UNCARRIED MEMO7 TOC.P013 Unified State Advisory Memorandum No. 7: Roadmap to Ceasefire and Lasting Peace in Ukraine (Draft V4)
Public Opinion and Civil Society Perspectives	7
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0053 Demands and Core Positions of the Parties
Ukraine’s fundamental demands center on restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as enshrined in the UN Charter (reuters.com). President Volodymyr Zelensky’s 10-point peace formula, first presented in late 2022, calls for full Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea and the eastern regions, with no compromise on Ukraine’s internationally recognized borders. It also demands justice for war crimes, security guarantees for Ukraine’s future, and the return of all prisoners and deported citizens (particularly thousands of children forcibly taken to Russia) (reuters.com, kyivindependent.com). In the interim Istanbul talks this year, Ukraine (with U.S. support) has consistently urged an immediate, unconditional 30-day ceasefire as a first step, to be followed by negotiations – a proposal Russia has thus far rejected (kyivindependent.com). Ukraine insists that any peace deal must not reward aggression or involve ceding its people or land to Russian control. However, President Zelensky has acknowledged that, given battlefield realities, not all occupied territory may be liberated by force now, and that some issues might be resolved “over time by diplomatic 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0056 Demands and Core Positions of the Parties
Russia’s publicly stated war aims have hardened over time into maximalist territorial demands. Moscow now insists that Ukraine formally renounce any claim to the four regions that Russia unilaterally annexed in 2022 – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson (reuters.com, reuters.com) – even though Russian forces do not fully control all of that territory on the ground. President Vladimir Putin’s government demands Ukraine’s “full withdrawal” from those regions and acceptance of the new status quo (kyivindependent.com). In effect, Russia seeks to legitimize its land-grab. Additionally, Russia has continually stressed its need for security guarantees: it opposes NATO expansion into Ukraine and in earlier talks demanded Ukrainian neutrality, limits on Ukraine’s armed forces and weaponry, and protection of the Russian language and culture in Ukraine (reuters.com). For example, draft accords in March 2022 had Ukraine ready to cap its army at 250,000 troops, but Russia wanted a much smaller cap (85,000) and short-range missiles only. Moscow also initially pushed for Ukraine to adopt a “neutral” status akin to a demilitarized buffer and to eliminate what it provocatively called “Nazi”
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0059 Demands and Core Positions of the Parties
The two sides’ red lines currently overlap only on humanitarian issues: both have agreed in principle on prisoner exchanges, civilian evacuations, and protecting critical infrastructure (pravda.com.ua). Indeed, the May and June Istanbul meetings led to swaps of thousands of POWs and fallen soldiers (reuters.com) – a rare positive outcome. However, on the central questions of territory and sovereignty, the positions are mirror opposites. Ukraine asserts that Russia must withdraw from all occupied lands, whereas Russia insists Ukraine surrender more territory (including areas Russia has not managed to seize by force) (kyivindependent.com). Ukraine demands accountability for aggression; Russia demands legal immunity and normalization despite its actions. Ukraine seeks security guarantees from the West; Russia seeks security guarantees against NATO’s presence in Ukraine. This deadlock has been described as a “great distance between the two sides’ minimal demands” (kyivindependent.com) – for now, each side’s minimum is beyond what the other can accept. The challenge for negotiators is to identify creative compromises that address the underlying interests (security, sovereignty, and stab
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UNCARRIED MEMO7 P0061 Public Opinion and Civil Society Perspectives
Public Opinion and Civil Society Perspectives
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0064 Public Opinion and Civil Society Perspectives
The Ukrainian people have endured immense suffering and are understandably reluctant to accept any peace that sacrifices their homeland. Polling indicates that a majority of Ukrainians oppose conceding territory for peace, though war-weariness has softened attitudes slightly in recent months. As of June 2025, 48% of Ukrainians say they “categorically oppose” even a de facto recognition of Russia’s control over occupied areas, and 68% firmly reject any formal cession of Ukrainian land (kyivindependent.com). At the same time, around 43% are willing to accept a ceasefire that leaves Russia temporarily holding those areas without legal recognition, if it leads to peace (kyivindependent.com). In other words, almost half the population could tolerate a practical freeze-in-place (no active fighting, Russia stays in some zones for now) as long as Ukraine doesn’t have to permanently surrender sovereignty over those regions. An overwhelming 78% oppose giving Russia any new territory beyond what it currently occupies  – meaning the idea of Russia expanding its gains or Ukraine withdrawing from additional oblasts is a non-starter for Ukrainian society. The prevailing mindset is shaped by both 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0068 Public Opinion and Civil Society Perspectives
Notably, there have been quiet efforts by Ukrainian and Russian civil society groups (intellectuals, religious leaders, ex-officials) to outline peace principles. These often emphasize human ties and shared futures. For example, appeals have been made to protect cultural heritage on both sides and to renounce hatred. Both Ukrainian and Russian mothers of fallen soldiers have voiced the same sorrow and appealed to leaders to “stop sending our children to kill each other.” Such human-centered perspectives, though often suppressed during wartime, provide a moral foundation for reconciliation. Public opinion in both countries converges strongly on humanitarian issues: majorities on each side support prisoner exchanges, protecting civilians, and an immediate ceasefire to halt the suffering. This suggests any interim agreement focusing on saving lives will have broad grassroots approval. Additionally, Ukraine’s vibrant democracy has fostered debates on what peace could look like, and while most reject territorial concessions, there is active discussion about models like demilitarized zones or UN-administered status consultations as possible solutions down the line. In Russia’s more contr
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0070 Public Opinion and Civil Society Perspectives
Empirical studies show peace accords are ~64% less likely to fail when civil society participates meaningfully. This clause operationalises that evidence (selection, voting rights, budget lines). (UN Women, Council on Foreign Relations)
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0082 Positions of Key International Stakeholders
Europe has been hit hard by the war’s fallout – energy crises, influx of refugees, and security fears. The EU’s official line echoes NATO’s: support Ukraine’s defense and a peace on Ukraine’s terms. Leaders like France’s President and Germany’s Chancellor have engaged in diplomacy with Putin and Zelensky, trying to find openings for peace. France, in particular, has talked about the need for a settlement that “respects both parties’ interests”, cautioning that diplomacy is not equal capitulation (reuters.com). Europe’s primary concern is a durable peace that ensures stability on the continent. Europeans worry about setting a precedent that aggression yields territory (which could embolden Russia further or other aggressors globally). On the other hand, the war’s protraction is causing “war fatigue” among European publics, and divisions are emerging (some politicians and citizens ask how long expensive support can continue, and fear escalation or an indefinite conflict on Europe’s borders). Thus, major EU countries will welcome a credible peace process. They will insist on certain principles: no acceptance of genocide or ethnic cleansing (so any deal must include protection of popul
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0084 Positions of Key International Stakeholders
Many countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America have taken a neutral or hedging stance on the war. They generally support the principle of sovereignty and condemn wars of aggression (as seen in multiple UN General Assembly resolutions where an overwhelming majority of states voted for Russia to cease