cooperation-not-end), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2611470/pakistan), [imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/05/09/pr-25137-pakistan-imf-completes-1st-rev-of-eff-arrang-and-approves-req-for-arrang-under-rsf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-pakistan-pledge-boost-cooperation-infrastructure-mining-projects-2025-02-06), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-pm-office-says-uae-has-committed-10-bln-investments-2024-05-23), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-premier-united-arab-emirates-investment-a54375c9866cfb27f59c5345c5bf8100), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2571468/pakistan), [casa-1000.org](https://www.casa-1000.org/construction), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2603064/pakistan), [interfax.com](https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/110134), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/02/15/world-bank-group-announces-next-phase-of-support-for-people-of-afghanistan))

**Spoiler profile (capabilities & risks)**

* **Internal militancy.** **TTP** and **Baloch insurgent** offshoots continue to threaten corridor projects and local stability. In July–Aug 2025 officials confirmed militants’ **use of quadcopter IEDs** in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (multiple attacks around Bannu/Miryan), and rights groups warned of the civilian risks from this emerging tactic. Separately, insurgent activity in Balochistan has targeted rail and other infrastructure. Authorities have also imposed **province-wide mobile-internet shutdowns** in Balochistan this month amid security alerts—measures that underscore the **CPEC/investor-confidence** exposure.
* **Cross-border shock potential.** A renewed **LoC spiral** could escalate quickly and spill into **visa/airspace/water** brinkmanship. After the **May 7–10, 2025** clash, a **U.S.-brokered ceasefire** and DGMO hotline contacts helped restore calm; but in late April India **suspended visa services, revoked most existing visas for Pakistanis**, and **put the Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance,”** steps Pakistan disputes as legally invalid—illustrating how fast shocks propagate beyond Kashmir.
* **Energy exposure to Iran.** Islamabad’s desire to advance the **Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline** repeatedly runs into **U.S. sanctions** signaling; Washington has said it does **not support** the project and has warned of **sanctions risk**. Pakistan has instead relied on **Iran→Gwadar electricity imports (100 MW via Polan–Gabd, scalable to ~200 MW)**—useful but politically sensitive. Any **Red Sea de-escalation** that reduces shipping/insurance premia would indirectly **ease Pakistan’s energy import costs**.
* **Nuclear backdrop.** **SIPRI Yearbook 2025** and companion reporting note a **global build-up** and confirm that **India’s stockpile modestly exceeds Pakistan’s** (around **180 vs. 170 warheads**, Jan 2025 estimates)—a reminder that even short crises carry **systemic risk**.

([usnews.com](https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2025-07-21/pakistani-islamist-militants-use-drones-to-target-security-forces-officials-say), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-suspends-mobile-data-service-restive-province-2025-08-08), [dawn.com](https://www.dawn.com/news/1923850), [amnesty.org](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/06/pakistan-recurrent-drone-strikes-in-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-signal-alarming-disregard-for-civilian-life), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-suspends-train-service-balochistan-blast-5279715677341506d8a828a251c69a1c), [digitalrightsmonitor.pk](https://digitalrightsmonitor.pk/balochistan-mobile-internet-shutdown-august-2025), [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/announcing-a-u-s-brokered-ceasefire-between-india-and-pakistan), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm), [ey.com](https://www.ey.com/en_gl/technical/tax-alerts/india-suspends-all-visa-services-and-indian-visas-issued-to-pakistani-nationals), [fragomen.com](https://www.fragomen.com/insights/india-restrictions-implemented-for-pakistani-nationals.html), [ddnews.gov.in](https://ddnews.gov.in/en/india-revokes-visas-for-pakistanis-suspends-new-visa-service), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/24/kashmir-attack-does-indias-indus-waters-treaty-freeze-threaten-pakistan), [internationalwaterlaw.org](https://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/blog/2025/06/16/a-treaty-on-the-brink-indias-suspension-of-the-iwt-and-the-case-for-cooperative-transboundary-water-governance), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-it-doesnt-support-pakistan-iran-gas-pipeline-project-going-forward-2024-03-26), [aljazeeracom](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/24/cost-of-doing-business-with-iran-us-warns-pakistan-of-sanctions-risk), [dawn.com](https://www.dawn.com/news/1754126), [unctadorg](https://unctad.org/publication/navigating-troubled-waters-impact-global-trade-disruption-shipping-routes-red-sea-black), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/world-entering-new-era-nuclear-powers-build-up-arsenals-sipri-think-tank-says-2025-06-15), [indianexpress.com](https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-has-more-nukes-than-pakistan-china-far-ahead-sipri-report-10070949))

**Inclusive de-escalation design — indicative options**

1. **DGMO & water guardrails (India–Pakistan).** Codify a **Standing DGMO Protocol** (routine check-ins; incident time-stamps) and a **Technical Water Lane** insulated from political signaling—i.e., keep **Indus data exchange/PIC notifications** active regardless of crisis tempo. Grounding: the **May 7–10, 2025** flare-up ended under a **U.S.-brokered ceasefire** and DGMO contacts; New Delhi formally **revoked visas/suspended visa services** (Apr 24–27), and **put the Indus Waters Treaty “in abeyance,”** which Islamabad disputes as **not unilaterally suspendable**—hence the need to ring-fence technical exchanges.
2. **Refugees-for-stability bargain (Afghanistan link).** Use **UNHCR/IOM-verified** reintegration funding and **hotlines/flow monitoring** to reduce forced-return blowback on Pakistani border districts; align **budget-support tranches** (under **IMF EFF/RSF**) with humane, orderly procedures that respect **non-refoulement**. Grounding: Pakistan **resumed deportations** in **Aug 2025**, including **registered PoR holders**, over **UNHCR** objections; IOM runs standing **flow-monitoring** and weekly returns tracking.
3. **Corridor-for-calm trade-off.** Publish **milestone-based facilitation** (insurance, export credit, **security escorts**) for **CPEC/Gwadar** throughput as incident rates fall in Balochistan/LoC sectors; use **third-party security measures** to reassure Chinese, Gulf, and private carriers (e.g., Pakistan’s **Special Security Division** and the July 2025 plan to **step up escorts** for Chinese nationals).
4. **Power hedges with conditions.** Fast-track **CASA-1000** interconnection support and grid-stability projects with clear **security/rights** benchmarks; keep any **Iran-linked gas** steps within **sanctions guidance**, prioritizing **Iran→Gwadar electricity swaps** over high-exposure pipeline moves. Grounding: **CASA-1000** construction contracts are in place across all four countries and Afghanistan works have **resumed**; public timelines cluster around **late-2026 completion/2027 operations**. The **U.S.** has repeatedly **warned** that the **Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline** faces **sanctions risk**, while the **Polan–Gabd 100 MW line** supplies Gwadar.
5. **Macro stabilization dividends.** Use the **IMF’s ongoing EFF/RSF reviews** to link donor-side support to measurable de-escalation (LoC quiet hours; fewer BLA/TTP incidents impacting corridors), converting peace signals into **cheaper financing/energy costs**. Grounding: on **May 9, 2025** the **IMF Executive Board** **completed the 1st EFF review (~US$1 bn)** **and approved an RSF (~US$1.4 bn)**; staff reports emphasize improved financing conditions and disinflation—an anchor for conditional incentives.

([businesstoday.in](https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/inside-the-india-pakistan-dgmo-hotline-how-it-works-who-uses-it-and-why-it-matters-475907-2025-05-12), [hindustantimes.com](https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-pakistan-dgmo-meeting-dgmo-talks-ceasefire-military-border-drone-operation-sindoor-101747053370518.html), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-preparing-challenge-indias-suspension-water-treaty-minister-says-2025-04-29), [pakistan.iom.int](https://pakistan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1121/files/documents/2025-07/fm_bi-weekly_1-15-july.pdf), [dawn.com](https://www.dawn.com/news/1277182), [arabnews.pk](https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2609097/pakistan), [documents1.worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099041525100041094/pdf/P145054-82085865-118f-4633-b6e6-77b232374b2d.pdf), [moderndiplomacy.eu](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/06/14/regional-connectivity-tajikistans-race-to-finish-casa-1000-by-2026), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-says-it-doesnt-support-pakistan-iran-gas-pipeline-project-going-forward-2024-03-26), [imf.org](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/05/17/Pakistan-First-Review-Under-the-Extended-Arrangement-Under-the-Extended-Fund-Facility-567021), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-says-imf-clears-loan-review-frees-1-bln-2025-05-09))

## **BRICS and Global South blocs**

BRICS (**Brazil**, Russia, **India**, China, **South Africa)** as a grouping doesn’t have a single stance on Gaza, but all except India were openly critical of Israel’s actions to varying degrees. The war further fueled the narrative in the Global South of Western double standards – as mentioned, Turki al-Faisal’s comments about the “hypocrisy” of the West standing with Ukraine but not with Gaza’s victims resonated widely.

Countries in Latin America (e.g. Bolivia cut relations with Israel, Brazil’s Lula was outspoken calling what Israel did a genocide in some comments) and Africa (South Africa’s ANC compared Gaza to apartheid struggle) overwhelmingly sympathized with Palestinians. This means any peace process that looks solely Western-driven might be viewed skeptically; integrating the Global South via BRICS participation or observers from the African Union, etc., can legitimize it more broadly.

### India

**Geostrategic context & unique capabilities**

**India** straddles convening platforms (G20 presidency legacy and its self-styled “Voice of the Global South” summits) and a rare web of working ties that run simultaneously to Israel (long-standing co-development/procurement, e.g., DRDO–IAI MRSAM/Barak-8) and to the Arab Gulf and Iran. Politically, Modi’s June 2024 NDA **coalition** preserved foreign-policy continuity under EAM S. Jaishankar even as consensus costs rose. On connectivity, the **IMEC** concept remains strategically attractive but its **western leg** is effectively on ice amid the Gaza war, with India and the UAE keeping cooperation alive via a Feb 2024 pact; in parallel, New Delhi locked a 10-year **Chabahar** deal with Iran that widens India’s access to West/Central Asia—while drawing explicit U.S. **sanctions-risk** messaging. At sea, **Red Sea** disruptions have lifted freight/insurance costs for Indian exporters, and the Indian Navy has leaned into independent deployments and counter-piracy/interdiction operations. Net-net, India is uniquely placed to **de-risk lanes, keep cross-bloc channels open, and anchor a Global South-branded humanitarian/rehab corridor**—exactly the mix our plan needs to marry ceasefire diplomacy with day-after logistics and financing.

([mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/CPV/G20-New-Delhi-Leaders-Declaration.pdf), [pib.gov.in](https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/india-modi-cabinet-nda-bjp-election-a607a3ac480c2ccc24c79cbde43fb61f), [pmindia.gov.in](https://www.pmindia.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Portfolios_of_the_Union_Council_of_Ministers_10_june_2024.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/india-uae-sign-pact-trans-continental-trade-corridor-2024-02-13), [indianexpress.com](https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/israel-gaza-war-imec-10179793), [mecouncil.org](https://mecouncil.org/publication_chapters/imecs-ambitious-gamble-overcoming-geopolitical-obstacles-in-a-fractured-mediterranean), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-sign-10-year-pact-with-iran-chabahar-port-management-et-reports-2024-05-13), [hindustantimes.com](https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/chabahar-deal-us-warns-of-sanctions-against-entities-considering-trade-with-iran-101715668469215.html), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-exporters-face-rising-costs-after-houthi-red-sea-attacks-2024-01-15), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/india-deploys-unprecedented-naval-might-near-red-sea-rein-piracy-2024-01-31))

**Posture in the Gaza war.** PM Modi condemned the 7 Oct 2023 Hamas attacks as “terrorist” and voiced solidarity with Israel; days later India **abstained** on the Oct. 27, 2023 UNGA humanitarian-truce text, explicitly citing the absence of a Hamas condemnation. From late-2023 onward, New Delhi’s line paired humanitarian relief with a two-state outcome: India air-shipped two consignments (total **~70 tonnes**) of aid via Al-Arish in Oct–Nov 2023 and later contributed **US$ 2.5 million** to UNRWA; official statements repeatedly reaffirmed support for Palestinian UN membership. India then **voted in favour** of the May 10, 2024 UNGA resolution recommending Palestine’s membership upgrade, but **abstained** on the June 14, 2025 UNGA ceasefire text—together underscoring a calibrated posture: **terrorism is unacceptable + humanitarian imperative + two-state eventuality**, while preserving operational ties (e.g., the DRDO–IAI MRSAM/Barak-8 co-development) that make a full break with Israel unlikely even as aid continues to Palestinians.

([aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/10/un-backs-palestines-bid-for-membership-how-did-your-country-vote), [thewire.in](https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-abstains-unga-gaza-ceasefire-resolution-aid-access), [timesofindia.indiatimes.com](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-18-others-abstain-149-back-un-resolution-for-gaza-ceasefire/articleshow/121839695.cms), [iai.co.il](https://www.iai.co.il/iai-congratulates-indian-air-force-and-drdo-on-mrsam-defense-system), [pib.gov.in](https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/india-condemns-hamas-terrorist-attack-reiterates-backing-independent-palestine-2023-10-12), [press.unorg](https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12548.doc.htm), [theprint.in](https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-abstains-from-voting-on-un-resolution-calling-for-truce-in-gaza-over-failure-to-condemn-hamas/1822554), [eoicairo.gov.in](https://www.eoicairo.gov.in/news_letter_detail), [eoicairo.gov.in](https://www.eoicairo.gov.in/news_letter_detail), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm))  
  
**Public opinion.** National, Gaza-specific polling in India is sparse; major cross-national work captures only broad images (e.g., Pew’s Spring-2025 survey finds Indians **roughly divided** on Israel’s image: 34% favorable, 29% unfavorable). Two observable signals fill the gap: (1) government messaging that pairs **condemnation of terrorism** with a **humanitarian/ceasefire** frame and support for a two-state outcome and Palestinian UN membership, repeatedly reaffirmed in MEA answers to Parliament through 2024–25; (2) street-level activism that **exists but often faces restrictions**—from permissions denied or curtailed events in Delhi and Bengaluru to bans/detentions in Kashmir—alongside very large authorized mobilizations in Kerala. Politically, the June-2024 election returned an **NDA coalition**, and mainstream analysis expects **foreign-policy continuity with higher consensus costs**—a setup that tends to favor cautious, balance-of-interests diplomacy on Gaza.   
  
([pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/06/03/most-people-across-24-surveyed-countries-have-negative-views-of-israel-and-netanyahu), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm), [indianexpress.com](https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/pro-palestine-protest-at-jantar-mantar-delhi-israel-hamas-gaza-war-9366730), [deccanherald.com](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/bengaluru/bengalurus-first-legal-protest-for-palestine-draws-hundreds-2794498), [thenewsminute.com](https://www.thenewsminute.com/karnataka/bengaluru-police-stifle-pro-palestine-protests-with-denial-of-permission-firs), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/india-kashmir-protests-israel-gaza-f4b431716decb1550522db2e49630d9e), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/15/informed-solidarity-why-thousands-hit-kerala-streets-for-palestinians), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2023/10/29/hundreds-of-thousands-march-worldwide-against-israeli-bombardment-of-gaza), [iiss.org](https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/06/the-modi-3.0-coalition-government-challenges-and-priorities), [wilsoncenter.org](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/modi-30-indias-new-governing-coalition-and-implications-foreign-policy-and-national))

**Interests, constraints, and levers**

**Core interests.**

* Safety of a very large Gulf diaspora (≈9 million Indians across GCC), steady remittances, and stable oil links.
* Energy security: India imports ~88% of its crude; a large share still transits the Strait of Hormuz/Suez routes and comes from Gulf suppliers (Iraq, Saudi, UAE). Red Sea/Suez disruptions have materially raised freight/insurance costs for Indian trade.
* Hard-connectivity optionality via IMEC, with New Delhi and Abu Dhabi signing an Inter-Governmental Framework Agreement in Mar 2024 to keep the corridor’s workstreams alive even as the western leg is slowed by the Gaza war.
* Strategic autonomy at sea: India has avoided joining the US-led OPG coalition while mounting sizable independent deployments and counter-piracy actions in the Arabian Sea/Gulf of Aden to keep lanes open.

**Constraints / red lines.**

* Persistent aversion to texts that omit explicit condemnation of terrorism (e.g., India’s Oct. 27, 2023 UNGA abstention when “Hamas” wasn’t named), even as humanitarian protection is stressed.
* Reluctance to jeopardize Israel-linked defence supply chains/co-production (Barak-8/MRSAM) despite humanitarian support to Palestinians/UNRWA.
* Sensitivity to secondary-sanctions risk on Iran-linked projects: after India signed the 10-year Chabahar agreement in 2024, the US State Department publicly flagged sanctions exposure for participating entities.

**Positive levers for this plan.**

* Humanitarian optics and delivery: India has repeatedly airlifted aid to Gaza and fulfilled its annual $5 m pledge to UNRWA—language that pairs “condemnation of terror” with “maximising civilian protection” aligns with New Delhi’s public stance.
* “Dual-key” drafting: formulations that explicitly denounce Hamas-style attacks **and** call for humanitarian access/ceasefire tend to draw Indian support in UN votes.
* Keep IMEC’s **eastern leg** (India-UAE-Saudi—logistics, payments/digital rails) warm while the western leg is stalled; the Feb–Mar 2024 India–UAE agreements (incl. the IMEC framework) show political will and practical channels.
* Leverage India’s independent naval posture as a de-escalatory, public-good provider—continuous escort, rescue and counter-piracy operations lower regional shipping risk without entangling New Delhi in others’ coalitions. *(Analytic inference grounded in recent Indian Navy operations and non-participation in OPG.)*

*(*[indianexpress.com](https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/israel-gaza-war-imec-10179793), [wam.ae](https://www.wam.ae/en/article/b4dfcy1-gcc-countries-host-nine-million-indians), [compass.rauias.com](https://compass.rauias.com/current-affairs/us-uk-replace-gulf-source-remittance-india), [indianexpress.com](https://indianexpress.com/article/business/india-oil-import-energy-demands-domestic-output-petroleum-planning-9806975), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-exporters-face-rising-costs-after-houthi-red-sea-attacks-2024-01-15), [livemint.com](https://www.livemint.com/industry/red-sea-attacks-send-shockwaves-through-indian-exim-business-container-costs-up-400-freight-rates-soar-11704796039879.html), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/india-uae-sign-pact-trans-continental-trade-corridor-2024-02-13), [thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/making-sense-of-indias-muted-response-to-the-red-sea-crisis), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/indian-navy-rescues-two-boats-somali-pirates-one-day-2024-01-30), [iai.co.il](https://www.iai.co.il/iai-congratulates-indian-air-force-and-drdo-on-mrsam-defense-system), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/us-warns-of-potential-sanctions-for-indian-companies-over-chabahar-port-deal-with-iran/3218604), [eoicairo.gov.in](https://www.eoicairo.gov.in/news_letter_detail), [ddnews.gov.in](https://ddnews.gov.in/en/india-releases-second-tranche-of-usd-2-5-million-to-unrwa-for-palestinian-refugees), [indianexpress.com](https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/india-vote-favour-un-resolution-gaza-ceasefire-9066979), [business-standard.com](https://www.business-standard.com/economy/news/india-uae-sign-bilateral-investment-agreement-during-pm-modi-s-visit-124021301662_1.html), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/india-sends-warship-after-hijacking-liberian-flagged-vessel-arabian-sea-2024-01-05), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/16/indian-navy-captures-ship-from-somali-pirates-rescues-crew-members), [thediplomat.com](https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/making-sense-of-indias-muted-response-to-the-red-sea-crisis))

**Potential contributions to the peace plan**

1. **Humanitarian lift.** Invite India to co-lead a **BRICS/Global South Humanitarian Air-Bridge** (medical kits, field power, water) via Egypt/Jordan nodes with transparent needs tracking—building directly on New Delhi’s prior airlifts to Al-Arish (~70 t across Oct–Nov 2023) and its continuing UNRWA support (US$2.5 m in 2024 as part of a US$5 m annual pledge).
2. **Maritime de-risking (non-combat).** Expand information-sharing and temporary corridor advisories with Gulf/EU counterparts to keep Suez-bound flows moving while avoiding bloc alignments—leveraging India’s **independent** naval posture and recent rescues/counter-piracy ops in the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden, as well as Delhi’s decision to steer clear of the US-led OPG coalition.
3. **Diplomatic drafting.** Table/co-sponsor a UN text that **combines**: (a) explicit condemnation of 7 Oct-style terror attacks; (b) an immediate humanitarian ceasefire; (c) guardrails on hostage releases and aid access; (d) a reaffirmed pathway to two states. This mirrors India’s pattern—abstaining on 27 Oct 2023 when Hamas wasn’t named, but later voting **for** the 10 May 2024 UNGA text backing enhanced Palestinian status—plus MEA statements pairing humanitarian relief with a two-state outcome.
4. **Connectivity peace-dividend.** Keep **IMEC’s eastern leg** (India–UAE–Saudi—logistics/digital rails) warm and explore a **“Relief-to-Rebuild”** annex that ties resumption of the western leg to verified Gaza reconstruction milestones—de-politicising near-term steps. India and the UAE already have an IMEC **intergovernmental framework** in place (Feb/Mar 2024); multiple analyses note the Gaza war has effectively stalled the western segment.

([eoicairo.gov.in](https://www.eoicairo.gov.in/news_letter_detail), [english.wafa.ps](https://english.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/146981), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/indian-navy-thwarts-somali-pirates-using-cargo-ship-ruen-ani-reports-2024-03-16), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/16/indian-navy-captures-ship-from-somali-pirates-rescues-crew-members), [indiatvnews.com](https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/world/indian-navy-conducts-daring-rescue-operation-of-21-crew-after-houthi-target-vessel-in-gulf-of-aden-video-israel-hamas-war-2024-03-07-920344), [indiatoday.in](https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-india-is-treading-cautiously-on-us-led-naval-coalition-in-red-sea-2483826-2024-01-03), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12548.doc.htm), [economictimes.indiatimes.com](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-votes-in-favour-of-unga-resolution-supporting-palestines-bid-to-become-full-un-member/articleshow/110017485.cms), [newsonair.gov.in](https://www.newsonair.gov.in/india-votes-in-favour-of-draft-resolution-supporting-palestines-bid-to-become-full-member-of-united-nations), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm), [wam.ae](https://www.wam.ae/en/article/13taz9u-india%E2%80%99s-cabinet-approves-agreement-enable), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-infinite-connection-how-to-make-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-happen))

**Strategic benefits for India**

* **Optics.** Branding a **Global South–led** humanitarian air-bridge and civilian-protection guardrails puts India exactly where it has been positioning itself: as convener-in-chief for the Global South (via its recurring **Voice of Global South** summits). Taking a visible sherpa role aligns with New Delhi’s own framing and MEA language on protecting civilians and enabling safe, timely aid.
* **Issue linkage that advances India’s agenda.** Quiet support for India’s near-term trade/connectivity goals—(i) sustaining **IMEC’s eastern leg** implementation with the UAE/Saudi and (ii) maintaining **EU-India FTA** momentum through 2025—can be paired with India’s sponsorship of balanced ceasefire text (terrorism condemnation + humanitarian access). Both tracks are alive: the India–UAE **inter-governmental framework** for IMEC is on the books (Feb/Mar 2024), and EU/Indian principals publicly signal a push to land the FTA by end-2025.
* **Sanctions comfort on Chabahar (humanitarian lane).** A **targeted G7 carve-out** for Chabahar-linked *humanitarian logistics* (if used for Gaza staging) would reduce India’s exposure while leveraging its corridor know-how. There’s precedent: Washington **exempted Chabahar in 2018** to facilitate Afghanistan relief/trade; after India’s **10-year Chabahar deal** (May 2024), the U.S. cautioned that Iran sanctions still apply and any entity faces risk—followed in 2025 by reviews/moves affecting waivers. OFAC also routinely issues **general licenses** permitting humanitarian activity under sanctions regimes. Together, these facts show a legal-policy pathway for a narrow, humanitarian-only carve-out that serves Indian and global interests.

([mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm), [mea.gov.in](https://www.mea.gov.in/voice-of-global-summit.htm), [pib.gov.in](https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx), [wam.ae](https://www.wam.ae/en/article/13taz9u-india%E2%80%99s-cabinet-approves-agreement-enable), [timesofindia.indiatimes.com](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/hope-to-conclude-eu-fta-by-year-end-pm-modi/articleshow/121894380.cms), [rferl.org](https://www.rferl.org/a/us-exempts-iran-chabahar-port-project-from-sanction-in-nod-to-afghanistan-india/29586874.html), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-sign-10-year-pact-with-iran-chabahar-port-management-et-reports-2024-05-13), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/state-dept-says-all-waivers-providing-iran-economic-relief-are-under-review-2025-03-06), [ofac.treasury.gov](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions))

### Brazil

**Geostrategic context & unique capabilities**

Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva couples BRICS stature and a 2024 G20 convening legacy (the **Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty**) with deep agrifood links to the Arab world and longstanding recognition of Palestine (2010). This gives Brasília unusual convening power on **humanitarian access, food, water, and reconstruction finance**—and credibility with Global South capitals.

([gov.br](https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/11/brazil2019s-president-lula-launches-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-alongside-148-members-including-82-countries), [g20.org](https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/G20-Rio-de-Janeiro-Leaders-Declaration-EN.pdf), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/18/g20-brazil-lula-hunger-alliance), [ap.org](https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/spotlights/2024/brazils-g20-summit-produces-a-broad-declaration-thats-short-on-specifics), [epthinktank.eu](https://epthinktank.eu/2024/11/25/the-2024-g20-summit-in-rio-de-janeiro), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2010/12/5/brazil-recognises-palestine))

**Posture in the Gaza war.**  
President Lula has been outspoken: he condemned civilian suffering and, in Feb. 2024, compared Israel’s actions in Gaza to the Holocaust—after which Israel declared him *persona non grata*; Brazil recalled its ambassador for consultations and, on May 29, 2024, removed him from the post and reassigned him to Geneva, leaving ties strained. At the UN, Brazil **voted in favor** of the May 10, 2024 UNGA resolution (A/RES/ES-10/23) recognizing Palestine as qualified for membership and urging the Security Council to reconsider; in June 2025 the UNGA adopted a stronger ceasefire/humanitarian-access text by **149–12–19**, reinforcing that multilateral track. On the ground, Brasília’s “Returning in Peace” operation helped evacuate more than **1,550 people** via Cairo by December 2023, while delivering **40 water purifiers, health kits, 11 tons of food**, and other relief via multiple presidential and air‑force flights to support Gaza. As part of a consistent multilateral pattern, Brazil also authored the Oct. 18, 2023 UNSC draft urging **humanitarian pauses** (vetoed by the U.S.). Most recently, on **July 23, 2025**, Brazil announced it would **join South Africa’s ICJ genocide case** against Israel.  
  
([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-brazil-palestinians-gaza-holocaust-netanyahu-lula-3816f5b18bcb4922898f79824c6f3350), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/brazil-lula-israel-ambassador-withdrawn-af9d295d989a86c4fcd8ca4531350f42), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/19/brazil-recalls-ambassador-to-israel-in-row-over-lulas-gaza-comments), [gov.il](https://www.gov.il/en/pages/fm-katz-summoned-brazil-s-ambassador), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-declares-brazils-lula-persona-non-grata-for-comparing-gaza-war-to-holocaust), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/lula-removes-brazilian-ambassador-israel-amid-diplomatic-spat-2024-05-29), [press.unorg](https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12599.doc.htm), [documents.un.org](https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n25/166/20/pdf/n2516620.pdf), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/un-gaza-assembly-resolution-vote-ceasefire-hostages-4b3585957f01c88ea2ebb13b59d118b4), [agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2023-10/plane-set-bring-brazilians-gaza-takes-egypt), [gov.br](https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2023/10/brazil-sends-new-cargo-of-humanitarian-aid-to-the-population-of-gaza), [gov.br](https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2023/12/plane-carrying-30-repatriated-citizens-from-gaza-lands-in-brasilia), [en.mercopress.com](https://en.mercopress.com/2023/12/26/brazil-not-giving-up-rescuing-people-from-war-torn-gaza), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-vetoes-un-security-council-action-israel-gaza-2023-10-18), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-join-south-africas-gaza-genocide-case-against-israel-icj-2025-07-23), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/23/brazil-to-join-south-africas-icj-genocide-case-against-israel), [gov.br](https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/delbrasonu/the-permanent-mission-of-brazil-to-the-un/statements/2024/july-2024/statement-by-the-permanent-representative-of-brazil-to-the-united-nations-ambassador-sergio-franca-danese-at-the-ad-hoc-committee-of-the-general-assembly-for-the-announcement-of-voluntary-contributions-to-the-united-nations-relief-and-works-agency-for), [gov.br](https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs/speeches/mauro-vieira-2023/address-by-minister-mauro-vieira-at-cairo-ministerial-conference-to-enhance-the-humanitarian-response-in-gaza), [gov.br](https://www.gov.br/mreen/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/brazil-assumes-presidency-of-unrwa-advisory-commission))

**Interests, constraints, and levers**

**Core interests.** Protect Brazil’s image as a **Global South convener** (Brazil’s 2024 G20 presidency launched the Global Alliance Against Hunger & Poverty), and keep agrifood exports into **Gulf/Egypt/UAE/Saudi** markets resilient (Arab trade hit record levels; Middle East poultry demand for Brazilian suppliers remained strong in 2024–25). Convert the G20 hunger-alliance brand into visible humanitarian wins.

**Constraints / red lines.** A sharp **diplomatic rift with Israel** after Lula’s February 2024 remarks (recall of Brazil’s ambassador; “persona non grata” spat) raises political costs for security cooperation; **civil-society pressure** has coincided with multiple reports of **delays/freezes** in Israel-linked defense deals (e.g., Elbit howitzers; armored vehicles).   
  
**Positive levers.** Lean into **humanitarian optics** where Brazil already has credibility (water purifiers, health kits, food shipments via Egypt; UNRWA Advisory Commission **presidency** in 2025), pair with **lawful multilateralism** (UNGA vote for Palestine’s UN bid; intent to **join South Africa’s ICJ case**), and activate **trade facilitation** via the **Mercosur–Palestinian Authority FTA** Brazil enacted in **July 2024** as a channel for essentials/reconstruction inputs.

([gov.br](https://www.gov.br/g20/en/news/a-joint-and-ongoing-journey-the-creation-of-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty), [globalallianceagainsthungerandpoverty.org](https://globalallianceagainsthungerandpoverty.org/new/world-leaders-launch-the-global-alliance-against-hunger-and-poverty-2), [datamarnews.com](https://datamarnews.com/noticias/brazil-hits-record-trade-surplus-with-arab-nations), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/brazil-chicken-exporters-enjoy-less-us-competition-strong-mideast-demand-2024-07-08), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/19/brazil-recalls-ambassador-to-israel-in-row-over-lulas-gaza-comments), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/02/brazil-israel-row-escalates-lula-declared-persona-non-grata), [defensenews.com](https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2024/10/07/brazils-deal-for-israeli-howitzers-frozen-over-gaza-war), [noticias.uol.com.br](https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2024/09/02/amorim-faz-lula-suspender-compra-de-blindado-israelense-e-irrita-exercito.htm), [agenciabrasil.ebccombr.](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2025-06/brazil-considers-measures-sever-military-ties-israel), [gov.br](https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2023/10/brazil-sends-new-cargo-of-humanitarian-aid-to-the-population-of-gaza), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-join-south-africas-gaza-genocide-case-against-israel-icj-2025-07-23))  
  
**Potential contributions to the peace plan**

1. **Global South Food-&-Water Air-Bridge (co-chair).** Co-chair a targeted air-bridge under the **G20 Global Alliance Against Hunger & Poverty** banner, focused on water purification, field power, and therapeutic foods via Egypt/Jordan—with transparent needs tracking. This builds on Brazil’s documented humanitarian ops.
2. **UN drafting caucus (humanitarian + accountability).** Lead/co-sponsor GA texts that pair **immediate humanitarian access/ceasefire** with hostage provisions and civilian-protection guardrails—consistent with Brazil’s multilateral posture (author of the 18 Oct 2023 UNSC draft on **humanitarian pauses**; **voted in favor** of **ES-10/23** on 10 May 2024 enhancing Palestine’s UN participation; signaled intent on **23 Jul 2025** to **join South Africa’s ICJ case**).
3. **Trade-for-Relief fast track.** **Activate the MERCOSUR–Palestine FTA**—in force bilaterally since Brazil deposited ratification on **5 Jul 2024**. Use its **SPS** and **technical regulations** chapters to fast-track essential goods and reconstruction inputs (preferential tariffs + green-lane customs via Egypt/Jordan).
4. **South-South reconstruction corps.** Stand up a vetted roster of Brazilian public institutes/NGOs (e.g., **Fiocruz** and partners; ABC’s water/sanitation cooperation) for Gaza “day-after” projects under UN/WB oversight—leveraging Brazil’s existing international health and water-management cooperation footprint (and Brazil’s 2025–26 **chair** role in **UNRWA’s Advisory Commission**).

([g20.org](https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/G20-Rio-de-Janeiro-Leaders-Declaration-EN.pdf), [gov.br](https://www.gov.br/mds/pt-br/noticias-e-conteudos/desenvolvimento-social/noticias-desenvolvimento-social/lideres-mundiais-lancam-a-alianca-global-contra-a-fome-e-a-pobreza), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15450.doc.htm), [research.un.org](https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/emergency), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/23/brazil-to-join-south-africas-icj-genocide-case-against-israel), [planalto.gov.br](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2023-2026/2025/decreto/D12432.htm), [gov.br](https://www.gov.br/ana/pt-br/acesso-a-informacao/acoes-e-programas/cooperacao-internacional/agua-no-mundo/projetos-bilaterais), [abcgov.br](https://www.abc.gov.br/imprensa/mostrarConteudo/1539))

### South Africa

**Why South Africa matters to the Roadmap**

South Africa has been a **leading Global South legal voice** on Gaza: **it filed** the ICJ case against Israel on 29 December 2023 **and repeatedly returned to seek/additional or modified provisional measures**, keeping the Court actively seized throughout **2024** (Orders on **26 Jan**, **28 Mar**, **24 May**) and into **2025** as proceedings advanced (memorial and third-party interventions).

That role draws on **Pretoria’s anti-apartheid moral authority** and the **ANC’s long-standing apartheid analogy** regarding Israel/Palestine, widely noted in government/party communication and international reporting.

Diplomatically, South Africa also has **BRICS convening experience** on Gaza (it **chaired the Extraordinary BRICS leaders’ meeting on 21 Nov 2023**, with an official Chair’s Summary and global coverage).

At home and in the field, an **active civil-society/humanitarian base**—notably **Gift of the Givers**—has operated long-running relief programmes for Palestinians and mounted Gaza-specific interventions since 2023–25 (medical and aid logistics via Egypt/Gaza).

([un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/icj-southafrica-israel-genocide-29dec2023), [icj-cij.org](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203447), [icj-cij.org](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192), [icj-cij.org](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204091), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-safrica-face-off-un-top-court-gaza-genocide-case-2024-01-11), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-africa-hopes-israel-will-comply-with-world-court-order-minister-2024-01-26), [anc1912.org.za](https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ANC-Today-11-October-2024.pdf), [dirco.gov.za](https://dirco.gov.za/opening-remarks-by-president-cyril-ramaphosa-to-the-extraordinary-joint-meeting-of-brics-leaders-and-leaders-of-invited-brics-members-on-the-situation-in-the-middle-east-21-november-2023), [dircogov.za](https://dirco.gov.za/the-chairs-summary-of-the-extraordinary-joint-meeting-of-brics-leaders-and-leaders-of-the-invited-brics-members-on-the-situation-in-the-middle-east-with-particular-reference-to-gaza-tuesday-21-nove), [giftofthegivers.org](https://giftofthegivers.org/where-we-work/palestine), [giftofthegivers.org](https://giftofthegivers.org/disaster-response/gaza-airstrikes/60106),

**Posture in the Gaza war**

South Africa’s posture in the Gaza war combines a sustained **ICJ track**, a parliamentary **diplomatic stance**, leadership continuity, and multilateral convening power: Pretoria filed *South Africa v. Israel* on **29 Dec 2023**; the ICJ indicated provisional measures on **26 Jan 2024**, added further measures on **28 Mar 2024**, and on **24 May 2024** ordered Israel to **“immediately halt” its military offensive in Rafah**, with case management continuing into **2025** (e.g., an **Order of 14 Apr 2025** extending Israel’s Counter-Memorial deadline). In the **National Assembly** on **21 Nov 2023**, lawmakers voted **248–91** to urge closure of Israel’s embassy and suspension of relations until a ceasefire—implementation resting with the executive—against the backdrop of an earlier **2019 downgrade** of South Africa’s mission in Tel Aviv to a liaison office with no political or trade mandate. After the **29 May 2024** election, a **Government of National Unity** was formed; President **Cyril Ramaphosa** named **Ronald Lamola** as Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on **30 Jun 2024** (sworn **3 Jul 2024**), and Lamola has since reiterated compliance with and implementation of **ICJ provisional measures** and advisory opinions, including in a **29 Jul 2025** UN speech. As **BRICS** chair, South Africa convened the **Extraordinary BRICS Leaders’ Meeting on Gaza** on **21 Nov 2023** (opening remarks and Chair’s Summary on record), and it also hosts the **New Development Bank Africa Regional Centre** in **Johannesburg/Sandton**, a platform that could support humanitarian-finance instruments.

([icj-cij.org](https://www.icj-cij.org/press-releases), [icj-cij.org](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203847), [parliament.gov.za](https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-adopts-motion-suspend-diplomatic-relations-israel), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/21/south-african-parliament-votes-for-motion-calling-to-close-israeli-embassy), [mg.co.za](https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-09-israel-and-south-africa-a-downgraded-relationship), [thepresidency.gov.za](https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/statement-president-cyril-ramaphosa-appointment-members-national-executive), [dirco.gov.za](https://dirco.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Speech-By-Minister-Lamola-On-the-Two-State-Solution.pdf), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/25/south-africa-has-a-new-top-diplomat-what-does-that-mean-for-palestine), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/view-safrica-president-ramaphosa-announces-cabinet-unity-government-2024-07-01), [mg.co.za](https://mg.co.za/article/2019-04-09-israel-and-south-africa-a-downgraded-relationship), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrican-lawmakers-vote-suspend-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-shut-embassy-2023-11-21))

**Public opinion**

Nationally representative polling on Gaza is limited, but three indicators align: **(1)** large, recurrent pro-Palestine demonstrations in major cities from 2023 through **2025** (e.g., Pretoria/Johannesburg/Cape Town), including fresh Cape Town protests on **Aug 1, 2025**, and mass marches in **Oct–Nov 2023**; **(2)** the **Nov 21, 2023** National Assembly vote (**248–91**) urging closure of Israel’s embassy and suspension of ties until a ceasefire; and **(3)** global tracking showing **South Africa’s** net favorability toward Israel flipping from positive to negative after Oct 7, 2023. Taken together, these point to broad public solidarity with Palestinians, with variation across parties and provinces.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/video/watch/idRW440301082025RP1), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/pictures/global-protests-support-palestinians-gaza-2023-10-22/QTW4MB2UDRMSHF5JAPFAIX2U7M), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinian-protests-us-embassy-0a8d106163346b53c0125777e78e8e13), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/safrican-lawmakers-vote-suspend-diplomatic-ties-with-israel-shut-embassy-2023-11-21))

**Potential contributions to the peace plan**

Leverage South Africa’s comparative strengths to deliver “science-first” relief: stand up a SANSA-hosted, South-South EO clearinghouse that publishes open, weekly Gaza damage/needs layers in partnership with UNOSAT and plugs directly into OCHA’s 3W coordination, so access decisions ride transparent data rather than rhetoric; deploy a CSIR-led field water-safety package (modular purification + rapid microbial testing) piloted from the Al-Arish hub with the Egyptian Red Crescent, then scale as crossings open; convene a health-logistics sprint via the WHO mRNA tech-transfer hub (Afrigen/Biovac/SAMRC) to restore cold-chain and schedule vaccination windows that require humanitarian pauses; co-chair at UNGA a legal-humanitarian caucus that marries ICJ/ICC compliance language to concrete access benchmarks; and prototype, through the NDB Africa Regional Centre (Johannesburg/Sandton), a fast-disbursing Humanitarian Infrastructure Facility for small WASH/power/medical projects—favoring local implementers and open standards.   
  
([sansa.org.za](https://www.sansa.org.za/products-and-services/earth-observation), [arcgis.com](https://www.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/11816edccdc24205990a33b1b3afd259), [data.humdata.org](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/ocha-global-humanitarian-operational-presence-who-what-where-3w-portal), [csir.co.za](https://www.csir.co.za/sites/default/files/Documents/CSIR%20BROCHURE-Water%20Centre.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/delegate/working-logistical-hub-humanitarian-aid-crossing-gaza), [who.int](https://www.who.int/initiatives/mrna-technology-transfer-%28mrna-tt%29-programme), [unicef.org](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/mass-polio-vaccination-campaign-continue-gaza-strip), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/ES-10/22), [ndb.int](https://www.ndb.int/projects/covid-19-emergency-assistance-info-hub))

## Mexico

**Why it matters to this plan**

Mexico pairs Global-South credibility with USMCA-linked proximity to Washington and leadership in CELAC (pro tempore 2020–21), plus active engagement at the OAS. Its consistent two-state/ceasefire line, reliance on UN/ICC/ICJ legal channels, and development-first diplomacy via AMEXCID give it convening power with minimal escalation risk—useful for a humanitarian-accountability track that needs both North–South buy-in and UN process fluency. Mexico and Chile’s joint referral of the Palestine situation to the ICC underscores rule-of-law positioning that can de-politicize accountability inside a ceasefire package.

([ustr.gov](https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement), [gob.mx](https://www.gob.mx/sre/en/articulos/mexico-is-elected-president-pro-tempore-of-celac-for-2020-219863), [gob.mx](https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/the-government-of-mexico-expresses-its-utmost-concern-over-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict-and-condemns-all-acts-against-civilians), [gob.mx](https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/the-government-of-mexico-welcomes-icj-provisional-measures-to-prevent-and-punish-genocide-in-the-gaza-strip), [gob.mx](https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/amexcid-cooperation-programs-address-the-structural-causes-of-migration), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-01/2024-01-18-Referral_Chile__Mexico.pdf), [oas.org](https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp))

**Posture in the Gaza war**

Mexico has urged an **immediate ceasefire** and protection of civilians (e.g., condemning the Rafah strike and calling for an “cese al fuego inmediato”), and it **welcomed the ICJ’s provisional measures** on Gaza; the government has framed its Gaza diplomacy through **UN/ICJ channels**. It also **backs Palestine’s bid for full UN membership**. Under President **Claudia Sheinbaum**, ties with the Palestinian mission have **deepened**—she formally received the **credentials of Ambassador Nadya Rasheed** in March 2025—and she has reiterated support for a **two-state peace** and for international recognition of Palestinian statehood.

([gob.mx](https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/mexico-condena-el-ataque-de-israel-a-la-ciudad-de-rafah-y-hace-un-llamado-al-cese-al-fuego-inmediato), [swissinfo.ch](https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/sheinbaum-dice-que-m%C3%A9xico-reconoce-a-palestina-ante-plan-de-trump-de-intervenir-en-gaza/88831877), [mexicobusiness.news](https://mexicobusiness.news/policyandeconomy/news/mexico-reaffirms-diplomatic-ties-palestine), [mexiconewsdaily.com](https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/sheinbaum-condemns-war-in-gaza), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/international/article-824276))

**Public opinion**

While comprehensive national polling is scarce, behavioral indicators point to sustained mobilization: large marches from the Ángel de la Independencia to the Zócalo in November 2023 and on subsequent dates, including the International Day of Solidarity (Nov 29, 2023/2024); a student encampment at UNAM in May 2024; confrontational protests outside Israel’s embassy in May–June 2024 with injuries reported; renewed mass marches in 2025 (e.g., a Nakba-anniversary march announced for May 18 and a June 15 Ángel→Zócalo march); and recurring vigils—outside the Foreign Ministry on March 21, 2025 and at the Ángel on August 12, 2025 for journalists killed in Gaza. Taken together, these signals suggest high salience and broad sympathy for civilian protection and diplomatic solutions.   
  
([jornada.com.mx](https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2023/11/29/sociedad/marchan-al-zocalo-contra-ataques-de-israel-a-palestina-5878), [jornada.com.mx](https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2025/05/17/politica/encabezara-embajadora-de-palestina-en-cdmx-marcha-por-aniversario-de-nakba), [efe.com](https://efe.com/en/latest-news/2023-11-06/thousands-march-in-mexico-city-against-israel-bombing-of-gaza), [dgcs.unam.mx](https://www.dgcs.unam.mx/boletin/bdboletin/2024_332.html), [elfinanciero.com.mx](https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/cdmx/2024/05/29/protesta-embajada-de-israel-mexico-manifestacion-por-rafah-en-cdmx-28-de-mayo), [reforma.com](https://www.reforma.com/deja-3-policias-heridos-protesta-en-embajada-de-israel/ar2833323), [nmas.com.mx](https://www.nmas.com.mx/ciudad-de-mexico/marcha-pro-palestina-cdmx-hoy-15-de-junio-2025-ruta-alternativas-viales), [newsreportmx.com](https://newsreportmx.com/2025/03/21/manifestaciones-hoy-en-cdmx-21-de-marzo-del-2025), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/pg/photo-gallery/vigil-held-in-mexico-city-for-palestinian-journalists-killed-by-israel/0))

## Japan

**Why Japan matters to the Roadmap**

Tokyo combines G7 credibility, longstanding aid relationships with Palestinians (e.g., CEAPAD and JICA programs), and trusted channels across the Gulf—backed by deep energy interdependence (≈90% of Japan’s crude oil comes from the Middle East). That mix lets Japan push humanitarian access without escalation and convene technical coalitions (water, health logistics, demining).

([mofa.go.jp](https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100734463.pdf), [mofa.go.jp](https://www.mofa.go.jp/me_a/me1/pageite_000001_01121.html), [mofa.go.jp](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01344.html), [kln.gov.my](https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/fourth-ministerial-conference-on-cooperation-among-east-asian-countries-for-palestinian-development-ceapad-iv-on-11-july-2025-kuala-lumpur), [kln.gov.my](https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/ceapad-iv-kuala-lumpur-action-plan-2025), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/news-releases/east-and-southeast-asia-strengthen-political-financial-and-diplomatic-support), [jica.go.jp](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/overseas/palestine/index.html), [mofa.go.jp](https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100529423.pdf), [gcc-sg.org](https://www.gcc-sg.org/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages//news2025-7-7-1.aspx), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/markets/japan-saudi-arabia-discuss-energy-industry-collaborations-forum-2024-05-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/japan-will-mitigate-potential-gasoline-price-spike-prime-minister-says-2025-06-19), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/japans-dependency-middle-east-crude-reaches-945-august-meti-2022-09-30), [arabnews.jp](https://www.arabnews.jp/en/business/article_146329), [jica.go.jp](https://www.jica.go.jp/english/overseas/palestine/activities/index.html), [unmas.org](https://www.unmas.org/en/japan-supports-unmas-humanitarian-mine-action-project-gaza), [enecho.meti.go.jp](https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/brochures/pdf/japan_energy_2024.pdf), [jica.go.jp](https://www.jica.go.jp/overseas/palestine/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2024/03/24/JICA_Palestine_Brochure_2024_EN_1.pdf))

**Posture in the Gaza war**

**Ceasefire & two-state line:** Japan voted **YES** for the Dec 12, 2023 UNGA call for an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire,” and keeps pressing for a two-state outcome in UN statements and MOFA briefs.  
**Humanitarian leadership:** Japan resumed funding to **UNRWA** in spring 2024 and has issued successive emergency grants (e.g., US$32 m on Feb 27, 2024; additional packages since). It also funds **UNMAS** demining in Gaza.  
**Medical evacuation:** In Mar 2025 Japan began **receiving wounded Gazans** for treatment (SDF Central Hospital).

([international.gc.ca](https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/controls-controles/military-goods-2024-marchandises-militaires.aspx), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/japan-lifts-funding-suspension-palestinian-refugee-agency-unrwa-2024-04-02), [international.gc.ca](https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/controls-controles/military-goods-2024-marchandises-militaires.aspx), [mofa.go.jp](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00174.html), [mofa.go.jp](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_01120.html), [unmas.org](https://www.unmas.org/en/unmas-gaza), [mofa.go.jp](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaikenwe_000001_00038.html))

**Public opinion**

Robust national polling is limited. Reporting and wire coverage document recurring **pro-ceasefire demonstrations in Tokyo** and student-led actions in 2024–2025.

([aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pro-palestine-rally-in-tokyo-against-rafah-attack/3216870), [arabnews.jp](https://www.arabnews.jp/en/japan/article_121656), [aa.com.tr](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pro-palestinian-rally-in-japan-condemns-israels-attacks-on-gaza/3311578), [arabnews.jp](https://www.arabnews.jp/en/japan/article_152719), [metropolisjapan.com](https://metropolisjapan.com/support-palestine-from-tokyo), [thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/2025/07/08/from-tokyo-to-gaza-one-mans-600-day-protest-for-palestine), [mainichi.jp](https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20250331/p2a/00m/0na/012000c), [monitor.civicus.org](https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/japan-multiple-protests-in-solidarity-with-palestine-as-well-as-anti-militarisation-protests-in-okinawa))

## Canada

**Why Canada matters to the Roadmap**

Ottawa holds the **G7 presidency in 2025**, has strong trans-Atlantic/US ties, an active sanctions toolset (e.g., IRGC listing), and credible humanitarian/immigration levers (UNRWA support; special TRV pathways for Gaza-affected families). That combination allows Canada to **pair humanitarian delivery with accountability drafting** and broad coalition-building.

([g7.canada.ca](https://g7.canada.ca/en), [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/09/canada-imposes-further-sanctions-against-iran0.html), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/canada-preparing-list-irans-irgc-terrorist-group-says-cbc-2024-06-19), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/13/unga-decisively-backs-gaza-ceasefire-resolution-how-your-country-voted), [international.gc.ca](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/g7/index.aspx))

**Posture in the Gaza war**

**Ceasefire & UN votes:** Canada shifted to vote **YES** for the Dec 12, 2023 UNGA ceasefire resolution.

**Humanitarian channel:** After pausing in Jan 2024, Canada **resumed UNRWA funding** in Mar 2024 and has continued Gaza-focused humanitarian assistance.

**Arms-export stance:** Global Affairs Canada states **no new permits to Israel have been approved since Jan 8, 2024**, consistent with a restrictive posture while reviews proceed.

**Accountability & Iran file:** Canada **listed the IRGC** as a terrorist entity in June 2024 and expanded related sanctions in Sept 2024.

**Mobility/humanitarian protection:** IRCC created a **temporary resident pathway** for certain extended family in Gaza (Jan 23, 2024) and **extended measures** in 2025.

**Diplomatic signaling:** With France and the UK, Canada issued joint calls (May 19, 2025) for **urgent humanitarian access and a sustainable ceasefire linked to hostage release**.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-says-it-will-resume-funding-un-palestinian-refugee-agency-2024-03-08), [international.gc.ca](https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/controls-controles/military-goods-2024-marchandises-militaires.aspx), [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2024/01/temporary-resident-pathway-opens-for-palestinian-extended-family-in-gaza.html), [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2025/08/canada-extends-temporary-measures-for-palestinians-in-canada.html), [pm.gc.ca](https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/statements/2025/05/19/joint-statement-leaders-canada-united-kingdom-and-france-situation), [canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2024/06/government-of-canada-lists-the-irgc-as-a-terrorist-entity.html))

**Public opinion**

Multiple credible 2024 polls show **majority support for an immediate ceasefire** and rising sympathy for Palestinian civilians (with continued recognition of Israel’s right to exist/defend). Campus encampments and repeated large marches through 2024 underscore salience.

([angusreid.org](https://angusreid.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/2024.06.05_CeasefireFinal.pdf), [angusreid.org](https://angusreid.org/israel-gaza-ceasefire-biden-trudeau), [angusreid.org](https://angusreid.org/israel-gaza-genocide-palestine-state), [universityaffairs.ca](https://universityaffairs.ca/features/timeline-encampments), [ipsos.com](https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2023-11/MEDIA%20RELEASE_Canadas%20Role%20In%20Conflict_Final.pdf), [environicsinstitute.org](https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/canadian-public-opinion-about-conflict-in-the-middle-east), [environicsinstitute.org](https://www.environicsinstitute.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/data-tables4464c577-56d2-4406-ab78-7b2d3dcd3d6a.pdf), [leger360.com](https://leger360.com/in-the-news-middle-east-ukraine-conflicts), [toronto.citynews.ca](https://toronto.citynews.ca/2024/10/04/immigrants-back-ceasefire-middle-east-conflict-majority-dissatisfied-ottawas-action-omni-poll), [ctvnews.ca](https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/majority-of-canadians-support-palestine-recognition-even-if-trump-objects-amid-trade-dispute-survey), [ottawa.citynews.ca](https://ottawa.citynews.ca/2024/05/03/in-the-news-today-students-set-up-pro-palestinian-encampment-at-uoft), [news.ontariotechu.ca](https://news.ontariotechu.ca/topic/encampment/finalagreement.pdf), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/mcgill-propalestinian-encampment-dismantled-8372845ff315ff6ff5d9f4607c7cbc53))

## United Nations

The UN carries the broadest legal peace-and-security mandate (the Security Council has “primary responsibility” under Article 24 of the Charter; the General Assembly is the UN’s main deliberative/policymaking forum) and maintains the deepest humanitarian footprint in Gaza through UNRWA, WFP, WHO, and OCHA. UNGA adopted two landmark texts: on **27 October 2023** it called for an “immediate, sustained humanitarian truce” (**120–14–45**); on **12 December 2023** it demanded an “immediate humanitarian ceasefire” (**153–10–23**). The Security Council later **demanded an “immediate” ceasefire for the month of Ramadan** in **Resolution 2728** on **25 March 2024** (**14–0–1**, United States abstained). Together with **Resolution 2720** (22 December 2023), which created a UN **Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator for Gaza**, these texts both codify global expectations and create procedural lanes for monitoring, access, and reconstruction.

([un.org](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/role-of-general-assembly), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12548.doc.htm), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12572.doc.htm), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15641.doc.htm), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15546.doc.htm), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/annual-operational-report-2024), [wfp.org](https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/palestine-emergency), [who.int](https://www.who.int/emergencies/situations/conflict-in-Israel-and-oPt), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/occupied-palestinian-territory))

**Posture since Oct 2023**

* **Humanitarian centrality + sacrifice.**UNRWA has remained the core lifeline in Gaza and also the primary victim among aid organizations. On **May 18, 2025**, UNRWA’s Commissioner-General stated that the **staff death toll surpassed 300**, and on **June 5, 2025** the UN Secretary-General said this is **the highest staff death toll in United Nations history**. OCHA’s rolling updates confirm the UN system’s continuing front-line role through August 2025.
* **Mandate anchors for implementation.  
  UNSC Resolution 2728** (**Mar 25, 2024**) demanded an **immediate** ceasefire for Ramadan—creating the clearest entry point for any monitoring/access architecture. The **Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO)** is the SG’s field mission for the political track and **coordinates more than twenty UN entities** supporting Palestinians; **UNOSAT** (damage mapping) and **OCHA** (needs/operations dashboards, 3W) provide the authoritative, shared baselines used by donors and agencies.
* **Resource lane recovery.**After early-2024 pauses, major donors **resumed or announced resumption** of UNRWA funding with added safeguards, restoring the key financing lane for any “reconstruction-for-compliance” bargain.
* **Israeli legislation restricting UNRWA**Knesset laws banning UNRWA operations in areas under Israeli sovereignty and prohibiting official contact entered into effect, with an order to vacate East Jerusalem facilities; the UN and key allies warned of humanitarian repercussions.
* **SG’s strategic options for UNRWA (July 9, 2025)**Facing a funding cliff, the Secretary-General presented **four options** for UNRWA’s future (from inaction/possible collapse to governance reforms or shifting service delivery), flagging urgent donor decisions.
* Humanitarian access & data rails (summer 2025)  
  OCHA’s **UN2720 Monitoring & Tracking** shows continued throughput problems and diversion/looting along convoy routes; July 20–Aug 3 saw ~**12,000 MT** of food brought in, **>90% off-loaded by crowds or looted** before reaching distribution points—illustrating the need to pair access with security/coordination.  
  UNOSAT’s **Comprehensive Damage Assessment (8 July 2025)** and FAO/UNOSAT **cropland damage** products provide the authoritative geospatial baseline for reconstruction and needs analysis.
* **Conflict-related sexual violence report to the Council (Aug 12, 2025).**  
  In his annual report, the Secretary-General **put Israeli forces “on notice”** over CRSV allegations (and cited Hamas as well), warning of potential listing absent remedial steps—another vector of UN scrutiny tied to access and accountability.
* **UN human rights findings (June–July 2025)**  
  The **Independent International Commission of Inquiry (HRC)** reported patterns amounting to **crimes against humanity, including extermination**, in relation to attacks on civilians sheltering in schools/religious sites; Israel rejects the allegations.
* **Security Council deadlock (June 4, 2025) - UNGA steps in**  
  A draft demanding an immediate, permanent ceasefire **failed due to a U.S. veto**; all other Council members voted in favor. (UN press + U.S. explanation of vote).
* **UNGA demands an immediate, unconditional, lasting ceasefire (June 12, 2025)**  
  In ES-10, the General Assembly adopted **A/ES-10/L.34/Rev.1** by **149–12–19**, demanding an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire; urging full implementation of **UNSC 2735 (2024)**; condemning starvation as a method of warfare; demanding the end of the blockade and opening of crossings; and calling for protection of UN/humanitarian personnel.
* **Emergency Security Council session**  
  The Council convened urgently after Israel’s move to “take over Gaza City”; the UN warned this could trigger “another horrific chapter,” underscoring acute protection and starvation risks.
* **Secretary-General statements amid escalating harm**  
  The SG continued high-frequency statements—including **June 2, 2025**—condemning killings around aid access and urging compliance with IHL and unfettered humanitarian operations.

([unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/unrwa-commissioner-general-gaza-today-unrwa-staff-death-toll-has-300), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/topics/death-toll-has-surpassed-gruesome-milestone-300), [un.org](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2025-06-05/secretary-generals-press-encounter-fallen-un-personnel), [un.org](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2023-10-24/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-the-middle-east%C2%A0), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/un-chief-says-false-accuse-him-justifying-hamas-attacks-2023-10-25), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15641.doc.htm), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-res-2728.php), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2728%282024%29), [dppa.un.org](https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unsco), [unsco.unmissions.org](https://unsco.unmissions.org), [unosat.org](https://unosat.org/products/4130), [unosat.org](https://unosat.org/products/4047), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/page/humanitarian-presence-activities-and-service-points-gaza-strip), [enlargement.ec.europa.eu](https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-will-proceed-paying-eur-50-million-unrwa-and-increase-emergency-support-palestinians-eur-2024-03-01_en), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-holds-back-part-unrwa-payment-boosts-palestinian-aid-2024-03-01), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-says-it-will-resume-funding-un-palestinian-refugee-agency-2024-03-08), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/news-releases/japan-resumes-funding-unrwa-contribution-us-35-million-support-palestine-refugees), [auswaertiges-amt.de](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/2627918-2627918), [oxfam.org.uk](https://www.oxfam.org.uk/media/press-releases/reaction-uk-government-resumes-unwra-funding), [ungeneva.org](https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2025/06/107316/un-general-assembly-adopts-gaza-ceasefire-resolution-overwhelming), [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/veto-of-the-united-nations-security-council-resolution-on-gaza), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16140.doc.htm), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/content/security-council), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-183-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-177-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unrwa-situation-report-180-on-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-the-gaza-strip-and-the-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/proposed-amendment-israeli-anti-unrwa-legislation), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-agency-unrwa-says-israel-orders-it-stop-east-jerusalem-operations-this-week-2025-01-26), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-chief-outlines-four-options-embattled-palestinian-relief-agency-unrwa-2025-07-09), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12863), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2411/text), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/us-unrwa-funding-already-halted-2024-not-by-trump-2025-order-2025-01-28), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025), [arcgis.com](https://www.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/11816edccdc24205990a33b1b3afd259), [data.humdata.org](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/unosat-gaza-strip-comprehensive-damage-assessment-08-july-2025), [data.humdata.org](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/unosat-fao-gaza-strip-cropland-damage-assessment-july-2025), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/israeli-attacks-educational-religious-and-cultural-sites-occupied), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/report-of-the-independent-international-commission-of-inquiry-on-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-including-east-jerusalem-and-israel-a-hrc-59-26), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-chief-puts-israel-russia-on-notice-over-conflict-related-sexual-violence-2025-08-12), [un.org](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2025-06-02/statement-the-secretary-general-the-situation-the-occupied-palestinian-territory-%28gaza%29))

**Game-theory frame (making compliance the best reply)**

**Design objective.**

Shape the UN package so that for each player (Israel, Palestinian factions/authorities, Egypt–Qatar mediators, major donors) **cooperation strictly dominates defection** in a repeated-game setting.

* **Information symmetry**—**reputational & legal cost of defection.**
* Use UN-run, open, and methodologically standardized baselines as the single public reference set:
* **UNOSAT structural damage mapping** (updated datasets incl. the **8 July 2025** comprehensive assessment).
* **OCHA 3W (Who-does-What-Where) for Gaza** to show presence and operational coverage by location/sector.
* **UN casualty-recording standards** (OHCHR guidance) and **OCHA data-responsibility guidance** used system-wide to harmonize definitions, verification, and disclosure.
* Recovery planning that **explicitly anchors on UN/World Bank/EU damage & needs assessments** for Gaza.

Transparent, UN-standardized metrics raise reputational exposure and potential legal risk for violations, reducing any short-term gain from cheating.

**Conditioned payoffs (“reconstruction escrow”)**

Stand up a **Gaza International Reconstruction Trust Fund** administered by proven multilateral fiduciaries, with **tranche releases only upon certified compliance** by a UN monitoring mission; **automatic pauses** on verified breaches. This is operationally realistic because:

* The **World Bank has long administered Palestine trust funds with scheduled, review-linked tranche disbursements** (e.g., **PRDP-MDTF** quarterly releases; **TFGWB**; current **PID-MDTF**).
* The **UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (UNDP/MPTF)** routinely designs and runs pooled, multi-donor funds across humanitarian/peace/recovery contexts—i.e., the needed plumbing for escrowed reconstruction.
* **Damage and needs baselines** for tranche sizing/targeting already exist via the **UN–World Bank–EU** assessments.
* For **claims/compensation architecture**, there are clear UN precedents: the **UN Compensation Commission** (Iraq–Kuwait) and the **UNGA-mandated Register of Damage for Ukraine (A/RES/ES-11/5)** now implemented via the Council of Europe’s registry.

(Related compliance precedent: the **Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (2014)** created monitored material flows tied to approvals, showing feasibility of conditional, monitored inputs even in high-constraint environments.)

**Enforcement shadow (legal & political)**

* A **consensus Security Council resolution** can codify monitoring, humanitarian access, and hostage/prisoner-exchange milestones; **UNSC 2728 (25 Mar 2024)** demanded an immediate ceasefire for Ramadan **and the release of hostages**, providing a textual hook for such milestones.
* **Article 25 of the UN Charter** establishes members’ obligation to carry out Council decisions; the **ICJ’s Namibia advisory opinion (1971)** is widely cited to support binding effect beyond Chapter V2 depending on text and intent.
* Practice and commentary around **2728** reflect the debate: several states and scholars assert it is **legally binding**, while other legal scholars argue it is **not**—but in either case it **raises political and reputational costs** and provides a coordination focal point.
* If Council consensus falters, a **UNGA-anchored donor compact/pledging track** can mirror triggers; UN has repeatedly convened **Gaza pledging conferences** under GA auspices (e.g., **UNRWA Pledging Conference, 12 Jul 2024**).

**Repeat-game discount factor (sequencing that sustains restraint).**

Structure **monthly/quarterly tranches** with public reporting so players heavily discount future losses from non-compliance *today*. This is operationally routine: **PRDP-MDTF** disbursed on a **quarterly schedule linked to reviews**, a proven cadence that can be repurposed for ceasefire-compliance tranching.

More broadly, **MDTFs in fragile/conflict settings** have been the standard donor modality, allowing conditions and phased releases aligned to governance/performance benchmarks.

([ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/page/humanitarian-presence-activities-and-service-points-gaza-strip), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Guidance_on_Casualty_Recording.pdf), [centre.humdata.org](https://centre.humdata.org/revised-ocha-data-responsibility-guidelines), [centre.humdata.org](https://centre.humdata.org/data-responsibility), [thedocs.worldbank.org](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/133c3304e29086819c1119fe8e85366b-0280012025/original/Gaza-RDNA-final-med.pdf), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/18/new-report-assesses-damages-losses-and-needs-in-gaza-and-the-west-bank), [palestine.unorg](https://palestine.un.org/en/289429-gaza-and-west-bank-interim-rapid-damage-and-needs-assessment-february-2025), [centre.humdata.org](https://centre.humdata.org/the-ocha-data-responsibility-guidelines), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/palestinian-recovery-and-development-program-trust-fund), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/palestinian-partnership-for-infrastructure-trust-fund/overview), [documents1.worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/900521567532116201/txt/West-Bank-and-Gaza-Palestinian-Recovery-and-Development-Plan-Multidonor-Trust-Fund-Project.txt), [openknowledge.worldbank.org](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/df338a12-1841-5d88-a01f-66e171692049/content), [mptf.undp.org](https://mptf.undp.org), [mptf.undp.org](https://mptf.undp.org/fund-type/peace-and-transition-funds), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/04/02/joint-world-bank-un-report-assesses-damage-to-gaza-s-infrastructure), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/default/files/2024/25th%20Suppl_Part_I_Kuwait.pdf), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_es_11_5.pdf), [rd4u.coe.int](https://rd4u.coe.int/en/faq/general), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209766), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-reconstruction-mechanism-enforcement-and-legitimization), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2728%282024%29), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15641.doc.htm), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text), [law.justia.com](https://law.justia.com/cases/foreign/international/1971-icj-rep-16.html), [ejiltalk.org](https://www.ejiltalk.org/resolution-2728-2024-is-a-binding-council-resolution), [ejiltalk.org](https://www.ejiltalk.org/resolution-2728-on-israel-gaza-is-significant-but-it-is-not-a-binding-council-decision), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-demanded-gaza-ceasefire-what-happens-now-2024-03-26), [un.org](https://www.un.org/pga/78/unrwa-pledging-conference-2024), [thedocs.worldbank.org](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/61611412631029704-0290022014/original/MainReportMDTFStudyinFCSOct18andAnnex2010.pdf))

**UN instruments to operationalize the equilibrium**

1. **UN-CMM (Ceasefire Monitoring Mission), Chapter VI/“light boots”:** Start with unarmed observers and technical verification (UNTSO-style), scaling to a Chapter VII–authorized protection component *only* with consent/regional buy-in (UNIFIL/UNDOF precedents for mandate design and deconfliction).  
   Relevant precedents:  
   **UNIFIL** (Lebanon) runs formal **tripartite meetings** and liaison channels between LAF and IDF to prevent escalation; it operates under **Chapter VI**; OIOS and UN notes describe its monitor/deconflict core.  
   **UNDOF** (Golan) — classic **ceasefire monitoring** mission renewed through **June 30, 2025** and again to **Dec 31, 2025**; also illustrates “light boots” posture.
2. **UN-led Open EO & Needs Lab:** A standing, South-North data room (UNOSAT + OCHA + WHO) that publishes weekly impact snapshots (power/water/health/food access), feeding the escrow triggers and counter-disinformation pillar mentioned in this memorandum “media/propaganda war” section.
3. **Hostage–Detainee Exchange Facilitation:** UNSCO serves as neutral secretariat for synchronized exchanges tied to verified compliance windows under UNSC text 2728’s humanitarian language.
4. **Claims & Compensation Track:** Stand up a **UN Register of Damage for Gaza** (immediate), linked to a future compensation panel modeled on the **UNCC**—with funding from donors and (subject to legal/political feasibility) assessed or seized sources.
5. **Pledging & Logistics Conferences:** OCHA-framed response plans and pooled logistics corridors (Egypt/Jordan) convened under the UN to align cargo flows with the tranche schedule.

([peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/untso), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unifil-head-chairs-regular-tripartite-meeting-with-laf-and-idf-officials-1), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unifil-head-chairs-1st-tripartite-meeting-of-2021-with-laf-and-idf-officials), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/faqs), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16106.doc.htm), [undof.unmissions.org](https://undof.unmissions.org/mandate), [data.humdataorg](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/unosat-gaza-strip-comprehensive-damage-assessment-08-july-2025), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/page/who-does-what-where-and-when), [emro.who.int](https://www.emro.who.int/opt/information-resources/dashboards.html), [data.humdata.org](https://data.humdata.org/dataset), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/map/occupied-palestinian-territory/unosat-fao-gaza-strip-cropland-damage-assessment-29-july-2025), [unsco.unmissions.org](https://unsco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/dsc_statement_on_ceasefire_and_hostage_release_deal_in_gaza_-_15_january_2025_1.pdf), [uncc.un.org](https://uncc.un.org/en), [rd4ucoe.int](https://www.rd4u.coe.int/en), [un.org](https://www.un.org/pga/78/unrwa-pledging-conference-2024), [reliefweb.int](https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-philippe-lazzarini-opening-unrwa-pledging-conference-12-july-2024-new-york), [app.un2720.org](https://app.un2720.org/tracking), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025), [logcluster.org](https://www.logcluster.org/en/document/palestine-logistics-cluster-meeting-minutes-gaza-2-july-2025), [logcluster.org](https://logcluster.org/en/document/palestine-logistics-cluster-meeting-minutes-jerusalemammancairo-4-june-2025), [unops.org](https://www.unops.org/news-and-stories/speeches/statement-by-unops-executive-director-to-the-security-council-on-un-2720-mechanism-for-gaza))

**Risk notes & mitigations**

**Council paralysis risk**

* The Security Council has *recently* deadlocked on Gaza (e.g., **4 June 2025**: a draft demanding an immediate, permanent ceasefire failed due to a U.S. veto; all other members voted in favor).
* In such situations the **General Assembly** may step in under **“Uniting for Peace” (GA res. 377 A(V))** to recommend collective measures when the Council is blocked, a practice used on the Gaza file (e.g., **12 June 2025** ES-10 resolution demanding an immediate, unconditional, lasting ceasefire).
* A **UNGA-anchored donor compact/pledging track** is available and has been used for UNRWA (e.g., **12 July 2024** pledging conference and “Shared Commitments on UNRWA”).
* The Secretary-General also has **existing authorities** to organize and coordinate humanitarian mechanisms (notably those rooted in **GA 46/182**, which created the Emergency Relief Coordinator/IASC architecture), even while keeping **regular Security Council briefings** to sustain pressure (e.g., **10 Aug 2025** emergency session on Gaza City).
* As precedent for SG action when the Council is blocked, the SG **invoked Article 99** (Dec 6 2023) to seize the Council on Gaza.

**Casualty-data controversy**

* To reduce politicization, anchor reporting to **transparent UN methodology**: the **OHCHR Guidance on Casualty Recording** (UN’s standard) and **OCHA/IASC data-responsibility practices**.
* OCHA’s Gaza updates explicitly **attribute sources and distinguish identified vs. aggregate/estimated figures**, noting revisions as identification advances (e.g., **31 May 2024** snapshot disclaimer; **Jun–Jul 2025** updates explaining retroactive additions and publication of an **identified list** by Gaza MoH on **23 Jun 2025**).
* UN press and reporting also show the UN **verifies** subsets of fatalities separately from larger reported totals, which explains periodic statistical adjustments (e.g., OHCHR-verified counts vs. wider MoH tallies reported by OCHA; see also Reuters’ coverage of OHCHR verification).

**Peacekeeper security & consent**

* UN peacekeeping is governed by the **three core principles**—**consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence/defence of the mandate**—which is why starting with **observers/technical verification** (“light boots”) is standard risk mitigation.
* **UNTSO** (unarmed military observers, Middle East since 1948) provides the canonical **ceasefire-monitoring** model.
* **UNIFIL** demonstrates **deconfliction** through its **Tripartite liaison mechanism** (IDF–LAF–UNIFIL) and liaison branch operations; this is the template for avoiding early mission shocks.
* **UNDOF**’s mandate renewals through **31 Dec 2025** reflect classic **ceasefire-observer** posture—another precedent for “light boots” in a high-risk theatre.

([press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16078.doc.htm), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-2025-353.php), [legal.un.org](https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html), [ask.un.org](https://ask.un.org/faq/177134), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/ga12690.doc.htm), [un.org](https://www.un.org/pga/78/2024/07/12/spokespersons-briefing-12-july-2024), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/shared-commitments-on-unrwa-12jul24), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/statement-unrwa-commissioner-general-philippe-lazzarini-unrwa-pledging-Conference), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/46/182), [oas.org](https://www.oas.org/dil/Res_46-182_UN_eng.pdf), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/ocha), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16140.doc.htm), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/situation-in-occupied-palestine-and-israel/sg-sc-article99-06-dec-2023), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/reported-impact-snapshot-gaza-strip-31-may-2024), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-300-gaza-strip), [unognewsroom.org](https://www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/2172/gaza-death-toll-ohchr-who-14-may-2024), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/nearly-70-gaza-war-dead-women-children-un-rights-office-says-2024-11-08), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping), [undof.unmissions.org](https://undof.unmissions.org/mandate), [media.un.org](https://media.un.org/avlibrary/en/asset/d341/d3419166))

## Unified Moral Voice: Global Spiritual Leaders

**Unified posture & values.** Across traditions, top faith leaders have converged on the same moral baseline for Gaza-Israel: protect civilians and holy sites, open humanitarian access, release hostages/detainees through agreement, and move to a sustained ceasefire grounded in law and dignity. Recent signals include: the Pope’s repeated public appeals for an immediate ceasefire, humanitarian corridors, and the freeing of hostages, including direct engagement after the July strike on Gaza’s Holy Family church; Jerusalem’s church leadership condemning attacks on sanctuaries and welcoming steps toward ceasefire; the World Council of Churches’ (WCC) calls for an immediate ceasefire and aid; the Ecumenical Patriarch’s denunciation of the Gaza carnage as a disgrace to humanity; leading Jewish bodies (Reform movement, Rabbinical Assembly, and rabbinic coalitions) urging both a negotiated ceasefire, unimpeded aid, and hostages’ release; Sunni and Shiʿa voices (Al-Azhar’s Grand Imam and Grand Ayatollah Sistani) pressing for an end to starvation and a political path to peace; and global interfaith platforms (Parliament of the World’s Religions; the Dalai Lama’s prayer for peace) reinforcing nonviolence and compassion.

([vaticannews.va](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2025-07/pope-leo-gaza-church-barbarity-netanyahu.html), [vaticannews.va](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2025-08/pope-stop-violence-ukraine-hunger-in-gaza-may-hostages-be-freed.html), [romereports.com](https://www.romereports.com/en/2025/07/28/pope-leo-makes-an-appeal-regarding-the-situation-in-gaza-a-population-annihilated-by-hunger), [romereports.com](https://www.romereports.com/en/2025/07/28/pope-leo-makes-an-appeal-regarding-the-situation-in-gaza-a-population-annihilated-by-hunger), [lpj.org](https://www.lpj.org/en/news/declaration-of-the-catholic-ordinaries-on-the-ceasefire-ingaza2025), [oikoumene.org](https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/statement-on-the-ceasefire-agreement-between-israel-and-hamas), [oikoumene.org](https://www.oikoumene.org/news/wcc-calls-for-immediate-ceasefire-urgent-humanitarian-aid-for-gaza), [ekathimerini.com](https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1277397/ecumenical-patriarch-gaza-events-a-disgrace-for-the-human-race), [urj.org](https://urj.org/blog/urj-and-israel-post-october-7th-updates-and-resources), [rabbinicalassembly.org](https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/story/statement-humanitarian-aid-gaza-and-freeing-hostages), [rabbis4ceasefire.com](https://rabbis4ceasefire.com/statements/statement), [manassa.news](https://manassa.news/en/news/25865), [madamasr.com](https://www.madamasr.com/en/2025/07/23/news/u/source-al-azhar-grand-imam-withdrew-call-to-save-gaza-at-foreign-ministers-request), [shiawaves.com](https://shiawaves.com/english/palestine/129664-grand-ayatollah-sistani-urges-action-to-break-gaza-blockade-amid-worsening-famine), [dalailama.com](https://www.dalailama.com/news/a-prayer-for-peace), [parliamentofreligions.org](https://parliamentofreligions.org/blog/statement-on-gaza-and-peace-in-the-middle-east))

**Why it matters to a Unified Peace Plan.** This convergence creates a rare, cross-faith “moral majority” that can de-polarize publics, legitimize political compromise, and reduce violence around sacred places. It also supplies trusted messengers for science-aligned humanitarian messaging (nutrition, epidemiology, deconfliction geometry for aid convoys) so that evidence and ethics move together.

**Unified Interfaith Operational Levers**

**Important note:** Items below are *proposals* backed by precedent and current signals from Christian, Jewish, and Muslim leadership and from humanitarian/verification bodies. Where a formal joint mechanism does not yet exist, we cite close precedents that show feasibility.

**1) Sacred-Sites Deconfliction Pact**

**What we’re proposing:** senior Christian, Jewish and Muslim authorities jointly publish a *sacred map* (churches, mosques, synagogues, cemeteries, faith-run hospitals) and endorse UN/OCHA movement-notification rules for convoys near these sites, with weekly public reporting.

**What the record shows:**

* **Documented incident & multifaith response:** On **July 17–20, 2025**, Israeli fire struck Gaza’s **Holy Family Catholic Parish**; the **Latin Patriarchate**, **Jerusalem Patriarchate**, and **the Pope** all condemned it and called for protection of civilians and holy places; the Holy See confirmed a **Pope–Netanyahu call** regarding the strike.
* **Operational precedent:** OCHA’s **Humanitarian Notification System / deconfliction** frameworks and guidance exist and are used in Gaza operations (though imperfect), and are exactly the sort of rules religious leaders can publicly back.
* **Mapping & monitoring tools ready to use:** **UNOSAT** maintains open satellite-based Gaza **damage maps/dashboards** publishable for clergy-endorsed “sacred maps.”

([lpj.org](https://lpj.org/en/news/lpj-statement-july-17th-2025), [en.jerusalem-patriarchate.info](https://en.jerusalem-patriarchate.info/announcements/statement-by-the-jerusalem-patriarchate-on-the-church-of-holy-family-in-gaza), [vaticannews.va](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2025-07/pope-renews-calls-for-ceasefire-in-gaza-following-attack-on-cath.html), [press.vatican.va](https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2025/07/18/250718a.html), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/17/gaza-catholic-church-holy-family-strike), [justsecurity.org](https://www.justsecurity.org/97384/humanitarian-notification-gaza), [unosat.org](https://unosat.org/products/4047), [arcgis.com](https://www.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/11816edccdc24205990a33b1b3afd259), [data.humdata.org](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/unosat-gaza-strip-comprehensive-damage-assessment-08-july-2025))

**2) “Days of Sacred Pause”**

**What we’re proposing:** recurring, calendar-anchored **humanitarian pauses** (e.g., Ramadan/Passover/Easter windows) tied to verifiable metrics (hostage releases, detainee releases—priority minors/medical, crossings throughput, malnutrition admissions).

**What the record shows:**

* **Holiday-anchored appeals:** The **UN Security Council** demanded an **immediate ceasefire for Ramadan** (Resolution 2728, **Mar 25, 2024**). Popes (2024, 2025) and other church leaders repeatedly tied ceasefire pleas to **Easter**.
* **Operational precedent for timed pauses:** Israel announced **daily “tactical pauses”** to allow aid flows (June 16, 2024), and again **July 27, 2025** for multiple areas—showing time-boxed humanitarian windows are practicable and scalable under monitoring.

([press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15641.doc.htm), [vaticannews.va](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2024-04/pope-francis-appeals-for-ceasefire-in-gaza.html), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/20/in-brief-easter-appearance-at-vatican-pope-francis-urges-gaza-ceasefire), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-announces-daily-pause-in-fighting-along-key-south-gaza-road-to-increase-aid-flow), [cbsnews.com](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/israel-military-tactical-pause-humanitarian-aid-gaza-hamas), [pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israel-announces-tactical-pause-to-daytime-fighting-along-road-in-rafah-to-allow-aid-through), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/mideast-wars-gaza-israel-pause-hunger-9752f9dbdbb1b85aac515ffe3e859216))

**3) Hostage-Aid Covenant**

**What we’re proposing:** shared theological framing—**pikuach nefesh** (saving life) / **la darar wa la dirar** (no harm)—for a synchronized sequence: immediate release of gravely ill/elderly hostages; scaled aid by agreed tonnage; then phased exchanges—messaged from pulpits, rabbinates, bishops’ conferences, senior ulema.

**What the record shows:**

* **Precedent of Releases + aid scale-up:** The **Nov 24–29, 2023 humanitarian pause** explicitly linked **hostage/prisoner exchanges** with **increased aid deliveries** into Gaza.
* **Jewish leadership signals:** Major rabbinic bodies (Reform movement; **URJ**; **CCAR**; **Rabbinical Assembly**) repeatedly call for **return of hostages**, **ceasefire**, and **unimpeded aid**.
* **Islamic & Shi’a moral grounding:** The **“no harm”** principle is a recognized legal maxim in **Islamic jurisprudence**; senior **Shi’a authority Grand Ayatollah Sistani** issued a July 2025 appeal over Gaza’s “extreme tragedy,” highlighting famine/starvation as morally intolerable.
* **Jewish moral grounding:** **Pikuach nefesh**—saving a life overrides almost all commandments—provides a clear ethical basis for hostage releases and lifesaving aid.

([ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-48), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-51), [al-monitor.com](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/11/un-says-61-trucks-deliver-aid-northern-gaza), [urj.org](https://urj.org/blog/urj-and-israel-post-october-7th-updates-and-resources), [urj.org](https://urj.org/press-room/reform-leaders-statement-hostage-release-and-ceasefire-agreement), [ccarnet.org](https://www.ccarnet.org/rabbinic-voice/statements-from-ccar), [rabbinicalassembly.org](https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/story/rabbinical-assembly-statement-israeli-ceasefire-hostage-deal), [rabbinicalassembly.org](https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/story/statement-humanitarian-aid-gaza-and-freeing-hostages), [al-islam.org](https://al-islam.org/thirty-principles-islamic-jurisprudence-sayyid-fadhil-milani/chapter-5-islamic-law-does-not-occasion), [ncbinlm.nih.gov](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK500179), [dergipark.org.tr](https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/303946), [coej.org](https://coej.org/sayyid-sistani-july2025), [myjewishlearning.com](https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/saving-a-life-pikuach-nefesh), [myjewishlearning.com](https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/pikuach-nefesh-the-overriding-jewish-value-of-human-life))

**4) Evidence-Guided Sermons**

**What we’re proposing:** WCC, Al-Azhar partners, rabbinic representatives, and the Latin Patriarchate co-issue weekly **“factsheets for clergy”** (malnutrition, water, disease, displacement), fed from **UN Clusters (OCHA/WHO/UNICEF)**—so homilies are data-aligned and cut rumor and cognitive warfare.

**What the record shows:**

* **WCC already produces clergy resources** on Palestine-Israel (liturgies, sermon helps, study packs)—a ready platform to “bolt on” data sheets.
* **LPJ & Jerusalem Patriarchs** publish regular **situational statements/notes**—again, an existing channel for clergy guidance.
* **Current datasets to feed the sheets:** **OCHA** bi-weekly **Gaza Humanitarian Response Updates**, **WHO/IPC** famine alerts, and **UNICEF** nutrition bulletins give timely, citable figures for malnutrition, access and convoy status.

([oikoumene.org](https://www.oikoumene.org/news/wcc-publishes-resources-for-world-week-for-peace-in-palestine-and-israel-whatever-you-didyou-did-for-me), [oikoumene.org](https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/seven-days-seven-themes-for-the-world-week-for-peace-in-palestine-and-israel-2024), [lpj.org](https://www.lpj.org/en/news/statement-on-the-attack-on-holy-family-catholic-church-in-gaza), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025), [who.int](https://www.who.int/news/item/27-07-2025-malnutrition-rates-reach-alarming-levels-in-gaza--who-warns), [ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_GazaStrip_Alert_July2025.pdf), [unicef.org](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/un-agencies-warn-key-food-and-nutrition-indicators-exceed-famine-thresholds-gaza))

**5) Interfaith Rapid Response & Chaplaincy Corps**

**What we’re proposing:** mixed teams (imams, rabbis, priests, nuns, lay carers, Buddhist/Hindu chaplains) trained in trauma-informed care / SPFA, deployed through existing **Caritas**, **Islamic Relief**, **PRCS/IFRC**, **MDA**, **ICRC**, and partner networks.

**What the record shows:**

* **Networks on the ground:** **Caritas Internationalis/Caritas Jerusalem** (including child-health initiatives), **Islamic Relief** (oPt since 1997), **Palestine Red Crescent** with **IFRC**, **Magen David Adom** (Israeli National Society), and **ICRC** are established, neutral channels capable of embedding chaplaincy/psycho-social support.
* **Training standards available:** widely used **Spiritual & Psychological First Aid (SPFA)** curricula can be adapted for interfaith teams serving civilians and families of hostages/missing.

([theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/05/francis-popemobile-mobile-clinic-children-gaza), [caritas.org](https://www.caritas.org/2025/07/gaza-crisis-reaches-breaking-point), [islamic-relief.org](https://islamic-relief.org/appeals/palestine-emergency-appeal), [ifrc.org](https://www.ifrc.org/press-release/statement-medical-services-overwhelmed-airstrikes-hit-gaza), [redcross.org.uk](https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and-emergencies/world/palestine-red-crescent-and-magen-david-adom-explained), [palestinercs.org](https://www.palestinercs.org/en), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/where-we-work/israel-and-occupied-territories), [icisf.org](https://icisf.org/spiritual-and-psychological-first-aid))

**6) Global Anti-Hate Compact**

**What we’re proposing:** synchronized decrees/guidance by senior clerics and rabbinic councils to counter **antisemitism, Islamophobia, and sectarian incitement**, plus a rapid joint rebuttal mechanism.

**What the record shows:**

* **Concrete precedents:** UK **Muslim–Jewish–Christian** leaders have issued **joint letters** rejecting both antisemitism and Islamophobia (Oct **2024**), and **Drumlanrig accords** (Feb **2025**) showed faith leaders can formalize cooperation to tackle dual hatreds.
* **Broader interfaith models:** U.S. faith coalitions (e.g., **Shoulder-to-Shoulder Campaign**) issued joint commitments against **anti-Muslim** and **anti-Jewish** hate—templates for a wider compact.

([archbishopofcanterbury.org](https://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/news/news-and-statements/joint-letter-faith-leaders-marking-one-year-anniversary-7th-october-0), [independent.co.uk](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ephraim-mirvis-archbishop-islamophobia-gaza-hamas-b2624537.html), [hyphenonline.com](https://hyphenonline.com/2025/02/11/drumlanrig-accords-muslim-jewish-leaders-faith-discrimination-king-charles-iii), [news.sky.com](https://news.sky.com/story/king-celebrates-signing-of-landmark-pact-between-jewish-and-muslim-groups-13307456), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2589935/world), [shouldertoshouldercampaign.org](https://www.shouldertoshouldercampaign.org/2023-commitment-signon))

**7) Faith & Tech for Verification**

**What we’re proposing:** a **clergy-endorsed public dashboard** that combines **open satellite analysis (UNOSAT)** with **OCHA crossings/aid throughput** and **health/nutrition indicators**, with Friday/Sabbath/Sunday updates shared from pulpits.

**What the record shows:**

* **Data streams exist today:** **UNOSAT** open **damage dashboards**, **OCHA** crossings/throughput pages and bi-weekly **response updates**, and **HDX** datasets for Gaza aid flows and sector data are regularly updated—and frequently cited by press.
* **Why this matters now:** Journalists and agencies are tracking **aid bottlenecks** and malnutrition; centralizing these feeds makes ethical messaging concrete and falsifiable.

([arcgis.com](https://www.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/11816edccdc24205990a33b1b3afd259), [data.humdata.org](https://data.humdata.org/dataset/unosat-gaza-strip-comprehensive-damage-assessment-08-july-2025), [data.humdata.org](https://data.humdata.org/organization/ocha-opt), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/data/crossings), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turned-back-gaza-aid-shipments-languish-warehouses-roadsides-2025-08-13), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/aid-gaza-hunger-united-nations-e703faaaba945e838aabfb3c7fa32d70))

**Current momentum (July–Aug 2025).** The Pope’s July phone outreach and appeals after the Holy Family church strike; Patriarchs’ and LPJ statements; WCC’s ceasefire line; Sistani’s call to end famine; Al-Azhar’s contested—but morally framed—interventions; and Jewish leaders’ paired emphasis on freeing hostages and safeguarding Gazan civilians all point to a shared, actionable center. This center can bless a ceasefire-hostage package now back in play and stabilize public opinion around humane implementation.

([lpj.org](https://lpj.org/en/news/lpj-statement-july-17th-2025), [lpj.org](https://lpj.org/en/news/press-release-from-the-latin-patriarchate), [pressvatican.va](https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2025/07/18/250718a.html), [oikoumene.org](https://www.oikoumene.org/news/as-gaza-faces-starvation-global-religious-voices-call-for-immediate-aid-and-respect-for-human-life), [vaticannews.va](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2025-07/pope-renews-calls-for-ceasefire-in-gaza-following-attack-on-cath.html), [press.vatican.va](https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2025/07/18/250718a.html), [coej.org](https://coej.org/sayyid-sistani-july2025), [manassa.news](https://manassa.news/en/news/25865), [middleeasteye.net](https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/egypt-pressures-top-islamic-institution-withdraw-statement-condemning-israeli-siege-gaza), [urj.org](https://urj.org/press-room/reform-leaders-statement-hostage-release-and-ceasefire-agreement), [ccarnet.org](https://www.ccarnet.org/rabbinic-voice/statements-from-ccar), [rabbinicalassembly.org](https://www.rabbinicalassembly.org/story/rabbinical-assembly-statement-israeli-ceasefire-hostage-deal))

**Caveat (accuracy & unity)**

Some institutions above (e.g., WCC, LPJ, URJ/RA, Sistani’s office, Al-Azhar) have **already** issued aligned statements; others have **capacity/precedent** but no *formal joint compact* yet. The plan explicitly **builds a new joint track** on top of these verified signals—**balanced across Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Sunni, Shi’a, and Jewish leadership**.

## **Summary of Stakeholders**

*Game‑Theoretic Analysis of International Positions*

The Gaza conflict has become a **multiplayer game** in which a diverse cast of actors—global powers, regional states, and non‑state movements—pursue competing objectives. This section analyses the **“Positions of Key International Stakeholders”** using game‑theory concepts, emphasising how **unification momentum** can be harnessed despite divergent interests.

**United States and NATO allies**

**Strategic calculus**

* **Power‑broker role:** The U.S. is the only actor capable of delivering Israeli concessions and unlocking major reconstruction funds. Congress approved a US$95 bn national‑security package in April 2024 that earmarked **US$26 bn for Israel and humanitarian aid for civilians**, illustrating that Washington couples support for Israel with limited assistance to Gaza.
* **Escalation control:** Washington faces rocket and drone attacks from Iran‑aligned militias and must protect its forces deployed in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. Carrier‑strike deployments demonstrate a credible threat of punishment while Patriot batteries reinforce the deterrent posture.
* **Iran containment and two‑state horizon:** U.S. rhetoric links Gaza diplomacy with constraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and with regional integration (e.g., Saudi‑Israeli normalisation). Domestic pressure has grown: polls show declining public approval for Israel’s military campaign and an electoral calculus that favours humanitarian relief.
* **Game‑theoretic implication:** The U.S. plays a **repeated game** with Israel. It uses **conditional aid** as a **carrot‑and‑stick mechanism**—continued arms flows are contingent on Israel opening crossings and freezing settlement expansion. This credible threat of withholding JDAMs or fuel if Israel reneges on obligations changes Israel’s payoff matrix: cooperation (ceasefire and incremental freedoms) yields continued support, while defection leads to economic and diplomatic isolation.

**NATO/EU**

* **Capabilities and domestic constraints:** European members provide vital Command‑and‑Control, ISR, and logistics assets for any ceasefire mission. Polls in the UK, Germany, France and Italy show majorities supporting an immediate ceasefire and suspension of arms exports to Israel. Mass demonstrations and legal challenges after July 2025 highlight that **domestic legitimacy is now a hard constraint**—mission planners must incorporate public opinion and civil‑liberties concerns into the payoff structure.
* **Internal fault‑lines:** Europe is not a monolith. **France announced it will formally recognise the State of Palestine at the UN General Assembly in September 2025**; President Macron framed recognition as a moral obligation and pledged to announce it in New York. Ireland, Spain and Norway already recognised Palestine, while Germany, Italy and Hungary argue that premature recognition could undermine Israel’s security. This **asynchronous recognition creates a mixed‑strategy equilibrium** where some players defect from a unified EU line to satisfy domestic constituencies, while others maintain the trans‑Atlantic consensus.
* **Enforcement challenge:** Because information warfare has weaponised grievances, the **information space becomes a co‑theatre**. Without transparency, small incidents can trigger protests and erode support for a stabilisation force. The memorandum recommends “integrated info‑ops cells” and **deliberative citizen panels** to pre‑empt disinformation and align policy with civil‑society expectations.

**Russia**

* **Dual‑edged leverage:** Moscow uniquely maintains open channels with Israel, Hamas, Tehran and Damascus, enabling it to act as a spoiler or mediator. Russia frames U.S. policy as a failure and portrays itself and China as champions of the developing world.
* **Information warfare:** Kremlin‑linked outlets fuse the Gaza and Ukraine narratives to erode Western solidarity. Russia thus maximises its payoff by **destabilising the information environment**, making it costlier for the U.S. and Europe to maintain unified positions.
* **Game‑theoretic insight:** Russia’s strategy resembles a **grim‑trigger**: if excluded from negotiations or sanctioned, it increases disinformation and arms flows to spoilers; if accommodated, it moderates its messaging. Effective diplomacy should incorporate Russia into a **multipolar snap‑back architecture**, reducing its incentive to defect while constraining destabilising moves.

**China**

* **Pro‑Palestinian rhetoric and mediator posture:** Beijing condemns violence on both sides but emphasises Palestinian self‑determination and calls for a two‑state solution. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Israel’s actions in Gaza “have gone beyond the scope of self‑defense” and called on Israel to stop its “collective punishment”.
* **Diplomatic initiatives:** In July 2024 China hosted fourteen Palestinian factions in Beijing, urging them to form a reconciliation government and work toward a UN‑sponsored two‑state solution.
* **Economic interests:** China is Israel’s largest supplier and a major export market; simultaneously Beijing supplies aid to Gaza and criticises Western “double standards”. It seeks to avoid a rupture with Israel while burnishing its role as a champion of the Global South.
* **Leverage over Russia:** Western sanctions force Russia to depend on Chinese trade and technology. Beijing could, in theory, use this to restrain Russian mischief in the Middle East but has so far chosen not to. The **missed use of leverage** suggests that China’s utility function prioritises counterbalancing U.S. influence over stabilising Gaza.
* **Game‑theoretic implication:** China plays a **mediator‑balancer game**. It derives reputational benefits by calling for a ceasefire and hosting talks, but its payoff for maintaining asymmetric trade ties with Israel and Russia outweighs the benefit of enforcing compliance. Only when combined with incentives (e.g., access to reconstruction contracts or BRICS influence) might Beijing lean on Moscow or Tehran.

**Key European States**

The EU’s normative power is undermined by divergent national payoffs:

| **State** | **Position and incentives** | **Game‑theoretic interpretation** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **France** | Committed to recognition; seeks to lead a time‑bound two‑state process. Recognising Palestine at the UN GA in September 2025 is framed as a moral duty. | France defects from the status‑quo equilibrium to trigger a **coordination game**: by moving first, it hopes others will follow and create a new equilibrium where recognition is the norm. |
| **Germany** | Prioritises Israel’s security; rejects premature recognition; supports humanitarian aid. | Germany’s payoff is shaped by historical responsibility; it adopts a **cautious strategy** to avoid domestic backlash, lowering its inclination to cooperate with unilateral recognition. |
| **United Kingdom** | Aligns conditionally with France; threatens recognition unless Israel improves humanitarian access. | The UK uses **threats as credible signals**: recognition is contingent on Israel cooperating, turning recognition into a bargaining chip. |
| **Spain/Ireland/Norway** | Already recognised Palestine; advocate for sanctions on settlers and review of EU‑Israel agreements. | They **set a precedent** that raises the reputational cost for other European states to remain silent. |
| **Hungary/Austria** | Shield Israel from EU penalties; oppose sanctions. | These states act as **veto players**; their continued defection maintains a fragmented equilibrium and reduces the EU’s collective leverage. |

The overall payoff matrix shows **coordination failure**: some states pursue normative leadership, others maintain status‑quo alliances, and veto players prevent punitive measures. This fragmentation dilutes the EU’s bargaining power but also creates an opportunity for a **minimum winning coalition** (France, UK, Ireland, Spain, Belgium, etc.) to form a credible sub‑group that conditions aid and recognises Palestine, thereby shifting the centre of gravity.

**Turkey**

* **Geostrategic pivot:** Turkey straddles NATO membership, deep energy ties with Russia, and aspirations for BRICS membership. It hosts Hamas’s political bureau but also operates a NATO airbase and engages with Europe on migration.
* **Domestic pressures:** Turkish public opinion strongly supports Palestinians, but economic interests limit radical measures.
* **Potential unifying role:** Turkey could be a **bridge** between East and West—leveraging its relations with Russia and China and its Muslim identity—to help shape a multinational peacekeeping force, host conferences, and deliver humanitarian aid. However, this requires moderating its anti‑Western rhetoric and embracing principled neutrality.
* **Game‑theoretic angle:** Turkey is a **swing player**. If it commits to the unified framework, it enhances the coalition’s credibility; if it defects, it provides cover for spoilers. Incentivising Ankara—through reconstruction contracts, BRICS accession or EU re‑engagement—raises the payoff for cooperation.

**Egypt**

* **Humanitarian gatekeeper:** Egypt controls the Rafah crossing and thus Gaza’s main humanitarian lifeline. It views any forced displacement of Gazans into Sinai as a red line. Cairo joined South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel and called for a ceasefire, while simultaneously coordinating security in the Philadelphi Corridor.
* **Balancing act:** Egypt must uphold its 1979 peace treaty with Israel and manage domestic pro‑Palestinian sentiment, which remains strong. Surveys indicate that most Egyptians view Hamas positively and demand severing ties with Israel, yet the state represses dissent.
* **Game‑theoretic insight:** Egypt plays a **gatekeeper game**: it can open or constrain aid flows, thereby shaping other players’ payoffs. By co‑chairing negotiations and partnering with Qatar and Turkey, Egypt can convert its geographic curse into a diplomatic asset. A trilateral humanitarian temporary corridor (Egypt‑Qatar‑Turkey) would increase the **joint payoff** of cooperation and reduce incentives for unilateral smuggling or arms transfers.

**Qatar**

* **Mediator and logistics hub:** Qatar hosts Hamas’s political office and the U.S. CENTCOM forward headquarters. Its mediation efforts produced hostage releases but stalled when parties showed little willingness to compromise. In November 2024 Doha told Hamas and Israel it would **pause its mediation until both sides showed “willingness and seriousness” to resume talks.**
* **Soft‑power and infrastructure:** Doha’s world‑class airports and ports allow rapid delivery of aid and hosting of confidential talks. Its network includes partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and BRICS aspirants.
* **Game‑theoretic note:** Qatar operates as a **trusted intermediary**. By threatening to withdraw its facilitation services (as in November 2024), it demonstrates **credible exit**—raising the cost of non‑cooperation for both Hamas and Israel. Maintaining Doha’s engagement therefore becomes an incentive for the principals to moderate their strategies.

**Jordan**

* **Humanitarian air‑bridge:** Jordan has conducted hundreds of airdrops and convoys into Gaza and advocates for an immediate ceasefire. It rejects any plan to resettle Palestinians in Jordan and insists on Hashemite custodianship over Jerusalem’s holy sites.
* **Hub potential:** With the Port of Aqaba and a developing railway network, Jordan can serve as a logistics node for reconstruction materials.
* **Game‑theoretic role:** Jordan acts as a **humanitarian player**—its payoff is stability along its borders. It can augment unification momentum by aligning with Egypt and Qatar in the humanitarian corridor, thereby increasing the coalition’s credibility.

**Cross‑cutting Insights and Unification Momentum**

1. **Endogeneity of domestic politics:** Public opinion, protest dynamics and information warfare are not peripheral; they directly shape state pay‑offs. Domestic legitimacy is a constraint that can either hinder or enhance cooperation. Incorporating citizen panels and transparent red‑lines into negotiations transforms activism into a feedback mechanism rather than a spoiler.
2. **Information space as co‑theatre:** Disinformation and narrative control function like an additional game board. Russia weaponises narratives to depress cooperation, while China uses anti‑colonial messaging to build Global‑South solidarity. Allied planners must treat **pre‑bunking and rapid fact‑checking** as integral to ceasefire enforcement rather than an afterthought.
3. **Multipolar guarantee vs. single‑hegemon enforcement:** A purely Western‑led peace has low credibility because spoilers can seek alternative patronage. The proposed **multipolar escrow and snap‑back architecture** aligns incentives across blocs: the U.S. conditions aid, Russia retains channels to Hamas and Iran, China gains contracts and moral authority, Europe offers reconstruction funds, and regional states provide logistical gateways. By ensuring that any serious violation triggers coordinated penalties, the architecture turns the ceasefire into a **self‑enforcing agreement**.
4. **Bridge states as pivotal players:** Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Qatar and Jordan are **bridge nodes** connecting different blocs. Their participation increases the expected pay‑off of cooperation by widening the coalition and decreasing the attractiveness of alternative alliances. Incentivising these swing players—through reconstruction contracts, political recognition or BRICS membership—can tip the game toward unification.
5. **Recognition as a coordination signal:** France’s commitment to recognise Palestine and Ireland/Spain’s earlier recognitions function as **costly signals**. They incur diplomatic backlash but reveal a high valuation for a two‑state outcome, encouraging other players to update their expectations and potentially shifting the equilibrium. The heterogeneity within Europe may ultimately produce a **tipping‑point dynamic** where a critical mass of recognitions forces laggards to follow to avoid isolation.
6. **Leverage asymmetries and misaligned incentives:** China’s unwillingness to expend its leverage over Russia and its balancing of trade with Israel illustrate that **not all leverage will be used**. Effective unification must therefore offer Beijing alternative pay‑offs—such as a role in a reconstruction fund or increased Global‑South leadership—so that using its leverage becomes rational.

**The Map**

* **Conflict dyad**: Israel ↔ Palestinian side (Gaza de-facto authorities & PA). Israel’s binding payoffs: **hostage return**, **no re-arm/rocket resurge**, **credible enforcement**; it is domestically constrained by right-wing coalition survival and audience costs. The Palestinian minimum: **siege lift**, **no re-occupation**, **political inclusion/PA pathway**, **holy-site guarantees**—with internal fragmentation and war attrition as constraints.
* **First-ring mediators** (Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, UN): maximize **border stability, humanitarian throughput, and reputational neutrality**, constrained by cross-pressures (Sinai security, gas corridor economics, alliance politics).
* **System guarantors** (U.S., EU-key states, Russia, China): maximize **regional de-escalation, credibility of international law, and domestic opinion management** while avoiding open-ended deployments. The **multipolar guarantee** is feasible if it is narrowly scoped, tech-heavy, and snap-back-credible.

**Why cooperation can now beat defection.**

Four fresh signals increase the shadow of the future and reduce unilateral “win” payoffs: (i) escalating **domestic pressure** inside Israel to end the war/secure a hostage deal; (ii) rising **international pushback** on renewed offensives/annexation talk; (iii) a viable **60-day truce+hostage** structure on the table; (iv) a rare **interfaith moral drumbeat**. Together they tip the game toward an Assurance equilibrium if paired with enforcement.

**Unification Momentum (overlapping interests often missed)**

* **Hidden convergence #1 – “Security-for-Access Swap.”**Israel’s real security need is **verifiable non-rearmament**, not endless footprint; Gaza’s real need is **access & reconstruction at scale**. Link these with **conditioned easing** and **automated snap-backs** so each side’s “gain” is contingent on the other’s verifiable compliance. This memo’s enforcement architecture (inspection, drones, joint ops center) operationalizes this swap.
* **Hidden convergence #2 – “Multipolar cover for domestic constraints.”**U.S./EU face audience-costs if seen “going soft,” while Russia/China need Global-South credibility without open-ended costs. A **mixed guarantor** mission (Western + BRICS + Muslim-majority contingents) lets each capital sell the deal at home as **burden-sharing, not capitulation**. (This memo’s chapters on China/Russia/euro-roles anticipate precisely this division of labor.)
* **Hidden convergence #3 – “Mediators’ self-interest in border quiet.”**Egypt/Jordan/Turkey gain directly from **aid throughput, smuggling suppression, and pilgrimage-safe holy sites**. They are natural **front-end implementers** for crossings, deconfliction hotlines, and early observer deployments—low-cost, high-legitimacy.
* **Hidden convergence #4 – “Faith umbrella lowers escalation risk.”**Sustained, cross-faith calls (Vatican/Al-Azhar/Chief Rabbis/Ecumenical leaders) raise the reputational cost of defection and provide **calendar anchors** (“Days of Sacred Pause”) for recurring humanitarian windows—useful **focal points** in repeated games.

**Coalition Calculus**

* **Minimum Winning Coalition to start** (MWC-0): **U.S. + Egypt + Qatar + Israel + Gaza de-facto + PA + UN** → triggers **hostage-for-access 60-day package** with verification.
* **Stability-grade Coalition** (MWC-1): MWC-0 + **Turkey + EU key states** (logistics/tech) → lowers frontline violations; adds **EU money + Turkish engineering/power** for quick “peace dividend.”
* **nap-back-credible Coalition** (MWC-2): MWC-1 + **China + Russia + KSA/UAE** → credible **cross-bloc snap-back** against violators; Gulf financing hedges reconstruction risk; Beijing/Moscow deter regional spoilers they influence.
* **Pivotal players** (swing leverage):  
  **Egypt/Qatar** (hostage logistics & crossings), **Turkey** (acceptable boots + energy), **KSA/UAE** (checkbook + normalization carrots), **China** (Global-South legitimacy + UNSC weight), **U.S.** (Israel constraint + tech/Intel), **Russia** (Tehran/Hezbollah channel). This is exactly the **multi-sponsor** architecture your roadmap envisions.

**Conclusion – Toward a Self‑Enforcing Cooperative Equilibrium**

The Gaza conflict exposes the tension between immediate humanitarian imperatives and long‑term geopolitical rivalries. Viewing the situation through a game‑theory lens reveals that **cooperation is possible but not automatic**. A unified peace architecture must (1) alter payoff structures by conditioning aid and recognition on compliance, (2) integrate domestic constituencies through transparency and deliberation, (3) treat information operations as part of the battleground, and (4) enlist bridge states to anchor a multipolar coalition.

The memorandum’s roadmap aims to become a **focal point** for such coordination by recognising these dynamics. By aligning incentives across stakeholders—from Washington to Beijing, Brussels to Doha—a ceasefire and reconstruction plan can transition from a fragile truce to a **self‑enforcing cooperative equilibrium** that benefits all players and, most importantly, honours the rights and dignity of those most affected.

**Holding Two Truths: Why Israel Cannot Be Ignored—and Why Neither Narrative Is Enough**

Across capitals and institutions, Israel now faces unprecedented censure and isolation: successive UNGA ceasefire votes, ICJ provisional measures on Rafah, ICC warrant applications, and even court-ordered curbs on certain defense exports in Europe. Yet despite this pressure, Israeli operations have continued while mediation cycles restart in Doha and Cairo and mass protests inside Israel demand a hostage deal and political change. Together these facts show that treating Israel as a pariah to be coerced—rather than a principal whose state-level security logic must be engaged—is not just ineffective; it is dangerous.

Our dataset makes the deeper point: both sides run on robust, internally consistent strategic logics that rarely intersect. Gaza’s humanitarian collapse and ongoing casualty toll are real and measurable; Israel’s domestic strain and international standing costs are also real, though lagged and diffuse. If we do not hold these truths at once, we default to cognitive warfare frames—moral absolutes that map poorly onto actual bargaining space. The task of diplomacy is to **embed two incompatible universes into one rules-bound sequence**: verifiable humanitarian protections and hostage releases alongside credible, externally underwritten security guarantees; phased military de-escalation alongside political pathways that key stakeholders (including Israel) can sign because defecting would be costlier than cooperating.

This also indicts the wider system: the conflict’s persistence, even as major states recognize Palestine and endorse two-state parameters, reflects a multipolar arena pulling in different directions—normative pressure without synchronized incentives and enforcement. The remedy is not louder proclamations but **joined-up mechanics**: a single verification spine, calibrated conditionality on aid and arms, and a mediation lane that forces complementarity among Washington/Brussels, key Arab and OIC partners, and swing actors. In short, stop asking who is “right” and start designing a deal in which each side’s next rational move is toward the ceasefire-to-peace track laid out in this plan.

([icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state), [loc.gov](https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2024-02-16/netherlands-appeals-court-orders-government-to-stop-export-of-f-35-fighter-jet-parts-to-israel), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/mossad-spy-chief-visiting-qatar-revive-gaza-peace-talks-israeli-officials-say-2025-08-14), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/mediators-present-updated-gaza-ceasefire-proposal-israel-hamas-axios-reports-2025-07-17), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/thousands-israelis-join-anti-government-protests-calling-new-elections-2024-04-20), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-313-gaza-strip), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-hunger-healthcare-collapse-and-unrelenting-war-bring-indescribable-hardships-for-civilians-ocha), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/thousands-rally-tel-aviv-against-netanyahus-new-gaza-plan-demand-release-2025-08-10), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/spain-ireland-norway-set-recognise-palestinian-statehood-2024-05-28), [gov.ie](https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-foreign-affairs/press-releases/joint-statement-of-spain-ireland-slovenia-and-norway-a-renewed-commitment-for-the-implementation-of-the-two-state-solution))

# **Global Concerns and Humanitarian Imperatives**

Beyond the immediate local stakes, the Gaza war and its resolution carry significant global implications – strategic, humanitarian, and moral – that both motivate the push for peace and shape the requirements of a stable outcome.

## **Nuclear and Regional War Risk**

The Gaza war has repeatedly risked widening into a broader regional conflict. That danger was stark in June 2025, when a 12-day Israel–Iran flare-up culminated in U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites, including B-2 strikes using 30,000-lb bunker-buster bombs against three nuclear facilities. The Pentagon and independent reporting confirm the scope of those operations, which precipitated a fragile ceasefire and underscored how quickly escalation can implicate actors with nuclear capabilities or ambitions.

The nuclear dimension remains acute. The IAEA Director General warned in June 2025 about Iran’s stockpiling of “over 400 kg of highly enriched uranium,” highlighting worsening proliferation risks even before the June strikes. (Iran’s cooperation with the Agency has fluctuated in response to Board of Governors actions.) In parallel, Saudi Arabia continues to seek a U.S.-backed civil nuclear deal that could include enrichment on its soil, while Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated that if Iran ever obtained a bomb, “we have to get one.” Together, these trajectories sustain fears of a regional arms-race dynamic flagged by leading research institutes.

Spillovers from the Gaza theater have already hit global trade and energy security. Since late 2023, Yemen’s Houthi movement has targeted Red Sea shipping—sinking vessels, killing seafarers, and forcing widespread rerouting around Africa—driving up costs, slashing Suez Canal revenues, and putting ports like Eilat at risk of collapse. The IMO, UKMTO and Reuters document a persistent tempo of lethal incidents through mid-2025. Earlier in the war, Israel even suspended output at the offshore Tamar gas field over security concerns—illustrating how hostilities can interrupt Eastern Mediterranean energy flows with global knock-on effects.

The presence of U.S. forces across the region adds another escalation vector. Since October 2023, Iran-aligned militias have mounted well over a hundred rocket and drone attacks on U.S. positions in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, prompting periodic U.S. retaliatory strikes and heightened alerts; militia leaders have threatened renewed attacks if the U.S. escalates. These dynamics create persistent risk of miscalculation or direct U.S.–Iran confrontation.

Finally, prolonged instability opens space for jihadist remnants to regenerate. Analyses in early-to-mid-2025 report rising ISIS/IS-KP activity and sustained insurgent attacks in Syria’s east, a pattern that historically worsens when state and international focus are diverted to interstate crises.

**Implication.** Preventing any “nuclear threshold” crossing is a global imperative. A durable Gaza ceasefire meaningfully lowers escalation pressures, creates diplomatic bandwidth to address Iran’s nuclear file, and should help de-escalate Red Sea attacks (a linkage regional analysts explicitly note). This window should be used to revive practical non-proliferation steps—including renewed IAEA access and region-wide confidence-building—while re-energizing the long-standing UN process toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear and other WMD.

([defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4227082/historically-successful-strike-on-iranian-nuclear-site-was-15-years-in-the-maki), [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4240876/defense-agency-contributed-toward-operation-midnight-hammer-success), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-b-2-bombers-bunker-busters-alternatives-2025-06-18), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-generals-introductory-statement-to-the-board-of-governors-9-june-2025), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-25.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-arabia-us-pathway-civil-nuclear-agreement-us-energy-secretary-says-2025-04-13), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/under-trump-saudi-civil-nuclear-talks-delinked-israel-recognition-sources-say-2025-05-08), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/why-does-saudi-arabia-want-civil-nuclear-deal-with-us-2025-05-08), [sipri.org](https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/nuclear-risks-grow-new-arms-race-looms-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ship-risk-sinking-after-first-houthi-red-sea-attack-this-year-2025-07-07), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-suez-canal-monthly-revenue-losses-around-800-million-sisi-says-2025-03-17), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/suez-canal-revenue-drops-some-shippers-shun-red-sea-2024-07-18), [imo.org](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/red-sea.aspx), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/07/21/port-eilat-israel-houthi-shutdown-shipping-trade), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-launches-retaliatory-strikes-iraq-syria-nearly-40-reported-killed-2024-02-03), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-strikes-targets-iraq-after-us-forces-wounded-officials-2024-01-23), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-not-expecting-surge-attacks-troops-iraq-syria-defense-secretary-says-2024-07-31), [icct.nl](https://icct.nl/publication/threat-isis-fragmentated-syria), [euaa.europa.eu](https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2025-03/2025_03_EUAA_COI_Report_Syria_Country_Focus.pdf), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthi-shipping-attacks-patterns-and-expectations-2025), [disarmament.unoda.org](https://disarmament.unoda.org/topics/conference-on-a-mezf-of-nwandowomd), [businessinsider.com](https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-crown-prince-iran-gets-nuke-we-get-one-mbs-2023-9))

## **Humanitarian Crisis and Refugee Impact**

The humanitarian toll in Gaza is system-wide. As of early August 2025, UN assessments and satellite analyses indicate that roughly 78% of all structures have been damaged or destroyed, nearly 92% of school buildings have been hit or damaged, and cropland damage has reached 86%, leaving only ~1.5% of fields accessible and undamaged. Humanitarian agencies report that about 1.9 million people—close to 90% of the population—have been displaced at least once, often multiple times, with hundreds of thousands still in makeshift or temporary settings. UN officials have repeatedly described conditions as “apocalyptic” and warned that no place is “safe” for civilians in the Strip.

Acute food insecurity has crossed emergency thresholds. The IPC’s July 2025 alert reports that famine-level food consumption thresholds (IPC Phase 5) have already been exceeded across most areas, with extreme hunger doubling between May and July and malnutrition rising rapidly. Health risks are compounding: poliovirus was detected in 2024 wastewater, a paralytic case was confirmed, and mass vaccination campaigns—most recently in February 2025—are ongoing to protect over half a million children amid collapsing WASH and health systems. OCHA also reports surges in meningitis and other conditions linked to overcrowded shelters and medicine shortages.

Children bear a disproportionate burden. UNICEF reported in May 2025 that more than 50,000 children had reportedly been killed or injured since October 2023. Education has been gutted: UNICEF and the Education Cluster estimate around 658,000 school-age children have been out of formal schooling for nearly two years, with ~90–95% of education facilities damaged or destroyed, and only a fraction of temporary learning spaces still functioning under displacement orders. Agencies warn that virtually every child needs mental-health and psychosocial support.

Regional spillovers are real. Egypt and Jordan have declared mass displacement across borders a “red line,” citing grave security and stability concerns. Nonetheless, Reuters and other reporting indicate that on the order of 100,000 Gazans have entered Egypt since late 2023 (largely patients, caregivers, dual nationals and family members), while Cairo continues to resist any wider population transfer and warns of security risks in Sinai. In the West Bank, months of military operations and violence have driven significant internal displacement, heightening Jordan’s anxieties about forced population movements. European governments, recalling the 2015 Syria crisis, have likewise warned that wider regional instability could generate renewed migration pressures toward the EU.

**Implication.** There is a broad humanitarian consensus—from the UN Secretary-General, OCHA, WHO, UNICEF and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee—that an immediate, sustained cessation of hostilities and large-scale humanitarian access are essential to prevent further mass starvation, disease and civilian harm. A ceasefire that enables a surge of assistance, protected aid corridors, and rapid rehabilitation of water, health and education systems is not only a moral imperative; it is central to regional stability and to reducing cross-border displacement pressures.

([ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-311-gaza-strip), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/Gaza_Reported_Impact_Snapshot_25_June_2025.pdf), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/statement-gaza-martin-griffiths-under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-emergency-relief-coordinator), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-177-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem), [unrwa.org](https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-181-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem), [ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_GazaStrip_Alert_July2025.pdf), [ipcinfo.org](https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/alerts-archive/issue-97/en), [who.int](https://www.who.int/news/item/19-02-2025-mass-polio-vaccination-campaign-to-continue-in-the-gaza-strip), [unicef.org](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/unimaginable-horrors-more-50000-children-reportedly-killed-or-injured-gaza-strip), [unicef.org](https://www.unicef.org/media/172691/file/State-of-Palestine-Humanitarian-SitRep-No-40%2C-30-June-2025.pdf.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordans-king-abdullah-displacement-palestinians-would-be-war-crime-2023-10-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/egypt-rejects-any-displacement-palestinians-into-sinai-says-sisi-2023-10-18), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-embassy-seeks-temporary-status-gazans-who-entered-egypt-during-war-2024-05-02), [crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/egypt-israelpalestine/b91-egypts-gaza-dilemmas), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/northern-west-bank-humanitarian-response-update-21-january-30-april-2025), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-becoming-a-graveyard-for-children-warns-un-secretary-general-calling-for-humanitarian-ceasefire-press-release), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/statement-by-iasc-01nov24))

## **Global Economic Stability and Energy Security**

The Gaza war’s direct economic footprint was more localized than Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but it still carried meaningful global risks—chiefly through energy markets and maritime trade. Red Sea attacks forced widespread rerouting around Africa, slashing Suez Canal transits (UNCTAD estimates mid-2024 Suez tonnage down ~70% with Gulf of Aden crossings down ~76%) and raising freight, fuel, and insurance costs; Egypt later assessed 2024 Suez revenue losses at roughly $7 billion (over 60% year-over-year).

Energy security risks were real even when realized price moves were episodic. The Strait of Hormuz still carries about one-fifth of global oil flows, so any Israel-Iran escalation that threatened transit would have had outsized effects. In practice, prices spiked on flashpoints—e.g., Brent to ~$92 after Iran–Israel strikes in April 2024, and +7% on June 13, 2025 amid Israel–Iran exchanges—before easing as fears receded. The World Bank’s commodity outlook has warned that a large Middle East supply disruption could push oil toward $140–$157/bbl—an upside scenario that would materially threaten global growth.

Regional investment sentiment and cross-border projects also wavered. Saudi-Israel normalization—seen as a gateway to large bilateral deals and regional integration—was put “on ice” after October 7, with Washington-Riyadh diplomacy later recast around preconditions tied to Gaza. That recalibration dampened near-term market expectations for some joint ventures linked to normalization.

Tourism, a major earner for several Middle Eastern economies, saw uneven impacts. Israel’s inbound tourism collapsed in 2024. Jordan and parts of Egypt reported softness tied to the war and Red Sea insecurity, while Gulf hubs (e.g., Dubai) proved comparatively resilient with record or near-record visitor spending.

Energy project execution proved sensitive to security. Israel ordered the Tamar gas field shut in October 2023 (resumed November), illustrating how hostilities can interrupt Eastern Mediterranean supply. Subsequent policy steps included approval to expand Leviathan and (in 2025) a major new export deal to Egypt—developments that underscore the upside for regional energy integration if security stabilizes.

**Implication.** De-escalation in Gaza lowers the geopolitical risk premium embedded in oil and shipping, helping keep global inflation and recession risks in check. It would also aid the normalization of Suez traffic and reduce war-risk insurance costs for Red Sea routes, while creating conditions for tourism recovery and for advancing energy connectivity projects (e.g., Eastern Mediterranean gas). IMF and UNCTAD assessments link conflict spillovers and Red Sea disruptions to weaker MENA growth; a durable ceasefire and humanitarian access are thus not only moral imperatives but core to macro-stability.

([unctad.org](https://unctad.org/publication/review-maritime-transport-2024), [unctad.org](https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osginf2024d2_en.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/regional-challenges-cost-egypt-around-7-bln-suez-canal-revenues-2024-sisi-says-2024-12-26), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-suez-canal-monthly-revenue-losses-around-800-million-sisi-says-2025-03-17), [openknowledge.worldbank.org](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/27189ca2-d947-4ca2-8e3f-a36b3b5bf4ba/content), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/10/26/commodity-markets-outlook-october-2023-press-release), [eia.gov](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/oil-seen-opening-up-after-irans-attack-israel-further-gains-may-depend-response-2024-04-14), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/china/oil-prices-jump-more-than-4-after-israel-strikes-iran-2025-06-13), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-puts-israel-deal-ice-amid-war-engages-with-iran-sources-say-2023-10-13), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R48162), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordans-tourism-industry-struggling-gaza-war-deters-visitors-2024-11-09), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/egypt-sees-tourism-numbers-picking-up-despite-shadow-gaza-war-2024-03-07), [wttc.org](https://wttc.org/news/international-traveller-spend-uae-to-reach-a-record-aed-228bn), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/israel-shuts-down-offshore-tamar-gas-field-output-2023-10-09), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/chevron-says-resumes-supplying-customers-tamar-natgas-gas-field-2023-11-13), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/israel-approves-extra-gas-exports-leviathan-field-be-expanded-2024-06-26), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/imf-revises-down-mideast-growth-outlook-war-trade-disruptions-2024-04-18), [unctad.org](https://unctad.org/news/suez-and-panama-canal-disruptions-threaten-global-trade-and-development), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-822401), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-811183), [travelandtourworld.com](https://www.travelandtourworld.com/news/article/tourism-in-israel-plummets-by-90-amid-gaza-conflict), [roadgenius.com](https://roadgenius.com/statistics/tourism/israel))

## **Erosion of International Law Norms**

The war in and around Gaza has stress-tested core rules of war—distinction, proportionality, precautions, and the absolute prohibitions on hostage-taking, human shields, and starvation of civilians. These are black-letter norms under customary international humanitarian law (IHL) and the Rome Statute. In short: parties must distinguish civilians from combatants and civilian objects from military targets; hostages and human shields are prohibited; and starvation of civilians is a war crime.

Grave violations have been credibly alleged on all sides. Human Rights Watch found that Hamas-led groups’ October 7 attack was designed to kill civilians and take hostages—constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity—and it has repeatedly urged the immediate release of all hostages, a position the International Committee of the Red Cross has publicly reinforced as a matter of law and ongoing humanitarian access.

Israeli military operations have also drawn detailed legal scrutiny. The UN Human Rights Office assessed emblematic IDF strikes that “raise serious concerns” under IHL; the UN’s Commission of Inquiry has found that Israeli forces committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza; and the UN rights office has repeatedly warned that escalatory strikes heighten risks of further IHL violations. Separately, in the case brought by South Africa, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered provisional measures requiring Israel to prevent acts prohibited by the Genocide Convention, enable humanitarian assistance, and—on 24 May 2024—halt military actions in Rafah that could inflict conditions of life capable of bringing about the physical destruction of Palestinians in Gaza in whole or in part. These measures do not prejudge the merits but underscore the Court’s view of a real and imminent risk to protected rights.

Accountability tracks have advanced in parallel. On 20 May 2024 the ICC Prosecutor announced applications for arrest warrants for senior figures from both Hamas and Israel; on 21 November 2024, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for Israel’s prime minister and defense minister, among others. These steps—whatever states’ political reactions—signal that individual criminal responsibility for atrocities is being actively pursued in international fora.

At the political level, uneven Security Council action has sharpened perceptions of double standards. After months of vetoes, the Council adopted Resolution 2728 on 25 March 2024 demanding an immediate ceasefire during Ramadan that leads to a lasting ceasefire and the release of all hostages; yet subsequent ceasefire texts again failed amid great-power divisions. UN briefers have warned explicitly that the “erosion of the rules of war” in Gaza demands urgent correction.

Rhetoric has compounded the legal harm. UN officials have cautioned against dehumanizing language and the conflation of civilians with combatants—practices that corrode protections and can abet violations. Importantly, even where a party alleges the other’s use of “human shields,” IHL is clear: such illegality never lifts the attacker’s duties of distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions toward civilians.

**Implication.** A sustainable peace must include visible recommitment to IHL and credible accountability. Alongside the ICC process and the existing UN Commission of Inquiry, Member States could establish a neutral evidence-preservation and case-building mechanism modeled on the UN’s IIIM for Syria (UNGA Res. 71/248) and the IIMM for Myanmar (HRC Res. 39/2)—tools designed to depoliticize justice, safeguard proof, and support prosecutions in competent courts. Done well, Gaza could catalyze stronger global enforcement against atrocities—by state or non-state actors—rather than accelerate the slide toward “might makes right.”

([ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v2/rule1), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule53), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v2/rule96), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/icc-statute-1998/article-8), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/17/october-7-crimes-against-humanity-war-crimes-hamas-led-groups), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/07/17/i-cant-erase-all-blood-my-mind/palestinian-armed-groups-october-7-assault-israel), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/document/FAQ-icrc-work-hostages-gaza), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/article/public-statements-icrc-regarding-hostages-held-gaza), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/06/un-report-israeli-use-heavy-bombs-gaza-raises-serious-concerns-under-laws), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/un-commission-finds-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity-israeli-attacks), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/escalation-of-attacks-in-gaza-ohchr-19may25), [icj-cij.org](https://www.icj-cij.org/case/192), [icj-cij.org](https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204091), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/icj-provisional-measures-24may24), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state), [icc-cpiint](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-res-2728.php), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-01/in-hindsight-the-security-council-in-2024-and-looking-ahead-to-2025.php), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15641.doc.htm), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/usg-ocha-briefing-security-council-16jul25), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/11/un-human-rights-chief-condemns-rise-hatred), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/gaza-strip-states-are-obliged-prevent-crimes-against-humanity-and-genocide), [guide-humanitarian-law.org](https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/human-shields), [blogs.icrc.org](https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2021/11/16/human-shields-ihl), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/71/248), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/res/39/2), [iiim.unorg](https://iiim.un.org/who-we-are/founding-documents), [iimm.un.org](https://iimm.un.org/en/mandate-and-establishment))

## “Global South” vs “West” Divide

Gaza has become a litmus test of the “rules-based order” for many outside the transatlantic camp. Leading policy institutes note that accusations of Western double standards—supporting law and civilian protection in some theaters but not in Gaza—have surged across the Global South and are reshaping views of Western credibility.

Voting patterns at the UN reinforced this perception. The UN General Assembly called for a humanitarian truce on 27 October 2023 by **120–14–45**, and again demanded an immediate humanitarian ceasefire on 12 December 2023 by **153–10–23**—overwhelming majorities largely driven by countries outside the West (with most EU members also backing the latter text).

Public opinion trends in the Arab and wider Muslim worlds have been especially stark. The Arab Opinion Index reports **94%** of respondents rated the U.S. position on the Gaza war negatively, with similarly negative views toward several major European states; analysts also find that the war has sharply constrained domestic support for normalization with Israel absent meaningful movement on Palestinian statehood.

Security services and the UN system warn that such grievances are being exploited by violent extremists. Official UN reporting to the Security Council notes that ISIL/Da’esh and affiliates have sought to **use the Gaza/Israel conflict to incite attacks** and to amplify propaganda—an added reason to reduce the conflict’s temperature and address its drivers.

**Implication.** A fair, enforceable Gaza ceasefire and political pathway would narrow a damaging credibility gap: it would signal to skeptical publics that universal norms apply consistently, undercut extremist narratives that thrive on claims of Western hypocrisy, and rebuild trust needed for cooperation on shared global challenges from climate to pandemics. That is the thrust of the UN Secretary-General’s calls to reduce polarization and restore confidence in multilateral problem-solving—precisely the kind of unifying dividend this roadmap seeks to deliver.

([securityconference.org](https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-brief/standard-deviation/main), [chathamhouse.org](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/will-war-gaza-become-breaking-point-rules-based-international-order), [chathamhouse.org](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/russia-using-soviet-playbook-global-south-challenge-west-and-it-working), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/un-resolution-vote-israel-hamas-gaza-truce-7eec00b0e28ef2036636b166b48ca030), [pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/un-general-assembly-votes-to-demand-a-humanitarian-cease-fire-in-gaza-u-s-opposes-resolution), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2023/ga12572.doc.htm), [unric.org](https://unric.org/en/eu-overwhelmingly-votes-at-un-for-humanitarian-ceasefire-in-gaza), [arabindex.dohainstitute.org](https://arabindex.dohainstitute.org/EN/Pages/APOIsWarOnGaza.aspx), [arabbarometer.org](https://www.arabbarometer.org/media-news/press-release-foreign-affairs-article-how-arab-public-opinion-constrains-normalization-with-israel), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/PV.9701), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga12579.doc.htm), [un.org](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2024-02-07/secretary-generals-remarks-the-general-assembly-priorities-for-2024))

## **Moral and Civilizational Stakes**

The conflict resonates far beyond politics because it implicates how diverse communities coexist. The Holy Land is sacred to the three Abrahamic faiths—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism—whose adherents together account for roughly half of humanity, underscoring why violence there tears at a shared moral fabric.

Since October 2023, international authorities and monitors have documented sharp rises in both antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred. The UN Secretary-General and the UN human rights chief warned early on of surging antisemitism and Islamophobia worldwide; subsequent European and national reporting recorded unprecedented spikes (e.g., large increases across EU member states; record or near-record levels reported in the UK by CST and Tell MAMA). In the United States, official FBI statistics show hate-crime totals near record highs in 2024, while civil-society tracking recorded historic levels of antisemitic incidents after 7 October. These patterns jeopardize social cohesion far from the battlefield.

Online discourse has amplified the harm. Independent research finds surges of antisemitic and anti-Muslim hate on social platforms in the wake of the 7 October attacks, while the UN system flags hate speech as a recognized early-warning sign for atrocity risks. Decades of social-psychology research show that dehumanizing language reliably predicts support for aggression and makes violence easier to justify—another reason de-escalation and responsible rhetoric matter.

Allowing the war to be cast as a civilizational or religious clash is both inaccurate and dangerous. UN Alliance of Civilizations leaders explicitly urge pushing back on “clash of civilizations” frames; a better path emphasizes universal values—compassion, justice, reconciliation—shared across faiths. That spirit is embodied in the **Document on Human Fraternity** (co-signed by the Holy See and Al-Azhar) and its follow-on Higher Committee, both aimed at practical interfaith cooperation.

Faith leadership has been consistent through the papal transition in 2025. **Pope Francis** repeatedly appealed for a ceasefire, protection of civilians, release of hostages and unhindered aid—including at Easter 2025 and after a January 2025 ceasefire step—while **Pope Leo XIV** has continued those appeals in 2025, urging an end to hunger in Gaza and the freeing of hostages.

**Implication.** A fair, enforceable Gaza ceasefire and rights-respecting political track would lower global temperatures, blunt extremist recruitment narratives, and help restore trust among communities at home and abroad. Framing the outcome around universal human dignity—rather than zero-sum civilizational tropes—offers a credible bridge for healing among Jewish, Muslim, and Christian communities and strengthens the wider rules-based order this roadmap seeks to unify.

([pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2025/06/09/how-the-global-religious-landscape-changed-from-2010-to-2020), [pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/04/05/the-changing-global-religious-landscape), [fbi.gov](https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-2024-reported-crimes-in-the-nation-statistics), [justice.gov](https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/hate-crime-statistics), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/119/meeting/house/118469/documents/HHRG-119-ED00-20250715-SD005.pdf), [axios.com](https://www.axios.com/2025/04/22/adl-survey-antisemitc-incidents-record-level-2024), [tellmamauk.org](https://tellmamauk.org/tell-mama-records-the-highest-number-of-anti-muslim-hate-cases-in-2024-since-its-founding), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/un-chief-says-there-is-disturbing-rise-anti-muslim-bigotry-2025-03-15), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a79319-global-threats-freedom-expression-arising-conflict-gaza-report), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/freedom-expression-global-crisis-says-un-expert), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sgsm22284.doc.htm), [journals.sagepub.com](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4), [pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5559031), [unaoc.org](https://www.unaoc.org/2025/06/remarks-4th-international-day-for-countering-hate-speech), [vatican.va](https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/travels/2019/outside/documents/papa-francesco_20190204_documento-fratellanza-umana.html), [forhumanfraternity.org](https://www.forhumanfraternity.org), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/20/in-brief-easter-appearance-at-vatican-pope-francis-urges-gaza-ceasefire), [vaticannews.va](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2025-01/pope-francis-makes-appeal-sunday-angelus-19-january-2025.html), [vaticannews.va](https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2025-08/pope-stop-violence-ukraine-hunger-in-gaza-may-hostages-be-freed.html))

**In sum**Taken together, these threads point to a rare alignment of global incentives for de-escalation in Gaza. A ceasefire that sticks would (1) reduce the risk of a wider Middle East war and renewed nuclear-proliferation peril, as flagged by the IAEA; (2) avert mounting famine and disease risks documented by the IPC and WHO; (3) stabilize shipping and energy markets rattled by Red Sea disruptions and oil-price tail risks highlighted by UNCTAD and the World Bank; (4) reinforce international law amid active ICJ and ICC processes; and (5) narrow a damaging trust gap exposed by UN General Assembly voting patterns and public opinion across the Arab world.  
  
Because the dividends are shared, a broad coalition is positioned to support an enforceable settlement and a humanitarian-reconstruction surge: the EU and key partners now publicly back an immediate ceasefire tied to hostages’ release and expanded aid; major economies and shippers want restored Suez traffic and lower war-risk premia; and regional actors—including Saudi Arabia—continue to link normalization and deeper regional integration to credible movement on the Palestinian track. That convergence makes a durable equilibrium possible—and worth organizing for.

# **Why This Roadmap Can Succeed – Toward a Nash Equilibrium Peace**

**Thesis.** The plan is designed so that, given everyone else follows it, each pivotal actor (Israel, Hamas/Palestinian armed factions, the PA/technocratic administrators, Egypt–Jordan–Qatar mediators, key Arab partners, the U.S./E3, and Iran-aligned actors) is better off complying than defecting. In game-theory terms, it aims for a **self-enforcing (Nash) equilibrium** by: (1) locking in *credible benefits* for compliance; (2) making *defection detectible and costly* through automated, third-party verification and snapback-style penalties; and (3) lengthening the *shadow of the future* via phased, reversible steps that build trust through payoffs early and often.

**1) The moment is “ripe”: high costs, rising risks, and a clear “way out”**

* **Mutually hurting stalemate (MHS).** Classic conflict research finds settlements become possible when parties face a jointly painful stalemate and can see a way out. The present war context exhibits both conditions: costs mount sharply while a phased ceasefire/hostage exchange already has an operational blueprint.
* **Costs to Israel keep rising** (fiscal + force posture). Israel’s central bank now projects a **~5% of GDP deficit in 2025** with public debt ~70–71% as war and regional escalation costs accumulate; the government has also announced a major **defense-spending uplift (≈9% of GDP baseline)** to replenish stocks and meet multi-front risks. These are long-run drags that make a *sustained* ceasefire plus hostage returns rational.
* **Costs to Palestinians are catastrophic** (humanitarian + economic). Gaza’s economy **contracted ≈83% in 2024**; damage and needs assessments by the World Bank/UN show devastation of infrastructure, while UN appeals remain only partially funded. Water/sanitation systems are heavily degraded, sustaining crisis conditions—strong incentives for a monitored truce that re-opens lifelines.
* **Escalation risk is newly vivid.** The June 2025 **U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear/military sites**, and the IAEA’s warning about **>400 kg of 60% enriched uranium** inside Iran, showed how a Gaza-centric conflict can pull in nuclear-scale dangers—raising *everyone’s* expected costs of continued war.
* **A feasible “way out” already exists.** The **U.S.–Qatar–Egypt** track for a **time-bound, phased truce with sequenced hostage/prisoner exchanges and staged IDF redeployments** provides an immediately usable scaffold the roadmap can adopt and harden.

**2) Mechanism design: verification and enforcement that change best-responses**

The roadmap operationalizes three enforcement pillars so that **defection is dominated**:

**A. Transparent, rapid verification (“truth layer”)**

**Open EO + neutral observers.** Pair **UNTSO-style unarmed observers** (proven in the region) with **UNOSAT/partnered open satellite dashboards** that publish weekly ceasefire-line and aid-access verifications. This sharply reduces information asymmetries and makes violations quickly observable to all principals and guarantors.

**B. Automatic, proportional penalties (“snapback” logic)**

Embed **pre-agreed, automatic “snapback” steps** for *any* verified breach: e.g., immediate micro-pauses of specific corridors; conditional re-deployment to prior lines; escrowed funds frozen, then released only when metrics normalize. The model uses robust snapback architecture—fast, hard to veto, and legible.

**C. Repeated-game payoffs (“long shadow” incentives)**

**Phasing + divisible payoffs** (hostages ↔ detainees, crossings ↔ verified calm, energy/water modules ↔ de-escalation days) keep both sides inside the game. The existing **60-day truce sequence** already defines early, visible wins; we add explicit *metric-gated* steps to regularize them.

Together, these features convert “first-strike” temptations into **dominated strategies**: cheating yields small, quick penalties and reputational loss; cooperation yields recurring, bankable gains.

**3) Incentive compatibility by actor (why compliance is each side’s best reply)**

* **Israel.** Compliance secures staged **hostage returns**, reduces **northern front** exposure as deconfliction routines scale, re-opens pathways to **regional normalization/economic relief**, and tempers budget stress from prolonged high-tempo operations. Non-compliance risks renewed multi-front escalation and deeper **fiscal/force** burdens, with partners tying broader regional tracks to quiet in Gaza.
* **Hamas/Palestinian armed factions.** Compliance yields **survival + prisoner releases + humanitarian throughput** under international monitoring; deviation re-triggers border closure, targeted sanctions, and worsening attrition under open-EO scrutiny. Hamas’ own engagement with **phased hostage releases** signals that structured truce payoffs are valued.
* **PA/technocratic Gaza administration.** Compliance unlocks **financing/technical lifts** and legitimacy via transparent dashboards and third-party vetting; deviation risks donors freezing flows per automatic triggers.
* **Arab guarantors (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar; plus Saudi/UAE as funders).** Compliance stabilizes borders and enables **sequenced reconstruction**; deviation risks spillover and reputational hits. **Saudi diplomacy** continues to link any deeper regional integration to quiet in Gaza and political steps—another incentive to sustain the truce.
* **U.S./E3.** Compliance reduces **regional war/nuclear** risk and validates a **snapback-style** enforcement precedent; deviation forces costly crisis management and splits allied diplomacy.
* **Iran-aligned actors.** Compliance reduces exposure to **renewed strikes** and impending **snapback**; deviation invites exactly those outcomes under a watching IAEA and mobilized E3.

**4) How the roadmap’s instruments map to equilibrium constraints**

* **Detection constraint (make cheating observable).** UNTSO observers + **UNOSAT** building-level damage/route status dashboards provide *near-real-time detectability* of ceasefire and aid violations; scientific teams are already publishing scalable SAR-based damage monitors.
* **Punishment constraint (make cheating costly).** **Pre-codified, automatic, proportionate penalties**—raise the expected cost of unilateral deviation above any short-term gain.
* **Incentive (participation) constraint.** Early-phase, **divisible payoffs** (hostages, detainees, corridor throughputs, WASH modules) deliver tangible near-term gains to all principals, encouraging entry and continued play. **World Bank/UN** damage and fiscal data explain why these near-term gains are now prized.
* **Time-consistency/commitment.** Guarantees are *delegated to mechanisms*, not political promises: observer reports, satellite audits, escrow releases, and quantifiable KPIs. That is how durable settlements mitigate classic **credible-commitment** failures found in the literature and why **peacekeeping/observer** deployments measurably reduce relapse.

5) Metrics that keep the equilibrium on track (and visible)

1. **Hostage & detainee flow:** # returned/released per phase vs. timetable.
2. **Ceasefire integrity:** # of verified violations per week (observer + EO concordance).
3. **Humanitarian throughput:** daily trucks/tonnage; **WASH** functionality recovery; acute malnutrition admissions trend.
4. **Economic stabilization:** Gaza reconstruction milestones; Israeli fiscal/defense outlays trending down as truce holds.
5. **Regional de-escalation:** zero major cross-border escalations; sustained nuclear compliance verified (IAEA access).

**Bottom line**

Because this roadmap **changes incentives at the edge**—making cooperation *more rewarding and more certain*, and defection *more visible and more costly*—it aligns with both the empirical peacebuilding record and core game-theory logic. The result is a **self-enforcing equilibrium**: not a leap of faith, but a mechanism-anchored peace where each party’s **best reply is to stay in**.

([nap.nationalacademies.org](https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/9897/chapter/7), [beyondintractability.org](https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness), [boi.org.il](https://www.boi.org.il/en/communication-and-publications/press-releases/research-department-staff-forecast-july-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-raise-defence-spending-meet-security-challenges-2025-07-17), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/18/new-report-assesses-damages-losses-and-needs-in-gaza-and-the-west-bank), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/04/02/joint-world-bank-un-report-assesses-damage-to-gaza-s-infrastructure), [ftsunoha.orgc](https://fts.unocha.org/countries/171/summary/2025), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/assistance-to-the-palestinian-people-report-of-the-secretary-general-a-80-86-e-2025-71), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-under-missile-attack-iran-says-all-options-open-after-us-strikes-2025-06-22), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-b-2-bombers-bunker-busters-alternatives-2025-06-18), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general-grossis-statement-to-unsc-on-situation-in-iran-20-june-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-backed-60-day-gaza-ceasefire-envisages-gradual-return-hostages-official-says-2025-07-03), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/untso), [untso.unmissions.org](https://untso.unmissions.org/mandate), [unosat.org](https://unosat.org/products/4165), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/how-un-sanctions-iran-could-be-restored-2025-04-10), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-raise-defence-spending-meet-security-challenges-2025-07-17), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-envoy-israel-saudi-normalisation-needs-gaza-quiet-discussion-palestinian-rule-2024-05-21), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-agrees-release-10-hostages-part-gaza-ceasefire-talks-says-negotiations-are-2025-07-09), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabias-current-priority-is-reaching-permanent-gaza-ceasefire-foreign-2025-07-04), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-on-developments-in-iran-5), [nature.com](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-025-02183-7), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background), [columbia.edu](https://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISQ%20offprint.PDF))

**Why Previous Attempts Failed — and How This Roadmap Closes the Loopholes**

**Brief diagnosis of failure modes.**

1. **Constructive ambiguity became destructive.** Oslo’s interimism left core issues (Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, security architecture) under-specified. Competing readings stalled implementation and eroded trust.
2. **Weak guarantees; easy to spoil.** With no robust, third-party enforcement or automatic penalties, spoilers—inside and outside the process—could upend progress (e.g., terror attacks, the Rabin assassination) and extract concessions by force of veto. Classic research shows that where **credible commitments** and **security guarantees** are absent, negotiated settlements fail; spoilers thrive.
3. **Bilateralism without true multilateral buy-in.** Oslo relied heavily on U.S. mediation and side understandings, without a standing, multilateral mechanism empowered to verify, enforce, and finance compliance over time. Comparative evidence shows that **unarmed monitors/peacekeepers** and third-party guarantees sharply reduce conflict relapse—features Oslo never institutionalized.
4. **Ceasefires as tactical pauses.** In Gaza, short truces were transactional (hostages ↔ detainees; pauses for aid) and **decoupled from a political track**, making breakdowns likely once immediate gains were banked. Contemporary ceasefire scholarship confirms that pauses without a linked political process and verification are fragile.

**How this roadmap is different (and durable)**

1. **Clarity over ambiguity.**The plan **specifies milestones, metrics, and timelines** across security, political, humanitarian, and justice tracks. Where Oslo tolerated constructive ambiguity, this design pins down *who does what by when*, with data-verified KPIs (crossing throughput, incident counts, release schedules). That closes the interpretive “grey zones” that previously enabled delay.
2. **Enforcement by design, not by promise.**We replace ad hoc diplomacy with **automatic, proportionate “snapback-style” responses** to verified breaches (e.g., escrow holds, corridor throttles, reset to prior lines).  
   *See Annex 1.A for the k-of-n rule and actor-specific payoff flips.*
3. **3) Verification that changes incentives.**A **UNTSO-style observer layer** paired with **open EO dashboards (UNOSAT/partners)** creates near-real-time, shared facts on ceasefire integrity and aid access—shrinking information asymmetries and making violations publicly costly. Empirically, such **monitoring/peacekeeping** measurably extends peace duration.
4. **Parallel, linked tracks to avoid single-point vetoes.**Rather than waiting for “the last brick,” the roadmap runs **parallel, interlocked processes** so that movement on one track (e.g., humanitarian/WASH recovery) conditions and nudges progress on others (e.g., detainees, security deconfliction). Negotiation research on **issue linkage / 3-D setup** and **multitrack peacemaking** supports this architecture to expand the ZOPA and reduce stall risk.
5. **A reversible trusteeship toolkit for disputes.**Where jurisdictional control is uniquely contentious (e.g., sensitive borders or crossings), the plan can deploy **time-bound, reversible trusteeship/special administration** with clear hand-back criteria—drawing on precedents like **UNMIK** (Kosovo) and **UNTAET** (East Timor) that temporarily exercised administrative functions to stabilize transitions. This provides a *credible interim authority* without predetermining final status.
6. **From tactical pauses to a strategic glidepath.**Every short-term payoff (hostage returns, detainee releases, corridor openings) is **embedded in a sequenced political pathway** with metric-gated steps and third-party verification—answering the core critique that Gaza truces have been ends in themselves rather than on-ramps to a settlement.

**Bottom line**

Previous efforts faltered on **ambiguity, unenforced promises, and siloed sequencing**. This roadmap **locks clarity to verification**, **ties payoffs to automatic enforcement**, and **runs linked tracks with reversible governance options**. It is thus **incentive-compatible**: each actor’s best reply is to comply because cooperation yields recurring, bankable gains while defection is swiftly observed and penalized. That is how a moral imperative becomes a **rational, self-enforcing peace**.

([brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-ambiguity-is-destructive), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-peace-process-killed-the-two-state-solution), [pestuge.iliauni.edu.ge](https://pestuge.iliauni.edu.ge/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Barbara-Walter-Committing-to-Peace.pdf), [files.ethz.ch](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/123283/1997_Spoiler_Problems_in_Peace_Processes.pdf), [columbia.edu](https://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/WP%20interstate%20pk%20offprint.pdf), [hdcentre.org](https://hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/HD-OF-2024-Pause-for-thought-contemporary-ceasefire-politics.pdf), [tandfonline.com](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13533312.2021.1894934), [css.ethz.ch](https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse252-EN.pdf), [gov.uk](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/iran-nuclear-letter-from-e3-foreign-ministers-august-2025/iran-nuclear-letter-from-e3-foreign-ministers-8-august-2025), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/iran-france-germany-uk-iaea-nuclear-weapons-dd9c8dbc65b13e1d85ff66fd157fee3e), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-lawmaker-says-reimposition-un-sanctions-will-lead-npt-withdrawal-2025-08-13), [hbr.org](https://hbr.org/2003/11/3-d-negotiation-playing-the-whole-game), [beyondintractability.org](https://www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/lax-3d), [hdcentre.org](https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Beyond-the-Tracks-Reflections-on-Multitrack-Approaches-to-Peace-Processes.pdf), [mpil.de](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/mpunyb_stahn_5.pdf), [watermark02.silverchair.com](https://watermark02.silverchair.com/ehh103.pdf), [pestuge.iliauni.edu.ge](https://pestuge.iliauni.edu.ge/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Barbara-Walter-Committing-to-Peace.pdf))

# **Unified Peace Roadmap & Negotiating Position**

## Jerusalem — Special ‘Infinite-State City’

A demilitarized Holy Basin with shared functional competences, guaranteed holy-site access under existing custodianship, integrated professional policing, an independent Verification Mission with public dashboards, and a ring-fenced Jerusalem Peace Endowment whose funds are unlocked only when access, safety, and service metrics are met. The arrangement is strictly without prejudice to final-status claims outside the Zone, and it is built on recognized doctrines of multi-level governance, subsidiarity, and treaty enforceability. **Purpose and scope**

This statute sets a legally workable, diplomatically neutral special‑status regime for Jerusalem that serves as a bridge into the ASI framework. It preserves the existing custodianship and prayer arrangements at holy sites, modernizes the city’s governance through functional (shared) competences, and confines detailed machinery to ASI Annexes. This statute establishes the ends; the means—competence allocation, interoperability, verification and remedies—are specified in the Unified Governance Wheel: Axis of Sovereign Interoperability (ASI).

([worldjpn.net](https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/docs/19471129.O1E.html), [avalon.law.yale.edu](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/res181.asp), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/il20jo941026peacetreatyisraeljordan.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-ben-gvir-says-he-prayed-al-aqsa-mosque-compound-2025-08-03), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0SK1GM), [palquest.org](https://www.palquest.org/en/historictext/23300/jordanian-palestinian-agreement-holy-sites-jerusalem), [palestine-studies.org](https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1657152), [ecf.org.il](https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/1362), [cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu](https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/sharing_sovereignty_new_institutions_for_collapsed_and_failing_states), [repository.law.umich.edu](https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi), [ohr.int](https://www.ohr.int/brcko-supervision), [ohr.int](https://www.ohr.int/dayton-peace-agreement/annex-4), [treaties.un.org](https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf), [eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT), [eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do))

**Legal and diplomatic foundations**

* **Internationalized-city lineage.** UNGA 181 articulated a **corpus separatum**—a special international regime for Jerusalem under UN trusteeship—creating a lawful tradition for non-exclusive administration of a uniquely sensitive city. Our proposal modernizes this tradition without re-litigating 1947 boundaries.
* **Custodianship & status quo.** Article 9 of the Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty recognizes Jordan’s special role in Muslim holy shrines and commits the Parties to freedom of access; the long‑standing status‑quo arrangements at Haram al‑Sharif/Temple Mount are preserved under Waqf administration and Israeli assurance of access to the Western Wall.
* **City-level shared governance models.** City‑level neutrality model: the Brčko District, supervised under the Dayton framework, demonstrates neutral, demilitarized, function‑specific administration with international oversight.
* **Geographic clarity.** We adopt the “**Historic/Holy Basin**” concept (Old City and immediate environs) as the special zone—an approach widely studied in planning literature—while deferring exact cadastral lines to a technical annex formed later with all parties involved.
* **Anchors:** Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty **Article 9** (access + Jordan’s special role); **2013 Jordan–PLO custodianship**; **ICCPR Art. 18** (freedom of religion; narrow safety limits only).

([securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A%20RES%20181%20%28II%29.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-179122), [tandfonline.com](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02665433.2012.646772), [jerusaleminstituteorg.il](https://jerusaleminstitute.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/PUB_basin_eng.pdf), [ohr.int](https://www.ohr.int/brcko-supervision), [ohr.int](https://www.ohr.int/is-brcko-district-a-condominium-an-entity-or-a-municipality), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-government-abdullah-ii-benjamin-netanyahu-jordan-31f05732e58002152a14730239d0fb02), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/21/far-right-minister-itamar-ben-gvir-says-israel-in-charge-on-visit-to-jerusalem-holy-site), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/data-collection/general-assembly), [religionmediacentre.org.uk](https://religionmediacentre.org.uk/news/explainer-jerusalems-holy-flashpoint), [ajc.org](https://www.ajc.org/news/what-to-know-about-jerusalems-temple-mount-and-the-status-quo-agreement), [2009-2017.state.gov](https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eur/693.htm), [openjerusalem.org](https://www.openjerusalem.org/ark%3A/58142/1R1HT), [avalon.law.yale.edu](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/jordan_treaty.asp), [content.ecf.org.il](https://content.ecf.org.il/files/M00950_JordanPLOJerusalem2013English.pdf), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights))

**What the modeling tells negotiators**

Our research assessed governance, access, security, recognition, and financing variables. Treating Jerusalem as a shared, special-status city **raised the modeled probability that Jerusalem’s status supports durable peace in the region by ~10 percentage points** relative to traditional zero-sum sovereignty contests. Highest-impact levers: **dual national recognition** of the special regime; **global guarantees with verifiable enforcement**; **integrated professional policing**; **unfettered holy-site access under strengthened custodianship**; and **reliable, rules-based funding**.

([columbia.edu](https://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISQ%20offprint.PDF), [jstor.org](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1j13z61), [poliscipit.edut](https://www.polisci.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/MattesSavun.InformationAgreementDesign.pdf), [police.un.org](https://police.un.org/en/strategic-guidance-framework-international-policing), [police.un.org](https://police.un.org/en/list-of-policy-documents), [papers.ssrn.com](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46259), [documents1.worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/175771468198561613/pdf/multi-page.pdf), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/trust-funds-and-programs), [openknowledge.worldbankorg](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/f454edcb-e1aa-5a0c-90e7-9390ceada477/content), [papers.ssrn.com](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm), [oxfordre.com](https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-551))

**The statute—concise operational outline**

**A. Zone & status**

* The **Holy Basin** is designated a **demilitarized, functionally administered** special zone. Neither party exercises *exclusive* sovereignty therein; instead, competences are allocated by **domain** (heritage, access, policing, municipal services, taxation), supervised by a Joint Board and an independent Verification Mission.

**B. Holy places & access**

* **Custodianship**: The Jordanian Waqf (with church custodians) continues day-to-day site administration; Israel guarantees secure access to the Western Wall; the **status quo** on prayer at Haram al-Sharif is maintained. Crisis procedures and incident review are codified.

**C. Security & justice (inside the zone)**

* **Unified City Protection Unit**: mixed composition under a neutral commander; unarmed crowd managers + armed quick-reaction policing; body-worn cameras; independent incident review.
* **Weapons-light rules** and **no uncoordinated raids** within the zone; hot pursuit hands off at marked interfaces to avoid sovereignty flashpoints.
* **City Statute Court**: mixed bench with international assessors for statute disputes; religious jurisdictions remain for intra-faith personal-status matters.
* Verification Mission protocols, response proportionality scoring, and graduated remedies are governed by **ASI Annex III (VCLT arts. 26 & 60)**.

**D. Services, economy & funding**

* **Joint Municipal Services**: water, waste, transport, zoning delivered by a Joint Authority with audited procurement.
* **Jerusalem Peace Endowment (JPE)**: ring-fenced, performance-linked fund backed by diversified donors; disbursements tied to verified compliance (access uptime, incident severity, service continuity, trust indices).

([legal.un.org](https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf), [jusmundi.com](https://jusmundi.com/en/document/treaty/en-vienna-convention-on-the-law-of-treaties-1969-vienna-convention-on-the-law-of-treaties-friday-23rd-may-1969), [jstor.org](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137587), [fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com](https://fsi9-prod.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/enhanced_sov_krasner_Aug_1_04.pdf), [dppa.un.org](https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/un-verification-mission-colombia), [colombia.unmissions.org](https://colombia.unmissions.org/en/mandate), [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed), [gov.il](https://www.gov.il/en/pages/israel-jordan-peace-treaty), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14869.doc.htm), [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-international-religious-freedom/israel-and-the-occupied-territories), [inss.org.il](https://www.inss.org.il/strategic_assessment/temple-mount), [police.un.org](https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/sgf-manual-mbpp_july.pdf), [resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net](https://resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net/%24web/Policy%20and%20Guidance/corepeacekeepingguidance/Thematic%20Operational%20Activities/Police%20and%20Law%20Enforcement/2024.14%20Formed%20Police%20Units%20in%20United%20Nations%20Peace%20Operations.pdf), [digitallibrary.un.org](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/161764)**,** [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-use-force-and-firearms-law-enforcement), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/LLW_Guidance.pdf), [jstor.org](https://www.jstor.org/stable/44504775), [bja.ojp.gov](https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/ariel_the-effect-of-police-body-worn-cameras-on-use.pdf), [pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6535014), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-head-chairs-1st-tripartite-meeting-2021-laf-and-idf-officials), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/tripartite-meeting-%E2%80%9Cblue-line-stability-should-not-be-taken-granted%E2%80%9D), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unifils-top-official-discusses-challenges-and-opportunities-along-blue-line-tripartite-meeting), [ustavnisud.ba](https://www.ustavnisud.ba/en/organization), [venice.coe.int](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx), [ohr.int](https://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/laws-of-bih/pdf/002%20-%20Statute%20of%20the%20Brcko%20District%20of%20Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina/BDBH%20Statute/BD%20Statute%20of%20the%20Brcko%20District%20of%20Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%203-07.pdf), [uscirf.gov](https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2023-09/2023%20Personal%20Status%20and%20Family%20Laws%20in%20MENA.pdf), [versa.cardozo.yu.edu](https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/topics/rabbinical-courts), [elcjhl.org](https://elcjhl.org/uploads/media/Study%20on%20Personal%20Status%20Laws%20in%20Palestine-%20Judge%20Damiri.pdf), [treaties.un.org](https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf))

**Safeguards, red lines, and today’s context**

* **Non-derogation clause**: Nothing here prejudices final-status claims outside the zone.
* **Settlement restraint**: Parties acknowledge that settlement expansion around East Jerusalem **fragments contiguity** and undermines the regime’s feasibility; parties therefore commit to restraint consistent with international law and the regime’s integrity. Recent UN human-rights findings underscored the legal risks of expansion plans linking West Bank settlements to East Jerusalem.

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-rights-office-says-israeli-settlement-plan-breaks-international-law-2025-08-15), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-smotrich-launches-settlement-plan-bury-idea-palestinian-state-2025-08-14), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185434), [aijac.org.au](https://aijac.org.au/resource/international-law-and-the-arab-israel-conflict), [legal-tools.org](https://legal-tools.org/doc/o3ubfl/pdf), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-high-representative-israel%E2%80%99s-e1-west-bank-settlement-plan_en), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/t%C3%BCrkiye/statement-high-representative-e1-settlement-plan_en), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5873-israeli-settlements-occupied-palestinian-territory-including), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ocha-humanitarian-situation-update-305-west-bank), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/report-israeli-settlements-occupied-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem-reporting-period-january_en), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eus-kallas-says-israeli-settlement-plan-breaches-international-law-2025-08-14))

**Sequencing (how to launch)**

1. **Dual letters of recognition** by Israel and Palestine acknowledging the special regime and renouncing unilateral changes in the zone.
2. **Jerusalem Stewardship Compact** by guarantors under a UN umbrella (monitoring, dispute boards, snap-back).
3. **Deploy Verification Mission**; stand-up Joint Municipal Services and the Protection Unit.
4. **Capitalization of JPE**; publish compliance dashboards for transparency and public trust.

This statute establishes the ends; the means—competence allocation, interoperability, verification and remedies—are specified in the Unified Governance Wheel: Axis of Sovereign Interoperability (ASI) that follows.

### Unified Governance Wheel

**Purpose and scope**

This section codifies the **Unified Governance Wheel**—a seven-sphere architecture anchored by the **Unified State** at the center and radiating across: **Local, Global, System, Galactic, Universal, Multiversal, Infinite**. It establishes an interoperable legal and diplomatic framework to coordinate competences across spheres while preserving each sphere’s integrity under recognized public-international-law principles (multi-level governance, subsidiarity, shared/functional sovereignty, treaty enforceability).

([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT), [garymarks.web.unc.edu](https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13018/2016/09/hooghe.marks_.unravelingcentralstate.apsr_.2003.pdf), [garymarks.web.unc.edu](https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13018/2020/10/2020_hooghe-marks-schakel_multilevel-governance_reduced-size-Caramani.pdf), [50shadesoffederalism.com](https://50shadesoffederalism.com/theory/condominiums-shared-sovereignty), [unmik.unmissions.org](https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/regulations/02english/E1999regs/RE1999_01.htm), [mj.gov.tl](https://mj.gov.tl/jornal/lawsTL/UNTAET-Law/Regulations%20English/Reg1999-01.pdf), [mpil.de](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/mpunyb_stahn_5.pdf), [trans-lex.org](https://www.trans-lex.org/500600/_/vienna-convention-on-the-law-of-treaties-of-1969))

**Legal foundations and precedents**

* **Multi-level governance & subsidiarity.** Authority may be dispersed **upwards, downwards, and sideways** across levels; action should be taken at the **lowest effective level** (subsidiarity), with higher levels acting only where objectives cannot be achieved below. These doctrines support a wheel in which each sphere exercises defined functions with coordinated oversight.
* **Shared/functional sovereignty.** International practice recognizes arrangements where sovereignty is **jointly exercised or functionally allocated** to stabilize contested spaces (e.g., shared sovereignty proposals; international **condominia**). Such tools inform ASI’s “interoperability” clauses.
* **Internationalized/special-status cities.** Historic models (e.g., **Jerusalem’s corpus separatum** concept under UNGA 181) demonstrate lawful **special regimes** for cities of global significance—useful precedent for an Infinite-State City within this wheel.
* **Treaty performance and snap-back.** Parties are bound to perform in good faith (**pacta sunt servanda**); material breach permits **suspension/termination** under Article 60 VCLT—the legal basis for ASI compliance and remedies.
* **Special districts as governance bridges.** The **Brčko District** exemplifies a neutral, demilitarized, nationally supervised entity used to defuse sovereignty disputes—an institutional analogue for shared city/zone management under ASI.

([garymarks.web.unc.edu](https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/13018/2016/09/hooghe.marks-contrasting-visions-of-multilevel-governance.pdf), [sciencespo.fr](https://www.sciencespo.fr/centre-etudes-europeennes/sites/sciencespo.fr.centre-etudes-europeennes/files/n3_2002_final.pdf), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A%20RES%20181%20%28II%29.pdf), [legal.unorg](https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/sv/document/EPRS_BRI%282023%29751410), [ohr.int](https://www.ohr.int/brcko-supervision), [refworld.org](https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/usdos/2000/en/25567))

**Structural design: the seven spheres**

| **Sphere** | **Core competences (non-exhaustive)** |
| --- | --- |
| **Local** | **Municipal services; community policing; cultural-heritage ops; local mediation** |
| **Global** | **Cross-border mobility; trade, climate & health coordination; donor compacts** |
| **System** | **Shared infrastructure standards (energy, water, data); inter-agency protocols** |
| **Galactic** | **Long-horizon research/space-heritage norms (symbolic; risk & resilience)** |
| **Universal** | **Interfaith/civilizational access principles; heritage of humankind safeguards** |
| **Multiversal** | **Ethics/AI alignment fora; cross-civilizational dialogue charters** |
| **Infinite** | **Foundational moral covenant (sanctity of life, dignity, and access to the sacred)** |

Competences are allocated by subsidiarity across seven concentric spheres—Local, Global, System, Galactic, Universal, Multiversal, Infinite—coordinated at the Unified State hub. Local authorities deliver municipal services, democratic/community policing, and cultural-heritage operations per UN-Habitat and UNESCO practice. Global flows (mobility, trade, climate, health) observe ICAO, WTO, Paris Agreement and IHR baselines with financing via multi-donor trust funds and AHLC-style donor compacts. System-level interoperability uses ITU/IETF technical standards and transboundary resource treaties, with OCHA/IASC cluster protocols for inter-agency coordination. Galactic norms (symbolic/practical) rely on Artemis Accords’ space-heritage commitments, the One Small Step Act, and UN COPUOS debris/LTS guidelines. Universal principles protect heritage of humankind through the World Heritage Convention and the 1954 Hague regime. Multiversal ethics are framed by UNESCO’s AI Recommendation, the OECD AI Principles, and the Council of Europe’s binding AI Convention, alongside UNAOC for cross-civilizational dialogue. The Infinite sphere articulates the foundational moral covenant of dignity, sanctity of life and access to the sacred anchored in the UDHR, ICCPR Article 18, and the UNESCO constitutional commitment to build the defenses of peace in the minds of humanity.

*Note:* Allocation follows **subsidiarity** (act locally where effective; escalate only as necessary) and **Type I/2 multi-level governance** (general-purpose tiers plus task-specific, overlapping jurisdictions).

([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT), [unhabitat.org](https://unhabitat.org/international-guidelines-on-decentralization-and-access-to-basic-services-for-all), [unhabitat.org](https://unhabitat.org/international-guidelines-on-urban-and-territorial-planning), [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/3/23804.pdf), [whc.unesco.org](https://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/190976), [refworld.org](https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/icao/1944/en/16932), [wto.org](https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/agrmntseries1_wto_e.pdf), [unfccc.int](https://unfccc.int/most-requested/key-aspects-of-the-paris-agreement), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/paris-agreement), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/trust-funds-and-programs/programsdescription), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/global-public-procurement-multi-donor-trust-fund), [unsco.unmissions.org](https://unsco.unmissions.org/ahlc-socioeconomic-reports), [itu.int](https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Pages/default.aspx), [ietf.org](https://www.ietf.org/process/rfcs), [legal.un.org](https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf), [treaties.un.org](https://treaties.un.org/doc/treaties/1992/03/19920317%2005-46%20am/ch_xxvii_05p.pdf), [unece.org](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/Convention_web.pdf), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/we-coordinate), [emergency.unhcr.org](https://emergency.unhcr.org/coordination-and-communication/cluster-system/cluster-approach), [nasa.gov](https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf), [nasa.gov](https://www.nasa.gov/artemis-accords), [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-oceans-and-international-environmental-and-scientific-affairs/artemis-accords), [congress.gov](https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ275/PLAW-116publ275.pdf), [unoosa.org](https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf), [unoosa.org](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/media/2019-unis-os-518.html), [icomos.es](https://icomos.es/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/document-57-39.pdf), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/UNESCO.pdf), [oecd.org](https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/ai-principles.html), [coe.int](https://www.coe.int/en/web/artificial-intelligence/the-framework-convention-on-artificial-intelligence), [rm.coe.int](https://rm.coe.int/1680afae3c), [theverge.com](https://www.theverge.com/2024/9/5/24236980/us-signs-legally-enforceable-ai-treaty), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/sep/05/uk-signs-first-international-treaty-to-implement-ai-safeguards), [unaoc.org](https://www.unaoc.org), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights), [treaties.un.org](https://treaties.un.org/doc/treaties/1976/03/19760323%2006-17%20am/ch_iv_04.pdf), [unaoc.org](https://www.unaoc.org))

### 

### The ASI (Axis of Sovereign Interoperability)

*See Annex 6 for non-operative reference draft*

**Definition.** ASI is the juridical “spine” that links all spheres, specifying (i) how competences interlock; (ii) how data and decisions flow; (iii) how disputes resolve; and (iv) how compliance is verified and enforced.

**Core instruments (treaty annexes):**

1. **Competence Catalogue.** Matrix assigning each policy domain to a lead sphere with supporting spheres (lex specialis controls conflicts). Grounded in subsidiarity and MLG doctrine.
2. **Interoperability Protocols.** Common standards for data-sharing, incident reporting, joint operations (task-specific “Type II” jurisdictions for security, heritage, and mobility).
3. **Shared/Functional Sovereignty Clauses.** Where territorial title is sensitive (e.g., special precincts), sovereignty is **functionally allocated** (heritage, policing, services) or **shared** under time-bound mandates.
4. **Compliance & Snap-back.** Benchmarks, verification, graduated remedies; legal basis in **VCLT Art. 26 & 60**.

([legislation.gov.uk](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eut/teu/title/I), [cccmcluster.org](https://www.cccmcluster.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/IASC-TransAg4_Cluster_Coordination_reference_module-2012-lang_EN-ref025.pdf), [emergency.unhcr.org](https://emergency.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/IASC%20Guidelines%20Common%20Operational%20Datasets%20%28CODs%29%20in%20Disaster%20Preparedness%20and%20Response.pdf), [emergency.unhcr.org](https://emergency.unhcr.org/coordination-and-communication/information-management/pre-existing-data), [centre.humdata.org](https://centre.humdata.org/the-ocha-data-responsibility-guidelines), [who.int](https://www.who.int/health-topics/international-health-regulations), [iris.who.int](https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/246107/9789241580496-eng.pdf), [legal.un.org](https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf), [academic.oupcom](https://academic.oup.com/oxford-law-pro/book/57893/chapter-abstract/472077860), [eiop.or.at](https://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2001-011.pdf), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/document/interplay-between-IHL-IHRL-article-droege), [brill.com](https://brill.com/view/journals/iclr/27/3/article-p218_3.xml))

**Decision-making & conflict rules**

* **Decision tiers.** Ordinary measures at Local/System; strategic measures elevate to Global/Universal; normative covenants at Infinite.
* **Conflict-of-laws test.** (1) **Lex specialis**; (2) **subsidiarity** feasibility; (3) **least-restrictive** measure to meet common objectives; (4) **escalation** to ASI Joint Board.
* **Joint Board & Secretariat.** Mixed composition (parties + neutral guarantors) mirroring **Brčko-style** supervision authority; empowered to issue binding interim measures.
* **Review & renewal.** Five-year reviews; auto-renew unless terminated per VCLT, with **material breach** pathways clearly defined.

([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT), [casebook.icrc.org](https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/lex-specialis), [papers.ssrn.com](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm), [scup.com](https://www.scup.com/doi/10.18261/ISSN.2387-3299-2020-03-01), [academic.oup.com](https://academic.oup.com/hrlr/article/23/3/ngad010/7187933), [assets.ireland.ie](https://assets.ireland.ie/documents/good-friday-agreement.pdf), [assets.publishingserice.gov.ukv](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/619500728fa8f5037d67b678/The_Belfast_Agreement_An_Agreement_Reached_at_the_Multi-Party_Talks_on_Northern_Ireland.pdf), [constitutionnet.org](https://constitutionnet.org/news/bonn-powers-bosnia-and-herzegovina-between-rock-and-hard-place), [unfccc.int](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf), [newclimate.org](https://newclimate.org/sites/default/files/2018/04/achieving-ambition-paris-designing-global-stocktake.pdf), [legal.un.org](https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf), [repository.law.umich.edu](https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi))

**Application to special-status cities (Jerusalem template)**

* **Legal seat.** ASI recognizes a **special international-regime precinct** consistent with the *corpus separatum* lineage, modernized through functional sovereignty and interoperable policing.
* **Custodianship & access.** Religious custodianship and holy-site **access guarantees** codified in treaty text; oversight through a global guarantor compact. (Precedent logic: internationalized cities and Brčko-style neutrality.)
* **Operational note.** Where daily administration requires neutrality, ASI authorizes a **task-specific joint authority** (Type 2 MLG) with independent inspectorate and binding dispute panels.

([un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-185393), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/1947/11/ARES181.pdf), [unispal.un.org](https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/aac25ar80.pdf), [ohr.int](https://www.ohr.int/supervisory-order-on-urban-planning), [ohr.int](https://www.ohr.int), [police.un.org](https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/2019.34_guidelines_on_specialized_police_teams.pdf), [police.un.org](https://police.un.org/en/guidelines-police-capacity-building-and-development))

**Enforcement, verification, and finance**

* **Verification Mission (VM).** Tech-enabled monitors report to the Joint Board; public dashboards on access, incident-severity, response proportionality, and service continuity (metrics tied to funding).
* **Finance.** Endowment-style trust with **performance-linked disbursements** and automatic **snap-backs** triggered by monitored breaches, consistent with treaty law obligations.

([walterdorn.net](https://walterdorn.net/home/287-technological-innovation-in-the-osce-smm-ukraine), [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/0/261066.pdf), [publicintegrity.org](https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/ukraine-in-crisis/the-past-and-future-of-the-drones-that-monitor-ceasefires-in-ukraine), [igad.int](https://igad.int/ceasefire-and-transitional-security-arrangements-monitoring-and-verification-mechanism-ctsamvm-mission-analysis), [jmecsouthsudan.com](https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/index.php/institutions-and-boards/ctsamm), [usip.org](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/20190829-pw_150-pw.pdf), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15876.doc.htm), [response.reliefweb.int](https://response.reliefweb.int/afghanistan/humanitarian-access-snapshot), [spherestandards.org](https://spherestandards.org/wp-content/uploads/Sphere-Handbook-2018-EN.pdf), [spherestandards.org](https://www.spherestandards.org/wp-content/uploads/sphere-for-monitoring-and-evaluation.pdf), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/program-for-results-financing), [thedocs.worldbank.org](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/bfce45f685b62ca533b1e2991a6ac5b8-0290012023/original/Directive-PforR.pdf), [ieg.worldbankgroup.org](https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/Evaluation/files/program-for-results-full.pdf), [thedocs.worldbank.org](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/b8933059eed89a8eac9404a6d336e3aa-0060072024/original/Annex-2-Guidance-on-Managing-World-Bank-Trust-Funds-for-Results-Final.pdf), [documents.worldbank.org](https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/430871585080837436/afghanistan-incentive-program-development-policy-grant-update-on-disbursements-from-the-afghanistan-reconstruction-trust-fund), [documents1.worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/706601546024081984/txt/afghanistan-incentive-program-development-policy-grant-p164882-update-on-disbursements-from-the-afghanistan-reconstruction-trust-fund-12202018-6368111289.txt), [wb-artf.org](https://www.wb-artf.org/sites/default/files/ARTF2021/2100610%20ARTF%20PFFP%202021-2024.pdf), [kfw-entwicklungsbank.de](https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/PDF/Download-Center/Materialien/2023_Nr.2_Materials-on-Development-Finance.pdf), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_resolution2231-2015.pdf))

**Drafting notes**

**Scope clarifier.** The items below are **Drafting Notes** intended to guide a **future treaty negotiation** (the “ASI Accord”). They are **not operative clauses** of this Memorandum and **create no legal obligations**. If the Parties elect to proceed, negotiators would translate these notes into a **core accord** with **integral annexes** (Competence Catalogue, Interoperability Protocols, Verification & Remedies, Special-Status City Statute), following the drafting and final-clauses practice outlined in the **UN Treaty Handbook** and consistent with **VCLT** principles.

1. **Preamble.** Recite multi-level governance and subsidiarity; recall international precedents for special regimes and shared sovereignty.
2. **Definitions.** “Unified State,” each of the seven spheres, **ASI**, “functional sovereignty,” “task-specific authority.”
3. **Competence Catalogue (Annex I).** Domain-by-domain allocation keyed to spheres.
4. **Interoperability Protocols (Annex II).** Data, operations, incident management; Type I/2 MLG references.
5. **Verification & Remedies (Annex III).** Benchmarks; reporting cadence; **VCLT**-compliant remedies.
6. **Special-Status City Statute (Annex IV).** Functional allocation, custodianship, security, finance; supervision architecture referencing **Brčko** practice.

**Implementation Note (non-operative cross-reference).—** The foregoing defines the **ASI as a normative axis**—a governance compass for interoperability and ethics. Any **optional technical instantiation** of this axis is described in **Annex 6 — ASI Annex (Reference Draft; Non-Operative)**, which sketches a **human-in-the-loop decision-support layer** (summaries, alerts, scenario comparisons) strictly **subordinate to this Memorandum and the Special-Status City Statute**. It **creates no legal obligations**, **does not alter ROE or holy-site status-quo**, and **cannot automate enforcement**.Consistency is required with **ASI Annex II** (interoperability & data protection), **ASI Annex III** (verification & remedies), **ASI** **Annex IV-A** (maps/geofences), and **ASI Annex V** (finance/JPE).

## Phased Implementation

Following the Executive Summary’s milestones, we detail the phased plan with specific steps, mechanisms, and guarantees at each phase.

To operationalize the Non-Annexation & Temporary-Corridor Principle, any de-confliction corridor (e.g., along Netzarim or the Philadelphi axis) will function **only** as a short-term safety and inspection strip under **joint international supervision** (e.g., Egypt–Jordan–UN/EU mission or MFO+), with **published start/end dates, width limits, and dismantlement milestones**, and with **Rafah/Egypt–Gaza flows** restored under updated **EUBAM-Rafah/2005 AMA** modalities.

*(Full corridor mechanics and the dated shrink schedule are in Phase 2 “Codify the Corridor Plan — Philadelphi/Netzarim”)*

## Process Rhythm: **14-Day Alignment Window** + **45-Day Operationalization Track**

### A. 14-Day Alignment Window (D+0 to D+14)

Within fourteen (14) days of the ceasefire start (“D+0”), the Parties and Guarantors will:

1. **Name principals & working groups** (ceasefire/monitoring; hostages & detainees; crossings & customs; humanitarian corridors & deconfliction; reconstruction finance).
2. **Table essential data**: hostage/detainee lists (tiered), humanitarian access needs, **corridor parameters** (start/end points, maximum width, inspection regime), and **monitoring rosters** (UN/MFO/EU-civilian options).
3. **Adopt modalities** to revive **Rafah operations** under **EUBAM-Rafah / AMA** templates, pending final go-live in the Operationalization Track.
4. **Issue a joint communiqué** recording: no-annexation / no-territorial-reduction; temporary, time-bound corridors under international supervision; and the initial hostage-for-detainee sequence with third-party verification.

*This docket sets a normative pace; if clocks slip, the* ***Automatic Slippage Buffer Rule*** *applies (7–15-day margin, symmetric), keeping momentum without collapse (see Phased Implementation C).*

### B. 45-Day Operationalization Track (D+15 to D+60)

From D+15 through D+60 the following targets are executed:

* **Monitors deploy** to designated sites and crossings (UN/MFO/EU civilian mission configurations), publish rules of movement & inspection logs. (UN peace operations routinely require weeks for initial deployments; tailored civilian missions like **EUBAM-Rafah** have historically mobilized within weeks.)
* **Corridor(s) go live** as *strictly temporary* safety/inspection strips with **published width limits**, geofenced endpoints, and inspection schedules; **first shrink step by D+30**; **full dismantlement by D+60** unless all Parties *consent* to a short technical extension.
* **Rafah partial reopening** under EUBAM-Rafah standby: prioritized medical and humanitarian categories first, scaling capacity as procedures stabilize. (EU has moved to **revive/restart** EUBAM-Rafah in recent months, demonstrating feasibility.)
* **Hostage & detainee exchanges (Stage 1 → Stage 2)** proceed on the agreed cadence, tied to verified compliance reports.
* **Humanitarian surge** reaches full tempo by ~D+30 (in line with IASC system-wide scale-up timelines), with deconflicted windows and nutritional therapeutics prioritized to famine-threatened areas.

### C. Automatic Slippage Buffer Rule (keeps momentum without collapse)

Each milestone above carries a **pre-agreed 7–15 day schedule margin**. If a target risks slipping beyond its buffer, the following *automatic* steps occur (no new negotiations required):

1. **Neutral Assessor review** (UN/AU/EU-appointed) issues a 48-hour variance note;
2. **Like-for-like pacing**: reciprocal obligations slow in proportion but do **not** unwind (DPARP mirror);
3. **Humanitarian safeguards**: *ceilings* on aid flows convert to *floors* until compliance is restored;
4. **Escalation ladder** to principals after 7 days beyond buffer.

### D. Legal & Precedent Pointers

* **AMA (2005)** + **Agreed Principles for Rafah** provide ready templates for border governance and third-party presence; **EUBAM-Rafah** launched **within days** of invitations in 2005, showing rapid civilian deployment is practicable.
* Complex verification packages in other files (e.g., **JCPOA**) show that technical tasks often run **30–90 days** from “adoption” to initial “implementation,” validating a **45-day** operationalization target for *initial* steps here.
* African mediation (e.g., **Pretoria/CoHA 2022**) used **30-day** benchmarks for disarmament phases—evidence that tight, time-bound windows are workable when verification is clear.

([peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/israeloptagreeddocumentsonmovementaccessgaza2005.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2005/12/30ead4170169f28d852570d600556b90_AgreementMovementAccess.pdf), [eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/nuclear-agreement-%E2%80%93-jcpoa_en), [ofac.treasury.gov](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20160116), [igad.int](https://igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Download-the-signed-agreement-here.pdf))

**UNSC Routing Hedge — Dual Track Authorization & Guarantees**

1. **Keep a Security Council lane (Chapter VI).** The Parties and Guarantors request a **Chapter 6** resolution **endorsing** the ceasefire/JMVM/escrow framework and **calling upon** the Parties to implement it on the published timelines. Any **P5 abstentions are acceptable**; punitive **Chapter V2** provisions are **not** sought, to avoid a veto duel and to preserve broad cover.
2. **If the Council is blocked → automatic GA route (non-vetoable).** Within **24 hours**, Guarantors request an **Emergency Special Session** of the General Assembly under **Resolution 377A(V) – “Uniting for Peace.”** The GA **recommends** the roadmap, requests Secretariat support to the JMVM, and invites member financing and deployments.
3. Non-UNSC guarantees pre-arranged
   1. **Security monitors (non-UN):** If UN force generation lags or a veto bites, Guarantors **deploy or expand non-UN mechanisms** (e.g., **MFO+** observers along treaty-compatible segments; **EUBAM Rafah** at crossings) until a UN/EU mission can assume or augment.
   2. **Finance & escrow (off-UN):** Donors seat a **World Bank–administered Unified Escrow** (trust-fund model) to channel reconstruction and governance support with **verify-to-unlock** gates aligned to Annex 2.
   3. **Political assurance letter:** A **Co-Guarantors’ Letter** (G7 + EU + key Arab partners) commits security assistance, border-management help, and escrow funding **irrespective** of UNSC dynamics—modelled on recent **G7 security assurances** frameworks.
4. **Procedural shields (to minimize veto friction).** The Council may use **procedural decisions** (agenda, briefers, meeting sequencing) that require **nine votes** and are **not subject to veto**—keeping the file active while Chapter 6 text is built.
5. **No-regrets deployment order.** Regardless of UN chamber outcomes, (i) **JMVM stand-up**, (ii) **EUBAM-style crossing support**, and (iii) **Unified Escrow** are **authorized by the Parties and Guarantors** and proceed on the **14→45 day** cadence; UNSC/GA outcomes **recognize and support** rather than gate these starts.

(See Annex 2 legend for symmetry/timers and humanitarian insulation.)  
  
**Phase 1: Immediate Ceasefire and Humanitarian Relief**

**Objective (Day 0–7).** Silence the guns, flood lifesaving aid, and begin daily, reciprocal hostage–detainee transfers under neutral facilitation—stabilizing conditions for the wider roadmap.

**Rationale & evidence.** Twenty-two months in, UN agencies urge an immediate “aid flood” as acute malnutrition peaks and service collapse accelerates; public pressure for a ceasefire/hostage deal is at record levels in Israel, while Gazans face catastrophic need. The text must be able to latch onto any Egypt/Qatar-mediated 60-day truce package announced at short notice.

**Stakeholders & roles.** Egypt/Qatar/UN co-convene the **Joint Monitoring Mechanism (JMM)** and deconfliction cell. UNTSO-pattern unarmed observers deploy at designated periphery and logistics nodes; liaison rooms are established on both sides of the fence (not inside active command bunkers). ICRC facilitates—without negotiating—every transfer and remains the custodian of neutral transport and remains-return.

**Game-theory analysis.** The phase couples simultaneous, visible gains to both sides (hostages-for-detainees; aid-for-calm) and backs them with verification and proportional snapback. Because each daily batch conditions the next, best-response is cooperation; defection immediately halts dividends and triggers reputational and material costs.

**Jerusalem & special considerations.** The synchronized Day One announcement is read in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Gaza City, and partner capitals—signaling custodianship of holy sites and the city’s bridge role without altering status in Phase 1.

**Verification & metrics (first 72 h).**

– **Aid:** ≥200 trucks/day; hospital fuel allotments published; kitchen outputs tracked.

– **Security:** “No fire, no maneuver” by land/sea/air; hotline replies <5 min; zero new indirect fire.

– **Exchanges:** At least one ICRC-supervised handover/day until all civilians are out; parallel staged detainee releases, with lists pre-verified. (Live counts reflect the current estimate of ~50 remaining hostages, ~20 believed alive, subject to on-day confirmations.)

– **Public comms:** De-escalation pledge: no incitement, no victory parades during Phase 1.

**Tone & narrative.** “For seven days we choose life: hands open at the crossings, mouths fed, families returned. The silence of weapons becomes the first word of peace.”

([ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-311-gaza-strip), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israelis-stage-nationwide-protests-demand-end-gaza-war-release-hostages-2025-08-17), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-accepts-proposed-deal-ceasefire-with-israel-hostage-release-egyptian-2025-08-18), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/untso), [untso.unmissions.org](https://untso.unmissions.org/mandate), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/israel-and-occupied-territories-icrc-calls-agreement-between-parties-enable-humanitarian-action-gaza), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025))

**Humanitarian Temporary Corridor Opening (D+0–D+7).** Simultaneous with the ceasefire, **Egypt and Israel open Kerem Shalom (Karem Abu Salem) and Erez West (Zikim)** for aid convoys, with **Rafah** reactivated as soon as safety conditions allow. A **UN-led Coordination Cell** (OCHA/WFP/WHO/UNICEF) operating across **Al-Arish** and **Kerem Shalom/Zikim** runs a strict slot system and Humanitarian Notification Scheme to avoid chaos and conflict along routes. **≥200 trucks/day** enter within the first 48 hours, **ramping to ≥600/day by Day 7**, carrying food, potable water, medical supplies, **diesel for life-saving services**, and shelter materials. Fuel is explicitly authorized for humanitarian use: **not less than ~70,000 L/day** for emergency WASH functions and **a minimum of 120,000–150,000 L/day** across hospitals, ambulances, water/desalination and logistics until grid power recovers. **Inspections** occur at the crossings by Egyptian/Israeli authorities using non-intrusive screening (incl. X-ray) **under UN oversight** to assure Palestinians the process is humanitarian and not a cover for espionage or sabotage. As a **maritime fallback**, vessels may discharge at **El-Arish (Egypt)** under Egyptian port control, with Israeli forces committing to coordinated **non-interference** and maritime deconfliction. **Security & protection:** no armed actors near convoys; community-led distribution and timed releases reduce crowding; any attack, shooting, or looting triggers a targeted pause and guarantor response—without collective punishment or aid suppression.

([unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-6-19-july-2025), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/delegate/working-logistical-hub-humanitarian-aid-crossing-gaza), [egypt.un.org](https://egypt.un.org/en/287702-un-delegation-al-arish-and-rafah-follow-post-ceasefire-aid-preparations-gaza), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turned-back-gaza-aid-shipments-languish-warehouses-roadsides-2025-08-13), [nrc.no](https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/gazas-energy-crisis-threatens-lives-and-humanitarian-response/2025-energy-assessment-for-gaza_norcap-report.pdf), [govextra.gov.il](https://govextra.gov.il/cogat/humanitarian-efforts/main/archive), [defense.gov](https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3778051/aid-will-soon-flow-to-palestinians-in-gaza-via-dod-temporary-pier))

**Civilians relocate to safe areas (D+0–D+7).** During Phase 1, parties establish **Designated Humanitarian Zones (DHZs)** and **Safe-Movement Corridors** by reciprocal written undertakings under **Geneva Convention IV Arts. 14–15**. DHZs are **demilitarized**: no armed presence, no weapons stores, no firing from or into the zones; coordinates and signage are published through the **Humanitarian Notification Scheme** and mirrored by the Joint Monitoring Mechanism (JMM). To build trust and reduce panic, Israel commits to **time-bound air-quiet windows and no ISR/UAS overflight directly above DHZs**, logged in the HNS; Palestinian factions commit to **no military presence or activity** in DHZs. UN teams (OCHA/WFP/WHO/UNICEF) designate **pre-assessed open sites** for concentrated services (food, WASH, primary care, protection), avoiding historically contested compounds; **marked corridors** with timed releases allow families to travel from shelters to homes (or vice versa) with **community-led waypoints** for the elderly, children, and persons with disabilities. Any violation—armed presence, firing near a DHZ, or overflight during quiet windows—triggers an incident review and proportionate remedies without collective punishment.

([ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-14/commentary/1958), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-15), [guide-humanitarian-law.org](https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/deconfliction-humanitarian-identification-and-notification), [casebook.icrc.org](https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/syria-deconfliction-humanitarian-facilities), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/sites/default/files/Gaza_Humanitarian_Access_Snapshot-May_2024_0.pdf), [amnesty.org](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/11/israel-opt-nowhere-safe-in-gaza-unlawful-israeli-strikes-illustrate-callous-disregard-for-palestinian-lives), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/17/israeli-military-preparing-to-expel-gaza-city-residents-as-baby-in-tent-among-those-killed-in-latest-attacks))

**Hostage and prisoner exchanges (D+0–D+7).** Within **24–48 hours** of the ceasefire, the parties commence **ICRC-facilitated** handovers at **Kerem Shalom** or **Erez West (Zikim)** (with **Al-Arish** as a medical/logistics fallback). The **first priority batch: medically urgent cases; in parallel, dignified repatriation of remains proceeds where applicable**; in parallel, Israel releasesIsrael releases **Palestinian women, minors, and other detainees not convicted of grave offenses**, under ICRC custody at designated transfer points in the **West Bank or Egypt**. Exchanges continue **daily** to build momentum, with **forensic identification and dignified repatriation of remains** proceeding alongside live releases. The **ICRC** does **not negotiate** but ensures **neutral custody, medical triage, family contact**, and **safe onward travel** for every transfer. Exchange **ratios are not fixed**; they are calibrated by the Joint Board to sustain cadence and public confidence, drawing on precedent (including **third-country supervised residence** where necessary for high-risk convicts). By **Day 7**, the aim is to complete releases of **all surviving civilian hostages** (or certify medical/operational continuation into Phase 2) and conclude the corresponding detainee releases—**a visible signal that the war is ending in deeds, not words**.

([icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/document/FAQ-icrc-work-hostages-gaza), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/israel-and-occupied-territories-icrc-calls-agreement-between-parties-enable-humanitarian-action-gaza), [newyorker.com](https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-the-west-bank/the-israel-hamas-prisoner-swap), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/what-we-know-about-gaza-hostage-prisoner-exchange-2025-01-18), [haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/2011-10-17/ty-article/syria-qatar-turkey-said-willing-to-take-prisoners-deported-in-shalit-deal/0000017f-db0e-df62-a9ff-dfdfeb910000), [haaretz.com](https://www.haaretz.com/2011-10-19/ty-article/prisoners-deported-under-shalit-deal-arrive-in-turkey-syria-jordan-and-qatar/0000017f-db46-df62-a9ff-dfd7e2730000), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/mothers-gaza-hostages-fear-israeli-offensive-will-endanger-their-sons-2025-08-12), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/gaza-israel-palestinians-hamas-war-878bdc43a5c5fdaecdb1cb4cff92d2fd), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-next-24-these-are-the-remaining-hostages-presumed-alive-in-gaza), [gov.il](https://www.gov.il/en/pages/hostages-and-missing-persons-report), [addameer.ps](https://addameer.ps/statistics/2025/08))

**Initial International Monitoring Mission (IMM) deployed (D+2–D+7).** By reciprocal consent (and/or UNSC mandate) and a signed **Status-of-Mission Agreement**, an **unarmed observer advance team** (~100) deploys to Gaza to monitor the ceasefire and enable humanitarian operations. Entry is via **Kerem Shalom** and **Erez West (Zikim)** (with **Al-Arish** as a rear logistics base; **Rafah** activated once safe). The team comprises **UN-standard military observers and civilian specialists** seconded from a **diverse group of states** (including Arab League, EU, AU, NATO and BRICS member states) under a **single UN chain-of-command**. They establish liaison desks at the crossings by **D+2**, then field patrols by **D+3** to **Gaza City**, **Khan Younis**, and the crossing perimeters. Operating in marked vehicles with high-visibility vests, they: verify “no fire / no maneuver” compliance; log incidents through the **JMM/Humanitarian Notification Scheme**; check adherence to **air-quiet windows** over humanitarian zones; and publish **daily impartial reports**. The vanguard’s presence has a stabilizing effect and **prepares the ground for a larger Phase-2 mission** (potentially a hybrid with regional troop support for perimeter security while monitors remain unarmed).

([peacekeeping.unorg](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping), [resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net](https://resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net/training-files/Training%20Materials/003%20CPTM-EN/003-034%20Lesson%201.4%20Legal%20Framework%20for%20United%20Nations%20Peacekeeping.pdf), [resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net](https://resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net/%24web/Policy%20and%20Guidance/corepeacekeepingguidance/Thematic%20Operational%20Activities/Military/2016.25%20Guidelines%20on%20UN%20Military%20Observers%20in%20Peacekeeping%20Operations.pdf), [untso.unmissions.org](https://untso.unmissions.org/facts-and-figures), [unocha.org](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-20-july-2-august-2025))

**Enforcement of the ceasefire (Annex III: Verification, Incident Management & Remedies).** The **ceasefire matrix** is activated on Day One. **All parties agree** that **single, stray violations** are treated as **localized** and do **not** collapse the truce. A **Joint Incident Assessment Commission (JIAC)** under the **Joint Monitoring Mechanism (JMM)** secures the scene, logs evidence, and issues a same-day finding using a **“reasonable grounds”** standard. Findings draw on **layered evidence** (monitor observations, crater/trajectory analysis, UAV/camera feeds, acoustic/radar data, open-source), with full **chain-of-custody**.

**Remedies ladder.**

**Level 1 – Localized incident:** public incident note; **internal arrests/discipline** by the side of origin; **removal of implicated unit/commander** where appropriate; **ex gratia compensation/repair** when civilians are harmed; monitors verify completion.

**Level 2 – Pattern alert:** if thresholds are crossed (e.g., repeated origin or command-linked incidents within 24–48h), guarantors notify a **time-bound corrective plan** and may **pause or condition** Phase-2 benefits until verified compliance resumes.

**Level 3 – Major breach:** for any **mass-casualty** or systematic violation, guarantors convene **within hours** to decide **targeted, reversible measures** proportionate to the breach, preserving humanitarian operations and the overall ceasefire.

**Reporting & transparency.** The JMM publishes **daily SITREPs** (counts, locations, remedies taken) and **weekly trends** (hotspots, compliance rates), mirroring proven OSCE practice that deters escalation through visibility and routine, not rhetoric.

**Why this works.** Field evidence shows ceasefires last longer when **violations are managed, verified, and met with clear, proportionate consequences**, not automatic collapse; and when monitors pair **human investigation with technology** to build confidence in attribution.

([static1.squarespace.com](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/645417eccab89a77aae9c71c/t/6614112d7cd32e6b39dd8569/1712591149521/Key+Concepts_+Ceasefire+Verification+and+Monitoring+.pdf), [unidir.org](https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNIDIR-Exploring_Use_Technology_Remote_Ceasefire_Monitoring_Verification.pdf), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-and-guidelines-right-remedy-and-reparation), [gppi.net](https://gppi.net/assets/Presence-without-Power_Lessons-from-the-OSCE-SMM.pdf), [peacemaker.unorg](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2022/11/ceasefire-guidance-2022-0.pdf), [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/337881), [rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com](https://rc-services-assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Ceasefire_monitoring_Developments_and_complexities.pdf))

**Humanitarian needs assessment and rapid repairs (D+0–D+7).** As soon as **UNMAS** clears priority routes and sites through **Explosive Hazard Assessments**, inter-agency teams launch a **Rapid Needs Assessment** anchored to the **World Bank–UN–EU IRDNA** playbook and **UNOSAT** damage mapping. Engineers and WASH specialists focus on **hospitals, desalination and pumping stations, trunk water lines (Mekorot), and electricity feeders/substations**, using standardized checklists and live uploads to the Joint Monitoring Mechanism dashboard.

**Quick-impact power & water.** Under JMM escort, **repair crews** (with equipment from Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye and others) begin **make-safe and patch repairs** by D+3. Early wins prioritize **critical loads**: hospitals, primary care, **WASH plants**, and telecom hubs. Where feeders are intact, segments are **re-energized**; elsewhere, **mobile generators** and **secured daily diesel** provide continuity while the **Gaza Power Plant** undergoes access, safety and parts work to **prepare for phased resumption** (a Phase-2 deliverable). In water, teams repair **Mekorot line breaks**, restart **desalination units** where power/fuel permit, **chlorinate** trucked water, and publish daily production/quality metrics.

**Public-health protection.** **WHO-led epidemiology cells** stand up **syndromic surveillance** in shelters and clinics (acute watery diarrhea/cholera, measles, polio, meningitis, COVID-like illness) with **lab referral** where available. **Vaccine operations** resume on a rolling basis—building on 2025 **polio nOPV2** rounds—and integrate with **WASH** and **nutrition** screenings, given documented **malnutrition-related mortality**.

**Outputs by Day 7.** A **sector-tagged asset list** (assessed vs. serviceable), **priority repair map**, and **fuel ledger** for hospitals/WASH are published; **initial feeder segments** and **water systems** are back online where feasible, delivering visible improvements (lights at critical sites, safe water at taps/trucks)—small but confidence-building steps for communities.

([ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-16-29-march-2025), [thedocs.worldbank.org](https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/133c3304e29086819c1119fe8e85366b-0280012025/original/Gaza-RDNA-final-med.pdf), [unosat.org](https://unosat.org/products/4130), [nrc.no](https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/gazas-energy-crisis-threatens-lives-and-humanitarian-response/2025-energy-assessment-for-gaza_norcap-report.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/un-ocha-humanitarian-assistance-plan-for-gaza-considerations-for-the-delivery-of-humanitarian-aid-during-a-ceasefire-in-gaza), [who.int](https://www.who.int/news/item/28-02-2025-humanitarian-access-improves-quality-of-polio-vaccination-campaign-in-the-gaza-strip), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/WHO-PHSA-oPt-260225.pdf), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-309-gaza-strip), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-300-gaza-strip))

**Media and communications (D+0–D+7).** To protect the ceasefire, all parties adopt a **Ceasefire Communications Code** grounded in **ICCPR** standards: free expression is respected (Art. 19), while **any advocacy that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is prohibited** (Art. 20(2)), assessed using the **Rabat Threshold Test**. Accordingly, **official channels** on each side cease **dehumanizing or collective-blame rhetoric**, avoid glorifying violence, and commit to **prompt corrections** when false claims circulate. A **Joint Information Center (JIC)** under the monitoring mission issues **twice-daily factual bulletins** and runs **rumor-tracking/RCCE** with trusted civic, health, faith and community messengers. Major online platforms are **formally requested**—consistent with their own hate/violence policies and, where applicable, the **EU Digital Services Act**—to implement **temporary, neutral measures** for the ceasefire period: elevate authoritative updates about corridors and exchanges; de-amplify content that violates hate/violence rules; add friction and labels for unverified or manipulated content; and publish transparency notes on actions taken. The shared narrative: **“This pause is our chance for peace.”**

([ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/one-pager-incitement-hatred-rabat-threshold-test), [resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net](https://resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net/%24web/Policy%20and%20Guidance/corepeacekeepingguidance/Thematic%20Operational%20Activities/Public%20Information%20and%20Strategic%20Communications/Policy%20on%20Strategic%20Communications%20in%20Peace%20Operations%20%282024%29.pdf), [digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-enforcement))  
  
The corridor(s) (if any) will be **notified** to Egypt, the UN, and guarantors; **maximum width** and **exact endpoints** will be published; **civilian passage and humanitarian flows** will be deconflicted. Within **D+7**, third-party monitors deploy; **D+30**: first shrink step; **D+60**: full dismantlement unless renewed by **consensus**.

**End-state of Phase 1 (by Day 7).** Monitors are on the ground and publishing daily impartial reports; **security incidents are rare and handled locally** under the ceasefire matrix; and **life-saving aid is verifiably flowing**, with gate counts ramping toward the **≥600-trucks/day** benchmark and fuel ledgers stabilizing hospitals and WASH. **ICRC-facilitated exchanges** have moved in daily waves—returning people to families and repatriating remains with dignity—sustaining public confidence. The atmosphere shifts from despair to **cautious, evidence-based optimism**: families sleep under quieter skies, clinics and water points stay on, and rumor-control messaging favors facts over fear. This **verified Phase 1 success** builds the trust capital to enter Phase 2.  
  
Milestones follow the **14-Day Alignment Window (D+0–D+14)  
  
Initial releases comply with Annex 7; proof-of-life and medical triage deadlines are binding; humanitarian unlocks are automatic.**

## **Phase 2: Consolidating the Truce and Security Agreements**

**Execution proceeds under the 45-Day Operationalization Track (D+15–D+60), including monitored corridor shrinkage and EUBAM-Rafah/AMA modalities.  
  
(Week 2 – Month 1)**

**Key actions:** formalize a long-term ceasefire accord; deploy the principal international monitoring/peace-support mission; implement security measures (monitoring, time-bound, internationally supervised, dismantled on schedule buffer zones, arms-control and anti-smuggling); launch structured political talks; and scale humanitarian-to-reconstruction operations.  
  
*(Oversight Council adopts k-of-n rule; publishes KPI thresholds (θ₍d₎) and challenge windows per Annex 1.A.)*

**Istanbul (or Geneva) Peace Conference — Opening Session (Week 2).** Co-convened by the **United Nations** and **Türkiye**, with a **Steering Committee** representing cross-bloc guarantors (U.S., EU, Egypt, Qatar, and at least one of **China/Russia/India**), the conference opens in **Week 2** at **Istanbul or Geneva** (with an agreed fallback venue to preserve neutrality if objections arise). All key actors are seated at a round table — **Israel** (officials and military advisors), a **joint Palestinian delegation** (PA leadership and Gazan civil society; Gaza’s de-facto leadership consulted via Qatar to avoid protocol deadlocks), the **UN Secretary-General**, **U.S. Secretary of State**, **Russian Foreign Minister**, **Chinese special envoy**, **Arab foreign ministers** (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar), and the **EU High Representative**. At the opening, participants **ceremonially adopt** a document of **Joint Basic Principles** (as set out earlier in this Memorandum), committing to protection of civilians, humanitarian access, non-use of force, and a political horizon.

**Working groups & timelines.** The co-chairs announce five **working groups** — **Security/Ceasefire Implementation; Political/Governance; Humanitarian-Reconstruction; Justice/Prisoners & Missing; Economic/Connectivity** — with **tight, public deadlines**: an initialed **Ceasefire & Security Implementation Agreement by Day 21**, and a **Framework Political Agreement by Day 30**. Outputs are standardized (ToRs, membership lists, daily readouts) to ensure transparency and sustain urgency. This structure follows recognized **mediation guidance** (consent, inclusivity, impartiality) and **ceasefire doctrine** emphasizing early lock-in of verification arrangements to prevent drift.

**Narrative & guardrails.** The co-chairs underline that **delays serve spoilers**; a temporary **non-spoiler code** applies during talks (no incitement, no unilateral annexation/“facts on the ground,” no celebratory militarism), and the Phase-1 **remedies ladder** governs any breaches without collapsing the process. The tone is sober but forward-leaning: **“This pause becomes peace through disciplined work.”**

([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-step-up-diplomatic-push-reinstate-gaza-ceasefire-erdogan-says-2025-03-18), [armscontrol.org](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/joint-comprehensive-plan-action-jcpoa-glance), [unidir.org](https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNIDIR-Lessons-from-the-JCPOA-for-the-ME-WMDFZ-essay-series.pdf), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/un-syria-constitution-talks-russia-geneva-5f34aec8b9c4e6c041a7b3bc994e00ec), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/en/resources/un-guidance-for-mediation), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2022/11/ceasefire-guidance-2022-0.pdf))

**Ceasefire & Security Implementation Agreement (first deliverable).**

Technical teams from **Israel** and the **Palestinian side** (including vetted former security engineers) finalize a detailed package under international mediation, framed by UN mediation guidance and a mission **SOFA/SOMA**.

**1) Permissible security activities (law-enforcement posture).** Israel affirms **no strikes/raids in Gaza** while the agreement holds, consistent with **non-use of force except in self-defence/defence of mandate**. Public order inside Gaza is provided by an **interim civil police service**, not armed factions, operating under **UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force** and **OHCHR less-lethal guidance**; **no weapons presence** in humanitarian facilities or near the borders. Hotlines and joint liaison desks link IDF, the civil police and the international mission.

**2) Monitored security strip & border integrity.** A **mapped, patrolled strip** is established along the Israel–Gaza line (width varies by segment to terrain: ~**300–800 m**). Within it, **no armed personnel or weapons** are permitted, monitored by the mission and liaisoned à la **UNIFIL**. Along the **Gaza–Egypt frontier**, Egypt leads an **anti-smuggling regime** with the mission and **EUBAM Rafah** support under the **2005 Agreement on Movement and Access**.  
  
**Philadelphi / Rafah track.** Israel’s forces **withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor** on a schedule agreed with Egypt and guarantors; **Rafah Crossing re-opens** under an **EUBAM-Rafah standby revival**, nested in an **AMA-update**. Compliance is verified against the **1979 Egypt–Israel Treaty Annex 1** force-disposition parameters and/or an agreed MFO+ addendum.

**3) Heavy weapons control (secure → reduce → remove).** An **Arms Control & Verification Mission (ACVM)** inventories, seals and secures **rockets, mortars, explosives and precursors** in **IATG-compliant armouries** with **tamper-evident seals and joint access logs**. Manufacturing/assembly **tooling is registered and disabled**. Sequenced, **verified destruction** (or **removal out of Gaza**) then proceeds, drawing on **DDR/WAM** standards and precedents from **Northern Ireland (IICD)** and **Colombia (UN-verified FARC handover)** to ensure impartiality and public confidence.

**4) Tunnel demilitarization.** **Cross-border attack tunnels** are detected, mapped and **sealed** under ACVM/mission supervision using **ground-penetrating radar** and **distributed acoustic sensing** where feasible; any remaining **internal cavities** are certified **non-military** or closed. (Analyses warn Gaza’s network is extensive—verification must be tech-enabled and persistent.)

**5) International mission mandate & size.** A **Multinational Truce Assurance Force (MTAF)** (~**5,000** uniformed personnel) deploys under a UN mandate or UN-recognized hybrid arrangement. Contributing states are balanced and mutually acceptable. **Mandate:** protect the mission and civilians; patrol the strip; guard crossings/UN depots; enable ACVM operations; run hotlines/tri-lateral liaison; mentor civil policing. **Rules:** **lightly armed**; **use of force limited to self-defence and defence of mandate**; legal status via **SOFA/SOMA**. (Comparable footprints and tasks exist in **UNIFIL**/**MFO**.)

**6) Timeline & benchmarks.** By **Day 21**, the Agreement is initialed; the **Monitoring Strip map** is published; **ACVM** stands up; **border cells** with Egypt/EU are live. By **Day 30**, **all heavy-weapons sites are inventoried and sealed**, with **initial tranches** moved to neutral armouries; **priority cross-border tunnels sealed** begin. By **Day 60**, scheduled **destruction/removal** of munitions is underway and **border-tech** checks are at scale. By **Day 90**, **MTAF** reaches **full operating capability**, patrols all segments, and **manufacture tooling remains disabled** under verification. Milestones are **publicly reported** (weekly ACVM bulletins; mission SITREPs).

([unrcca.unmissions.org](https://unrcca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/dpa_msu_guidance_english_web.pdf), [digitallibrary.un.org](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/101559), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/firearms.pdf), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/united-nations-human-rights-guidance-less), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate), [docs.unorg](https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/461), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-rafah_en), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/israeloptagreeddocumentsonmovementaccessgaza2005.pdf), [unoda-saferguard.s3.amazonaws.com](https://unoda-saferguard.s3.amazonaws.com/iatg/en/V3_IATG_compiled-compressed.pdf), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/ddr-handbook-2ed-3_2021.pdf), [cain.ulster.ac.uk](https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/decommission/iicdreports.htm), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2017/sc12900.doc.htm), [scitepress.org](https://www.scitepress.org/Papers/2020/88696/88696.pdf), [rand.org](https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2023/11/the-wests-incoherent-critique-of-israels-gaza-strategy.html), [unifil.unmissionsorg](https://unifil.unmissions.org/about), [mfo.org](https://mfo.org/contingents), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/colombias-farc-rebel-weapons-handover-totals-nearly-60-percent-idUSKBN1942SW), [unmc.unmissions.org](https://unmc.unmissions.org/en/un-mission-finalises-extraction-arms-caches-and-laying-down-weapons-farc-ep))

**Signatures, witness endorsements, and deposit.**This Agreement is **signed** by (i) the **Government of Israel** and (ii) the **Palestinian side represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization / State of Palestine**. To avoid any implication of recognition or conferral of status, **Hamas** transmits—through **Qatar** and **Egypt**—a **separate Letter of Commitment to Adhere** to all provisions of this Agreement. That letter is **annexed** hereto and forms an integral compliance instrument for verification and remedies.

**Without-prejudice clause.  
Engagement, signatures, witness endorsements, and annexed commitments are strictly *without prejudice* to the legal status or claims of any party.** The Parties recall that concluding implementation arrangements or commitments **does not affect legal status**, consistent with applicable international law and practice.

**Witnesses/guarantors and deposit.**

The Agreement is **witnessed** by the **United Nations** and **Türkiye** (co-chairs), together with **[U.S., EU, Egypt, Qatar, and one of China/Russia/India]** as **guarantors**. The text, annexes, and Hamas Letter of Commitment are **deposited with the UN Secretary-General** for circulation to all Member States; the Parties request that the **UN Security Council** be invited to **endorse/take note** of the package in support of implementation.

**Notes.**

— The PLO/State of Palestine signature follows the **Oslo-era exchange-of-letters** model, which anchored representation and mutual commitments.

— The separate Hamas letter mirrors the **Geneva Call** model for **non-state armed actors**: binding humanitarian/security commitments **without recognition**.

— If parties ever prefer direct co-signature by de facto actors, use the **Doha-style non-recognition formula** (“which is **not recognized** as a state…”) to preserve legal positions.

([ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/protocol-additional-geneva-conventions-12-august-1949-and), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8742.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-205528), [casebook.icrc.org](https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/geneva-call-and-apcls-deed-commitment-health-care), [state.gov](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf), [legal.un.org](https://legal.un.org/repertory/art102.shtml), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/article/ukraine-russia-and-the-minsk-agreements-a-post-mortem), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_8742.pdf))

**International peacekeeping deployment (late Week 2 → Month 1).** Pursuant to a **United Nations Security Council mandate**—grounded in the principles of **consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate**—a multinational peace-support mission begins phased deployment in **Week 3**. A **Status-of-Forces/Mission Agreement** provides the legal basis for operations. Logistics stage through **El-Arish (Egypt)** and **Ashdod (Israel)**, with entry via **Kerem Shalom** and **Erez/Zikim**; all base sites and approach roads are opened only after **UNMAS explosive-hazard assessments**. Within a month, **thousands of international personnel**—as **UN blue helmets** or, in a hybrid model, under **agreed neutral insignia**—are positioned at **three hubs** (north/Erez sector, central, and south/Rafah). Their tasks: maintain observation along the **monitored strip**, guard crossings and UN depots, enable humanitarian movements, mentor vetted **civil police**, and liaise via 24/7 hotlines. As observation posts fill in, **IDF heavy units pull back from the fence** but remain on the Israeli side as a contingency; with sustained compliance they redeploy to home bases. Contributors are **balanced and mutually acceptable** (e.g., regional forces such as **Egypt/Türkiye** alongside **India/European** contingents), under a **single chain of command** and **light-arms ROE**. To meet tempo, the Council may authorize a **bridging force** (as in **INTERFET → UNTAET** or **EUFOR → MINURCAT**) to deploy rapidly, transitioning to the full UN mission as generation completes. If a UNSC mandate proves impossible, a **host-invited coalition** can deploy with **UNGA “Uniting for Peace”** endorsement as a political backstop, pending Council action.

([peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mandates-and-legal-basis-peacekeeping), [digitallibrary.un.org](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/101559), [unmas.org](https://www.unmas.org/sites/default/files/documents/unmas_eo_threat_facthseet_january_2025.pdf), [mfo.org](https://mfo.org), [controlrisks.com](https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/unifil-mandate-renewed-what-it-means-for-lebanon-and-israel), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1264%281999%29), [ask.un.org](https://ask.un.org/faq/177134))

**Naval and airspace arrangements (Week 2 → Month 1).** The mission establishes a **Maritime Operations Center (MOC)** and deploys a **multinational naval task unit** modeled on the **UNIFIL Maritime Task Force** to support coastal security and **prevent the unauthorized entry of arms by sea**, while enabling lawful economic activity. Licensed **Gaza fishers** may operate **up to 12 nautical miles** along the full coast from Day 21, expanding to **15 nm** with verified compliance. All licensed vessels carry **VMS/AIS** transponders; inspections are **non-intrusive, by consent**, and coordinated with the MOC—**no lethal force** against unarmed fishing craft. Maritime coordination links to **EUBAM Rafah** and the **2005 Agreement on Movement and Access**, aligning sea control with land-border anti-smuggling measures.

**Airspace de-escalation & shared ISR.** Recognizing that **Israel has controlled Gaza’s airspace and seaport permissions**, the Parties adopt **time-bound air-quiet windows** over population centers and humanitarian zones. Any **Israeli ISR overflights** during Phase 2 occur only on **filed profiles**, and their **imagery is mirrored to the monitors**. To meet legitimate situational awareness needs **without constant drone presence**, the mission fields **unarmed UAVs** on pre-agreed corridors and shares **routine, redacted feeds** with both sides via the JMM—following ceasefire-monitoring practice that combines **UAVs, cameras, satellite and acoustic sensors** with human patrols. A **NOTAM-based** deconfliction regime governs all flights.

**Confidence & accountability measures.** (i) **Weekly transparency notes** publish counts of patrol hours, fisher catches within the limit, inspections conducted, and any incidents; (ii) **remedies ladder** applies to violations (e.g., temporary reduction of the fishing limit for repeated non-compliance; formal censure for unscheduled ISR flights); (iii) joint **capacity-building** pairs mission sailors with Palestinian maritime police and coordinates with Egyptian and Israeli navies to standardize VHF/boarding protocols. The message is simple: **secure coasts and quiet skies that feed people and starve smuggling**.

([unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-maritime-task-force), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-s-fisheries-record-expansion-fishing-limit-and-relative-increase-fish-catch-shooting), [gisha.org](https://gisha.org/en/israel-reverses-latest-punitive-reduction), [peaceagreements.org](https://www.peaceagreements.org/media/documents/ag139_55e5d600babe9.pdf), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/14/gaza-israels-open-air-prison-15), [css.ethz.ch](https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/MediationResources21_CeasefireMonitoringTechnology.pdf), [gppi.net](https://gppi.net/assets/Presence-without-Power_Lessons-from-the-OSCE-SMM.pdf), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/unifil-maritime-task-force-resumes-training-exercises-with-laf), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-s-fisheries-record-expansion-fishing-limit-and-relative-increase-fish-catch-shooting))

**Political track — Interim governance (Week 2 → Month 1).** In parallel with security implementation, the Parties establish an **Interim Gaza Administration Council (IGAC)** to **run civilian services and coordinate reconstruction** for a **transitional period of up to 12 months**, pending elections. The **State of Palestine (PLO/PA)** provides formal leadership (Chair/Governor), while the Council itself is **technocratic and Gaza-rooted** (municipal engineers, hospital administrators, utility managers, education and private-sector leaders), with **women’s representation per UNSCR 1325** and meaningful seats for independent civil society. This inclusive, non-factional design mirrors recognized mediation guidance and current “day-after” plans backed by Arab and international actors.

**Role of Gaza’s de-facto actors.** To avoid governance capture while preserving stability, Gaza’s de-facto actors **formalize adherence** to the ceasefire/security accords via a separate commitment. **They do not run policing or crossings.** Individuals with professional expertise **may serve as technocrats**, subject to **human-rights vetting** and conflict-of-interest rules. Political participation channels shift to **future elections**, not armed leverage.

**Fighters and personnel management.** The Council, with UN support, launches a **DDR program** compliant with **IDDRS**: registration, disarmament, short-term stipends, and **jobs in rubble removal, utilities repair and housing**. Any **later integration** into the **civil police under PA authority** requires **individual renunciation of violence and OHCHR-style vetting**; **no** integration for those credibly implicated in serious violations. **Amnesties**, where contemplated, **exclude war crimes, crimes against humanity and other grave violations**, consistent with UN/ICRC policy and ongoing **ICC processes**.

**Arab and international support cell.** At IGAC’s side, **Egyptian and Jordanian advisors** help reopen ministries and train police; **Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and the EU** co-lead financing and program management; the **UN** and **World Bank** anchor fiduciary controls using **IRDNA/GRF** benchmarks and a **multi-donor trust-fund** with third-party monitoring. Monthly scorecards track service delivery, integrity (public procurement), and protection outcomes.

**Elections pathway.** The Parties and guarantors commit to **PLC/PA executive elections within ~12 months**, conditions permitting (security, freedom of campaigning, and voting arrangements including **East Jerusalem**). An **independent elections task force** begins now (voter registry updates, legal harmonization, media code of conduct), learning from the **postponed 2021 process** to prevent drift.

**North Star.** The frame is **national unity without re-militarizing governance**: services first, **rights-respecting policing**, transparent money flows, and a time-bound road to representative rule. This is where public consent—and donor confidence—live.

([peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/en/resources/un-guidance-for-mediation), [un.org](https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps), [brookings.edu](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/gazas-day-after-reconstruction-and-governance-challenges), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-day-after-governance-gaza-can-draw-existing-plans), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-1st-entire-arab-league-condemns-oct-7-urges-hamas-to-disarm-at-2-state-solution-confab), [unddr.org](https://www.unddr.org/the-iddrs), [unddr.org](https://www.unddr.org/operational-guide-iddrs), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/rule-law-tools-post-conflict-states-vetting), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Amnesties_en.pdf), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/170545_amnesties_factsheet_14_july_2017_clean_en.pdf), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/04/arab-leaders-gaza-summit), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/18/new-report-assesses-damages-losses-and-needs-in-gaza-and-the-west-bank), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/purse_multi_donor_trust_fund), [palestine.un.org](https://palestine.un.org/en/289429-gaza-and-west-bank-interim-rapid-damage-and-needs-assessment-february-2025), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/legislative-elections), [crisisgroup.org](https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2025-01/wl-2025-israel-palestine_1.pdf), [carnegieendowment.org](https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2025/03/gaza-ceasefire-egypt-reconstruction-palestine-summit))

**Reconstruction & economy (Week 2 → Month 1).**

With the truce holding, donors capitalize a **Gaza Reconstruction Trust Fund**—administered by the **World Bank** with a PA-led implementing window, independent technical committee, and third-party monitors. This aligns with joint **IRDNA** estimates (**≈ $53.2 billion** decade-long needs; **≈ $20 billion** in the first three years). The fund immediately releases a **100-day “Quick Impact” package**: (i) **debris & UXO clearance** to open lifelines and public facilities; (ii) **emergency shelter** (prefab units and repairs); (iii) **power & water stabilization** (fuel to critical sites; partial **Gaza Power Plant** generation for hospitals/waterworks; rapid repairs at wells/desalination; ramp-up of the **UAE cross-border water pipeline**); and (iv) **telecom restoration** (fiber splicing, spare parts entry), because connectivity underpins cash, logistics and protection. **Cash-for-work** hires tens of thousands of youth into debris removal, utility repairs, and shelter construction, pairing wages with skills training. Markets re-open as **controlled commercial entries** resume; **Gaza fishers** work **up to 12 nm** coast-wide under the maritime code. Medical evacuations expand through **Rafah** under **PA/Egypt** with **EU monitors**, subject to security.

**Reverse-blockade ladder (verification-based easing).** Access, trade, and mobility **increase each month without violence**, tied to transparent monitoring:

* **Month 1:** unrestricted **food/medicine**; **WASH/Energy & telecom spares**; **12 nm fishing** under VMS/AIS; multiple crossings scheduled (Kerem Shalom, Zikim; Rafah for patients).
* **Month 2:** **construction materials** via enhanced **GRM-style** monitoring; SMEs can import inputs; **pilot exports** to the West Bank/Israel under sealed trucking.
* **Month 3:** **broader exports** (agri/garments/furniture); consider **15 nm** fishing if compliance holds; phased telecom core rebuild permissions.
* **Month 4+:** begin **internationally supervised seaport works** (lessons learned: land crossings remain primary; maritime aid piers were fragile) and commission an **airport feasibility/design** track contingent on security compliance.

**Transparency & safeguards.**

Weekly public dashboards track: **rubble cleared**, **jobs created**, **m³/day of safe water** and **MW to critical loads**, **connectivity uptime**, **crossing throughputs**, **fishing landings**, and **price baskets**. Dual-use controls follow **GRM/AMA-2005** practice with independent monitors, while OCHA/UNICEF fuel and WASH pipelines are prioritized to prevent system collapse.

([worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/18/new-report-assesses-damages-losses-and-needs-in-gaza-and-the-west-bank), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/westbankandgaza), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-259-gaza-strip), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-297-gaza-strip), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/un-ocha-humanitarian-assistance-plan-for-gaza-considerations-for-the-delivery-of-humanitarian-aid-during-a-ceasefire-in-gaza), [punchng.com](https://punchng.com/uae-begins-construction-of-7km-water-pipeline-to-ease-gazas-crisis), [i24news.tv](https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/artc-uae-launches-water-pipeline-project-to-supply-gaza), [etcluster.org](https://www.etcluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/ETC%20Palestine%20Global%20Partners%20Teleconference_minutes_2025_07_08%20%2335_0.pdf), [unognewsroom.org](https://www.unognewsroom.org/story/en/2754/gaza-aid-update-ocha-unicef), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/mideast-wars-gaza-rafah-ceasefire-egypt-children-7330b0f2a30855cd5ae69b5a32b218df), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-humanitarian-response-update-25-may-7-june-2025), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209766), [jpost.com](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/israel-to-expand-gaza-fishing-zone-to-15-nautical-miles-cogat-617982), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-military-ends-gaza-pier-mission-2024-07-17), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209766), [unicef.org](https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/gazas-taps-running-dry-fuel-crisis-deepens-daily-struggle-families))

**Justice & Accountability Mechanisms Begin (Week 3 – Month 1)**To sustain the truce and honor victims on all sides, the parties and guarantors activate a balanced accountability architecture built on three pillars: **(1) truth-finding & evidence preservation, (2) criminal accountability pathways, and (3) victim-centered redress**.

Timelines below keep momentum while avoiding politicization.

**1) Truth-Finding & Evidence Preservation (immediate, rolling)**

* **Independent Evidence Cell.** Under the UN-mandated Commission of Inquiry’s umbrella and with participation from neutral forensic organizations, a joint cell standardizes chain-of-custody, digital forensics, and witness-protection protocols. It is *venue-agnostic*: material can support national, hybrid, or ICC proceedings.
* **Public Hearings/Right-to-Truth.** The Commission schedules periodic public hearings to surface victim testimony and to publish non-prejudicial updates (protecting due-process and witness safety).

**2) Criminal Accountability Pathways (complementarity-based)**

* **Domestic Tracks under Firm Benchmarks.**
  + *Israel*: The Military Advocate General (MAG) and allied bodies proceed with prioritized incidents (civilian mass-casualty events; attacks on protected sites). Benchmarks include: initial determinations within **60–90 days**, charging decisions or public declinations by **Month 6**, and periodic transparency reports.
  + *Palestinian side*: Competent judicial authorities (PA courts in coordination with an Interim Gaza Administration) prepare files on alleged grave crimes by Palestinian armed groups; individuals credibly implicated in atrocities are barred from security roles pending review.
* **Independent Complementarity Review Board (ICRB).** By **Month 4**, an expert panel (nominated by guarantors and OHCHR) assesses whether domestic proceedings meet **genuineness** standards (independence, timeliness, scope, outcomes). Findings trigger:  
  + **Track A – Defer to Domestic Justice** (if genuine);
  + **Track B – Internationalization**, by (i) notifying the **ICC** that complementarity is unmet for specified incidents, and/or (ii) activating a **Hybrid/Special Chamber** (see below).
* **Hybrid/Special Chamber Option (neutral venue).** If agreed by parties and endorsed by guarantors, establish a time-bound **Special Chamber** with mixed international/national judges and prosecutors, seated in a **neutral location**, applying applicable domestic law plus international crimes definitions, with full fair-trial guarantees. The Chamber focuses on those **most responsible** for atrocity crimes, irrespective of affiliation.
* **ICC Interface.** The parties acknowledge the ICC’s ongoing proceedings and commit to facilitate lawful cooperation requests, consistent with complementarity and due-process rights.

**3) Victim-Centered Redress**

* **Truth & Reconciliation Commission (TRC) – twin-track with courts.** An inclusive TRC launches by **Month 3** to hear victim narratives from Israelis and Palestinians, issue findings, and recommend systemic reforms. Participation by perpetrators may inform sentencing/clemency decisions in domestic courts, but the TRC **cannot** shield anyone from prosecution for grave international crimes.
* **Reparations Program.** A Reparations Working Group (Finance + Justice tracks) designs administrative reparations (medical/psychosocial care, education stipends for orphans, housing assistance, memorialization) with **non-discrimination** guarantees and a claims process accessible to survivors on both sides.

**4) Missing Persons & Dignified Returns (start Week 3)**

* **Joint Missing Persons Mechanism (JMPM).** Co-led technically by the ICRC with participation from both parties, JMPM consolidates lists of the missing, coordinates DNA sampling and identifications, manages respectful remains transfers, and issues verified status notifications to families.
* **Data-Sharing Protocols.** Secure, privacy-compliant exchanges of detention registers, battlefield recovery logs, hospital/death records, and grave-mapping enable swift clarifications.

**5) Conditional Leniency & Demobilization Safeguards**

* **Eligibility.** Lower-level actors not credibly implicated in war crimes/crimes against humanity may receive conditional leniency tied to: verified **disarmament**, **full disclosure** before the TRC or prosecutors, and **non-recidivism**.
* **Red Lines.** No amnesty, safe-haven deal, or political appointment may cover grave international crimes. Individuals under credible suspicion are **suspended** from public-security roles pending outcome.

**6) Governance, Transparency, and Survivor Voice**

* **Victims’ Participation.** Victims’ legal representatives may make submissions in domestic/hybrid processes; a Victim Liaison Office provides translation, transport stipends, and trauma-informed support.
* **Public Reporting.** Quarterly dashboards publish aggregated metrics (cases opened/closed, referrals, reparations delivered, missing persons identified) while protecting identities.
* **Independent Ombudsperson.** A lean office receives complaints about intimidation, interference, or bias and can recommend protective measures or external referral.

**Sequencing Milestones (illustrative)**

* **By Day 30–45:** Evidence Cell operational; JMPM begins verifications; first MAG/PA public updates.
* **By Month 3:** TRC opens; first remains identifications delivered; ICRB constituted.
* **By Month 4:** ICRB issues first complementarity findings; if needed, Hybrid/Special Chamber framework tabled.
* **By Month 6:** First charges (domestic or hybrid) in priority cases; initial reparations disbursements; substantial progress on missing-persons notifications.

([icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/victims/state-palestine), [idf.il](https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/qa-concerning-the-violent-riots-and-attacks-occurring-on-the-border-between-gaza-and-israel-during-2018-9/investigation-of-allegations-of-misconduct), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/thematic-report-ohchr-19jun24), [yesh-din.org](https://www.yesh-din.org/en/the-general-staff-whitewashing-mechanism-the-israeli-law-enforcement-system-and-breaches-of-international-law-and-war-crimes-in-gaza), [btselem.org](https://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/201609_whitewash_protocol), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-issues-warrant-arrest-mohammed-diab-ibrahim), [rscsl.org](https://www.rscsl.org/Documents/AnRpt11.pdf), [rscsl.org](https://rscsl.org), [eccc.gov.kh](https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en), [eccc.gov.kh](https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%20-%20EN%20-%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1757%282007%29), [asil.org](https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/6/issue/2/lockerbie-trial-verdict), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Amnesties_en.pdf), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/protected-persons-missing-persons), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/model-law-missing-icrc-eng-.pdf), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-israel/index), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/commission-inquiry-occupied-palestinian-territory-including-east-jerusalem), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-israel/public-hearings), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/rule-law-tools-post-conflict-states-amnesties), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v2/rule159), [rscsl.org](https://www.rscsl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.pdf), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/document/legal-fact-sheet-missing-persons-and-their-families-updated), [ictj.org](https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/subsites/complementarity-icc), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/170545_amnesties_factsheet_october_2017_clean_en.pdf))

**Integration with Ukraine / Global links (Week 2 → Month 1).**

To convert momentum into a wider peace dividend, the co-chairs frame Gaza’s Phase-2 progress and the **Istanbul Ukraine** channel as **twin tracks for global stability**—mutually reinforcing but **not** contingent. In New York, following Council action referencing **Resolution 2728 (2024)**, members **welcome Phase-2 Gaza milestones** and **encourage** intensified diplomacy in Istanbul; Ankara and the UN mirror this with a **joint communiqué** underscoring shared principles: civilian protection, verifiable de-escalation, and time-boxed deliverables.

Practically, the co-chairs **cross-pollinate** methods: Gaza’s monitoring playbook (hotlines, daily SITREPs, third-party tech feeds) is briefed to **Istanbul delegations**, while **Istanbul’s** confidence-building steps (exchanges, missing-persons returns) echo back into Gaza’s **Justice & Accountability** and **Hostages/Detentions** tracks on a synchronized calendar. This **global feedback loop** signals that **major-power cooperation**—already visible in the Gaza file’s renewed truce push with **Egypt, Qatar and U.S. backing**—can be **replicated in Istanbul**, even amid sharp differences.

**Messaging.** Co-chairs and guarantors deliver **paired statements**: “As Gaza quiets under verified arrangements, we redouble efforts in Istanbul; as Istanbul advances humanitarian steps, we reinforce Gaza’s calm.” EU/UN figures already frame Gaza and Ukraine together; the twin-track narrative **undercuts fatalistic bloc talk** (“NATO vs Russia,” “West vs Islam”) by showcasing **practical, multipolar problem-solving**.

**Guardrail.** Neither process is **hostage** to the other: slippage on one does **not** suspend the other. But success in either raises political **appetite and trust** for the other—turning isolated breakthroughs into a **wider de-escalation arc**. And because **Istanbul talks** have resumed (June–July 2025) now supported by Alaska and Washington talks while **Gaza truce terms** are again on the table (Aug 18, 2025), the calendar itself supports this choreography.

([press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15641.doc.htm), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-res-2728.php), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-accepts-proposed-deal-ceasefire-with-israel-hostage-release-egyptian-2025-08-18), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-told-mediators-it-approves-latest-gaza-ceasefire-proposal-group-official-2025-08-18), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/united-nations-speech-high-representative-kaja-kallas-annual-un-security-council-session-eu-un_en), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-set-out-roadmap-peace-istanbul-talks-document-shows-2025-06-01), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ukraine-talk-about-peace-are-still-far-apart-2025-06-02), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/trump-tells-zelenskiy-that-putin-wants-more-ukraine-urges-kyiv-make-deal-2025-08-16), [reuters.com](http://reuters.com/world/ukraine-war-live-trump-zelenskiy-discuss-russias-terms-peace-2025-08-18))

**End-state of Phase 2 (≈ Day 30).** A **formal ceasefire & security accord** is in force and **international monitors/peacekeepers** are fully on duty under the classic peacekeeping principles of **consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-/mandate-defence**; they publish routine **daily SITREPs** that show only **localized, remediated incidents** with no major violations.

**Aid and services** have shifted from crisis to stabilization: gate counts and fuel ledgers verify a sustained ramp toward the **~600 trucks/day** benchmark (food, WASH, medical, shelter), while priority feeders, wells/desalination and clinics are back on predictable cycles—small, visible wins that the public can feel.

**Governance transitions peacefully:** the Interim Gaza Administration Council is seated, operating with donor fiduciary controls and a World Bank-managed reconstruction window aligned to the **IRDNA** recovery envelope (multi-year, multi-billion scale).

**Talks are moving:** working groups hit their **Day-21/Day-30** deliverables and keep time-boxed agendas per UN mediation guidance, while access arrangements at land/sea crossings follow **AMA-2005/EUBAM Rafah** style monitoring—linking security compliance to economic reopening.

**Human atmosphere.** Gaza is no longer a battlefield but **a construction site and diplomatic forum**: markets reopen, phones/internet stabilize, fishers work under the maritime code, and families experience **a month of quiet skies**. On the Israeli side, communities near Gaza begin **planning returns and normal routines**. Those everyday experiences—sleep, school, work, prayer—become the **constituency for peace** that empowers leaders to enter **Phase 3** and tackle the long-horizon political questions with **far better goodwill** than on Day 0.

### Codify the Corridor Plan — Philadelphi/Netzarim Disengagement & Monitoring

**Purpose.** To operationalize the Non-Annexation & Temporary-Corridor Principle by converting ad-hoc “security strips” into a short-term, internationally supervised disengagement scheme with a dated shrink-to-zero schedule, transparent inspection logs, and matching border-security assistance to Egypt.

**Scope & geography.** The scheme applies to (i) the Philadelphi axis (Egypt–Gaza boundary) and (ii) the Netzarim east–west spine inside Gaza. Both are designated **strictly temporary safety/inspection strips** with **published width limits**, geofenced endpoints, and **full dismantlement by D+60** unless all Parties consent to a short, technical extension.

**Monitoring configuration (Egypt–Jordan–UN/EU or MFO+)**

* **Core:** A light, civilian-led presence (e.g., **EUBAM-Rafah** modalities revived under the 2005 AMA) at Rafah and crossing nodes, paired with neutral **observers/patrols** along the strip. (EU has already redeployed an EUBAM team in 2025 at the Parties’ request.)
* **Backstop:** If UN force generation lags, **MFO+** (per the treaty’s UN-force fallback letters) can host an augmented observer cell until a UN/EU mission transitions in.

**Physical security measures (time-bound)**

* **Fencing & sensing:** temporary smart fencing, ground-disturbance detection, cameras, UAV patrols, and periodic ground sweeps—calibrated to avoid permanence or territorial change. (Egypt has already fortified its side; tech support focuses on detection/interdiction, not expansion.)
* **inspection regime:** fixed-time windows for controlled movements; **daily inspection logs** posted to the **Public Milestone Ledger** with chain-of-custody standards.

**Transparency & reporting**

* A **public corridor dashboard** (traffic-light format) publishes: width/segment status, inspection counts, interdictions, hotline incidents, and scheduled shrink steps. **Remote-sensing inputs** and methods notes are published with privacy safeguards.

**Disengagement schedule**

* **D+15–D+30:** Monitors deploy; corridor(s) go live with **max width** declared; **first shrink step by D+30.**
* **D+31–D+60:** Progressive shrink every 7–10 days; **full dismantlement by D+60**, absent a narrowly-tailored, time-boxed technical extension agreed by all Parties and noted on the ledger. (UN/EU civilian missions have historically mobilized within weeks; EUBAM-Rafah reactivation in 2025 shows feasibility.)

**Border-security aid for Cairo (paired measures)**

* **Package:** scanners, counter-tunnel detection, ISR feeds, training, and maintenance funded by donors (EU, U.S., Gulf) and routed via a joint board; no change to sovereignty or the 1979 treaty zones. (EU has unlocked significant new Egypt support in 2024–25; negotiators also explored **electronic surveillance** alternatives to an Israeli troop presence on Philadelphi.)
* **Conditioning:** aid tranches **verify-to-unlock** on inspection-log publication and corridor shrink-milestones.

**Legal anchors & red-lines (recorded in footnotes/box).**

* **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty (1979):** boundary inviolability; security arrangements & observers in Annex I; U.S. letter enabling an **acceptable alternative multinational force** (MFO) if UN fails—basis for **MFO+** interim use.
* **Positions to reconcile:** Israel’s past insistence on Philadelphi/Netzarim presence vs. Egypt’s refusal to accept border-arrangement changes; the corridor is therefore **temporary, supervised, and shrinking**—not a sovereignty claim.

**Enforcement & remedies.**

* **If logs not posted, width not shrunk, or presence politicized:** **Snapback Tier-1 → Tier-2** targeting non-compliance actors; **DPARC** fast panel (48–96h) can order a reversion to the last agreed text/width.

**Corridor Dashboard & Inspection Logs**

**Public Corridor Dashboard (traffic-light).** The JMVM will publish a daily dashboard covering: (i) corridor segment map with **published width limits** and geofenced endpoints; (ii) **inspection counts** (inspections, interdictions, anomalies); (iii) **hotline incidents** and time-to-closure; (iv) **scheduled shrink steps** (next target date & % accomplished); (v) **Rafah operations status** (EUBAM-Rafah standby → full activation). Dashboard methods include remote-sensing/AIS/UAV inputs with chain-of-custody and privacy safeguards; raw images redacted per humanitarian norms.

**Inspection Log (minimum fields).** Date/time; segment ID; team ID; observation type (routine/triggered); finding (clear/interdiction/anomaly); remedial action; photo/hash; operator signature; JMVM receipt.

**Publication cadence.** Daily summary, weekly roll-up; **verify-to-unlock** triggers tied to (a) log publication, (b) shrink-schedule completion.

**Border-Security Aid for Cairo**

**Package.** Donors (U.S., EU, Gulf) will fund scanners, counter-tunnel detection, ISR feeds, training and maintenance for Egypt’s Rafah/Philadelphi border police, with no change to sovereignty or 1979 treaty zones. A donor **Board** (Escrow sub-board) authorizes tranches **only on**: (1) inspection-log publication, (2) corridor shrink-milestones, and (3) Rafah operations uptime meeting the **EUBAM-Rafah/AMA** standard.

**Fallback.** If a UN/EU civilian presence lags, **MFO+** hosts an interim observer cell under the 1979 Peace Treaty framework and the 1981 **Protocol establishing the Multinational Force and Observers**, until hand-over to UN/EU monitors.

**Completion of Stage 2 under Annex 7 (Band B pacing) a precondition for Escrow Tranche-1 release (verify-to-unlock).**

## **Phase 3: Toward Lasting Peace – Final Status Framework & Multipolar Guarantees**

**(Month 2–Month 6)** *Final-Status Framework & Multipolar Guarantees.*

With Phase-2 stabilization in place, the Co-Chairs convene a **Final-Status Working Conference** to negotiate the core political file—**statehood, territory, Jerusalem, refugees**—for Gaza *and* the wider Israel-Palestine track, under UNSC-referenced baselines. Over a 90–180-day window, parties will (i) **initial** a **Framework Outline** specifying parameters for Palestinian sovereignty across Gaza & the West Bank (with ASI-enabled functional interoperation and a **special Jerusalem custodianship regime**) and modalities for refugee remedies; (ii) **codify** a **Guarantor Tools Table** (U.S./EU conditionality & ISR support; Egypt/Qatar/KSA/UAE/Jordan crossings, releases & policing support; Türkiye/India/BRICS peace-support/engineering roles; Russia/China de-escalation channels & UNSC shepherding); (iii) **launch** **regional CBMs** tied to progress (hours-extended crossings, maritime code adherence, phased visa/overflight, arms-transfer guardrails); and (iv) **calendar** an **Implementation Timetable** culminating in a UNSC-referenced **Guarantees Resolution**. Verification runs via a Joint Secretariat with weekly public bulletins; **snapback/escrow** remedies apply to missed benchmarks. This sequence aligns with public-opinion realities (measured Israeli skepticism but commitment to work toward peace; plurality Palestinian support for a sovereignty-anchored outcome) and uses normalization leverage to keep incentives cooperative.

([press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15641.doc.htm), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2728%282024%29), [pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/06/03/israeli-public-is-increasingly-skeptical-about-lasting-peace), [pewresearch.org](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2025/06/03/views-of-the-potential-for-lasting-peace), [pcpsr.org](https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2095%20press%20release%206May2025%20ENGLISH.pdf))

**Permanent Status Negotiations — Gaza and the Region’s Future**

**Mandate & format.** With immediate concerns stabilized and verification missions operating, the Peace Conference reconvenes in **expanded final-status format** to address the broader Israeli-Palestinian file. Given complexity, negotiators may proceed on **two synchronized tracks**—(A) a **Gaza-specific accord** and (B) a **parallel West Bank/Jerusalem framework**—with a view to **consolidate** them into a single comprehensive settlement instrument. UNSC 2728 provides the baseline for ceasefire → lasting ceasefire transitions, to be reflected in the final package.

**Track A — Gaza-specific finalization (status, borders/maritime, security, connectivity, economy).**

1. **Status & non-claims clarity.** Parties record that Gaza is **to be integrated into the sovereign State of Palestine** as part of the comprehensive settlement, with Israel **formally reaffirming** that it asserts **no sovereignty claims** over Gaza following the **2005 disengagement** (removal of settlements and military installations), while reserving security arrangements stipulated in the agreement.
2. **Security & non-aggression.** The current ceasefire is **converted into a permanent cessation of hostilities/non-aggression regime** for Gaza, with prohibited activities enumerated, tech-enabled monitoring, and proportionate, codified remedies for violations—benchmarked against UNSC-referenced verification practices.
3. **Borders & maritime.** The parties adopt **maritime delimitation principles** grounded in the **UN Convention on the Law of the Sea** (to which the State of Palestine acceded on **1 Feb 2015**), recognizing that many UNCLOS rules reflect **customary law** applicable to non-parties; an interim **fisheries/access** regime references the **Oslo-era 20-NM** parameter as a ceiling for phased expansion, subject to security corridors and seasonal management.
4. **Energy & resources.** Parties endorse **orderly development** of **Gaza Marine** under joint security and revenue-transparency arrangements and third-party escrow, aligning with prior Israeli **in-principle approval** and the broader maritime framework—linking disbursements to humanitarian and reconstruction benchmarks.
5. **Connectivity (Gaza ↔ West Bank).** The agreement **revives and modernizes** the **Safe Passage** architecture (1999 Protocol; 2005 **Agreement on Movement and Access**), specifying **secure land-link corridors** for people and goods (permits, vetted convoys, time windows, and digital manifesting), with implementation phased alongside security certification.

**Track B — West Bank/Jerusalem framework (in parallel).** Negotiations advance parameters on **statehood, territory, and Jerusalem’s special regime**, to be consolidated with the Gaza accord into a comprehensive instrument and UNSC-referenced guarantees package. (Normalization and regional CBMs are tied to milestone compliance in both tracks.)

**Outputs & timeline (illustrative).**

* **By Month 3–4:** Initialed **Gaza Finalization Accord** (status + non-aggression articles; interim fisheries/maritime principles; connectivity MoU) and **Parallel WB/Jerusalem Framework Outline**.
* **By Month 5:** **Gaza Marine Implementation Note** (security, revenue, escrow), **Corridor Operating Procedures** (derived from 1999/2005 instruments), and **Verification Dossier** for UNSC referencing.
* **By Month 6:** Consolidated **Comprehensive Settlement Draft** transmitted to guarantors for **UNSC-referenced Guarantees Resolution** and donor-linked enforcement tools.

**Verification & remedies.** The Joint Secretariat publishes weekly bulletins on: ceasefire integrity, corridor uptime, fisheries access windows, and Gaza-Marine milestones. **Snapback/escrow** applies to missed benchmarks (automatic escrow holds on new funds; calibrated restrictions on dual-use transfers; corrective action plans within 30 days).

([docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2728%282024%29), [gov.il](https://www.gov.il/en/pages/israeli-disengagement-plan-20-jan-2005), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-209303), [apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/israel-gaza-settlements-disengagement-20th-anniversary-5db86a29bbbe2f41e5bb7059098fd450), [treaties.un.org](https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2015/CN.10.2015-Eng.pdf), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/between-maritime-law-and-politics-east-mediterranean), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-s-fisheries-record-expansion-fishing-limit-and-relative-increase-fish-catch-shooting), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/israel-gives-nod-gaza-marine-gas-development-wants-security-assurances-2023-06-18), [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/20/recognised-palestinian-state-could-develop-disputed-gas-resources-expert-says), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/il20ps991005protocol20concerning20safe20passage20between20the20west20bank20and20the20gaza20strip.pdf), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/israeloptagreeddocumentsonmovementaccessgaza2005.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2005/12/30ead4170169f28d852570d600556b90_AgreementMovementAccess.pdf), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2728%282024%29), [ochaopt.org](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/gaza-s-fisheries-record-expansion-fishing-limit-and-relative-increase-fish-catch-shooting))

**Refugees.**

Establish an **International Commission** to implement a comprehensive solution with **five calibrated options**: (1) return to the **State of Palestine**; (2) residence in **swap areas**; (3) **rehabilitation** in current host countries; (4) **third-country resettlement**; (5) **limited, sovereignly-determined admissions to Israel**—paired with a **multi-donor compensation and resettlement fund** sized in the **tens of billions**, consistent with prior international economic frameworks.

**Security Guarantees.**

Define **Palestine as a non-militarized state** with robust internal security forces; deploy an **international presence** for border security and **time-bound arrangements in the Jordan Valley**, evolving to full Palestinian responsibility as benchmarks are met. Utilize the **Allen/CNAS security toolkit** (integrated ISR, layered border tech, joint ops centers) and encode emergency procedures under UNSC-referenced oversight.

**Recognition & Normalization.**

Upon Framework adoption, the parties exchange **mutual recognition**; **Arab and Islamic states** operationalize **normalization** in line with the **API**, sequenced to implementation. Note **Saudi Arabia’s** position: **no normalization without a credible path to a Palestinian state**; seek an **OIC** endorsement to broaden legitimacy.

([usip.org](https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Peace%20Puzzle/10_Clinton%20Parameters.pdf), [washingtoninstitute.org](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/StrategicReport06.pdf), [ecf.org.il](https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/1439), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/egypt-rejects-any-displacement-palestinians-into-sinai-says-sisi-2023-10-18), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/210520/EPRS_ATA%282020%29646166_EN.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/peace-to-prosperity-plan-framework-released-by-white-house-factsheet), [ec.militarytimes.com](https://ec.militarytimes.com/static/pdfs/CNASReport-2StateSolution-FINAL.pdf), [kas.de](https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/oic-resolutions-51st-session-22jun25))  
  
**Certification clause.** Guarantors issue a public **‘No Annexation/No Reduction’** certificate once monitors confirm corridor dismantlement and territorial status quo ante is restored; this unlocks the **recognition ladder** and **reconstruction compact**.

**Multipolar Guarantees Formalized.**

**Objective.** Convert stabilization into a **binding, multi-pillar guarantee**: a UNSC-referenced **Guarantees Resolution** plus a **Guarantors’ Joint Declaration** that codifies roles, resources, and responses for the U.S., Russia, China, EU, UN and core neighbors (Egypt, Jordan), with participation pathways for KSA, UAE, Qatar, Türkiye, India and others.

**Rationale & evidence.** Durable peace needs a **credible enforcement umbrella** that is not one-sided. The design echoes the **Madrid (1991) co-sponsorship** logic—broad, visible backing—now extended to a fuller multipolar set.

**Stakeholders & roles.**

* **UNSC/P5:** Mandate, monitoring authority, and text shepherding under the Charter.
* **Egypt/Jordan (with others):** Borders, crossings, gendarmerie/policing support, releases leverage.
* **EU/Gulf donors:** Fiduciary controls, reconstruction windows, performance-linked tranches.
* **Peace-support forces:** Mix of UN-mandated and **treaty-based** (MFO-style) contingents to cover seams if UNSC stalls.

**Enforcement architecture.** The UNSC adopts a **Chapter V2** resolution that (i) endorses the agreements; (ii) authorizes a **time-bound international presence** in the State of Palestine during transition; (iii) directs **weekly public reporting** by the Verification Mission; and (iv) **prohibits transfers of arms to non-state actors** in the theater—using the Lebanon 1701 model as precedent—while supporting state capacity.

**Spoiler-response ladder (snapback).** Guarantors pre-commit to a calibrated ladder: targeted sanctions, interdiction assistance, pause of non-humanitarian tranches via **automatic escrow**, and—if P5 deadlock—activation of **Uniting-for-Peace** for GA recommendations. Humanitarian channels remain protected.

**Unified Governance & ASI.** All monitoring is **human-in-the-loop**, privacy-preserving, and auditable; ASI elements remain **non-operative** guidance (dashboards, alerts, scenario comparisons) subordinate to political authority.

**Jerusalem — special considerations.** The Guarantees Resolution cross-references the **special regime for Jerusalem** (international/co-sovereign custodianship) and affirms that nothing in enforcement alters holy-site status-quo.

**Verification & metrics.** The Joint Secretariat publishes weekly SITREPs; success metrics include mandate issuance, force generation, crossings uptime, and dashboard availability; **snapback/escrow** applies to missed benchmarks with a 30-day cure window.

([history.state.gov](https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/madrid-conference), [mfo.org](https://mfo.org), [stimson.org](https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/OccasionalPaper12_1.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text), [legal.un.org](https://legal.un.org/repertory/art25.shtml), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1031%281995%29), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-resolution-1701-cornerstone-any-israel-hezbollah-truce-2024-11-21), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml), [ask.un.org](https://ask.un.org/faq/177134))

**Bold Unified Humanitarian Action.**

By month 6, the aid surge matures into a **Gaza Joint Health Reconstruction Compact (JHRC)**—a neutral, standards-based build-out led by the **Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS)** with **ICRC/IFRC** custodianship and **WHO Emergency Medical Teams (EMT)** accreditation. The Compact stands up a **three-node hospital network** (north/centre/south) with a pediatric centre of excellence and a dedicated oncology wing to replace services lost during the war (e.g., European Gaza Hospital and the Turkish-Palestinian Friendship Hospital).

**How it works.** Donors from **across blocs**—US/EU, **China**, **Russia**, Türkiye, the Gulf, Egypt and Jordan—fund a multi-year package that converts existing **Red Cross ERU** field capacity into semi-permanent facilities while new Type-2 units are commissioned under WHO’s Blue Book standards. Staffing blends **WHO-EMT–classified teams** and Palestinian clinicians, with PRCS in command and ICRC/IFRC providing governance, biomedical logistics, data, and QA.

**Why it’s credible.** The Rafah **Red Cross field hospital** already operates as a multi-national platform (supported by 12–14 National Societies), while **Jordan** and the **UAE** continue to rotate field hospitals and assets; **WHO+UAE** have executed medical evacuations at scale. The Compact **scales what’s working** into a permanent network.

**De-politicized symbolism.** Communications emphasize **care, not camps**: joint trainings, morbidity reductions, and paediatric recoveries—not flags. To show that **multipolar cooperation saves lives**, partners may field mixed clinical teams for high-visibility rotations (e.g., US and Russian paediatric surgeons on the same ward), drawing on historic precedents of cross-rival **Ebola** and **smallpox** collaboration to re-center health above politics.

**Protection & access.** The network sits on a **humanitarian no-strike list**, with fuel/oxygen corridors and 24/7 deconfliction. The Guarantees Resolution shields medical operations and prohibits arms transfers to non-state actors that threaten health sites; enforcement ladders never interrupt **medical supply chains**.

([who.int](https://www.who.int/news/item/22-05-2025-health-system-at-breaking-point-as-hostilities-further-intensify--who-warns), [thelancet.com](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanonc/article/PIIS1470-2045(25)00192-5/abstract), [icrcnewsroom.org](https://www.icrcnewsroom.org/story/en/770/gaza-red-cross-opens-new-60-bed-field-hospital), [go.ifrc.org](https://go.ifrc.org/surge/catalogue/health/eru-hospital), [extranet.who.int](https://extranet.who.int/emt/sites/default/files/BlueBook2021.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/red-cross-sets-up-rafah-emergency-field-hospital-2024-05-14), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/article/red-cross-field-hospital-rafah-gaza-strip-facts-figures-february-2025), [redcross.org.uk](https://www.redcross.org.uk/stories/disasters-and-emergencies/world/red-cross-responds-to-vast-medical-needs-in-rafah), [arabnews.com](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2612148/middle-east), [plenglish.com](https://www.plenglish.com/news/2025/08/18/jordanian-field-hospital-resumes-operations-in-gaza), [thenationalnews.com](https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2025/04/23/uae-field-hospital-in-gaza-hit-by-bomb-shrapnel), [khaleejtimes.com](https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/gaza-field-hospital-hit-by-shrapnel), [who.int](https://www.who.int/news/item/30-07-2024-who-and-united-arab-emirates-evacuate-85-patients-from-gaza), [cartercenter.org](https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/china/trs-03-combating-ebola-breakout.pdf), [csis.org](https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-foes-can-defeat-common-enemy-us-china-collaboration-combat-ebola), [who.int](https://www.who.int/news-room/spotlight/history-of-vaccination/history-of-smallpox-vaccination), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/opt/20241231-attacks-hospitals-gaza-en.pdf))

**Differentiating War Crimes vs. Legitimate Defense (Ongoing).**

With hostilities stilled, justice moves from rhetoric to **predictable law**. Core crimes are assessed under the **Rome Statute** and its **Elements of Crimes**; attacks against civilians are condemned and prosecuted irrespective of cause. At the same time, targeting rules are clarified using the **ICRC’s Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH)** guidance so that “who is targetable, when, and for how long” is uniformly understood in asymmetric settings. Acknowledging that the UN lacks a single, universal definition of **terrorism**, the guarantors adopt a **non-politicization pledge** that operationalizes **UNSC 1566** elements (criminal acts intended to cause death or serious injury to civilians to terrorize or compel) while keeping the legal focus on **conduct**, not labels.

To embed practice, guarantors co-host a **Conference on International Humanitarian Law in Asymmetric Warfare** (with ICRC/UN), issuing a **Civilian-Protection Package**: endorsement of the **2022 Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA)**; an urban-warfare harm-mitigation playbook grounded in distinction, proportionality, and precautions; and model DPH-based rules of engagement for state and non-state actors.

Accountability uses three complementary lanes. **(1) ICC lane:** Parties reaffirm cooperation with ICC proceedings in the Situation in the State of Palestine (jurisdiction settled in 2021; arrest-warrant applications and decisions since 2024–25). **(2) Fact-finding lane:** Parties activate the **International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (AP I, Art. 90)** for confidential, expert inquiries that defuse politicization. **(3) Evidence lane:** The UN General Assembly, if needed, establishes an **IIIM-style mechanism** to collect, preserve, and prepare case files for competent courts. All lanes require **Berkeley Protocol** standards for digital/open-source evidence and **Minnesota Protocol** standards for investigating potentially unlawful death. Gaza’s settlement thus **strengthens international law** for future conflicts by clarifying rules, de-politicizing terms, and improving credible, court-ready accountability.

([icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf), [icc-cpiint](https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/Publications/Elements-of-Crimes.pdf), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0990-interpretive-guidance-notion-direct-participation-hostilities-under-international), [unodc.org](https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-4/key-issues/defining-terrorism.html), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1566%282004%29), [ewipa.org](https://ewipa.org), [ewipa.org](https://ewipa.org/the-political-declaration), [icrc.org](https://www.icrc.org/en/law-and-policy/urban-warfare-and-violence), [icc-cpi.int](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-issues-its-decision-prosecutors-request-related-territorial), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-90), [ihffc.org](https://www.ihffc.org), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/71/248), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/berkeley-protocol-digital-open-source), [digitallibrary.un.org](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3973958))

**Regional Co-Development & Integration.**

With peace on track, the region pivots from **buffering conflict to building connectivity**. The guarantors midwife a **Regional Co-Development Compact (RCDC)** that sequences shovel-ready power, water, and logistics links so people feel dividends quickly.

**Power.** The Compact aligns timetables for the **Great Sea Interconnector** (Israel–Cyprus–Greece HVDC, EU-backed) and the **EuroAfrica/GREGY** corridors (Egypt–Cyprus–Greece), creating an Eastern Mediterranean **clean-power spine** that trades surplus renewables and stabilizes grids across fault lines.

**Water–energy.** The UAE-backed **Project Prosperity** becomes operationalized: **Jordan** exports solar power; **Israel** backhauls **desalinated water**—leveraging Israel’s newly commissioned **Sorek-2** capacity while Jordan’s Red Sea desal plant ramps. A dedicated **humanitarian/essential-services carve-out** keeps these flows insulated from politics.

**Trade & transport.** A **Levant spur** of the **India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC)** is piloted—Gulf gateways feeding rail/road through **Jordan** to **Haifa**, complementing Suez traffic. Haifa’s recent Indian stake gives the corridor a ready Mediterranean anchor, while customs “green lanes” and joint inspections cut dwell time.

**Sinai growth platform.** Egypt’s **SCZONE** and the **El-Arish logistics hub** evolve into a tri-lateral **Sinai Free Logistics Precinct**—bonded warehousing, cold-chain, and MSME park—serving **Gaza–Negev–Sinai**. China’s zone-building experience (TEDA) and European/Gulf financing can co-fund; governance sits with Egypt, with PRCS/UN agencies ensuring humanitarian corridors stay open.

**Broader participation.** **China** contributes industrial-zone financing and grid hardware; **Russia**, already co-building Egypt’s **El Dabaa** plant and exporting **desalination** know-how, can support dual-use water/energy modules that benefit both Gaza and the Negev. Participation is **project-bounded** and strictly civilian.

**Strategic effect.** By turning borders into **interfaces**, the Compact makes disruption costly and uptime profitable. Analysts of the Eastern Med’s energy transition and regional integration underline how interconnectors and corridors **lock in peace dividends**—precisely the stabilizer this phase seeks.

([apnews.com](https://apnews.com/article/greece-israel-cyprus-power-cable-mediterranean-ce858162f7308e704dd2352cbeafe550), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/greek-foreign-minister-says-subsea-power-link-cyprus-will-conclude-2025-03-13), [commission.europa.eu](https://commission.europa.eu/projects/ending-energy-isolation-project-common-interest-euroasia-interconnector_en), [euroafrica-interconnector.com](https://www.euroafrica-interconnector.com), [iea.org](https://www.iea.org/policies/17197-project-prosperity), [ide-tech.com](https://ide-tech.com/en/project/sorek-b-desalination-plant), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/jordan-signs-deal-with-french-led-group-to-build-massive-desalination-plant), [iss.europa.eu](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_2024-10_IMEC.pdf), [ecfr.eu](https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-infinite-connection-how-to-make-the-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor-happen), [economictimesindiatimes.com](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/shipping-/-transport/iran-israel-conflict-adani-haifa-port-missile-strike-stake-importance/articleshow/121900351.cms), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/suez-canal-economic-zone-set-rapid-expansion-chairman-2024-11-05), [sis.gov.eg](https://sis.gov.eg/Story/191654/Egypt-establishing-logistics-hub-for-Gaza-aid-in-North-Sinai), [english.news.cn](https://english.news.cn/africa/20250717/93d5faf27af7441fb9eecf63be1f2dc1/c.html), [world-nuclear-news.org](https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/articles/supplementary-agreements-signed-for-el-dabaa-project), [world-nuclear.org](https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/egypt), [atlanticcouncil.org](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/great-sea-connections-financing-the-eastern-mediterraneans-energy-transition), [documents1.worldbank.org](https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/177631603170717413/pdf/Trading-Together-Reviving-Middle-East-and-North-Africa-Regional-Integration-in-the-Post-COVID-Era.pdf))

**Public Opinion Transformation.**

By month six, the story arc bends from despair to **shared dignity**. The guarantors launch a **Coalition of Civilizations Campaign** that pairs **contact-at-scale** with responsible storytelling. Evidence is clear: sustained, cooperative contact reduces prejudice; we operationalize this through **1,000 sister-school and sister-city pairings**, joint youth institutes, and service projects that put Israeli, Palestinian, Arab, and Jewish diaspora communities shoulder-to-shoulder on constructive work.

**Narrative shift.** Major outlets adopt **peace-journalism** practices—foregrounding solutions, human impacts, and de-escalatory framing—while local media run monthly reconciliation features. Social platforms roll out **empathy-based counterspeech prompts** and targeted enforcement that demonstrably reduce toxic content without politicizing debate. The result is a feed where **joint graduations, co-founded startups, and pediatric-ward success stories** outrun outrage-bait.

**Measurable outcomes.** A **Cohesion Dashboard** tracks the turn: hate-incident baselines (e.g., 2023–25 spikes in **antisemitism** and **anti-Muslim** cases) trend downward as contact programs scale and rhetoric cools; OSCE-ODIHR reporting and civil-society monitors verify the drop. Universities, faith leaders, and civic groups issue **joint statements** and run co-curricular dialogues, replacing dueling rallies with humanitarian drives for rebuilding and trauma care.

**Strategic effect.** With reconciliation visible in classrooms, campuses, and congregations, the oxygen for extremist narratives thins. The public square leans toward a simple, durable message: **we answered the old “clash” frame with a living coalition for peace**—not as slogan, but as daily practice.

([pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16737372), [annualreviews.org](https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163607), [chicagobooth.edu](https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/summer-camp-can-bring-peace-for-israelis-and-palestinians), [mediapeaceproject.smpa.gwu.edu](https://mediapeaceproject.smpa.gwu.edu/2017/12/14/what-is-peace-journalism), [ethicalspace.pubpub.org](https://ethicalspace.pubpub.org/pub/3somby2g/release/1), [pnas.org](https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116310118), [dl.acmorg](https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3134666), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-antisemitic-incidents-hit-record-high-2023-amid-war-gaza-report-says-2024-04-16), [aljazeera.com](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/11/anti-muslim-hate-hits-new-high-in-us-advocacy-group), [tellmamauk.org](https://tellmamauk.org/tell-mama-records-the-highest-number-of-anti-muslim-hate-cases-in-2024-since-its-founding), [hatecrime.osce.org](https://hatecrime.osce.org/infocus/2023-hate-crime-data-now-available))

### Statehood Horizon & Recognition Ladder

**Purpose.** To translate Phase-3 benchmarks into a **time-bound horizon toward Palestinian statehood** and a **sequenced recognition ladder** by a coalition of partners, while protecting symmetry, verification, and humanitarian insulation.

**A. Horizon (political)**

1. **Destination statement.** Guarantors affirm that **two states**—Israel and Palestine—living side by side in peace and security is the end-state, with **no annexation and no territorial reduction**.
2. **Certification gate.** Upon **Phase-3 Certification** (corridor dismantled; Annex-7 Stage-2 completed; security & governance benchmarks met), the **Recognition Ladder** in §B activates.

**B. Recognition Ladder (sequenced, performance-linked benefits)**

* **R-0 (Now):** Partner governments **publicly reaffirm** the two-state end-state and lodge intention statements to align future recognition with verifiable progress. *(FR, UK, PT have announced or signaled readiness windows; DE remains cautious about timing.)*
* **R-1 (UNGA window):** A coordinated **UNGA high-level statement** endorses the Phase-3 roadmap, invites UN organs to support institution-building, and calls for technical assistance to elections and borders (non-vetoable).
* **R-2 (Coordinated bilateral recognition):** **Core Five** partners (UK, FR, PT, CA, AU) undertake **coordinated bilateral recognition** of the State of Palestine *upon Phase-3 Certification* and the issuance of the **No-Annexation/No-Reduction Certificate**.
* ***R-3 (EU measures):*** *The EU and willing member states* ***upgrade mission status****, launch a* ***structured support package*** *(budget support, customs, border management under EUBAM/AMA), and invite Palestine to preparatory dialogues under existing EU neighborhood instruments.*
* **R-4 (Broader alignment):** Additional G7 and like-minded partners consider recognition or recognition-equivalent upgrades aligned to the certification calendar.

**Notes:** Recognition decisions remain **sovereign**; this ladder **does not** make recognition conditional on unrelated files. It sequences **benefits** to **verification**, preserving integrity while building momentum.

**C. Saudi-Led Reconstruction Compact (SRC)**

**Objective.** To mobilize **first-tranche financing** for Gaza/West Bank recovery, conditioned on compliance, with disbursements tied to **verify-to-unlock** milestones.

1. **Scale & need.** The **IRDNA** (UN-EU-WB) estimates **~$53.2bn** over ten years (≈**$20bn** in the first three). The **SRC** aims to cover a **significant share of early-year needs**, alongside EU, G7, and IFIs.
2. **Lead & contributors.** **Saudi Arabia** convenes the compact with **UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, EU, G7** and the **World Bank** as trustee, aligning with ongoing Arab deliberations that have floated **~$20bn** in regional contributions.
3. **Trigger.** SRC launches **upon Phase-3 Certification** and **EUBAM/AMA border operations** reaching steady state (Rafah uptime benchmark).
4. **Guardrails.** Funds flow through a **Unified Escrow** sub-board; disbursement is tied to **Annex-2 matrix** (e.g., corridor dismantlement, Annex-7 completion, anti-corruption/financial-integrity codes). Humanitarian flows remain insulated (UNSCR **2664**).
5. **Normalization lane (political signal).** **Saudi Arabia** reiterates that **normalization with Israel** requires a **credible path to a Palestinian state**; progress on the ladder and SRC compliance forms the **political floor** for future steps.

### D. Verification & Snapbacks (interface)

* **Verification:** JMVM certifies Phase-3 benchmarks; Depositary issues the **No-Annexation/No-Reduction Certificate**.
* **Snapbacks:** If Phase-3 benchmarks **slip**, **benefits** in R-2/3/4 and **SRC tranches** **pause** proportionally (aid floors continue per **2664**). Recognition acts already taken are **not revoked**; instead, **programmatic benefits** are suspended until compliance restores.

## Phase 4: Implementation and Enforceable Peace (Month 6 onwards)

The ceasefire dividend now becomes **treaty-backed reality**. Israel and Palestine sign a **Peace Treaty**—witnessed by guarantors—and **register it with the UN (Charter Art. 102)** so obligations are public, traceable, and enforceable before UN organs. Embassies open on an agreed sequence, while **transitional arrangements** govern complex districts (e.g., special-regime areas) until local power-sharing and services are fully normalized.

**Security you can feel.** A **conditions-based international presence** supports the buildup of reformed Palestinian security services and joint Israeli-Palestinian incident response. The mandate is **time-bound but renewable**, with a **clear exit on benchmarks**, drawing on proven models from the Balkans (**KFOR**, **EUFOR Althea**) and the region (**UNTSO/UNIFIL**) to keep deterrence credible while sovereignty grows. **SOFA/SOMA** frameworks protect mission impartiality and accountability.

**HLSC: a permanent, light footprint.** A **Holy Land Stability Commission**—civilian, impartial, and cooperative—monitors compliance, runs hotlines, issues public bulletins, and convenes joint boards to defuse disputes. Its design borrows from **OSCE field missions** that have quietly underwritten stability across Europe for decades.

**Refugees, with dignity.** Durable solutions proceed by consent and capacity: **voluntary repatriation**, **local integration**, and **resettlement** where needed, with services and legal guarantees sequenced to **UNHCR** standards. Family reunification and documentation get fast-tracked to turn freedom of movement from paper to practice.

**Rebuild at scale—fairly and fast.** A **Middle East Reconstruction Compact** channels funds through a multi-donor trust with **performance-linked tranches** and local procurement. The first three years prioritize debris removal, WASH, power, hospitals, and schools—sized to the **Interim Rapid Damage & Needs Assessment** (≈**$53 billion** decade-long needs). Private capital follows as risk falls, with export corridors and interconnectors from Phase 3 doing the heavy lifting.

**Managing spoilers.** Fringe violence is met by **joint, law-bound response**: targeted arrests, court-ready evidence, and transparent reporting—no collective punishment, no revenge spirals. The **snapback ladder** remains in reserve; humanitarian channels stay protected.

**Global ripple effects.** Success here **raises the ceiling for cooperation elsewhere**: guarantors find it easier to coordinate on other files (non-proliferation, climate, de-escalation theatres). As the **security-and-cooperation norm** strengthens (think how durable missions in the Balkans anchored regional recovery), trust compounds and enforcement credibly remains multipolar.

**Strategic end-state.** Treaty, institutions, and daily life line up: **a Palestinian state delivering services and security**, **an Israel living without siege psychology**, and **a region where borders are interfaces, not fault lines**. The roadmap stays what it promised—**scientific on incentives, pragmatic on sequence, and idealistic about justice**—and turns an intractable conflict into a **pillar of a wider coalition for peace**.

([legal.un.org](https://legal.un.org/repertory/art102.shtml), [nato.int](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15884.doc.htm), [peacekeeping.unorg](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/untso), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/faqs), [digitallibrary.un.org](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/101559), [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/mandate), [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/where-we-are), [unhcr.org](https://www.unhcr.org/handbooks/ih/getting-started/what-resettlement), [unhcr.org](https://www.unhcr.org/us/what-we-do/build-better-futures/solutions), [worldbank.org](https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/02/18/new-report-assesses-damages-losses-and-needs-in-gaza-and-the-west-bank), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15884.doc.htm))

# **Conclusion: From Holy War to Holy Peace**

In a land where the language of the sacred too often became the language of war, a different sanctity is now being affirmed: the sanctity of life itself. This memorandum has shown that peace is not a miracle to be awaited but a future to be built—step by step, with verifiable commitments, lawful deterrence, and the steady work of human hands. It marries reason to conscience: a Nash-style equilibrium that rewards cooperation and deters violation, bound to a moral compact that protects civilians, dignifies worship, and keeps holy sites beyond the reach of politics.

Moving from holy war to holy peace means re-ordering what we honor. We choose children sleeping safely over banners carried into battle; shared custodianship of sacred places over competing claims of possession; the patient architecture of phased implementation over the false promise of decisive victories. In this balance—justice with mercy, security with dignity—each people’s core needs are safeguarded, and neither must seek safety at the other’s expense.

The path set out here is practical and principled. It couples immediate relief with enforceable guarantees; invites regional and global co-sponsors to shoulder responsibility together; and embeds religious and cultural safeguards so that faith is a bridge, not a battleground. If the parties and their partners keep faith with these commitments, the center of gravity will hold: away from retribution, toward reconciliation; away from zero-sum rivalry, toward a rules-based peace that all can defend.

Holy peace is not naïveté; it is discipline. It is the discipline to verify, to de-escalate, to listen across difference, and to keep returning to the table when fear would send us back to the field. Let this be our shared vow: to make cooperation more rational than conflict and the protection of human life our common act of devotion—so that, in this most storied of places, the sacred is finally measured by the futures we save.

**To Israelis:** The ethical command to “seek peace and pursue it” is honored here through enforceable calm, protected worship, and the dignity of every life. Leading with restraint and law enlarges Israel’s security and the promise of a thriving, peaceful homeland.

**To Palestinians:** “If they incline to peace, then incline to it” finds form in unity under lawful institutions, protection for all faiths, and a sovereign future built on justice. Let governance, not grievance, carry the sacrifices of generations into a state worthy of them.

**To Christian communities and other faiths:** “Blessed are the peacemakers” is a charge to build guardrails: reject incitement, protect holy sites, care for children and the vulnerable, and accompany this peace with reconciliation work that heals memory.

**To regional and global partners:** Let conscience become coordination—joint guarantees, fair monitoring, and reconstruction that rewards compliance and deters relapse. Keep the sanctity of human life as our common measure.

Across our traditions humanity recognizes a shared ethic: “Steadfast love and faithfulness meet; righteousness and peace kiss” (Ps. 85). “God invites to the Home of Peace” (Qur’an 10:25). “Blessed are the peacemakers” (Mt. 5:9). Let these be touchstones, not trophies—guiding Israelis and Palestinians, and all who stand with them, toward the sober work of reconciliation.

Let this moment be a beginning, not an end: a ceasefire maturing into reconciliation, reconciliation into cooperation, and cooperation into shared prosperity. Security, here, is intertwined; dignity, mutual; memory, safeguarded for every community. The holy is honored not by triumph over one another, but by the futures we build together.

With faith in God for those who believe, and faith in each other for all, may the parties—supported by regional and global partners—step into a new morning where restraint is strength, mercy is wisdom, and every child can sleep without fear. May swords be forged into ploughshares, and may “nation not lift up sword against nation, neither learn war anymore.”

*Issued jointly by representatives of the Unified State coalition and endorsed by the concerned parties, as a testament to unity over division and to science and strategy guided by compassion.*

# Annex 1 — Game Theory Analysis: Toward a Nash Equilibrium Peace in Gaza

*(For methodology and canonical sources see 1.A–1.D)*

In crafting this section we adopt a game‑theoretic lens, as in the “[Unified State Advisory Memorandum No. 7: Roadmap to Ceasefire and Lasting Peace in Ukraine](https://www.unifiedstate.us/unified-state-advisory-memorandum-07/)“. The war in Gaza is not just a bilateral confrontation but a multi‑player strategic interaction: Israel, Hamas and other Palestinian groups, the Palestinian Authority, the roughly two million civilians trapped in Gaza, the Israeli hostages and prisoners, regional neighbours (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iran), international mediators (Qatar, the United States, Egypt), and great‑power stakeholders (European Union, China, Russia). Each player chooses actions based on how they perceive others will act and on their own best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNAs). The conflict’s complexity, asymmetry of power and history of mutual mistrust make cooperation extremely difficult, but a stable peace is still possible if the proposed settlement constitutes a **Nash equilibrium**: once the agreement is in place, no party—neither Israel nor Hamas nor any guarantor—should gain by unilaterally breaking the deal. This annex explains how we build such an equilibrium for Gaza by analysing payoffs, designing enforcement mechanisms and integrating the diverse positions in our database.

**1. War as a Prisoner’s Dilemma**

The October 7 2023 attack by Hamas killed about 1,200 people in Israel and led to the capture of 251 hostages. Israel responded with a massive air and ground campaign across the Gaza Strip. After nearly two years of fighting, the human cost is staggering: Gaza’s Ministry of Health reports that over **60,000 Palestinians have been killed** and around **145,870 wounded**. Vast areas of the enclave have been reduced to rubble, **the majority of the population has been displaced**, and famine conditions are emerging. During a two‑and‑a‑half‑month total blockade beginning in March 2025 the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) found that **470,000 people were experiencing catastrophic hunger** and the **entire population was acutely food insecure**; the report projected that **71,000 children and more than 17,000 mothers** would need urgent treatment. United Nations officials have warned that the situation has moved from a hunger crisis to outright starvation, with **over 1,200 Palestinians killed and more than 8,100 injured** while trying to access food and aid.

([pbs.org](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/over-60000-palestinians-have-died-in-the-israel-hamas-war-gazas-health-ministry-says), [wfp.org](https://www.wfp.org/news/risk-famine-across-all-gaza-new-report-says), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16135.doc.htm))

From a strategic perspective, Israel continues the war in the hope of destroying Hamas, freeing the remaining **50 hostages** and reasserting deterrence. Hamas, meanwhile, believes that prolonged resistance—helped by regional allies like Hezbollah and Iran—will preserve its bargaining leverage, secure a lifting of the blockade and possibly lead to concessions on Palestinian statehood. Each side fears that a unilateral ceasefire would let the other regroup: Israel fears that Hamas would rearm and repeat October 7, while Hamas fears that Israel would consolidate control and renege on reconstruction. External actors also calculate: the United States remains Israel’s principal ally and **vetoed a June 2025 Security Council resolution** demanding an immediate and permanent ceasefire because it lacked condemnation of Hamas and a call for disarmament. China and many other states, by contrast, **call for an immediate, durable ceasefire and the implementation of a two‑state solution**. These conflicting expectations create a classic **prisoner’s dilemma**: cooperation (a negotiated peace) is better for everyone, yet the fear of defection pushes the players toward continued conflict.

([press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16140.doc.htm), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-backed-gaza-aid-group-halt-distribution-wednesday-un-vote-ceasefire-demand-2025-06-04), [en.people.cn](https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0806/c90000-20349796.html))

**2. Analysing the Payoff Matrix and BATNAs**

To shift this conflict from a destructive non‑cooperative equilibrium to a cooperative one, we analyse each actor’s BATNA and design a settlement that **Pareto‑dominates ongoing war**.

* **Israel’s BATNA** is to pursue total military victory. After March 2025, Israel imposed a complete blockade and resumed major offensives, aiming to seize Gaza City. Israeli officials argue that only destroying Hamas and recovering all hostages will ensure national security. However, the cost is immense: the humanitarian toll is catastrophic, regional escalation has drawn Israel into clashes with Hezbollah, the Houthis and even Iran; domestic protests by tens of thousands of Israelis increasingly call for a deal to free hostages. The U.S. veto at the Security Council underscores that Israel cannot count indefinitely on international support if humanitarian conditions remain catastrophic. A prolonged war may degrade Israel’s international standing and risk wider war. ([reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-accepts-proposed-deal-ceasefire-with-israel-hostage-release-egyptian-2025-08-18), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16140.doc.htm), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-backed-gaza-aid-group-halt-distribution-wednesday-un-vote-ceasefire-demand-2025-06-04))
* **Hamas’s BATNA** is to survive, maintain control of Gaza and possibly force concessions through attrition. Yet the military balance is unfavourable and the civilian toll is eroding support. The war has devastated Hamas’s infrastructure and left the group dependent on external funding; its fighters are isolated, and the starvation of Gaza’s population may trigger internal revolt. Continued resistance also risks Israel’s plan to take control of Gaza City and displace up to **800,000 more people**.
* **Palestinian civilians** have no viable BATNA. They face starvation, disease and displacement if the war continues. A negotiated ceasefire and humanitarian access is literally a matter of survival.
* **Regional and international actors** (Egypt, Qatar, the U.S., EU, China, Russia, Iran) have diverging interests but share a core aim: preventing the war from igniting a regional conflagration. Egypt and Qatar have mediated ceasefire proposals; Qatar confirmed on 18 August 2025 that Hamas **accepted a 60‑day truce** that would return half the hostages and release Palestinian prisoners. The proposal mirrors a plan previously accepted by the United States, showing that a mutually acceptable framework exists. China calls for a durable ceasefire and two‑state solution, Russia condemns Israel’s planned takeover of Gaza City, and many European states warn that blocking aid and bombing civilians is unacceptable. Prolonged war threatens their energy supplies, fuels extremism and undercuts international law.

These assessments indicate that the **expected costs of continued war far exceed the uncertain gains**. A rational game‑theoretic solution must therefore provide each actor with a better outcome than their BATNA. In classical terms, the war is currently stuck in a high‑cost Nash equilibrium (mutual defection). To reach a cooperative equilibrium, we must adjust payoffs by creating incentives for compliance and penalties for cheating.

**3. Designing a Self‑Enforcing Peace Plan**

Drawing on the Ukraine analysis, our unified Gaza peace roadmap is calibrated so that **no party will have an incentive to deviate** once the plan is in place. Key elements include:

1. **Balanced concessions and mutual benefit.** The agreement must satisfy each side’s core interests. For Israel, this means the unconditional release of all hostages, verifiable demilitarisation of Gaza and international guarantees that Hamas (and other militant groups) will not rebuild their offensive capabilities. For Palestinians, it means an immediate and permanent ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces, the lifting of the blockade to allow free flow of humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials, and a clear pathway toward self‑governance and eventual statehood. Our plan proposes a phased hostage‑prisoner exchange akin to the **60‑day truce accepted by Hamas**, coupled with an internationally monitored disarmament process and the deployment of a UN‑Arab League peacekeeping force to guarantee security. In exchange, Israel would gradually relinquish control of Gaza’s territory while retaining defensive perimeters and early‑warning mechanisms.
2. **Deterrence of cheating.** The agreement should embed automatic “snap‑back” mechanisms similar to those proposed in the Ukraine memo. Violations—such as resumption of rocket attacks, rearmament, or renewed blockade—would trigger proportional penalties. For example, if Hamas or other groups violate the ceasefire, the guarantor states (Egypt, Qatar, U.S., EU, China, Russia) would suspend reconstruction assistance and could authorise limited defensive actions. If Israel violates the ceasefire (e.g., by reimposing a total blockade or conducting large‑scale strikes without due process), sanctions would be reinstated and recognition of its demilitarisation of Gaza could be revoked. International monitors and satellite verification would provide transparency. This shifts the payoffs: defection becomes costlier than compliance.
3. **Iterative trust‑building and flexibility.** A phased approach allows for confidence‑building measures. An initial humanitarian pause would allow the entry of aid and the evacuation of the wounded. Subsequent phases would include the exchange of prisoners and hostages, withdrawal of Israeli forces, deployment of international peacekeepers, the establishment of an interim Palestinian administration with participation from both Fatah and non‑violent Hamas officials, and finally negotiations on a political settlement and reconstruction. Each phase would only proceed if the previous one is verified. This mimics an iterated game, encouraging cooperation through reciprocal moves. Escape valves—joint review mechanisms and the ability to adjust timelines by mutual consent—reduce the risk of sudden breakdown.
4. **Incorporating all players’ interests.** Peace will not hold if key external actors have incentives to spoil it. Our database of state positions shows that, despite rhetoric, there are overlapping interests: the U.S. wants hostages freed and Hamas weakened; China, Russia and the EU want a ceasefire and humanitarian access; Egypt and Qatar want stability and a boost to their diplomatic role; Iran and its proxies want relief from sanctions and a platform to influence Palestinian politics; Israel wants security and an end to rocket fire; Palestinians want dignity, freedom of movement and self‑determination. By packaging concessions—e.g., including an Iranian role in reconstruction funds under UN oversight in exchange for restraining Hezbollah and the Houthis; offering economic incentives to Egypt and Jordan for managing border crossings; providing China and Russia with roles in the peacekeeping mission—we increase the number of stakeholders invested in upholding the deal.
5. **Punishing spoilers and rewarding compliance.** The plan proposes targeted sanctions and legal consequences for actors who subvert the agreement, alongside rewards for compliance. For example, if Israel fully lifts the blockade and allows free movement, the EU and U.S. would provide security assistance and invest in regional economic corridors. If Hamas completes disarmament and renounces violence, it could transition to a political party and be integrated into a unified Palestinian administration. Spoilers—whether armed factions in Gaza, extremist Israeli settler groups, or external actors—would face diplomatic isolation and asset freezes.

**4. Using Big‑Data Analysis to Build a Unified Position**

Our memorandum benefits from an extensive **database of core positions** compiled from public statements, resolutions, media reports and expert analyses of more than 100 states and organisations, with an overview presented in this text, supported by links to diversified sources. This dataset includes:

* **Voting records** at the UN Security Council and General Assembly, such as the June 2025 **U.S. veto** of a ceasefire resolution and subsequent votes in August where many states condemned Israel’s plan to take over Gaza City.
* **Official speeches and press releases**, such as the **Chinese envoy’s call** for an immediate, durable ceasefire and two‑state solution, and UN officials’ warnings that the Gaza population faces starvation.
* **Media reports** documenting casualty figures, humanitarian conditions and positions of the warring parties.

By synthesising these diverse sources we identify each actor’s red lines and preferences. The database reveals, for example, that Israel consistently demands the complete disarmament of Hamas and the return of all hostages; Hamas rejects disarmament without a path to statehood; China and Russia emphasise a two‑state solution and condemn starvation; the U.S. will not support a ceasefire that leaves Hamas in control. Mapping these positions into a multidimensional payoff matrix allows us to propose trade‑offs that satisfy as many constraints as possible. For instance, combining a phased disarmament with international supervision meets Israel’s security concerns while giving Hamas time to transition into a political entity. Including China and Russia in the guarantor group addresses their desire for multipolar involvement and reduces the risk of unilateral Western domination.

**5. The Nash Equilibrium Peace**

A **Nash equilibrium** occurs when no actor can unilaterally improve its payoff by deviating, given the strategies of others. Our proposed Gaza peace plan achieves this by balancing interests and altering payoffs:

* **If Israel contemplates breaking the peace** (e.g., by reimposing a blockade or launching new offensives), it would face unified international sanctions and the withdrawal of reconstruction aid, while the peacekeeping force would bolster Palestinian defences. Israel would also risk renewed rocket fire and global isolation. The cost of defection would outweigh any potential security gains.
* **If Hamas or other militants consider violating the ceasefire** (e.g., by smuggling weapons or launching attacks), they would lose their political legitimacy, forfeit reconstruction funds and face swift and unified counter‑measures by the guarantor coalition. Given that Hamas’s BATNA is bleak—mass casualties, starvation and eventual military defeat—adhering to the agreement offers a far better outcome.
* **If external guarantors** (e.g., the U.S., China, Egypt, Qatar) contemplate undermining the deal for short‑term advantage, they would risk being blamed for renewed mass famine and regional war, which would harm their economic interests and global standing. Participating in a successful peace would, by contrast, enhance their prestige and influence.

In short, the plan is structured so that **everyone’s minimum conditions are met while the cost of defection is prohibitively high**. This transforms a zero‑sum war into a cooperative equilibrium. The economic reconstruction of Gaza, integrated into regional development corridors, and the establishment of a Palestinian self‑governing entity within a two‑state framework, provide long‑term incentives for all players to maintain stability.

**6. Conclusion: From Tragedy to Just Peace**

The war in Gaza has produced suffering on a scale that is almost unimaginable. **More than 60,000 lives have been lost**; children have been forced to dig their own graves; famine now stalks an entire population. In this darkest hour, game‑theoretic analysis offers a pathway to a rational, self‑enforcing peace. By carefully mapping each actor’s payoffs, leveraging our comprehensive database of state positions and embedding robust enforcement mechanisms, we can craft a settlement that no party will want to abandon. This is not a cold, mechanical exercise; it is grounded in an ethical commitment to human dignity and the universal values of empathy and justice. The Nash equilibrium peace we propose is therefore not only rational; it is, in the deepest sense, humane. It invites Israelis and Palestinians, and all who care about them, to step out of the prisoner’s dilemma and into a cooperative future—one where the Gaza Strip becomes a place of life rather than death, and where the two peoples can begin to heal under the gaze of the world.

## Annex 1.A — Equilibrium Conditions (Compact Test)

**Purpose.** A roadmap is *stable* if no core actor wants to defect when others comply. This box states the minimal inequalities, the strategy sets, and the enforcement levers that make cooperation self-interest–compatible.

**Strategy sets.**

* **Cooperate (C):** Adhere to ceasefire; hostages/POWs exchange cadence; aid & access corridors open; demobilization/disarmament milestones met; no re-armament or cross-border attacks; verification access granted.
* **Defect (D):** Any verified breach of the above (e.g., fire/strikes, re-armament, blockade/closure, targeting of civilians, denial of monitors).

**Testable equilibrium condition (for each actor ):**

where are cooperation rewards (security, finance, legitimacy) and are credible, promptly applied losses (snapbacks, sanctions, interdictions). Monitoring and thresholds are defined in **Annex 3 (Verification & Remedies)**; finance mechanics in **§ Finance: Endowment-Style Trust**; operational steps in **Phased Implementation §§ 1–4**.  
  
(For proportional enforcement and due-process rules, see **Annex 1.B (Graduated Responses)** and **Annex 3 (Verification & Remedies)** for KPI thresholds (θ₍d₎), timers, and challenge windows; **Finance § Snapback Architecture** defines the k-of-n trigger.)

**Enforcement architecture (summary).**

* **k-of-n snapback:** Any *k* of *n* guarantors can freeze tranches or trigger sectoral measures upon a Joint Monitoring & Verification Mission breach finding above threshold for domain (aid access, incident severity, demilitarization, service uptime).  
  **Including China and Russia is part of making *k* reachable across blocs**
* **Graduated responses:** warning → partial tranche hold → sectoral sanctions/peacekeeping constraints; **forgiveness** for minor, swiftly-remedied breaches; **grim-trigger** reserved for mass-casualty/major violations.
* **Audience-costs:** Public dashboards and audit trails increase domestic legitimacy costs of defection for all sides.

**Actor-specific levers (what flips the inequality):**

* **Government of Israel.  
  *​:*** Border security + multinational VM, **Saudi-led normalization** steps, reconstruction off-load, tech & trade packages.  
  *:* Tranche freeze on normalization/aid, targeted sectoral measures, suspension of preferential access; VM-guided peacekeeping constraints if needed.
* **Gaza Interim Authority / PA (governance).**  
  *​:* Phased **reconstruction-for-disarmament** tranches, civil-service payroll support, crossing openings, governance legitimacy.  
  *​:* Tranche freeze, interdiction on dual-use imports, designation exposure for protected entities that violate terms.
* **Hamas/PIJ (armed elements) — spoiler focus.**  
  *:* Amnesty/reintegration for low-level fighters contingent on verified compliance; limited political pathway under proscribed-violence rules.  
  *​:* Financial asphyxiation, leadership targeting via international warrants/sanctions, exclusion from aid flows, coordinated interdiction.
* **Regional guarantors (Egypt, Qatar, Saudi, Türkiye).**  
  *:* Diplomatic prestige, trade/energy packages, infrastructure finance.  
  *​:* Escrowed funds paused, reputational costs via public Joint Monitoring & Verification Mission findings, conditional access to projects.
* **Great-power/Multilateral guarantors (US, EU, China, Russia, UN).**  
  *:* Regional stability dividends (energy prices, migration risk reduction), credit for enforcement success.  
  *:* Reputation and reciprocity costs if guarantees aren’t honored; k-of-n design limits any single veto from collapsing enforcement.

**How to use this box.**

1. Set initial **,**  by tying each tranche/guarantee to a specific KPI (Annex III).
2. Stress-test four scenarios (base, best-case, spoiler-shock, guarantor-split) and confirm the inequality still holds with graduated responses.
3. Publish the KPI dashboard to lock in audience-costs and reduce information asymmetry (challenge windows for due-process on alleged breaches).

If every row above satisfies ​, the roadmap’s cooperative path is a Nash equilibrium; with k-of-n and graduation, it is also coalition- and spoiler-resilient.  
  
**Sidebar — Coalition-Proof Nash (CPNE)**

Beyond single-actor stability, this roadmap is engineered so no likely sub-coalition (e.g., Hamas hardliners with external patrons; Israeli ultra-hardliners with minor partners) can jointly raise their payoffs by coordinated deviation. The **Joint Monitoring & Verification Mission + public dashboard** attributes breaches fast (raising domestic audience-costs), **k-of-n snapback** auto-freezes tranches across aid/normalization/dual-use domains, and **Annex 1.B’s proportional ladder** escalates penalties while preserving forgiveness for promptly cured minor breaches. The **Spoiler Policy** further collapses coordination gains—financial asphyxiation and exclusion for violent spoilers, alongside amnesty/reintegration paths that peel off low-level members—making such blocs internally unstable. Result: cooperation remains the uniquely self-enforcing choice for individuals **and** blocs (coalition-proof Nash), consistent with the inequalities formalized in **Annex 1.A**.

## Annex 1.B — Graduated Responses for Partial Defection (Proportionality Ladder)

**Purpose.** Keep enforcement metric-driven (not political) by tying responses to verified KPI deviations reported by the Verification Mission (VM).

**Domains & KPIs (examples).**

* **Humanitarian access:** corridor uptime, queue time, inspection delay.
* **Security incidents:** ceasefire violations, cross-border fire, casualty count.
* **Demilitarization:** milestone completion, weapons turnover, re-armament signals.
* **Service continuity:** power/water/health uptime, repair access.

**Thresholds.** Each domain *d* has a breach threshold **θ₍d₎** defined in Annex 3 (Verification & Remedies). Joint Monitoring & Verification Mission classifies incidents by severity below.

**Response ladder (applies to any actor; automatic unfreeze on cure):**

* **S1 — Minor deviation (below θ, promptly remedied).**VM notice + corrective action plan within **24h**; **no tranche impact**; logged on public dashboard.
* **S2 — Material breach (exceeds θ in one domain ≤72h, no casualties).  
  Partial tranche hold (10–30%)** in affected domain; intensified monitoring; **7-day cure window**.
* **S3 — Serious breach (multi-domain or casualty-causing; >72h persistence).** **Sectoral sanctions / expanded holds**, targeted dual-use controls, **peacekeeping constraints**; **k-of-n** guarantors confirm; **72h cure** with verifiable rollback.
* **S4 — Grave breach (mass-casualty attack, systematic access denial, verified re-armament).  
  Immediate full snapback** of tranches; referral to designated legal mechanisms; activation of **grim-trigger** provisions.

**Due process & data integrity.**

* **Challenge window:** accused party may file evidence within **48h**; Joint Monitoring & Verification Mission ( issues a reasoned determination.
* **Audit trail:** all findings, thresholds, and timers published on the dashboard to raise audience-costs for defection.
* **Forgiveness rule:** S1–S2 cured on time are **fully restored**; S3 requires monitored probation; S4 triggers treaty-specified long-horizon remedies.

**Governance.** Any **k of n** guarantors (as set in Finance/Enforcement text) may authorize S2–S4 measures upon a JMVM finding meeting **θ₍d₎**; no single actor holds a veto.

**Information Asymmetry & False-Positive Safeguards (Due Process).** To prevent sanctions on bad data—and thereby strengthen compliance—breach findings by the Verification Mission (VM) must meet domain thresholds **θ₍d₎** with **multi-source corroboration** (e.g., JMVM sensors/satellite + independent NGO/ICRC logs, or equivalent confidence score), and are subject to a **48-hour challenge window** and a **72-hour independent review** by a rotating, tri-partite **Independent Review Cell (IRC)** appointed by guarantors. During review, only **S1–S2** measures may apply unless there is ongoing harm or an S4-class event. A **safe-harbor rule** encourages self-reporting: deviations self-reported within 24 h and cured within 72 h revert to the lowest proportional rung with no reputational strike. All evidence chains are recorded in a **tamper-evident audit log** (hash-chained; sources/methods redacted as needed) and mirrored on the **public dashboard** with time-series KPIs, incident IDs, rationale, and final determinations, raising audience-costs for deception while protecting sensitive collection. This due-process layer aligns incentives to disclose and cure quickly, reduces escalation from misreads, and keeps **k-of-n** snapbacks tied to transparent, reviewable facts.

## Annex 1.C — Dynamic Credibility: Trigger Strategies (Repeated Game Playbook)

**Purpose.** Make cooperation self-enforcing over time by pairing the response ladder with clear, repeatable “if-then” rules that deter major violations without igniting escalation spirals.

**Default rule — Tit-for-Tat with Forgiveness (TFT-F).**

* **Start in C (cooperate).**On a **verified S1–S2 breach**, mirror proportionally **next period** (apply the corresponding rung from Annex 1.B), **offer a cure path**, and **revert to C upon cure**.
* **Probation:** after cure, require **M clean periods** (e.g., 14 days) before full restoration of tranches/permissions.
* **Self-report leniency:** deviations **self-reported within 24 h** and **cured within 72 h** are handled at the **minimal rung** with no reputational strike (per Due-Process rules).

**Escalation rule — Two-Step for Serious Breaches.**For **S3** (multi-domain or casualty-causing; >72 h persistence):

1. Immediate **sectoral hold / expanded monitoring**;
2. If uncured by the deadline, **auto-escalate one rung** (per Annex 1.B) via **k-of-n** authorization.

**Deterrence rule — Grim Trigger for Grave Breaches.**For **S4** (mass-casualty attack, systematic access denial, verified re-armament):

* **Immediate full snapback** of tranches; **normalization track suspended**; shift to **enforcement posture** until the treaty’s **rehabilitation conditions** are met (e.g., disarmament steps, arrests/hand-overs, monitored stand-down) **plus T clean periods** before re-entry to TFT-F.

**Windowed memory to prevent spiral.** Use a rolling window of **W periods** (e.g., 30 days) for reciprocity calculations so ancient incidents don’t permanently harden play; meeting **W** days of clean KPIs resets to full cooperation.

**Positive reciprocity — Compliance Credits.** Actors earn **credits** for *over-performance* (e.g., faster crossings, extra demobilization, humanitarian surges). Credits can **accelerate tranches**, **compress probation**, or **unlock pilot projects**, creating upside for visible cooperation.

**Shadow-of-the-future condition (intuition).**

Let be each actor’s discount factor. The trigger set above sustains cooperation when the value of staying cooperative (security, finance, legitimacy) **exceeds** the one-off gain from defection **minus** the expected, repeated penalties:

(Annex 1.A defines ,; Annex 1.B defines penalties per rung.)

**Worked micro-examples (for clarity).**

* *S2 rocket salvo, promptly condemned and demobilized:* 10–30% hold; 7-day cure; **TFT-F** restores on time; **probation M**; credits for verified weapons turnover.
* *Crossing closure causes 36 h delay (S2):* partial hold; 7-day cure; if >72 h or multi-domain → **S3** two-step.
* *Mass-casualty bombing (S4):* **grim trigger**: full snapback; normalization paused; enforcement posture until conditions met + **T** clean periods.

**Governance & transparency.**

The **Oversight Council** codifies these triggers in SOPs; the **JMVM** runs timers and severity classifications; the **public dashboard** displays a simple **state-machine** (C → S1/S2/S3/S4 → Cure/Probation → C) with time-stamped decisions to raise audience-costs for defection and reward timely cures.

## 

## Annex 1.D — Stress Tests & Sensitivity (4-Scenario Matrix)

**Purpose.** Demonstrate that cooperation remains each actor’s best response under plausible shocks. Matrix pairs **assumptions → risks → pre-baked levers** tied to **Annex 1.A (inequalities)**, **Annex 1.B (ladder)**, **Annex 1.C (triggers)**, and **Annex 3 (θ₍d₎, timers, JMVM rules)**.

**Baseline:** Phases 1–2 active; JMVM + public dashboard live; escrow/snapback operating; **k-of-n = 3/5** for finance/security; domain thresholds **θ₍d₎** set; discount factors **δ** for principals high (long horizon).

| **Scenario** | **Trigger snapshot** | **Main risks** | **Stabilizers (pre-baked levers to keep NE)** | **KPIs / thresholds to watch\*** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Best-case (Acceleration)** | Spoilers weak; publics supportive; crossings uptime high; hostage/POW cadence met | Complacency; aid leakage; overextension | Use **compliance credits** to accelerate safe tranches; pilot **normalization** steps; keep **S1** oversight & audits; hold **probation M** (don’t zero it) | Corridor uptime ≥ **90%**; incident-severity index < **S1** band; demilitarization milestones ≥ **95%** on time |
| **Base-case (Expected Noise)** | Intermittent **S1–S2** deviations; political churn; gradual economic lift | Slippage; isolated attacks; narrative warfare | **TFT-F** (Annex 1.C); apply **S2 partial holds**; targeted dual-use controls; fast JMVM notices; proactive comms via dashboard | ≥ **90%** of S1–S2 cured ≤ **72h**; no multi-domain persistence > **72h**; re-arm signals below **θ\_demil** |
| **Spoiler-shock** | **S4** event by rogue/non-compliant cell; attribution contested | Escalation spiral; collective punishment; public support collapse | **Grim-trigger** on perpetrators; isolate with **Spoiler Policy** (finance asphyxiation, warrants); **maintain civilian access**; **k-of-n** snapback; third-party forensics; due-process windows | Attribution confidence ≥ **0.8** before S3+ on wider actors; civilian-access uptime ≥ **70%**; time-to-VM finding ≤ **48–72h** |
| **Guarantor-split** | One principal balks; geopolitics shift; sanctions fatigue | Enforcement paralysis; free-riding; moral hazard | Rely on **k-of-n** (no single veto); pre-authorized sectoral measures by remaining guarantors; escrow **re-weighting**; side-payments to neutralize holdouts; public naming on dashboard | Decision time ≤ **72h**; % tranches frozen ≥ **70%** of exposure; abstainer share ≤ **1/5** across domains |

\*Illustrative values; calibrate in **Annex 3** and publish on the dashboard.

**Sensitivity sweeps (what strains the equilibrium & how to hedge)**

* **k-of-n rule.** If coordination frays, keep **k = 3** but allow **domain-specific n** (finance n=5; security n=4) so action remains feasible without lowering standards.
* **Thresholds θ₍d₎.** Too tight → false positives; too lax → moral hazard. Recalibrate monthly to base rates; require **multi-source corroboration** (VM sensors/satellite + NGO/ICRC logs).
* **Discounting (δ).** If actors value the present more (δ ↓), **front-load Rᵢ** (early security dividends, visible normalization) and increase **Lᵢ** salience (larger first-rung holds, shorter timers to S3).
* **Tranche size & cadence.** If Lᵢ is weak, **rebundle** tranches (finance + normalization + access permissions) so snapbacks bite; avoid micro-tranches that lack leverage.
* **Attribution lag.** If time-to-confidence > **72h**, cap measures at **S2** pending review; pre-position forensic teams to cut lag.
* **Audience-cost visibility.** Mirror the dashboard to third-party hosts; if outages occur, issue **pre-committed communiqués** with incident IDs and timers.
* **Spoiler finance.** If illicit flows > threshold, auto-expand sanctions perimeter to enablers; synchronize designation lists among guarantors.

**Decision checklist (pre-commit these)**

1. **If KPI X crosses θ₍d₎ for Y hours** → apply rung **S2**; announce timer & cure path.
2. **If multi-domain or >72h persistence** → escalate to **S3** via **k-of-n**.
3. **If S4** → execute **grim-trigger**; preserve humanitarian access; communicate rehabilitation path & **T** clean periods to re-enter TFT-F.

## **Annex** 1 **Reference Guide**

**1.A — Foundations & core concepts**

* Myerson, *Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict* (canonical, policy-oriented text): [jstor.org](https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjsf522), [hup.harvard.edu](https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674341166)
* Osborne & Rubinstein, *A Course in Game Theory* (free grad-level reference): [sites.math.rutgers.edu](https://sites.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/EM20/OsborneRubinsteinMasterpiece.pdf)
* Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (iterated PD; why reciprocity works): [eestanford.edu](https://ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/axelrod.pdf)

**1.B — Repeated games, reciprocity & enforcement**

* Fudenberg & Maskin, “The Folk Theorem…” (what long-run cooperation can sustain): [scholar.harvard.edu](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/maskin/files/folk_theorem_in_repeated_games_with_discounting_or_incomplete_information.pdf), [jeromemathis.fr](https://jeromemathis.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/FudenbergTirole_ECA1986.pdf)
* Abreu, “On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting” (optimal punishments/penal codes): [ideas.repec.org](https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v56y1988i2p383-96.html)
* Green & Porter, “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Information” (trigger strategies under noise—intuition for grim-trigger/snapback): [jeromemathis.fr](https://jeromemathis.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/GreenPorter_ECA1984.pdf)
* Nowak & Sigmund, “Tit-for-Tat in Heterogeneous Populations” + “Generous TFT” (why calibrated forgiveness beats rigidity): [nature.com](https://www.nature.com/articles/355250a0), [pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov](https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2614626)

**1.C — Multiparty stability & decision rules**

* Bernheim, Peleg & Whinston, “Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria (I: Concepts; II: Applications)” (self-enforcing deals resilient to side-deviations): [bernheim.people.stanford.edu](https://bernheim.people.stanford.edu/publications/coalition-proof-nash-equilibria-i-concepts), [sciencedirect.com](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022053187901001)
* Moreno & Wooders, “Coalition-Proof Equilibrium” (communication without binding contracts): [sciencedirect.com](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825696900950)
* Qualified-majority voting (k-of-n style thresholds) — Council of the EU explainer (designing veto-robust triggers): [consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority)
* Shamir, “How to Share a Secret” (threshold schemes—useful analogy for multi-key authorizations): [web.mit.edu](https://web.mit.edu/6.857/OldStuff/Fall03/ref/Shamir-HowToShareASecret.pdf)

**1.D — Verification, monitoring, sanctions & peace support**

* OSCE Vienna Document (inspection & notification CSBMs—playbook for on-the-ground verification): [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/4/86597.pdf), [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/fsc/74528)
* OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine — mandate & practice (civilian monitoring model): [osce.org](https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed), [europarl.europa.eu](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede140715oscemissionukraine_/sede140715oscemissionukraine_en.pdf)
* IAEA Safeguards (independent technical verification—principles & methods): [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification), [iaea.org](https://www.iaea.org/topics/verification-and-other-safeguards-activities)
* UN targeted/“smart” sanctions — design & effectiveness (listing/delisting, monitoring panels, impact): [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/special_research_report_sanctions_2013.pdf), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/information), [padf.org](https://www.padf.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Evaluating-Targeted-Sanctions-Report-Nov-2023.pdf)
* “Snapback” under UNSCR 2231 (rapid re-imposition mechanism; lessons for contingency clauses): [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/2231/background), [armscontrol.org](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/un-security-council-resolutions-iran), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/how-un-sanctions-iran-could-be-restored-2025-04-10)
* Peacekeeping principles (consent, impartiality, limited use of force)—doctrine references: [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping), [resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net](https://resourcehub01.blob.core.windows.net/training-files/Training%20Materials/003%20CPTM-EN/003-022%20Final%20Lesson%201.3%20160517.pdf)

**Negotiation craft (BATNA, audience costs & signaling)**

* Harvard PON — BATNA primers & practice notes: [pon.harvard.edu](https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/batna/translate-your-batna-to-the-current-deal), [pon.harvard.edu](https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/batna/take-your-batna-to-the-next-level)
* Sebenius (HBS): BATNA—common errors & types (advanced guidance): [hbs.edu](https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/17-055_878a070d-7972-4ce3-95ce-73f424a38900.pdf)
* Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes” (audience costs and credibility): [web.stanford.edu](https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Domestic-Political-Audiences-and-the-Escalation-of-International-Disputes.pdf), [jstor.org](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944796)

**Transparency & tamper-evident public logs (for dashboards/audit trails)**

* RFC 6962 Certificate Transparency (append-only Merkle-tree logs): [rfc-editor.org](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962.html)
* Google Trillian “Transparent Logging” (operational guide): [googlegithub.io](https://google.github.io/trillian/docs/TransparentLogging.html)

# **Annex 2** — **Ceasefire and Snapback Enforcement Matrix** E**xample**

**Purpose.** Operationalize fast, impartial, *pre-agreed* responses to specific ceasefire breaches so that politics can’t stall enforcement. The matrix below turns “breach → consequence” into an automatic, time-boxed ladder—symmetrical, proportional, and veto-resistant—consistent with your Annex Highlights and unified escrow/snap-back design.

**Editorial note — evolution from** [**Memorandum No. 7**](https://www.unifiedstate.us/unified-state-advisory-memorandum-07/)**.**

This Annex adapts the “Enforcement & Snapback Matrix (example)” architecture first set out in **Memorandum No. 7 (Ukraine)** to Gaza’s distinct verification, humanitarian-access, and multipolar-guarantor realities. In Memo 7, Annex 2 appeared alongside two additional **example** templates — a **Justice & Accountability Enforcement Matrix** and a **Security Guarantees Enforcement Matrix (G2 model)** — intended for parties to tailor in talks. In **Memorandum No. 11**, these two example templates are **not** reproduced; they are incorporated **by reference** as optional models for negotiation teams to customize, while this Annex focuses narrowly on **ceasefire breach → consequence** rules, **time-boxed snapback**, and **k-of-n** trigger design linked to **Annex 1.B’s** proportional ladder and a **humanitarian firewall**. The result is **complementary, not duplicative**: Memo 7 provides broader justice/security scaffolds; Memo 11 operationalizes a Gaza-specific, veto-resistant ceasefire control system that can interlock with those scaffolds at the parties’ discretion.

**Principles**

1. **Verification first.** Independent monitors attribute incidents within hours using multi-source evidence (human observers, fixed cameras, UAV, SIGINT/OSINT), drawing on proven peacekeeping & liaison models.
2. **Proportionality ladder.** Responses scale by severity (S1 — Minor deviation, S2 — Material breach, S3 — Serious breach, S4 — Grave breach) with humanitarian channels fire-walled—no collective punishment.
3. **Snap-forward / snap-back.** Incentives unlock only on verified compliance; privileges automatically re-freeze within 48h upon breach, per your unified escrow design and Memo 7 mirror.
4. **Multipolar guardrails.** Any **3 of 5** principals (e.g., U.S., EU, Turkey, Egypt, UN lead) can trigger tranche freeze above threshold θ (cf. Annex 1.A)
5. **Liaison & deconfliction.** Round-the-clock hotline + tripartite meetings (IDF–Palestinian Security–Peacekeeping HQ) prevent escalation, modeled on UNIFIL’s Blue Line practice.

**Definitions**

* **Oversight Council (OC):** 5 principals; emergency decisions by 3/5 after verification report.
* **Thresholds:** S1 (minor), S2 (material), S3 (serious ), S4 (grave) set in Annex 1.B and Rules of Engagement.
* **Timers:** *T+0* (incident), *T+6h* (prelim. notice), *T+24h* (attribution), *T+48h* (snap-back), *T+7d* (remedy review).

**Table 1 “Breach”**

| **Breach (examples)** | **Verification & Thresholding → S-tag (Annex 1.B)** |
| --- | --- |
| **1. Rocket/mortar launch from Gaza** | *VM classifies S1/S2/S3/S4 by pattern & effects.* **S1** if below θ and promptly cured (false alarm/misfire). **S2** if single-domain ≤72 h with no casualties. **S3** if casualty-causing, multi-site/salvo, or persists >72 h. **S4** if mass-casualty or part of a verified systematic re-armament effort. |
| **2. Unprovoked Israeli strike/incursion** | *VM classifies S2/S3/S4 by harm and duration.* **S2** if contained, no casualties, ≤72 h. **S3** if casualty-causing, cross-domain escalation, or persists >72 h. **S4** if mass-casualty or systematic access-denial/collective-punishment pattern. |
| **3. Humanitarian obstruction (convoys/medevac)** | *Humanitarian firewall applies; aid never frozen.* **S1** if below θ and promptly cured (brief delay). **S2** for denial/impediment ≤72 h without casualties. **S3** for systematic/recurring denial, diversion/looting, or casualty-linked obstruction. **S4** for patterns causing widespread deprivation (e.g., starvation risk or critical medical denial). Legal anchors on rapid, unimpeded access and humanitarian principles. |
| **4. Border/arms smuggling (tunnels/sea/Sinai)** | **S1** if below θ and promptly cured (false positive/attempt with immediate interdiction). **S2** for isolated attempt within a single domain ≤72 h. **S3** for confirmed transfer, multi-node network, or persistence >72 h. **S4** for verified re-armament pipeline or state-linked facilitation (*EUBAM-style third-party surge may be mandated at S3/S4*). |
| **5. Hostage / prisoner-exchange default** | **S1** for minor schedule slip cured ≤24 h. **S2** for missed milestone ≤72 h. **S3** for partial non-delivery, bad-faith bargaining, or >72 h persistence. **S4** for outright refusal or reversal of prior releases. |
| **6. Peacekeeper interference / intimidation** | **S2** for obstruction/tampering without injuries. **S3** for harassment with injuries, kinetic threats, or systematic intimidation. **S4** for fatality, kidnapping, or command-directed interference (*tripartite liaison invoked immediately — UNIFIL model*). |
| **7. State-linked disinformation inciting violence** | **S2** for verified incitement artifacts from state-linked channels. **S3** for coordinated campaigns linked to violence/offline harm. **S4** for mass-violence outcomes or state-mandated incitement at scale. |
| **8. Political milestone default (e.g., port opening, security-sector reform)** | **S1** for brief, promptly cured delay below θ. **S2** for single-domain slippage ≤72 h. **S3** for multi-domain slippage or >72 h persistence. **S4** for refusal/repudiation or deliberate stalling. |

**Table 2 “Consequence”: S-Level → Timers & Measures (applies to every row above)**

| **S-level (Annex 1.B)** | **Meaning** | **T+0–24 h** | **T+48 h (if not cured)** | **T+7 d (if still not cured)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **S1 — Minor deviation (below θ; promptly remedied)** | Admin/disciplinary fix; no casualties | **VM notice** + corrective plan ≤24 h; **no tranche impact**; public log | — | — |
| **S2 — Material breach (exceeds θ in one domain ≤72 h; no casualties)** | Single-domain breach; contained | **Partial tranche hold (10–30%)** in affected domain; intensified monitoring; **7-day cure window** | **Partial hold persists**; public dashboard entry | Lift on verified cure; escalate to **S3** only if >72 h or spreads multi-domain |
| **S3 — Serious breach (multi-domain or casualty-causing; or >72 h persistence)** | Escalatory / harmful | **Sectoral sanctions / expanded holds;** targeted dual-use controls; **peacekeeping constraints**; **k-of-n** guarantors confirm | **Automatic sectoral snapback** sustained; publish compliance benchmarks | If not cured, **mandate third-party technical control** (e.g., crossings/ports) until rollback verified |
| **S4 — Grave breach (mass-casualty; systematic access denial; verified re-armament)** | Strategic violation | **Immediate full snapback of all non-humanitarian tranches**; force-protection surge; legal referrals; **grim-trigger** activates | Measures remain pending independent rollback + guarantees | OC may impose **special measures** (e.g., expanded monitoring zones/mandated operators) |

**Holy-site incidents** apply the same **symmetry, timer, and reset** rules; lifesaving aid **never pauses** (UNSCR 2664).

**Symmetry note:** *The* ***same tier, timer, and reset*** *apply whether the breaching actor is Israeli or Palestinian. Proportionality is* ***calibrated****, not partisan.*

**Automaticity note:** *Grave breaches revert to the* ***last certified baseline*** *without a new vote.*

**Humanitarian firewall (always on):** life-saving aid remains **rapid and unimpeded** across all S-levels; only *non-humanitarian* waivers/privileges are frozen, consistent with **UN GA 46/182** and **ICRC Customary IHL Rule 55**. **Automatic reversion anchor:** If JMVM certifies non-compliance, pre-agreed consequences **re-engage on a fixed timeline** (per the matrix) **without any new political vote**. The clock starts upon notice; aid/access/security relaxations **revert to pre-violation status** until the breach is cured to verifiable standards. (adapted to k-of-n rule).

**Liaison/Border precedents:** **UNIFIL** tripartite liaison for deconfliction; **EUBAM Rafah** as third-party crossing support (now in active revival discussions/deployments).

([docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/46/182), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule55), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/default/files/23rd_supp_part_v_advance.pdf), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/default/files/part_v_2020.pdf), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/tripartite-meeting-blue-line-stability-should-not-be-taken-granted), [peacekeeping.un.org](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/evolving-role-of-unifils-liaison-branch), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/eus-kallas-says-talks-under-way-revive-rafah-border-mission-2025-01-17), [reuterscom](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-restarts-rafah-border-crossing-mission-says-eu-foreign-policy-chief-kallas-2025-01-31))

**Verification & Liaison Architecture**

* **Monitors & Methods.** Continuous patrolling, remote observation posts, UAV & fixed cameras, standard incident notebooks—mirroring OSCE SMM methodologies for ceasefire verification.
* **Daily tripartite mechanism.** Peacekeeping HQ + Israeli + Palestinian security focal points; hotline and routine deconfliction (UNIFIL model).
* **Border assistance surge (as needed).** Third-party EU teams at crossings to rebuild trust and audit flows (EUBAM Rafah precedent).
* **Regional liaison (Sinai).** MFO channels for Egypt–Israel security coordination when Gaza measures touch Sinai dynamics.

**Snap-Forward / Snap-Back Mechanics**

* **Design logic:** Pre-agreed **triggers** tied to independently verified metrics, a **public countdown clock**, and **non-discretionary reversion of benefits**. The only way to stop the clock is to **cure the breach** to the verification threshold defined in this memorandum.
* **Voting rule.** “Any 3 of 5 principals” trigger freeze upon verified breach θ≥θ²; due-process note appended; remedy path defined.
* **Due-process & transparency.** Every action carries: (i) evidence pack, (ii) proportionality class, (iii) remedy checklist, (iv) public dashboard entry.

**Legal Alignment Note**

* **UN Charter / UNSC 242**: reaffirms the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war.
* **UNSC 2334**: reaffirms settlements have “no legal validity.”
* **US position**: no re-occupation or **reduction in Gaza’s territory**; opposes territorial change/buffer-zone shrinkage.
* **EU position**: attempts at annexation or settlement extension **violate international law**.
* **Egypt track**: asserts **no Israeli military presence** in the Philadelphi corridor and no unilateral security changes; draws on **1979 Treaty** & border regimes; corridor control is a core **ceasefire sticking point**.
* **Precedents**: **AMA (2005)** and **EUBAM-Rafah** as ready governance templates for Rafah/border flows.

([avalon.law.yale.edu](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/un242.asp), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2016/sc12657.doc.htm), [washingtonpost.com](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/11/08/blinken-gaza-future-reoccupation-indefinite), [timesofisrael.com](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/blinken-reaffirms-opposition-to-israeli-reoccupation-of-gaza-reduction-of-territory), [ndtv.com](https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/antony-blinken-says-us-opposes-territorial-change-in-gaza-4920395), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-statement-gaza-foreign-ministers-and-eu-high-representative-0_en), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-wont-accept-security-changes-gaza-border-foreign-minister-says-2024-09-18), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-has-tactical-control-gaza-egypt-border-corridor-military-official-says-2024-05-29), [2009-2017.state.gov](https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/2005/87237.htm), [eeas.europa.eu](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eubam-rafah_en))

**Module A — Humanitarian Surge (Famine Mode) — Verify-to-Unlock Triggers**

**Example**

**Interpretive note (famine mode):** *These Module-A unlocks are* ***parallel humanitarian measures****, not concessions; they are activated by verification (IPC/WHO/OCHA) and insulated by* ***UNSCR 2664****.*

**Module A**

**A-1 | Corridor “green” + deconfliction windows published (daily)**

* **Trigger:** JMVM posts **day-ahead, 3× deconfliction windows** (e.g., 06:00–10:00, 12:00–16:00, 18:00–22:00) for named corridors; hotline active.
* **Evidence/Verification:** JMVM dashboard + OCHA Humanitarian Notification System (or restored equivalent) publication; Cairo/Al-Arish Deconfliction Cell notice.
* **Timer:** Publish by **18:00** daily for **D+1**.
* **Tier:** Not punitive—**precondition** for unlocks.
* **Automatic effects (unlocks):** **Convoy floor = ≥600 trucks/day** net across all crossings; ≥50 fuel trucks/week; prioritised lanes for health, WASH, and nutrition cargo. *(600/day mirrors ceasefire-window targets and is technically feasible when deconfliction functions.)*
* **DPARC:** If windows not posted, panel can order **temporary default windows** using Cairo cell coordinates.
* **Reset:** Windows + hotline live; first convoys recorded.

**A-2 | Nutrition therapeutics caseload release (per tranche)**

* **Trigger:** Per certified compliance tranche (e.g., Phase-1/2 milestone), release **≥25,000 SAM treatment courses** (RUTF) into Gaza + **≥50,000 MAM rations** (RUSF/SuperCereal Plus) via Cairo/Al-Arish hub.
* **Evidence/Verification:** UNICEF/WHO pipeline manifest; sachet counts; batch hashes; JMVM receipt.
* **Timer:** First **48h** after tranche; then rolling weekly.
* **Tier:** **Tier-1 pause** on non-humanitarian benefits if not met; aid continues.
* **Automatic effects (unlocks):** RUTF/RUSF routed to **stabilisation sites & OTPs**; public stock and **admissions** counters on dashboard. *(RUTF: 500 kcal/sachet; dosing* ***150–185 kcal/kg/day*** *for ~4–8 weeks.)*
* ***DPARC:*** *Quantity disputes resolved by batch logs.*
* ***Reset:*** *Minimum caseload released and logged. (WHO/UNICEF warn of surging wasting; famine confirmed.)*

**A-3 | WASH & bakeries continuity (fuel + water floors)**

* **Trigger:** Weekly **fuel floor** for hospitals, water plants, bakeries met (publish site list + litres/site); **water access ≥15 L/person/day** in served districts; **≥25 WFP-supported bakeries** operational.
* **Evidence/Verification:** OCHA/WFP fuel and bakery ops report; water production/spot checks; JMVM ledger.
* **Timer:** Weekly; 7-day buffer.
* **Tier:** **Tier-1** if below floor in any two consecutive reports (targeted to responsible node).
* **Automatic effects (unlocks):** When floors met, movement easings for food pipelines; if missed, reroute fuel to essential services first.
* **Reset:** Floor restored for 7 days. *(Sphere/WHO reference:* ***≥15 L pppd*** *baseline; higher in urban/heat contexts.)*

***A-4 | Cairo/Al-Arish hub deconfliction cell active***

* **Trigger:** Daily **Cairo Hub** deconfliction brief issued (convoy timings, routes, comms blackout protocols); Egyptian Red Crescent & OCHA sign-off.
* **Evidence/Verification:** Hub bulletin + ERCS/OCHA stamp; Logistics Cluster minutes.
* **Timer:** Daily by 20:00 for next day.
* **Tier:** Not punitive—**enabler**; if absent, **Tier-1** suspension of non-humanitarian easings that rely on the hub.
* **Automatic effects (unlocks):** Priority docking/turnaround at **Kerem Shalom, Zikim, Rafah** when open; load-out queue managed from Cairo board.
* **Reset:** Bulletin issued; queues cleared to target.

**A-5 | HNS restoration / safe-passage assurance**

* **Trigger:** Parties certify use of **HNS or equivalent** for all humanitarian movements; **no-strike adherence** publicly acknowledged.
* **Evidence/Verification:** OCHA notice; standing ROE excerpt; incident-rate trend.
* **Timer:** 72 h to restore after notice.
* **Tier:** **Tier-2 targeted** on actor obstructing safe passage.
* **Automatic effects:** If not restored, **non-humanitarian** benefits pause; **aid never pauses** (2664).
* **Reset:** HNS restored; 7-day incident-free verification.

**A-6 | Famine-mode kcal floor (population-level outcome)**

* **Trigger:** District-level food assistance achieves **≥2,100 kcal/person/day** equivalent (own resources + assistance) for two consecutive weekly cycles in ≥80% of locations served.
* **Evidence/Verification:** Cluster pipeline + distribution data; household FCS/consumption surveys; third-party monitors.
* **Timer:** Weekly; 7-day buffer.
* **Tier:** **Tier-1** (pause non-humanitarian easings) if floor missed; escalate on repeat.
* **Automatic effects:** When floor met, unlock **additional movement easings**; if missed, divert to highest-deficit districts.
* **Reset:** Floor met for two weeks.

**Module H — Annex 7 (Hostage & Prisoner Releases) Anti-Stall Snapbacks**

**Purpose.** These rows operationalize Annex 7’s Human-Dignity Protocol: they deter commodification of persons, keep releases moving through **verification not bargaining**, and preserve humanitarian space via the standing carve-out in **UNSCR 2664**.

**H-1 | Proof-of-Life (PoL) milestone missed**

* **Trigger:** PoL not reaching D+2 ≥10%, D+5 ≥50%, D+7 **100%** of the named Stage-1 list.
* **Evidence/Verification:** ICRC attestation; JMVM ledger entry.
* **Timer/Buffer:** No extra buffer beyond PoL clock in Annex 7.
* **Snapback Tier:** **Tier-1** (pause non-humanitarian disbursements & non-essential movement easings).
* **Automatic effects:** Humanitarian carve-out **remains on** (UNSCR **2664**); escorts & medical access continue.
* **DPARC route:** 48–96h fast panel may order targeted corrective measures.
* **Reset:** When PoL threshold is met and logged.

**H-2 | Transfer log not published within 24h of a tranche**

* **Trigger:** JMVM/ICRC transfer log absent >24h after any release.
* **Evidence/Verification:** Public dashboard check (counts, time/place stamps), JMVM backend.
* **Timer/Buffer:** 24h grace; single automatic 12h extension for declared technical outage.
* **Snapback Tier:** **Tier-1**.
* **Automatic effects:** Pause **non-humanitarian** unlocks tied to that tranche; aid flows continue (2664).
* **DPARC route:** If dispute over “publication,” panel rules whether minimum fields were met.
* **Reset:** Log posted with minimum fields (time, segment ID, team ID, chain-of-custody).

**H-3 | Tampering with lists (substitution, double-counting, hidden detainee lists)**

* **Trigger:** Mismatch between pre-filed, hash-signed list and actual persons presented for release.
* **Evidence/Verification:** Depositary’s hashed list; ICRC manifest; JMVM variance note.
* **Timer/Buffer:** None.
* **Snapback Tier:** **Tier-2 targeted** (responsible node(s) only).
* **Automatic effects:** Revert to **last certified schedule**; next sub-tranche triggers **Default-Flow Rule** at 18:00 local (Annex 7).
* **DPARC route:** 48–96h determination; may order immediate corrective release.
* **Reset:** Correct list presented and certified. *(Legal basis: hostage-taking is absolutely prohibited under CA3/GC IV art. 34; “persons ≠ currency”.)*

**H-4 | Coercive filming / public humiliation of captives**

* **Trigger:** Releases or detention scenes filmed for propaganda without informed consent; degrading exposure.
* **Evidence/Verification:** Open-source capture; JMVM/ICRC incident note.
* **Timer/Buffer:** None.
* **Snapback Tier:** **Tier-1** plus public censure.
* **Automatic effects:** Communications privileges for responsible unit suspended; mandatory ethics briefing.
* **DPARC route:** Panel confirms “outrages upon personal dignity.”
* **Reset:** Written undertaking to cease; next tranche monitored with independent media-blackout protocol. *(IHL: outrages upon personal dignity are prohibited – Customary IHL Rule* ***90****.)*

**H-5 | “Incident misuse” to stall (rockets/raids invoked to freeze releases )**

* **Trigger:** Party invokes a security incident to halt releases when JMVM certifies **no immediate, proximate threat** to escorts.
* **Evidence/Verification:** JMVM risk assessment; incident logs.
* **Timer/Buffer:** 48h “incident fuse” (offensive ops paused); transfers proceed unless JMVM flags proximate risk.
* **Snapback Tier:** **Tier-2 targeted** on the stalling actor.
* **Automatic effects:** Reversion to last certified schedule; **Default-Flow Rule** resumes daily releases at 18:00.
* **DPARC route:** Expedited review (≤48h).
* **Reset:** Transfer resumes on timetable. *(ICRC’s neutral escort/access role is part of compliance; access to persons deprived of liberty is customary – Rule* ***124****.)*

**H-6 | Remains repatriation obstructed / “missing” cases not actioned**

* **Trigger:** Failure to initiate or honor ICRC-led forensic process for declared deceased/missing.
* **Evidence/Verification:** Forensic case file status (ICRC); family liaison record.
* **Timer/Buffer:** Weekly status cadence; >7 days with no action = breach.
* **Snapback Tier:** **Tier-1**, escalate to **Tier-2** if >14 days.
* **Automatic effects:** Conditioning of non-humanitarian unlocks tied to that case; aid carve-out unaffected.
* **DPARC route:** Can order immediate sampling/transfer to forensic lab.
* **Reset:** Case accepted and active; repatriation on identification. *(Standards: ICRC DNA/forensic identification guidance.)*

***Absolute prohibition.*** *Hostage-taking is prohibited at all times (Common Article 3;* ***GC IV art. 34****; Customary IHL Rule* ***96****).*

***Dignity & privacy.*** *Outrages upon personal dignity are banned (Rule* ***90****). ICRC must have access to persons deprived of liberty (Rule* ***124****). For remains and the missing, follow ICRC forensic identification best practice.*

## Annex 2.A — S2/S3 Demilitarization Signals & Unlockers (Phase 2 → Phase 3)

**Design intent.** Replace “all-at-once” asks with **verify-to-unlock** steps: **S2** (Weeks 2–4) proves the truce can hold while **disabling capabilities** that most threaten civilians; **S3** (Months 2–6) scales down heavy systems and production capacity in exchange for political and economic openings. Verification runs through **JMVM** with **k-of-n** confirmation to reduce gaming and single-indicator failure. See §8 “Core Tracks” (Demilitarization Signals; S-pathways) and §11 “Parameterization Box.”

**A) S2 Signals (Weeks 2–4) — “Make the truce safer, fast”**

**Goal:** Reduce immediate launch capacity and weapon inflow without front-loading total disarmament.

**Select any k = 3 of n = 5 S2 events (JMVM-verified) to unlock S2 modules:**

1. **Launcher decommission logs** — Decommission and render-inert **X** multiple-tube or long-range launchers; JMVM collects photo/video, GPS-stamped forms, serials/unique identifiers; disposal in line with **IDDRS 4.10** + **IATG** evidence SOPs.
2. **Tunnel neutralization (priority grid)** — Seal/neutralize **Y** km-equivalent or **Y** nodes on a pre-agreed “red grid” (peri-urban launch/stockpile corridors), with method statements and end-state inspection by JMVM/EOD. (UN practice: evidence-based, safety-first sequencing.)
3. **Interdiction trendline** — For **28 consecutive days**, joint interdiction cell (JMVM + border liaisons) reports **≥θ** detection-to-seizure ratio on proscribed materiel; monthly series published to the dashboard per DPPA ceasefire-guidance templates.
4. **Heavy-weapons registry (initial)** — File and spot-verify **≥p %** of heavy rockets/ATGMs/mortar systems into a sealed **registry-and-storage** regime (no removal demanded yet), using **MOSAIC** marking/record-keeping for traceability.
5. **Manufacture pause** — Verified **shutdown and seal** of **q** machine tools/propellant lines used for long-range munitions; tamper-proof seals logged (randomized JMVM spot-checks).

**S2 Unlockers (fire only when k-of-n met):**

* **Governance:** Interim PA-led administration gets expanded **permits, movement, utilities** permissions; police vetting and municipal service restarts.
* **Economic:** **Tranche-1** Unified Escrow release; crossings hours and “green-lane” logistics open per ledger notice. (Humanitarian never pauses per UNSCR 2664.)

**B) S3 Signals (Months 2–6) — “Scale down the system, not just stocks”**

**Goal:** Move from immediate launcher/tunnel risk-reduction to **capability draw-down** under third-party guarantees.

**Select any k = 4 of n = 7 S3 events (JMVM-verified) to unlock S3 modules:**

1. **Inventory reduction (heavy munitions)** — Verified destruction/exit of **≥r %** heavy rockets (> range threshold) following **IATG** destruction logbooks & sampling.
2. **Production disablement** — **≥s %** of designated fabrication lines dismantled; tooling removed or sealed with serialized custody chain (MOSAIC record-keeping).
3. **Launcher class sunset** — Verified **retirement of class-A/B launchers** with end-use destruction reporting (Northern Ireland decommissioning precedent—independent witnessing, chain-of-custody).
4. **Tunnel grid attrition (cumulative)** — **≥t %** cumulative neutralization across the red grid (independent EOD sampling + UAV/ground-penetrating evidence packs).
5. **SALW management compliance** — **≥u %** of designated SALW marked & recorded to **MOSAIC 05.30**; diversion-incident rate **≤ δ** per 30 days.
6. **Ceasefire reliability** — Security-incident index **≤ ε** over rolling 60 days (DPPA “ceasefire indicators” approach; traffic-light dashboard).
7. **Border interdiction sustainability** — 3-month moving average maintains **≥θ** detection-to-seizure ratio; joint reports archived for audit (UNIDIR remote-verification good practice).

**S3 Unlockers:**

* **Political:** Initial **Final-Status parameters** signing window with **Multipolar Guarantee Accord** intake; **recognition ladder** steps.
* **Economic:** Larger escrow tranches + phased **mobility/trade easings** (ports/airport works under oversight).

**C) Evidence, Methods & Chain-of-Custody (how JMVM certifies)**

* **Tripartite monitoring** model (unarmed international observers, parties’ liaisons) with **48–96 h** determination clocks and public traffic-lights—**Colombia UNSCR 2261** precedent.
* **Ceasefire-mediation guidance** for indicators, maps, and incident logging (DPPA/UN Peacemaker).
* **Arms control standards**: **IDDRS 4.10** (disarmament operations), **MOSAIC** (marking/records), **IATG** (ammunition destruction/stockpile logs).
* **Independent witnessing** of destruction (Northern Ireland IICD practice) to bolster legitimacy.
* **Remote-sensing/OSINT** with chain-of-custody and privacy guardrails (UNIDIR).

**D) Guardrails — no front-loaded “total disarmament”**

1. **Registry-then-reduction.** Phase 2 emphasizes **registry + safe storage** (not mass surrender); Phase 3 scales **destruction/exit** tied to unlockers. (Your §2 verify-to-unlock spine + Annex 2/3 enforcement.)
2. **Humanitarian always on.** Any breach triggers **calibrated snapbacks** to the last safe baseline; **aid never pauses**.
3. **k-of-n resilience.** Multiple, heterogeneous indicators defeat single-metric manipulation, as recommended by UN ceasefire/DDRs.

**E) Snapbacks & DPARC hooks (if signals slip)**

* **Automaticity:** Failure to sustain S2/S3 k-of-n → **pause** non-humanitarian unlockers and **revert** to last certified baseline (Annex 2), with **DPARC** clocks forcing a quick, neutral determination.
* **Public ledger:** Default traffic-light note to the dashboard raises audience-costs for defection (§9).

([unddr.org](https://www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.10-Disarmament.pdf), [unoda-saferguard.s3.amazonaws.com](https://unoda-saferguard.s3.amazonaws.com/iatg/en/V3_IATG_compiled-compressed.pdf), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2022/11/ceasefire-guidance-2022-0.pdf), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/en/thematic-areas/ceasefires-security-arrangements/guidance-on-mediation-of-ceasefires), [s3.amazonaws.com](https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.31-2012EV1.0.pdf), [unidir.org](https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNIDIR-Exploring_Use_Technology_Remote_Ceasefire_Monitoring_Verification.pdf), [disarmament.unoda.org](https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/ammunition/iatg), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2261%282016%29), [unmc.unmissions.org](https://unmc.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1622903_update.pdf), [cain.ulster.ac.uk](https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/peace/decommission/iicdreports.htm))

# Annex 3 — Deadlock-Prevention & Automatic Reversion Clauses (DPARC)

**0) Purpose**

To ensure enforcement never stalls: once the Verification Mission (VM) issues a qualifying Breach Notice (BN), the default is **auto-activation** of the matching enforcement package unless a duly qualified, **cross-bloc** majority intervenes within fixed windows. This mirrors Annex 3 from [Memorandum No. 7](https://www.unifiedstate.us/unified-state-advisory-memorandum-07/), and adds Gaza-specific humanitarian firewalls and hostage/aid safeguards.

1. **Definitions**

* **Guarantor Council (GC):** States/organizations named as enforcement guarantors in the main text.
* **Cross-Bloc Requirement:** Any qualified vote must include ≥1 Western and ≥1 non-Western/Global-South guarantor on the prevailing side.
* **Breach Notice (BN):** JMVM certification that an Annex 1.B threshold **θ** was met (S1–S4 classification).
* **Provisional Enforcement Package (PEP):** The pre-agreed measures bound to each breach tier (e.g., tranche holds, dual-use controls, constraints).
* **Reversion Baseline (RB):** The last verified stable configuration of relief/permissions prior to breach (used for automatic reversion).

**2) Triggering Sequence**

1. **Detection:** JMVM verifies facts meet θ in Annex 1.B.
2. **BN Circulation (T0):** BN goes to GC and the Depositary for timestamp.
3. **Default Timers:**
   1. **FPM (Fast-Track Provisional Measures)** for S4-class harm: auto-active **T0+12h** unless paused by **simple majority** with cross-bloc.
   2. **Standard PEP** for S2–S3: auto-active **T0+48h** unless blocked/amended.

**3) Decision Rules (Reverse-Consensus + Silence Procedure)**

* **Blocking/Amending a PEP** within the window requires **≥ 2/3 of GC** **and** the **cross-bloc** condition; otherwise **auto-activation** stands.
* **Silence Procedure:** Draft decisions circulate with a clear deadline; **silence = adoption**, unless a written objection arrives before expiry (reference model from OSCE rules). Use a minimum 24–48 h window for S2–S3 and 12 h for FPM notes.
* **Design Rationale:** This mirrors the WTO’s “reverse (negative) consensus” logic that makes adoption virtually automatic unless **everyone** objects—adapted here via super-majority + cross-bloc to fit multipolar guarantees. ([wto.org](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s3p1_e.htm), [wto.org](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s4p1_e.htm), [wto.org](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s10p2_e.htm))

**4) Cure, Review & Due-Process**

* **Challenge Window:** Accused party may file evidence within **48 h**; a rotating tri-partite **Independent Review Cell (IRC)** issues a reasoned assessment within **72 h**. During review, only S1–S2 measures apply unless ongoing harm or S4-level events.
* **Safe-Harbor:** Self-reported deviations cured within 72 h revert to the lowest rung with no reputational strike. Evidence is logged in a tamper-evident audit chain mirrored on the public dashboard.
* **Snap-Forward on Cure:** Verified rollback automatically restores paused tranches (no fresh vote needed), keeping symmetry with Annex 1.B’s **“automatic unfreeze on cure.”**

**5) Automatic Reversion (Snapback Defaults)**

When S-ladder thresholds are met, the following **auto-revert** to RB unless blocked per §3:

* **Financial/Trade Tranches:** Proportional pause matching S-tier; interest accrues to Reconstruction Escrow.
* **Dual-Use & Access Controls:** Targeted restrictions consistent with S2–S3; full snapback for S4.
* **Peacekeeping Constraints:** Temporary repositioning/access rules per S-tier.

**6) Humanitarian & Protected Channels (Firewall)**

Even during snapback, **non-derogable humanitarian flows** (medical, water, food, ICRC/UN access) and hostage-release logistics remain whitelisted, monitored by JMVM with time-stamped corridors and queue-time KPIs, per Annex 1.B’s service-continuity metrics.

**7) Deadlock-Escape Routes (if GC stalls)**

Any party may file a compliance dispute that starts a short, public countdown. If the dispute isn’t resolved—or the breach isn’t cured—by expiry, the specified measures reapply automatically (no additional approvals). Humanitarian channels remain open and hostage-release steps are never penalized. If Security Council action is blocked, parties may seek a UN General Assembly Emergency Special Session under ‘Uniting for Peace’ (GA Res. 377 A(V)), which can be convened within 24 hours at the request of nine Council members or a majority of UN Member States. As a procedural fallback, the GC may circulate outcomes under a time-boxed silence procedure; no objection by the deadline = adoption.

**8) Core Tracks**

* **Hostages & Detainees:** If milestones slip **> N days**, default releases and humanitarian visits proceed from escrowed lists; any state-level objection must meet the cross-bloc threshold to pause.
* **Crossings & Aid Cadence:** If average corridor uptime or queue-time KPIs breach θ for **> 72 h**, crossing hours **auto-extend** and inspection lanes **auto-increase** until KPI streak returns to green.
* **Demilitarization Signals:** Verified re-armament triggers S3/S4 pathways with **k-of-n** confirmation and immediate PEP per §2.

**9) Transparency & Public Dashboards**

All timers (T0, T+12/T+48, vote tallies, objections), KPIs and reasoned determinations are published (with sensitive redactions) to raise **audience-costs** for defection and reduce information asymmetry.

**10) Sunset, Sunrise & Probation**

* **Sunrise:** Compliance streaks (e.g., **M months** green on KPIs) **auto-release** next tranches.
* **unset:** Repeated process misses (>2 clock failures/12 mo) auto-trigger a procedural reform plan and tooling audit; penalties lift after sustained compliance.

**11) Parameterization Box (for Parties to Fill)**

* **k-of-n** for S2–S3; **k’-of-n** for S4 (higher bar optional)
* Time windows: **T0+12h (FPM)**, **T0+48h (PEP)**; **48h challenge / 72h IRC review**
* KPI thresholds θ₍d₎ per domain (Annex III)
* Humanitarian whitelist SKUs & lanes; dashboard SLAs
* Escrow mechanics & interest rules

**Deadlock → Automatic Path (Reference Table)**

| **Deadlock / Failure Pattern** | **Automatic Path** | **Cure → Snap-Forward** | **Evidence** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| GC fails to convene in 24 h post-BN | Name-and-pause on blocker; substitute chair; **Uniting-for-Peace** notice filed | GC meets; minutes/action plan filed → next tranche resumes | GC minutes; UN registry notice |
| A single actor blocks without super-majority | Default PEP activates at timer expiry | Re-vote ≤ 72 h; lawful opt-out or execution lifts pause | JRC vote record |
| Domestic law not passed by X days | Guarantor status suspended; escrow substitute steps in | Law enacted & notified → status restored | National gazette; UN filing |
| Pre-listed support tranche late | Relief to counter-party paused; escrow releases substitutes; liability charged | Delivery certified; arrears paid → relief resumes | Delivery audit |
| Consultation clocks repeatedly missed | Tiered penalties; mandatory process-automation | Compliance streak **M** months → penalties lift | Timing dashboard & audit |

**Neutral Assessor & DPARC Timelines**

1. **Assessor of record:** JMVM (cross-bloc composition) is the **sole neutral fact-finder** for triggers referenced in Annex 2.
2. **Submission window:** Any party may file an incident **within 6–12h** of occurrence; JMVM acknowledges in **≤6h**.
3. **Determination clock:** JMVM issues a preliminary finding in **≤48h**; complex cases escalate to a **3-expert panel** (DPARC) for a **≤96h** determination.
4. **Freeze-frame:** While a case is pending, **no party may create new facts on the ground** in the affected area.
5. **Default:** If a deadline lapses, **reversion to the last accepted text/line** auto-applies until a determination is filed.
6. **Symmetry clause:** **Identical timers and consequences** bind both sides.
7. **Publication:** A public **traffic-light note** posts to the dashboard (privacy-safe).
8. **Humanitarian insulation:** **UNSCR 2664** carve-out applies at all times; lifesaving aid **never pauses**.
9. **Appeal:** Only on **procedural error**; does not stay the snapback already applied.
10. **Standards:** Methods align with **UN mediation guidance** and **IDDRS/DDR** verification practice; Colombia’s **UNSCR 2261 tripartite** model is the precedent for unarmed, international verification.

# Annex 4 — Religious & Cultural Safeguards

**A. Purpose & Scope**

This Annex binds the ceasefire architecture to durable respect for holy places, cultural heritage, and inter-communal dignity. It creates: (i) a tri-faith **International Holy Sites Council (IHSC)** for designated sites (Jerusalem Old City; Hebron/Al-Khalil Old Town); (ii) conservation and emergency-response standards aligned to **UNESCO/ICOMOS** and the **1954 Hague Convention + 1999 Second Protocol**; (iii) a science-based **Education-for-Peace Compact (E4PC)** to reduce incitement via curriculum review and measurable fixes. The IHSC/E4PC produce public metrics that feed **Annex 3 (DPARC)** for reversion logic, and expose **ASI** endpoints for monitoring.

**Cross-reference.** This Annex is the operational layer of **“Jerusalem — Special Infinite-State City”**: IHSC governance and E4PC audits publish machine-readable signals (**ASI-H1 / ASI-E1 / ASI-C1** per Annex VI), anchoring obligations in **UNSC 2347 (2017)**, **Hague 1954/Second Protocol**, and **UNESCO World Heritage (in Danger)** listings for the Old City of Jerusalem and Hebron/Al-Khalil.

**B. International Holy Sites Council (IHSC)**

**Mandate.** IHSC co-governs sacred precincts—initially: **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount & Western Wall; Church of the Holy Sepulchre**; **Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs (Hebron)**—to safeguard access, safety, conservation and rapid de-escalation. The Jerusalem Old City and Hebron are already within **UNESCO** protection regimes; this Annex operationalizes them locally.

**Composition.**

* **Religious seats (voting):** equal **Jewish, Muslim, Christian** representation.
* **State seats (voting):** **Israel, State of Palestine, Jordan** (reflecting Jordan’s *recognized special role in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem* under the 1994 peace treaty, Art. 9).
* **Technical seats (non-voting):** **UNESCO/ICOMOS** and **Blue Shield International** for standards, audits, emblem use and emergency drills.

**Decisions** are by consensus; failing that, by **5/6 supermajority**, **provided the Waqf (Jordanian custodianship) concurs for any measure inside Al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.**

**Legal anchors.** IHSC decisions implement the **1954 Hague Convention** (marking and protection of cultural property/emblem), its **1999 Second Protocol**, and **UNSC 2347 (2017)** on heritage in armed conflict.

([whc.unesco.org](https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/148), [whc.unesco.org](https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1565), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/il20jo941026peacetreatyisraeljordan.pdf), [theblueshield.org](https://theblueshield.org/download/the-1954-hague-convention-blue-shield-emblems-of-protection), [digitallibrary.un.org](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/862506), [avalon.law.yale.edu](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/jordan_treaty.asp), [content.ecf.org.il](https://content.ecf.org.il/files/M00950_JordanPLOJerusalem2013English.pdf))

**C. Status-Quo & Access Safeguards (Jerusalem & Hebron)**

**Principle.** IHSC codifies and protects historical **status-quo** practices while ensuring predictable, dignified access for all communities through transparent calendars and crowd-safety rules (e.g., Waqf administration and Muslim-prayer-only at Haram al-Sharif with non-Muslim visitation; multi-denominational Status Quo at the Holy Sepulchre).

**Hebron reference.** Local access/security rules harmonize with the **1997 Hebron Protocol** (H-1/H-2 arrangements) and lessons from the **TIPH** precedent (now lapsed).

**Bridge to Infinite-State City.** The **IHSC sacred-calendar** for Jerusalem becomes a shared “clock” for de-confliction, integrated into the Infinite-State City regime and published via **ASI-C1** (see §J and Annex VI).

**D. Conservation Standards & Emergency Response**

**Standards.** Site management plans must meet **ICOMOS/Venice Charter** principles; conservation is documented, reversible where feasible, and scientifically justified.

**Blue Shield readiness.** IHSC maintains a **Blue Shield** roster with local authorities to mark protected property (emblem), run joint drills, and coordinate post-incident damage assessments in line with Hague rules.

**Crisis loop.** Any attack, misuse, or unsafe crowd condition at a protected site triggers **automatic alerts** to IHSC, UNESCO, and guarantors under **UNSC 2347** with time-boxed SLAs (see §J).

**Works registry:** a public noticeboard for any excavation/conservation inside the Old City, aligned to **UNESCO World Heritage** procedures.

**E. Education-for-Peace Compact (E4PC)**

**Purpose.** Bind peace “in hearts and minds” through **evidence-based** content reform on both sides.

**Joint Curriculum Review Panel (JCRP).** Under **UNESCO** facilitation and with the **Georg Eckert Institute (GEI)** as independent reviewer, the JCRP conducts double-blind audits of textbooks and official learning materials (history, civics, literature, social studies). Public reports grade removal of dehumanizing depictions and inclusion of the other side’s narratives.

**Normative floor.** Baseline aligned to **ICCPR Art. 20(2)** and the **Rabat Plan of Action** (six-part threshold test distinguishing protected speech from unlawful incitement).

**Legacy references.** Revives and upgrades the **Wye River anti-incitement committee** and **Quartet Roadmap** obligations, now with third-party metrics and enforcement (see §H).

**F. Anti-Incitement & Harm-Reduction Regime**

**Scope.** Applies to state-funded media, school content, and official political communications in campaign and non-campaign periods.

**Monitoring.** A **Trilateral Monitoring & Remedies Committee** (Israel, Palestine, IHSC Chair) with UNESCO/GEI advisers publishes quarterly **Incitement Risk Scores** using a transparent rubric (lexical polarization; dehumanization markers; explicit/implicit violence endorsement), interpreted through **Rabat** thresholds.

**Graduated remedies.**

* *Level 1 (advisory):* correction notice ≤14 days.
* *Level 2 (contractual):* withdrawal + amended content validated by JCRP.
* *Level 3 (financial):* holdback of non-humanitarian funds tied to E4PC milestones.
* *Level 4 (treaty):* snapback per **Annex 2**; caretaker reversion per **Annex 3**.

G. Game-Theory Backbone

**Repeated game with public monitoring.** IHSC/E4PC dashboards act as **public signals**; **graded trigger strategies** deter defection while allowing resets after remediation—avoiding brittle “grim” punishments. (Folk-theorem logic with imperfect public monitoring.)

**Correlation device.** Joint sacred calendars and advisories function as a **correlation device** (Aumann), coordinating expectations (e.g., festival windows) to reduce misreads and panic spirals.

**Ostrom co-management.** IHSC mirrors **Ostrom’s eight design principles** (clear boundaries, local congruence, participatory rules, monitoring, **graduated sanctions**, conflict resolution, recognition of local rights, nested governance), which raise cooperation payoffs above unilateral deviations.

This Annex lights six spokes of the **Unified Governance Wheel**—Legitimacy, Security, Justice, Memory, Knowledge, Feedback—through measurable outputs exposed as ASI services.

**H. Metrics & Dashboards (published monthly)**

1. **No-incident days** at each sacred site;
2. **Access equity index** (wait-time parity / closure rates);
3. **Blue-Shield readiness** and emblem compliance;
4. **Conservation works delivered** (UNESCO/ICOMOS verified);
5. **Curriculum audit score** & fix-rate (UNESCO/GEI);
6. **Incitement Risk Score** trend (Tri-Committee / Rabat test);
7. **Interfaith engagements** completed;
8. **Visitor safety & satisfaction** surveys.

**I. Dispute Resolution & Deadlock Prevention**

* **Cooling-Off Rule (48–72h)** at sites; IHSC **Rapid Mediation Cell** (religious + technical + security).
* **Technical arbitration**: conservation/access disputes first to **ICOMOS/UNESCO** experts; unresolved matters escalate to guarantors.
* **Automatic Reversion**: if IHSC is incapacitated or veto-locked >7 days, **Annex 3** DPARC shifts site management temporarily to a neutral caretaker (UNESCO/ICOMOS/Blue Shield) until quorum restores.

**J. ASI Interfaces (for Annex 6 Catalogue)**

To interoperate without merging sovereignties, Annex 4 exposes three **ASI-compliant services**:

* **ASI-H1 — Heritage-Protection Service.** *Inputs:* site calendars, crowd caps, emblem status, Blue-Shield readiness. *Outputs:* incident alerts, SLA timers, remediation plans. *Standards:* **Hague 1954/Second Protocol**, **UNSC 2347**, **Venice Charter / ICOMOS**.
* **ASI-E1 — Education-for-Peace Audit.** *Inputs:* textbooks/media samples. *Outputs:* **Incitement Risk Score**, fix-rate, audit notes. *Norms:* **ICCPR 20(2)**; **Rabat Plan**.
* **ASI-C1 — Correlated Calendar/Advisory.** *Outputs:* quarterly sacred-calendar, synchronized advisories during tension spikes, access-window forecasts; **acts as correlation device** for equilibrium selection.

(Implementation details and SLAs are specified in **Annex 6 — ASI Annex (Non-Operative)**.)

**K. Funding & Incentives (“Sacred Heritage Dividend”)**

Compliance unlocks staged tranches for conservation, teacher training, youth exchanges, and interfaith programs. Funds **pause automatically** on verified breaches and **resume on remediation**—**carrot-dominant, stick-credible**—with breach categories grounded in **UNSC 2347**/**Hague** definitions and E4PC metrics.

L. Cultural Legitimacy Notes (Jerusalem & Hebron)

* **Old City of Jerusalem** remains on the **World Heritage in Danger** list; IHSC reporting aligns to committee decisions.
* **Hebron/Al-Khalil Old Town** is a **World Heritage** site with maintained listing decisions; IHSC harmonizes local rules with the **1997 Hebron Protocol**.
* **Jordan’s special role** in Jerusalem’s Muslim holy shrines is reflected in IHSC composition and procedures (Peace Treaty, Art. 9).

([peacemaker.unorg](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/il20jo941026peacetreatyisraeljordan.pdf), [peacemaker.un.org](https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/il20ps970117protocol20concerning20the20redeployment20in20hebron.pdf), [un.org](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-202062))

**M. Universal Affirmation (for the record)**

We affirm—calmly, without coercion—that **life, conscience, and culture are one fabric**. Let sacred stones be neutral ground where adversaries remember they are kin. In Unified State terms: **guardianship outranks dominion; access outranks ownership; peace is the only victory permitted.**

# 

# Annex 5 — Multipolar Cooperation Mechanisms Beyond Gaza

**Purpose.** This Annex operationalizes a **“peace-linkage” architecture** so that momentum created by the Gaza/Palestine roadmap is immediately converted into coordinated de-escalation and settlement tracks across adjacent theaters. It plugs directly into the **Unified Governance Wheel** and **ASI (Axis of Sovereign Interoperability)** so that verification, snapbacks, finance, and civil-society participation work the same way across regions, without merging sovereignties.

**A) Mandate & Scope**

1. **Mandate.** The Guarantors (U.S., EU, key Arab partners, Russia, China, UN) constitute a standing **Joint Peace Linkage Board (JPLB)** to:  
    – launch synchronized stabilization tracks;  
    – extend the Verification Mission (VM) toolset beyond Gaza;  
    – align reconstruction finance with measurable calm (“dividends for de-escalation”).  
    The JPLB relies on ASI’s **competence catalogue, interoperability protocols, and compliance/snapback rules**; all remedies remain VCLT-compliant and human-in-the-loop.
2. **Scope.** Initial theaters and files:
   1. **Yemen ceasefire & Red Sea safety corridor** (maritime/air deconfliction, port access, detainee releases). UN reporting confirms Yemen remains **“deeply fragile”**; the Special Envoy is actively convening talks on ceasefire and security arrangements, while Houthi attacks have disrupted Suez-linked trade and increased rerouting emissions.
   2. **Lebanon stabilization & UNIFIL continuity** with a path to **integrate armed actors under state authority** per Resolution 1701 logic; mandate deliberations are ongoing in August 2025.
   3. **Israel–Lebanon follow-on package** to consolidate the **Oct 27, 2022 maritime boundary agreement** (energy revenues, joint safety protocols, incident hotlines).
   4. **East–West bridge: Ukraine peace track linkages.** Negotiations in 2025 repeatedly reference the **Istanbul 2022 draft parameters** (neutrality with international guarantees) as a discussion baseline; any European settlement should be framed as complementary to the Middle East gains.
   5. **Regional détente enablers.** Sustain the **Saudi–Iran rapprochement** (2023, Beijing) as a de-escalation backbone for Yemen/Levant files.

**B) Governance: How It Interlocks with ASI**

* **Joint Peace Linkage Board (JPLB).** Mixed composition (Parties + neutral guarantors), mirroring the ASI **Joint Board & Secretariat**, empowered to issue **binding interim measures**, escalate disputes, and align metrics/finance.
* **One playbook, many theaters.** ASI standardizes **data-sharing, incident reporting, and proportional remedies** so monitors, dashboards, and snapbacks look and behave the same from Gaza crossings to Red Sea lanes and Blue Line patrol sectors.
* **Normative guardrails.** Automation is prohibited; **people decide, systems advise** (see Annex 6 reference draft).

C) Thematic Tracks & Mechanisms (Templates)

1. **Yemen – “Ceasefire-to-Corridors” Track.**
   1. **Objective.** Lock a nationwide truce; stand up a **Red Sea Safety Corridor** (Bab al-Mandab–Suez) with route advisories and escorted humanitarian convoys.
   2. **VM Package.** AIS-based traffic heatmaps; incident tiering; public dashboards; proportional snapbacks tied to strikes at sea or cross-border fire.
   3. **Finance.** A ring-fenced **Maritime Stability Facility** disburses port rehabilitation and insurance subsidies as verified incident rates fall (de-risking Suez trade after 2023-25 disruptions).
2. **Lebanon – “1701 Plus” Stabilization.**
   1. **Objective.** Reduce cross-border fire; assure **UNIFIL freedom of movement**; expand LAF support; open a pathway for **weapons integration under state command**.
   2. **Steps.** Annual **mandate renewal + performance goals**; Blue Line hotlines; farmer-season deconfliction; **community compensation fund** linked to verified calm days; structured talks on integrating armed formations.
   3. **Follow-on to the 2022 maritime deal**: joint safety zones around energy blocks; incident boards; revenue transparency.
3. **Israel–Lebanon Maritime & Energy Confidence Measures.**  
   **Objective.** Codify **“safe ops” SOPs** for rigs, cables, and patrol craft; publish **shared incident maps**; adopt **neutral inquiry panels** for at-sea events, grounded in the 2022 framework.
4. **Ukraine Linkage – “Global Guarantees Harmonization.”**
   1. **Objective.** Use Middle East verification & snapback templates to inform **European security guarantees** that **exclude veto-locks** yet incorporate **graduated remedies** and **public dashboards** (grain corridors, POW releases, strike moratoria).
   2. **Rationale.** A coherent playbook increases credibility and reduces forum-shopping; references to Istanbul 2022 drafts show parties accept a **guarantor-based architecture** as negotiable terrain.
5. **Détente Sustainers (Saudi–Iran).**  
   **Objective.** Keep normalization **functional** (pilgrimage, consular, maritime security) to prevent spillovers that would derail Yemen/Lebanon tracks.

**D) Enforcement, Verification & DPARC (Cross-Theater)**

* **Verification Mission (VM-X).** A portable team using the memo’s **metrics, audit cadence, and public dashboards** (access-uptime / incident-severity / response proportionality), expanded to maritime & border contexts.
* **Snapbacks.** **Graduated, proportional** responses per Annex 2, with **automatic reversion** if boards gridlock (Annex 3 DPARC) — e.g., if UNIFIL movement is obstructed >X days, a **neutral caretaker** function triggers until compliance is restored.
* **Civilian-harm minimization.** Incident-tiering and **response proportionality scoring** mirror the Gaza template to avoid escalation spirals.

**E) Finance & Incentives (“Calm-for-Capital”)**

* **Peace-Linkage Facility (PLF).** A multi-donor trust with **performance-linked tranches** for: port repair (Hudaydah/Aden), energy interconnectors, LAF support, cross-border clinics, and education-for-peace audits. Disbursements **pause automatically on verified breaches** and **resume on remediation**—carrot-dominant, stick-credible.
* **Insurance & freight offsets.** Targeted subsidies lower the rerouting premium created by Red Sea insecurity; subsidies phase out as **verified incident rates** drop.

**F) Public Opinion & Civil Society Channel**

**People-to-People Track.** Mirror the memo’s **Education-for-Peace** audits and **interfaith/heritage access** norms to Yemen and Lebanon; publish **trust indices** quarterly.

**Global South legitimacy.** Invite **BRICS/AU observers** into the JPLB process to narrow the perceived West/Global-South gap and broaden ownership.

**G) Phasing & Milestones (Illustrative)**

**T+30 days:** Yemen truce text initialed; **Red Sea Safety Corridor** Notice to Mariners issued; UNIFIL mandate extended with **performance clauses**; Israel–Lebanon maritime safety SOPs published.

**T+90 days:** First PLF tranche released (ports/LAF support); **hotline metrics** show reduced border incidents; joint energy revenue reporting begins.

**T+180 days:** **Twin Peace Summit** convened to codify Middle East packages and present a **framework outline** for the Ukraine track, signaling **East–West / North–South convergence**.

**H) Legal Notes & Consistency**

**No prejudice clause.** Participation in JPLB or receipt of PLF funds **does not** waive territorial claims or political status (mirrors Jerusalem statute safeguards).

**Compatibility.** All filings, dashboards, and remedies comply with **ASI Annex II (interoperability & data-protection)**, **Annex 3 (verification & remedies)**, and the **Annex 6 non-operative ASI reference draft**.

**I) Draft Operative Clauses (for treaty drafters)**

**Establishment.** The Parties and Guarantors hereby establish the **Joint Peace Linkage Board (JPLB)** to coordinate cross-theater stabilization efforts consistent with this Memorandum.

**Verification.** The **VM-X** shall maintain public dashboards and audit trails; its determinations trigger **graduated remedies** per Annex 2 and **automatic reversion** per Annex 3.

**Finance.** The **Peace-Linkage Facility** disburses **performance-linked tranches**; breach → escrow; remediation → resumption.

**Review.** Annual review by Guarantors; five-year renewal unless terminated per VCLT.

**J) Rationale**

* It reuses one **evidence-aligned playbook**—metrics, snapbacks, and finance—that parties already accepted for Gaza, reducing negotiation cost and increasing credibility.
* It aligns with **current UN and diplomatic tracks**: Yemen envoy-led talks; UNIFIL renewal; 2022 Israel–Lebanon maritime deal; and Ukraine discussions informed by Istanbul 2022 parameters.
* It draws on **regional détente** (Saudi–Iran) to suppress spoilers.

**K) Summit Concept**

When Phase 2–3 milestones are met, Guarantors convene a **Twin Peace Summit** to ceremonially recognize the Gaza/Jerusalem progress and table a Europe track outline—**a moral and diplomatic hinge** from region-wide attrition to **linked settlements** that honor dignity, law, and security.

**Cross-References**

**Unified Governance Wheel**; **ASI (Axis of Sovereign Interoperability)**; **Annex 6 — ASI Annex (Reference Draft; Non-Operative)**; **Annex 2 (Ceasefire & Snapback Matrix)**; **Annex 3 (DPARC)**; **Annex 4 (Religious & Cultural Safeguards)** — for metrics, compatibility, and access principles.

## Annex 5B — Northern Front De-Escalation Grid (“Blue-Line Quiet”)

**A. Purpose & Legal Anchors**

**Objective.** Reduce the Hezbollah escalation risk by creating a parallel, monitorable quiet along the Israel–Lebanon Blue Line that moves in lockstep with Gaza-truce milestones.  
**Mandate context.** The framework operates under **UNSCR 1701 (2006)** and subsequent renewals of **UNIFIL**, which task UNIFIL to support LAF deployment in the south, accompany LAF along the Blue Line, and monitor/report violations.

**B. Strategic Design (Gaza ↔ North Reciprocity)**

1. **Reciprocal coupling.** *Partial* IDF tactical stand-down measures in the north (see §D) are **linked to verified Gaza milestones** (proof-of-life clocks met; humanitarian kcal floor trending above threshold).
2. **No sovereignty claims.** This grid **does not alter borders or sovereignty**; it is a technical quieting regime under 1701’s cessation-of-hostilities architecture.

**C. Trigger Chain & Timelines**

**D+0 (Entry).** Activate a *Tripartite Hotline* (IDF–LAF–UNIFIL) and announce a **21-day “Blue-Line Quiet”** pilot: no cross-border fires, no infiltration, no armed reconnaissance close to the line, and disciplined air activity. UNIFIL chairs; LAF and IDF confirm rules at a Tripartite meeting. (UNIFIL Tripartite is the only forum where LAF and IDF officially meet.)

**D+7 / D+14 (Mid-course checks).** UNIFIL issues public traffic-light updates (green/amber/red) on incidents and posture.

**D+21 (Decision).** If indicators ≥ **Green 70%**, roll to **D+60 expansion** (see §F). The **21-day** pilot mirrors US–France calls for a Blue-Line pause and fits prior de-escalation roadmaps.

**D. Posture Adjustments (Reciprocal, K-of-N Gating)**

Adjustments unlock **only** when both sides meet **k-of-n** verifiable criteria recorded by UNIFIL liaison teams:

**On the Israeli side (examples):**

* Artillery pause within a defined northern belt when Gaza PoL + kcal metrics are “green” for 72 hours.
* ISR altitude/tempo discipline in a border strip (safety corridors for civil aviation/UNIFIL Ops).
* Removal or rear-positioning of selected batteries proximate to the line as indicators stay green.

**On the Lebanese side (examples):**

* **LAF deployment** surge south of the Litani (minimum **5,000** personnel during pilot), with fixed and mobile checkpoints keyed to known launch zones.
* **Non-state armed units** cease border-proximate armed presence; **elite elements withdraw ~10 km** from the line (consistent with the French written proposal tabled in 2024).
* UNIFIL escorted patrols re-established on high-friction segments (as security permits), with immediate incident logging.

**E. Ruleset (Pilot, then Expandable)**

* **Prohibited during Quiet:** rocket/missile/UAV fire; cross-border shooters; border breaches; targeting of UNIFIL/LAF/IDF along the line; “hot pursuit” across the line; *any* action that risks press or humanitarian personnel near the line.
* **Air/ISR discipline:** no low-altitude intimidation flights over the line; deconfliction windows set daily with UNIFIL liaison.
* **Incident handling:** first to UNIFIL liaison cells; if unresolved in **60 minutes**, push to **DPARC-N** (see §G) for a binding de-escalation instruction.

**F. Indicators, Dashboard & Public Accountability**

UNIFIL hosts a **Blue-Line Quiet Dashboard** (updated 2×/day):

* **Incident count** (fires, infiltrations, air violations), **launch interdictions**, and **civilian return rate** by locality;
* **LAF presence index** (patrol hours, checkpoint uptime); **UNIFIL patrol continuity**; **airspace discipline hours**.  
   Green ≥70%, Amber 40–69%, Red <40%. Tripwires automatically **freeze** posture roll-outs until green is restored. (UNIFIL routinely reports and publishes Blue-Line violations; this formalizes the dynamic KPI view.)

**G. DPARC-N (Northern Deadlock-Prevention & Rapid Correction)**

A three-tier panel modeled on the memo’s DPARC:

1. **Tier 1 (Ops):** UNIFIL Liaison Branch + LAF + IDF duty officers (real-time fix).
2. **Tier 2 (Command):** UNIFIL Force HQ chaired call (≤ 6 hours) for corrective orders and map notes.
3. **Tier 3 (Political):** US–France co-convened call with parties for stubborn incidents; any **Tier-3** decision pushes public **Amber/Red** and automatically pauses next-step posture changes. (UN reports and UNSC briefs consistently urge maximal use of UNIFIL liaison/Tripartite arrangements; this codifies it.)

**H. Snapback & Safeguards**

* **Localized snapback**: A Red incident pauses the implicated sector only (5–10 km cell) for **48 hours**, not the whole front.
* **Escalation ladder**: repeat Reds in the same cell trigger a **72-hour sectoral freeze** and a Tripartite in-person.
* **Humanitarian/press insulation**: Any action endangering UN/press triggers **immediate Red** and automatic Tier-2 review.

**I. Incentive Pack (Parallel, Non-UNSC)**

* **For Lebanon:** donors coordinate a fast-disbursing **LAF southern operations package** and civilian recovery micro-grants in return-to-village localities if D+21 is green.
* **For Israel:** green D+21 unlocks **structured return timelines** for northern evacuees; ISR/air defense posture can re-optimize towards other theaters.
* **For both:** if the pilot holds, parties step to a **D+60 stabilization**: formalize withdrawal buffers and LAF deployments under a joint UNIFIL-chaired verification committee, echoing prior US–France de-escalation understandings.

**J. Relationship to 1701 & UNIFIL Renewal**

This grid **implements—rather than replaces—1701’s cessation-of-hostilities logic**: LAF assumes primacy in the south with UNIFIL support/monitoring; non-state armed presence recedes from the frontier; IDF posture normalizes as indicators remain green. Annual mandate reviews (late August) offer a natural **checkpoint** to bank gains.

([unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2749%282024%29), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15801.doc.htm), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/use-liaison-and-coordination-mechanisms-advance-mutual-interests-unifil%E2%80%99s-top-official-urges-parties), [unifil.unmissions.org](https://unifil.unmissions.org/tripartite-press-release%C2%A0-16-august%C2%A02023), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-hezbollah-says-it-launched-rocket-targeting-mossad-base-near-tel-aviv-2024-09-25), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/france-us-push-roadmap-stop-hezbollah-israel-escalation-macron-2024-06-13), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-poised-approve-ceasefire-with-hezbollah-israeli-official-says-2024-11-26), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/france-proposes-hezbollah-withdrawal-border-talks-israel-lebanon-truce-2024-02-12), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/excerpts-un-report-into-attack-reporters-lebanon-2024-03-13), [docs.un.org](https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/460), [securitycouncilreport.org](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_240.pdf), [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com/world/frances-foreign-minister-looks-prevent-israel-hezbollah-conflict-escalation-2024-04-28))

# Annex 6 — ASI Annex (Reference Draft; Non-Operative)

**ASI Annex — Rationale (Reference Draft for Further Deployment).—**

This Annex is provided **for reference only**. It sketches the **concept and mechanics** of an optional, **human-in-the-loop ASI decision-support layer** that could, in the future, assist the Zone’s institutions with monitoring, translation, forecasting, and option-testing. It is **non-operative** and creates **no legal obligations** under this Memorandum or the Special-Status City Statute. Its purpose is to help negotiators and technical teams **visualize how an ASI-assisted toolkit might work**—what signals it ingests (public dashboards, access telemetry, incident tiers), what it outputs (auditable alerts, explainable summaries, scenario comparisons), and what **guardrails** apply (privacy-by-design, transparency, bias checks, manual override, and a hard **no-automation** rule for enforcement or use that would alter holy-site status-quo). Any eventual deployment would be **phased** (pilot → independent audit → limited production), **procurement-neutral** (no vendor lock-in), and strictly **subordinate to the Statute**: **people decide; systems only advise**. Cross-references align to **Annex 2** (interoperability & data protection), **Annex 3** (verification & remedies), and **Annex 5** (finance/JPE), so that any future technical build remains **explainable, auditable, and reversible**. The Annex also anchors the normative scaffolding of the **seven spheres** (Local→Infinite) as **ethics and governance principles**, not as operative law.

**Annex II: Interoperability & Data-Protection Protocols**

**II-A Sensor Catalogue & Deployment Rules, II-B Retention & Deletion Schedule  
 II-C Audit & Public Dashboard Spec**

***Annex II-C — KPI Brief:*** *This annex states what we measure, the target, how often we check, and what happens if the target isn’t met. Detailed formulas, sampling plans, and dashboards live in a separate Technical Note maintained by the Verification Mission (VM).*

**1) Access-Uptime** — Share of scheduled open hours when gates/paths are open and operable.  
**Target:** ≥ **97%**. **Checks:** daily internal; weekly public; quarterly for finance gates.  
**If below:** the **Access-Uptime tranche (⅓ of JPE)** is held in escrow until remedied (humanitarian flows unaffected).

**2) Queue Time (95th percentile)** — Time that 95% of entrants wait or less at access points.  
**Target:** ≤ **20 min** on normal days; **surge-day caps** per Annex III-F.  
**If exceeded Zone-wide in a quarter:** hold **½** of the Access-Uptime tranche until a corrective plan is certified by the VM.

**3) Incident-Severity Index** — Average operational intensity experienced in the Zone over time (VM tiering).  
**Target:** ≤ **1.0**.  
**If >1.0:** the **Incident-tranche (⅓ of JPE)** moves to escrow; **>1.5 for 2 straight months** = **material breach** → Annex 3 remedies escalate.

**4) Response Proportionality** — Share of reviewed PU responses rated **proportionate & necessary** under ROE.  
**Target:** ≥ **95%**.  
**If below:** pause **¼** of the **Incident-tranche** until corrective training/orders are verified by the VM.

**5) Service-Continuity Index** — Continuity of water, sanitation, first-aid, lighting, and accessibility around queues/precincts.  
**Target:** ≥ **95%**.  
**If below:** the **Service-tranche (⅓ of JPE)** is escrowed and a **30-day** remedial plan is required.

**6) Privacy-Incident Rate** — Confirmed privacy non-compliance per unit of monitoring activity.  
**Target:** ≤ **0.5** per unit.  
**If above:** **2 consecutive months = 5%** tranche hold; **3 months = 10%** and an Independent Auditor special review.

**7) Trust / Legitimacy Index** — Composite sentiment on safety, fairness, dignity, clarity (surveys + hotlines).  
**Year 1:** informational only. **Year 2+:** aim for **≥ 60/100** in **two straight quarters** or clear upward trend; otherwise **10%** hold with a community-engagement plan (no impact on humanitarian flows).

**Publication & Integrity (applies to all KPIs).**The VM publishes weekly/quarterly dashboards (CSV/JSON API) with per-site/gate breakouts and, where feasible, protected-group accessibility splits. Data use and retention follow Annex II; **no political profiling**. KPIs are **geofenced** to Annex IV-A maps where relevant (access, works), and finance gates interact with Annex 3remedies and Annex 5 disbursement rules. **Annex III: Verification & Remedies  
 Annex III-B (Carriage & Deployment Matrix)  
 Annex III-C (Incident Tiers & Escalation)  
 Annex III-D (Handoff Protocol)  
 Annex III-E (Conflicts Panel Rules)  
 Annex III-F (Access, Queue & Surge Management Rules)  
 Annex III-G - “Entries are geofenced to Annex IV-A Map 1/2 grid-cells.”  
  
  
III-G. Settlement-Restraint Benchmarks, Monitoring & Remedies**

**Settlement-Restraint Benchmarks & Remedies.—** A **stand-still** applies within the **Zone** and the **Zone-Adjacent Planning Ring (ZAPR)** (as mapped in **Annex IV-A, Map 1**): **no new housing-unit plan approvals, no housing starts, no outpost establishment or legalization, no land expropriations, no settlement-serving infrastructure extensions (roads, utilities), and no administrative-ground evictions or demolitions**. Limited exceptions (safety works, heritage protection, humanitarian rehousing, essential maintenance) require **prior Joint Board clearance** and Verification Mission (VM) notification. The VM maintains a **quarterly scoreboard** with **monitorable indicators** sourced from official gazettes, planning-committee minutes, permits, geospatial change detection, and field verification: *(i)* plan approvals; *(ii)* housing starts; *(iii)* outpost events (established/legalized/removed); *(iv)* expropriation actions; *(v)* demolitions/evictions; *(vi)* settlement-serving infrastructure. **Triggers & consequences:** any single breach **auto-pauses 25%** of next-quarter **JPE** disbursements pending remediation; a **material breach** (two or more indicators breached in a quarter, or one indicator breached in two consecutive months) **snaps back** all non-humanitarian JPE disbursements to escrow, activates a **30-day Compliance Action Plan** under VM oversight, and **auto-escalates** to the Guarantors Panel. Repeated material breach within twelve months authorizes the Joint Board to impose **temporary permitting freezes** (least-restrictive, time-bound) and to publish a **non-compliance notice**. These measures are **without prejudice** to final-status claims and apply in a **non-discriminatory** manner to any authority or actor; VM publishes methodologies and quarterly datasets for public auditability.

**Annex IV: Special-Status City Statute  
Article 1: Definitions**

**Baseline Date**: the calendar date fixed by **Joint Board** resolution (published in the Gazette) that anchors eligibility for **Zone Resident ID (ZRID)** issuance, initial registries, and baseline KPI cohorts; changes require a **5/7** Board vote. **Chair (Joint Board)**: the Independent Chair who convenes meetings, sets agendas, certifies items for expedited vote, and may order **proportionate interim measures** during **Tier-3+** incidents for up to **72 hours**, subject to Board ratification. **Tier-Severity**: the incident-classification scale defined in **Annex III-C** (Tier-1 minor → Tier-4 critical), certified by the **Verification Mission** and used to trigger **ROE**, access adjustments, and escalation clocks. **Zone Resident ID (ZRID)**: a digital/physical credential (issued by the Secretariat under Board rules) conferring **Right-of-Abode** and dedicated-lane access for persons domiciled in the Zone on the **Baseline Date**; **citizenship remains unchanged**; data handling per **Annex II**. **Mobility Registry**: the Secretariat’s authoritative record of ZRIDs, passes, checkpoint telemetry, and queue/uptime statistics, operated under **Annex 2** (privacy, retention, audits) and feeding the public dashboard/KPIs. **Handoff Protocol**: the time-bound transfer procedure in **Annex III-D** governing custody, evidence, and interface points for cases moving from the **Protection Unit** to domestic authorities or the **Statute Court**. **Material Breach**: any violation meeting the domain-specific thresholds in **Annex 3**that authorizes **finance snap-backs, escalations, or interim measures** (e.g., verified VM obstruction beyond the allowed window; settlement-restraint triggers per **Annex III-G**); remedies apply **without prejudice** to other lawful consequences. **Cross-Community Consent:** a decision rule requiring **at least one affirmative vote from each of Israel and the State of Palestine** in any simple-majority decision of the Joint Board (see Art. 4).

**Article 2 (“Implementation & Legal Effect”)**

**Implementation & Supremacy (Domestic Law Fit-Up).—** Within ninety (90) days of signature, Israel and the State of Palestine shall enact the measures necessary to give this Special-Status City Statute direct effect within the Zone, including Knesset and Palestinian legislation harmonizing policing, judicial cooperation, taxation, and service delivery. For acts or omissions within the Zone, this Statute operates as *lex specialis* and prevails over inconsistent domestic law and administrative practice; courts shall recognize Joint Board regulations as having binding effect. Nothing herein alters constitutional arrangements or prejudices sovereignty claims outside the Zone. Pending full enactment, interim regulations issued by the Joint Board may apply provisionally (subject to later legislative confirmation). Conflicts of norms arising in the Zone are justiciable in the Statute Court in the first instance, with transfer protocols to domestic courts as applicable.

**Article 3 (“Institutions & Functions”)**

The Zone’s governance architecture comprises six organs, each acting within a defined mandate and cross-referenced for detail: **(a) Joint Board (Art. 4)** — sets policy and regulations, allocates competences, issues permits, and may adopt proportionate **interim measures** during certified incidents with time-bound escalation; **(b) Verification Mission (Art. 5)** — conducts independent monitoring, audits, and publishes the public dashboard; holds unfettered site access and classifies obstruction; **(c) Protection Unit (Art. 6)** — an integrated civil policing body with **carriage & deployment per Annex III-B**, with limited arrest authority, short-hold detention, and chain-of-custody duties; **(d) Statute Court (Art. 7)** — exercises jurisdiction over Statute/regulatory offenses, reviews acts of Zone organs, and allocates forum in concurrent cases; **(e) JPE Trustee (Annex V)** — ring-fenced fiduciary for the Jerusalem Peace Endowment, executing rule-based disbursements tied to **VM-certified KPIs** and maintaining a public grant ledger; **(f) Secretariat (Art. 4 & Annex II)** — provides administrative support, publishes minutes and regulations, manages **notice-and-comment**, keeps the **Mobility Registry** and official records (including maps, datasets, and rosters), and ensures interoperability and data-protection compliance. All organs apply **Annex 2** data rules and **Annex 3**remedies; none may alter holy-site status-quo or deploy armed force except as expressly authorized in their Articles.  
  
**Cross-References & Remedies.** Deadlocks, certified obstruction, or time-outs follow **Annex 3(Verification & Remedies)** clocks; unresolved items **auto-escalate** to the **Guarantors Panel (Art. 12)** for a written determination within the prescribed window; interim measures remain in force until resolved.

**Article 4 (“Joint Board”)**

**Joint Board.—** The Joint Board consists of **seven (7)** members: two appointed by Israel, two by the State of Palestine, one by the Hashemite Custodianship/Waqf (heritage & access liaison), one **Independent Chair** jointly selected by Israel and Palestine, and one **International Member** nominated by the Guarantors Panel. **Quorum is five (5).** Ordinary measures (operations, access scheduling, permits, services) pass by **simple majority** including at least **one Israeli and one Palestinian** affirmative (“cross-community consent”). Measures altering **security posture, finance/JPE disbursements, ROE, or the status-quo at holy sites** require a **5/7 supermajority** including the Chair and at least one member from each of Israel and Palestine. Upon **Tier-3 or higher incidents** certified by the Verification Mission or the Protection Unit Commander, the Chair may issue **proportionate interim measures** (weapons-light posture, route closures, surge staffing) **for up to 72 hours**; continuation demands **5/7 ratification**. If the Board fails to decide within **72 hours** on matters affecting **safety, access, or service continuity**, the question **auto-escalates** to the **Guarantors Panel** for a facilitated determination within **48 hours**; pending that, the **last-agreed baseline** and any **Chair’s interim measures** remain in force. Members serve **staggered two-year terms (one renewal max)**, file financial disclosures, and are bound by a code of conduct; Board **regulations have binding effect within the Zone** (subject to Statute Court review), and **minutes/directives are published** with narrowly tailored security redactions.  
  
**Cross-References & Remedies.** **Deadlocks, certified obstruction, or time-outs** follow **Annex 3 (Verification & Remedies)** clocks; unresolved items **auto-escalate** to the **Guarantors Panel (Art. 12)** for a written determination within the prescribed window; any **Chair’s interim measures** remain in force until resolved.

**Article 5 (“Verification Mission”)**

* **Article 5.3 (“Privacy, Data Handling & Access Guarantees”)  
  Verification Mission — Privacy-by-Design & Unfettered Access.—** The VM operates on strict **data-minimization** and **privacy-by-design** principles: only the least data necessary is collected, with **sensor classes** limited to *(A) visual safety* (fixed cams, checkpoint cams, PU body-worn cameras), *(B) environmental/crowd-flow* (acoustic levels, density counters, air-quality), and *(C) systems logs* (gate uptime, queue times, permit system telemetry); **biometrics and content interception are prohibited**, and any exceptional use for life-safety requires **Joint Board pre-authorization**, VM notice to the **Independent Chair**, and automatic **post-facto review**. **Retention limits**: raw BWC/checkpoint video **≤30 days** (unless preserved as evidence), systems logs **≤90 days**, and only **anonymized aggregates** may persist **≤5 years** for trend analysis; deletions are logged and **independently audited**. All data are **encrypted in transit/at rest**, access-controlled, and shared externally only with the **Joint Board Secretariat** and **Statute Court** for defined purposes; **no use** for political profiling, immigration enforcement, or commercial exploitation. The VM holds **24/7, unannounced, unescorted site-access rights** across the Zone—including holy sites (with cultural-sensitivity rules), checkpoints, command rooms, registries, and storage areas—and may privately interview staff and visitors; **denial or delay >30 minutes** (absent immediate life-safety grounds) constitutes **obstruction**, triggers an **incident classification** per Annex III, and may **pause JPE disbursements** pending remedy. The VM publishes **methodologies, redacted audit reports**, and a **public dashboard** (access uptime, queue times, incident severity, response proportionality, service-continuity, privacy incidents), while an **Independent Auditor** conducts **semi-annual audits** of sensors, retention, and access logs. **Whistleblower channels** (confidential, protected) are maintained by the Auditor; violations by any actor carry **graduated remedies** under Annex III.

**Cross-References & Remedies.** **KPI definitions, targets, cadence, and dashboard methods** are in **Annex II-C (KPI Brief)**; technical formulas and sampling live in a **VM Technical Note**. Obstruction, access denials (>30 min), or privacy non-compliance trigger **incident classification and graduated remedies** under **Annex III**, including **JPE gating** per **Annex III-G**.

**Article 6 (“Protection Unit”)  
 6.1 Mandate & Command  
 6.2 Rules of Engagement  
 6.3 Arrest & Short-Hold Detention  
 6.4 Evidence & Chain of Custody  
 6.5 Interface & Handoff**

**6.6 Accountability & Complaints**

**Protection Unit (PU) — Authorities & ROE.—** The PU is a professional, an integrated civil policing body with **carriage & deployment per Annex III-B** operating solely within the Zone under Joint Board direction. Its Rules of Engagement follow **necessity, proportionality, distinction, de-escalation, duty to warn, and duty to intervene**. **Crowd-management teams** are unarmed; **patrol teams** may carry restraints and approved less-lethals; **quick-reaction teams (QRTs)** may carry sidearms; **long guns, armored platforms, and UAVs** may deploy **only** upon Verification Mission–certified **Tier-3 incidents or higher** and pursuant to Chair interim measures or **5/7** Board authorization (see **Annex III-B: Carriage & Deployment Matrix**). PU officers hold **limited arrest authority** for Statute offenses and imminent threats inside the Zone; **detention beyond six (6) hours** requires transfer under a signed **Handoff Protocol** at designated interfaces (e.g., North Gate, South Gate, Hospital, Court). All arrests require body-worn camera capture (exceptions logged), **rights notification** in Arabic/Hebrew/English, and immediate hotline notice to the Verification Mission. **Evidence** is sealed with unique chain-of-custody tags and lodged with the **Statute Court Registry**; forensic access is supervised and auditable. PU acts are reviewable by the Statute Court; complaints may be filed with the **VM Civilian Oversight Desk**. Identification (uniform, visible ID, patch) is mandatory; **plainclothes operations** require prior Board approval and post-operation disclosure to the VM.

**No uncoordinated raids** by external forces occur within the Zone; **hot pursuit terminates at marked interfaces** and proceeds only via the **Handoff Protocol (Annex III-D)**.  
  
**Cross-References & Remedies.** **ROE carriage & deployment** per **Annex III-B**; **incident-tiering & escalation clocks** per **Annex III-C**; **custody transfer & interface rules** per **Annex III-D (Handoff Protocol)**; non-compliance and obstruction remedied under **Annex III**.

**Response proportionality** and **privacy-incident** KPIs are defined in **Annex II-C** and reported to the Public Dashboard; failures trigger **remedies** under **Annex 3** and **JPE gates** per **Annex V**.

**Article 7 (“Statute Court”)**

**Composition, Chambers & Powers.—** The Statute Court is an independent tribunal of **seven (7)** judges: **2** nominated by Israel, **2** by the State of Palestine, **2 international judges** designated by the Guarantors Panel, and **1 President** elected by the full bench from among the international judges. **Quorum = 5.** The Court sits in **three Chambers** (panels of 3): **Urgent Relief**, **Administrative/Regulatory Review**, and **Criminal/Transfer**. Jurisdiction covers: (i) review of acts/omissions by Zone organs (Joint Board, VM, PU, Secretariat, JPE Trustee); (ii) violations of the Statute and Board regulations; (iii) **forum allocation** and **Handoff Protocol** disputes; (iv) **habeas/access** petitions; and (v) protection orders and compliance remedies. **Standards of review:** **manifest-error / ultra vires** for Board/GP policy determinations; **proportionality/reasonableness** for operational acts; **de novo** for Statute elements and rights questions. **Powers:** interim measures (injunctions, tailored stays—except where immediate life-safety is certified), orders to produce, contempt sanctions, confirmation/modification of **Chair interim measures**, remedial orders, and costs. **Clocks:** liberty/access petitions **≤48h**; transfer decisions **≤48h** from filing; merits **≤30 days** (extendable with written reasons). **Registry** maintains the **Evidence Locker** with auditable **chain-of-custody**; decisions are **trilingual (Arabic/Hebrew/English)** and published (security-redacted) **within 7 days**. **Due process:** right to counsel, legal-aid scheme for indigent parties, interpreter on request, limited **amicus** at Court’s discretion, open hearings with tailored closures. Judgments are **binding within the Zone**, enforceable via the **PU**; domestic courts shall recognize them for acts within the Zone. **Appeals** lie **en banc** on a point of law **within 14 days**. **Ethics & recusals** follow a published code; limited functional immunities for VM/PU personnel **do not bar** injunctive or disciplinary review.

**Article 8 (“Criminal Jurisdiction, Applicable Law & Transfer”)**

**Criminal Jurisdiction & Forum Allocation.—** Offenses arising **within the Zone** are allocated as follows: the **Statute Court** has **exclusive jurisdiction** over (i) violations of this Statute and Joint Board regulations (e.g., obstruction of holy-site access, interference with the Verification Mission or Protection Unit, damage to protected heritage), (ii) disputes between or among the Parties and Zone institutions, and (iii) review of acts by the Joint Board, VM, and PU. **Ordinary crimes** (homicide, assault, theft, etc.) are tried in **domestic courts** under the **place-of-commission default**, executed through PU arrest and a **time-bound Handoff Protocol** (initial custody by PU; transfer decision by the Statute Court within **48 hours**; physical transfer at designated interfaces within **24 hours** of decision). In **concurrent or cross-border cases** (multiple victims/nationals or linked conduct outside the Zone), a **Conflicts Panel** of the Statute Court determines forum on listed factors (gravity, investigative readiness, victim protection, fair-trial guarantees), with a **72-hour** decision clock. The Zone confers **no sanctuary**: warrants are executed by the PU only (no unilateral entry by external forces); domestic protection orders, bail conditions, and final judgments are **mutually recognized** and enforceable inside the Zone through the PU. **Ne bis in idem** applies across forums; due-process baselines track ICCPR standards (notice in **Arabic/Hebrew/English**, interpreter, counsel, prompt presentation). Limited privileges and immunities for VM/PU personnel are defined in annexed instruments and do not bar **injunctive relief** or **disciplinary review** by the Statute Court.  
  
**Cross-References & Remedies.** **Transfers and custody** proceed under **Annex III-D (Handoff Protocol)**; **forum conflicts** and allocation follow **Annex III-E (Conflicts Panel Rules)**; decisions are enforceable via PU, with **remedies** under **Annex III**.

**Article 9 (“Mobility, Residency & Access Management”)**

**Mobility, Residency & Access Management.—** The Zone establishes a **Resident Right-of-Abode** for persons domiciled within its boundaries on the **Baseline Date** (to be fixed by the Joint Board), issued a **Zone Resident ID (ZRID)** that confers continuous access through dedicated lanes; **national citizenship and civil status remain unchanged** by this regime. All other access is by **time-bound passes**: **Pilgrim Pass** (single/multi-day, group-capable), **Diplomatic/Consular Pass** (Vienna-compliant), **Press Pass** (accredited media), **Service & Vendor Pass**, and **Emergency Services Credential**. Passes are digital/physical with minimal data fields, multilingual (Arabic/Hebrew/English), privacy-by-design retention (pilgrim/press logs ≤90 days; ZRID metadata ≤365 days) and independent audit by the Verification Mission (VM). Checkpoints operate **lane management** as follows: **Green** (residents & services), **Blue** (diplomatic/press), **Gold** (accessibility & families with small children), **Grey** (general pilgrims/visitors); **95th-percentile queue time ≤20 minutes** and **access-uptime ≥97%** are target KPIs (KPI definitions, targets, and cadence are in Annex II-C (KPI Brief)) tied to JPE disbursement. **Holiday surge plans** (Ramadan, Passover, Easter and other high-holy periods) expand hours, add temporary gates and shuttles, and deploy crowd stewards; **capacity caps** or **sequencing** may be used only as the **least-restrictive means** and never as a blanket closure of holy sites, except upon **VM-certified Tier-3+ incidents** under Chair interim measures or **5/7** Board authorization. Standardized, non-discriminatory screening applies to all entrants; **no unilateral armed entry** by external forces is permitted. Misuse or fraud leads to suspension (with **prompt appeal** to the Statute Court). The Joint Board Secretariat maintains the **Mobility Registry**, publishes weekly access statistics, and implements **Accessibility Standards** for persons with disabilities (including priority lanes, seating, water points, and shade).  
  
**Cross-References & Remedies.** Access lanes, checkpoints, and eligibility are **geofenced** to **Annex IV-A (Maps & Legal Description)**; **KPI definitions and targets (Access-uptime; 95th-percentile queue time)** are in **Annex II-C (KPI Brief)**; **surge-day rules** follow **Annex III-F**; breaches post to the **Annex III-G scoreboard** and trigger **finance gates** and **graduated remedies** under **Annex III-G**.

**Article 10 (“Planning, Land & Heritage Controls”)  
 10.1 Permitting Framework**

**10.2 Heritage-Impact Assessment & Buffers**

**10.3 Archaeology & Chance-Finds**

**10.4 Prohibited Acts & Limited Exceptions**

**10.5 Enforcement & Remedies**

**10.6 Appeals & Transparency**

All **construction, alteration, excavation, utility works, signage, and site-clearance** within the Zone and **Zone-Adjacent Planning Ring (ZAPR)** require a permit issued under Joint Board regulations. Three **pipelines** apply: **Normal** (complete file; decision ≤30 days), **Expedited** for minor/reversible works (pre-approved templates; decision ≤7 days), and **Emergency** for imminent life-safety or heritage-stabilization (immediate authorization by Chair or PU Commander with **72-hour** Joint Board ratification). A **Heritage-Impact Assessment (HIA)** is mandatory for works: *(i)* within mapped **holy-site buffers** (per Annex IV-A), *(ii)* involving **subsurface excavation >0.5 m** or mechanized digging, *(iii)* **vertical additions** breaching protected **viewshed/skyline planes**, *(iv)* causing **vibration > threshold** at sensitive structures, *(v)* altering access routes, plazas, or **processional lines**, or *(vi)* intersecting custodianship parcels/utilities. HIAs must include custodians’ written views and mitigation plans. **Archaeology Protocols:** pre-works survey, continuous monitoring where triggered, **chance-finds** stoppage rules, custody chain to the **Statute Court Registry** with joint stewardship allocations, and weekly dig logs published by an **Antiquities Joint Unit** under the Secretariat. **Prohibited acts** (absent Board clearance and VM notice): unpermitted **demolitions or evictions**, **tunneling or underground cavities**, settlement-serving infrastructure extensions, invasive night works near holy sites, and any inciting or misleading **signage**. **Limited exceptions** (safety shoring, heritage stabilization, essential maintenance, humanitarian rehousing) must be **least-restrictive**, **reversible**, time-bound, and documented. **Enforcement:** VM geofences monitoring; breaches trigger **stop-work orders** (PU), equipment sealing, remedial orders, and **scoreboard entries** under **Annex III-G**; **material breach** activates **JPE snap-back/escrow** and a **30-day Compliance Action Plan**. Applicants have a **5-day** appeal right to the **Statute Court**; except for Emergency permits, **works pause pending appeal**. All permits, HIAs, maps, and decisions are published (security-redacted) to the **public registry**.

**Cross-References & Remedies.** Permits, HIAs, buffers, and archaeology controls apply **as mapped in Annex IV-A**; the **Service-continuity index** is defined in **Annex II-C**; detected breaches are **logged by grid-cell** to the **Annex III-G scoreboard**, with **stop-work, remedial orders, and snap-back/escrow** per **Annex III-G**.

**Article 11 (“Communications, Inclusion & Public Voice”)**

Establish an **Interfaith & Civil Society Council (ICSC)** as an advisory, non-veto forum to the Joint Board, comprising recognized custodians (Waqf/Churches/Western Wall Heritage), local neighborhood committees, women’s groups, youth and disability advocates, merchants’ associations, and independent human-rights observers—balanced for gender/community representation, with rotating **co-chairs (one Israeli, one Palestinian)** and a neutral secretariat. The ICSC (i) reviews draft Board regulations affecting **access, heritage, policing posture, or services** and issues **public advisory opinions** within **14 days** (expedited **72-hour** track for urgent measures); (ii) convenes **monthly town halls** and **quarterly diaspora briefings** (virtual/hybrid) and maintains multilingual hotlines and **rumor-control** channels; (iii) runs **notice-and-comment** windows (≥7 days) for non-urgent rulemaking; (iv) publishes minutes, attendance, and minority views with tailored security redactions; (v) enforces a **Code of Conduct** (anti-incitement, respect for custodianship, do-no-harm) and conflict-of-interest policy; and (vi) partners with the **Verification Mission** on **community-sentiment surveys** and accessibility audits. Inputs are **non-binding** but require a **reasoned Joint Board response** in the final regulation. A **Diaspora Liaison Channel**—managed by the Secretariat—aggregates global faith/community inputs, circulates factual briefings, **pre-bunks disinformation**, and may deploy **JPE micro-grants** for stewardship, queue-support volunteers, and accessibility upgrades. Participation confers **no jurisdictional or property claims** and is **without prejudice** to final-status positions; data handling follows **Annex 2** safeguards.  
  
**Cross-References & Remedies.** **Hotlines, surveys, and data handling** follow **Annex 2** safeguards; **rumor/disinformation incidents** are classified and remedied per **Annex III**; **ICSC micro-grants** and queue-support initiatives draw from the **JPE** under **Annex 5** eligibility and reporting rules.

**Article 12 (“Guarantors Panel”)**

**Composition, Powers & Timelines.—** A **five-member Guarantors Panel (GP)** provides fast, **non-veto** facilitation on escalations from the Joint Board. Composition: **1 Independent Chair** (jointly designated by Israel and the State of Palestine), **2 State-Guarantor nominees** (rotating among designated Guarantors), and **2 international members** (one from an IGO, one with fiduciary/administrative expertise). **Quorum = 4**; members serve **two-year staggered terms (one renewal max)** with conflict-of-interest and **recusal** rules. **Decision rules:** **simple majority (≥3/5)** for interpretative notes, information requests, special audits/inspections, and appointing a **Special Facilitator**; **supermajority (≥4/5 incl. Chair)** for temporary **finance/security posture** measures. **Tempo:** upon **auto-escalation** under Art. 4 (72-hour Joint Board deadlock) or a **VM obstruction petition** (Annex III), the GP **convenes within 12 hours** and issues a **written determination within 48 hours**. **Permissible remedies (short of veto)** include: *(i)* confirming/modifying **Chair interim measures** for up to **+48 hours**; *(ii)* ordering a **VM special audit/inspection**; *(iii)* directing the **JPE Trustee** to **pause/release** tranches per Annex 5 gates; *(iv)* setting **default, time-limited operating parameters** (access hours, lane mix, staffing levels) pending Board decision; *(v)* appointing a **Special Facilitator/Panel** to mediate and report; and *(vi)* issuing a **public interpretative note** (published with tailored security redactions). GP determinations are **binding on Zone organs** for the specified duration and are subject to **prompt Statute Court review** on **manifest-error/ultra vires** grounds only. The GP **may not** alter **holy-site status-quo**, **maps/boundaries**, or decide **criminal cases**.

**Article 13 (“Final Clauses & Review”)**

*Pacta sunt servanda.* The Parties shall perform this Statute in good faith (VCLT **Art. 26**); **material breach** (VCLT **Art. 60**) may ground proportionate **suspension/termination** consistent with this Article and triggers remedies under **Annex III**. **Signature/Ratification.** Open for signature by **Israel** and the **State of Palestine** (and by designated **Guarantors** solely for their undertakings); **entry into force** occurs **30 days** after both Parties deposit instruments with the **Depositary**; **provisional application** of operational provisions (Arts. 4–8; Annexes II–V) is permitted upon signature for up to **180 days** pending ratification. **Depositary & Registration.** The Depositary (to be designated; e.g., **UN Secretary-General**) registers the Statute per **UN Charter Art. 102**, circulates notifications, and maintains the authentic text and annex dataset. **Authentic Languages.** **Arabic, Hebrew, and English** are equally authentic; divergences are resolved by a **Joint Interpretative Note** endorsed by the **Guarantors Panel**, subject to **Statute Court** review for manifest error. **Reservations.** No reservations to **core obligations** (VM access, PU ROE regime, JPE finance-gates, settlement-restraint); other reservations are permitted only if **not incompatible with object and purpose**; interpretative declarations allowed. **Amendments.** Text amendments require adoption by **5/7 Joint Board** and ratification by both Parties; **annex updates** follow the specified **change-control rules** (e.g., micro-rectifications to maps) without reopening the core text. **Periodic Review & Renewal.** A comprehensive review convenes **5 years** after entry-into-force and **every 5 years** thereafter; the Statute **auto-renews** in five-year terms unless a Party gives **12-month** notice of termination; termination or suspension follows **VCLT Arts. 54 & 60** and shall not prejudice accrued rights, pending cases, or the orderly **winding-down of JPE** commitments. **Succession.** Obligations bind successors and authorized administrators within the Zone.

**Annex IV-A: “Maps & Legal Description (Zone & ZAPR)”**

**Precision, Publication & Change Control.—** The **Zone (“Historic/Holy Basin”)** is fixed by an annexed legal description and geospatial dataset comprising: *(i)* a **metes-and-bounds narrative** tied to permanent survey benchmarks (horizontal and vertical datums specified); *(ii)* an authoritative **GIS polygon** in **WGS84 / EPSG:4326** with a published coordinate list (≥6 decimal places); *(iii)* a dated **1:5,000 orthophoto basemap**; and *(iv)* a co-registered **Zone-Adjacent Planning Ring (ZAPR)** polygon and, where applicable, **3-D easements** for subterranean and airspace corridors. The dataset (**SHP/GeoJSON + PDF sheets**) is **time-stamped, versioned, and hashed (SHA-256)**, lodged with the **Statute Court Registry** as copy-of-record and mirrored at an agreed cartographic repository. Only **micro-rectifications** to cure survey/cartographic error may be adopted by **5/7 Joint Board** resolution with **VM concurrence**; any enlargement/reduction of the Zone or ZAPR requires **treaty amendment**. Boundary anomalies are handled by a **Boundary Working Group** under a **30-day clock**, defaulting to the **last-agreed baseline** if unresolved. Data are **open by default** (coordinate lists, metadata, style files), accompanied by standardized **on-the-ground signage**; this annex operates **without prejudice** to Parties’ final-status claims outside the Zone.

**Map 1: Zone polygon**

**Map 2: ZAPR**

**Map 3: Volumetric Easements (schematic)**

**Annex V: Finance — Jerusalem Peace Endowment (JPE)**

* **V.1 “Governance & Fiduciary Controls.”  
  Jerusalem Peace Endowment (JPE) — Governance & Fiduciary Controls.—** The JPE is a ring-fenced **multi-donor trust** administered by an independent **Trustee** (IFI or reputable global foundation) under a published Trust Deed. A standing **Audit & Risk Committee** (appointed by the Guarantors Panel) oversees controls, can commission special audits, and may **freeze disbursements on red flags**. A strict **Conflict-of-Interest Code** applies to trustees, officers, evaluators, and grantees: pre-award disclosures, **beneficial-ownership** declarations, cooling-off/recusal rules, and a ban on related-party awards absent supermajority waiver—**all statements published annually**. The JPE maintains a **Public Grant Ledger** (web + CSV/JSON API) listing unique grant IDs, recipients, award amounts and tranches, procurement method, contracts, KPI gates, Verification Mission status, and audit findings; entries update **within 15 days** of any transaction. Funds follow an **endowment-style investment policy** (capital preservation, low-risk instruments, ESG and sanctions/FATF compliance) with **overhead capped at X%**; segregated custody, dual-signature release, IFRS/IPSAS reporting, **annual auditor rotation**, and protected whistleblower channels are mandatory. **Disbursements are rule-based**: unlocked only when **VM-certified KPIs** are met; breach triggers **escrow/snap-back** per Annex III.
* **V.2 “Disbursement Mechanics & KPI Gates”**“**Quarterly Tranches.** Each quarter’s program disbursement is divided into **three equal sub-tranches** tied to **VM-certified KPIs**: *(i)* **Access-uptime**, *(ii)* **Incident-severity index**, *(iii)* **Service-continuity index** (targets/cadence in **Annex II-C**). **Queue-time** overruns may **hold up to ½** of the Access sub-tranche until a corrective plan is VM-certified (Annex II-C; III-F). **Privacy-incident** overruns may **hold 5–10%** of the active tranche pending Auditor review. **Trust/legitimacy** under-performance (Year 2+) may **hold 10%** with a community-engagement plan. **Humanitarian/life-safety flows are never blocked.** Non-compliance moves held funds to **escrow**; **material breach** triggers **snap-back** and a **Compliance Action Plan** under Annex III, with public updates to the **JPE Grant Ledger** (Annex V.1).”
* **V.3 “Investment & Risk Policy.”**

# Annex 7 — Hostage & Prisoner Releases: Human-Dignity Protocol and Anti-Stall Rails

**A. Moral & Legal Bright Line (operative principle)**

1. **No commodification of persons.** All sides affirm that **hostage-taking is absolutely prohibited** under international law (Common Article 3; Hostages Convention). Releases occur **because they are due**, not as “trades.” Ratios—where used—are **administrative pacing tools**, not valuations of human life.
2. **Language discipline.** In all official texts and public messaging, Parties and guarantors use “**releases/discharges**,” not “swaps,” and “**remains repatriation**,” not “body exchange.”

**B. Structure of the Releases (tiered, time-bound)**

**Stage 1 (D+3, D+7 tranches):** all medically urgent; women; elderly; minors. **Higher pacing band** (see §E ratios).

**Stage 2 (D+15 → D+45):** all remaining living captives on a rolling schedule tied to published verification logs. **Moderate pacing band.**

**Stage 3 (≤ D+60):** **remains repatriation** and resolution of “missing” cases under ICRC-led forensics; **no ratio** applies.

**Proof-of-life (PoL) clock:**

* D+2: PoL sample ≥ 10 % of named list; D+5: ≥ 50 %; D+7: **100 %** or remains-search protocol auto-starts (§D). Failure to meet PoL thresholds triggers Annex 2 proportional snapbacks.

**Medical triage:** WHO/ICRC teams conduct immediate triage at transfer points; lifesaving evacuations are prioritized irrespective of sequence.

**C. Anti-Stall Rails**

1. **No-Bundle Rule.** Hostage releases may not be made contingent on unrelated files (e.g., corridor sovereignty, recognition). Only the **humanitarian unlocks** in §F are linked.
2. **Default-Flow Rule.** If negotiators fail to initial the next sub-tranche by the deadline, a **pre-filed default list** auto-releases daily at 18:00 local under ICRC escort until parties catch up.
3. **Incident Fuse.** Any rocket/raid incident pauses only **offensive** operations for 48 h while escorts continue; **hostage transfers continue** unless the JMVM certifies an immediate, proximate threat (DPARC governs disputes).
4. **List Hygiene.** Names are locked 24 h before each tranche; disputes go to a **three-expert DPARC panel (48–96 h)**.
5. **Transparency without doxxing.** Public dashboard shows **counts and categories**, not names/IDs; families’ privacy is protected.
6. **Reverse-Consensus Timer.** Missed deadline = automatic reversion to **last certified schedule** and ratio band.

**D. Remains & “Missing” Protocol (humanitarian forensics)**

If PoL fails or a death is alleged, **ICRC-led forensic identification** begins immediately: collection of ante-mortem data from families, post-mortem examination, and **DNA matching** under INTERPOL/ICRC best practice. Weekly status to families and the JMVM; repatriations occur as soon as identity is established.

**E. Ratio Bands (calibrated pacing, not currency)**

* **Band A (Stage 1):** **3-to-1 up to 5-to-1** detainee discharges per released hostage (ceilings set by guarantors after PoL).
* **Band B (Stage 2):** **1-to-1 up to 3-to-1**.
* **Stage 3:** **0-to-1** (no ratios for remains repatriation).

**Notes:**

* Banding reflects observed practice in the 2023 pause (**~3-to-1** women/children) while avoiding recent outlier asks (e.g., **“30-to-1 lifers”**), which stall talks and rupture public consent. Guarantors may narrow bands if PoL shows fewer living captives than assumed.

**F. Verify-to-Unlock Incentives (automatic, rolling)**

Each certified sub-tranche unlocks in parallel:

* **Humanitarian:** daily convoy floor ↑; fuel/medicines lanes ↑; telecoms hours ↑.
* **Civic:** hospital/utility repairs fast-laned; payments channels unblocked (UNSCR 2664-aligned).
* **Governance:** vetted detainee discharges executed; civil-registry updates processed.  
   Failure to publish logs within 24 h **pauses** non-humanitarian unlocks (aid never pauses).

**G. Verification & Escort**

* **Lead actor:** **ICRC** conducts transfers, medical checks, family notification, and escorts (neutral status).
* **Mission interface:** JMVM logs every transfer (time, place, team ID, chain-of-custody), then **issues the Unlock Notice**.
* **Privacy:** families can opt-in to name disclosure; otherwise the dashboard shows anonymized counts.

**H. Enforcement Hooks (Annex 2 ladder)**

Snapback triggers include: missed PoL milestone; tampered lists; transfer interference; propaganda filming against consent; refusal to process agreed detainee discharges. **Tier-1:** pause non-humanitarian disbursements and permissions; **Tier-2:** targeted diplomatic/financial measures on responsible nodes; **Grave breach:** revert to last certified schedule + investigation referral.

**I. Sacred Commitments (Unified State clause)**

**Unified State Stand on Hostage-Taking and Release.** We speak from the Unified State—stretching into the Infinite—where one rule is non-negotiable: **persons are never currency**. Hostage-taking is an absolute taboo and a crime in law and conscience; it is **prohibited at all times** under Common Article 3 and **Article 34 of Geneva Convention IV**, and criminalized by the **1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages**. No cause is advanced by enslaving the living or by treating the dead as leverage. We reject the normalization of “swap logic,” which corrodes dignity and can turn detention into a self-perpetuating war instrument. Releases here occur **because they are due**, not as bargains: sequencing under neutral escort is a **safety method**, not a condition; verification is **proof of mercy**, not a price. We therefore bind all parties to the anti-stall rails in this Annex—proof-of-life clocks, default-flow lists, dashboard transparency, and snapback remedies—so that **every verified release expands humanitarian space and shrinks fear**. Let leaders of all sides honor their debt to humanity and to God by ending hostage-taking forever, releasing captives in prioritized, humane stages, and refusing to over-link their freedom to unrelated files. The side that chooses freedom first—freeing others before it is itself secure—proves the strength of its own freedom, and both peoples move out of the prisoner’s dilemma into a future ordered by law, dignity, and love.

Leaders of all sides sign a one-paragraph **Human Dignity Pledge**:

***No side will ever again take or hold hostages; no side will treat persons as bargaining chips. We release because life is sacred, not because life is traded. We choose freedom over fear and mercy over leverage; this is our debt repaid to God and to one another.***

## Annex 7-B — Lawful Review & Release of Persons Imprisoned in Israel (Non-Exchange Track)

**1) Purpose & Separation Principle**

**Aim.** End the war-economy logic that treats people as chips by **separating**:

* **Sub-Annex 7-A (Hostages in Gaza):** unconditional return of hostages; hostage-taking is a per se war crime.
* **This Sub-Annex 7-B (Prisoners in Israel):** **independent, criteria-based** review and release/relief for persons deprived of liberty in Israel—**not** linked to any hostage numbers, phases, or “ratios.”

**Separation Rule.** No party may condition, delay, or calibrate actions on this track to events on the hostage track. **No numerical pairing, swaps, or price language** (see §8 Communications). This respects: the absolute IHL ban on hostage-taking; the prohibition of **collective punishment**; and victims’ rights to remedy.

**2) Legal Foundations (floor, not ceiling)**

* **Hostage prohibition (reference from 7-A):** GC IV **Art. 34**; Customary IHL **Rule 96**; ICC **Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(a)(viii)/(c)(iii)**; **1979 Hostages Convention**; **UNSC 579 (1985)**.
* **No collective punishment:** GC IV **Art. 33**.
* **Humanitarian carve-out insulation (aid, legal access):** **UNSC 2664 (2022)**—standing humanitarian exemption.
* **Children’s rights in detention (last resort; shortest time):** **CRC Art. 37**.
* **Detention in occupation/security context (for clarity):** GC IV **Art. 78** (security internment) sets strict necessity and review standards—this Annex operationalizes those standards, and **never** treats people as bargaining instruments.

**3) Scope & Categories (non-exchange, individualized)**

Covers persons held by Israel under: criminal sentences; **remand**; **administrative detention** (Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 1979 / military orders); and the **Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 2002**—all processed **individually** against objective criteria below.

**Category matrix (for transparent handling):**

* **A. Administrative detainees** (no charge/trial): **presumption of release** unless **current, individualized** security risk is demonstrated with reviewable evidence. Rolling **30-day** re-review; secret evidence allowed only with independent special advocate. (Aligns with GC IV 78 limits and UNWGAD guidance.)
* **B. Children (any status):** detention only as **last resort** for the **shortest time**; priority for diversion, community measures, and monitored release.
* **C. Remand/minor & non-violent offenses:** prioritize release on recognizance, non-custodial alternatives, or time-served credit.
* **D. Medically vulnerable/elderly/women:** humanitarian release or non-custodial alternatives, consistent with **Mandela Rules**.
* **E. Long-term & life sentences:** see §5 (Eligibility Ladders) for **criteria-based** relief distinct from any hostage logic (no ratios, no swaps).

**4) Independent Review Authority (IRA)**

**Composition (7 members).** 1 Israeli retired judge; 1 Israeli defense/penology expert; 1 Palestinian jurist; 1 EU jurist; 1 ICRC-recognized detention expert; 2 neutral criminology/penology experts.  
 **Powers.** Access files; hear special advocates; issue **binding** eligibility decisions per clocks (§6).  
 **Standards.** Individualized necessity; least-restrictive alternative; due process; no collective penalties; child-specific standards.

**5) Eligibility Ladders (decoupled from hostages)**

**No barter, no pairing, no “X-for-Y.”** Decisions rest on **law + risk + time-served**, not politics.

**5.1 Administrative detention.**

* **Default:** release, unless **present**, **individualized**, **lawful** security grounds shown; orders **expire** unless renewed with fresh grounds; **public stats** monthly. (Responds to UN concerns over arbitrariness.)

**5.2 Children.**

* Immediate review; if detention cannot be justified to CRC Art. 37 standard, **release** to guardians/programs.

**5.3 Long-term sentences (non-life).**

* **Time-served ladder:** ≥15 yrs → priority parole/commutation review; 10–15 yrs → expedited parole if rehabilitated; <10 yrs → alternatives favored if non-violent and low risk. (Mirrors global practice under due-process safeguards.)

**5.4 Life sentences.**

* **Tier A (highest gravity):** intentional killing/mass-casualty orchestration → relief only via commutation/conditional release with restrictive conditions or third-country residence; never “priced.”
* **Tier B (high gravity without mass-casualty conviction):** parole eligibility with stringent monitoring if risk controllable.

**5.5 “Unlawful combatants.”**

* Case-by-case necessity test; periodic judicial review; special advocate access to closed material; children and medical cases prioritized for release—bringing domestic law into line with IHL’s individualized standards.

**6) Clocks, Access, and Transparency (Non-Exchange Timelines)**

* **D+0–D+7:** Publish anonymized register by category; enable legal access (Mandela Rules baseline) and family notification.
* **D+14:** IRA decisions for **children** and **admin detainees**; releases executed unless specific risk decisions issued.
* **D+21 & rolling:** Monthly tranches for long-term/life-eligible cases per §5 ladders.
* **Access & aid firewall:** Legal visits, ICRC access, nutrition/medical supplies **may not** be curtailed—shielded under **UNSC 2664** logic and basic detention standards.
* **Dashboard:** counts by category; % decisions on time; complaints resolved; no use of “exchange” language.

**7) Remedies, Accountability & Non-Recurrence**

* **No impunity.** Serious crimes remain prosecutable; relief can mean **conditional** or **alternative** sanctions, not erasure.
* **Victims’ rights.** Adopt the **UN Basic Principles on Remedy and Reparation (GA 60/147)** for acknowledgment, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-recurrence.
* **Missing & remains.** Families’ **right to know** and dignified handling under ICRC guidance; remains are **not** bargaining tokens (separate humanitarian track).

**8) Communications Doctrine (de-escalatory, anti-commodification)**

* **Forbidden terms:** any phrasing implying **“X for Y”** or “swap.”
* **Required phrasing:** “Eligibility met under Sub-Annex 7-B criteria; release executed under Mandela-compliant conditions” (or “detention lawfully continued with individualized reasons”).
* **Religious/ethical line (optional):** “No hostages, no collective punishment, no commodification of life”—a shared vow consistent with GC IV 33/34.

**9) Oversight & Enforcement Hooks**

* **JMVM/DPARC** (from core memo): monitor **process compliance only** (timeliness, access, dashboard integrity).
* **Red/Amber signals:** missed clocks → **public amber** and corrective order; repeated non-compliance → **localized red** with specified administrative remedies (not reciprocal “swap” penalties).
* **External monitors:** ICRC, OHCHR, and designated NGOs for detention conditions and complaints (UNWGAD opinions considered in IRA reviews)

**10) Why this works (and deters future abuse)**

* **Breaks the market.** Hostages (7-A) and prisoners (7-B) are **incommensurable**; each is resolved on its **own lawful merits**—no price, no ratios. (Hostage-taking remains criminal per GC IV/ICC/UNSC.)
* **Reinforces core IHL.** Ends collective-penalty dynamics; restores individualized justice; protects children; integrates humanitarian carve-outs.
* **Politically survivable.** Israel retains individualized risk control and judicial review; Palestinians see real, rule-based relief—**without** weaponizing human lives.

([ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-34), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ar/customary-ihl/v2/rule96), [treaties.un.org](https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/english-18-5.pdf), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-33), [main.un.org](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/sres2664-2022), [press.un.org](https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15134.doc.htm), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/crc-1989/article-37), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-78), [btselem.org](https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/1979_emergency_powers_law_detention_0.pdf), [jewishvirtuallibrary.org](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/IncarcerationLaw.pdf), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/detention-wg/opinions/session98/a-hrc-wgad-2023-60-israel-aev.pdf), [unodc.org](https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf), [ohchr.org](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/07/un-report-palestinian-detainees-held-arbitrarily-and-secretly-subjected), [casebook.icrc.org](https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/israel-detention-unlawful-combatants), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule117), [ihl-databases.icrc.org](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/icc-statute-1998/article-8), [hrw.org](https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/01/gaza-unlawful-combatants-law-violates-rights), [un.org](https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf))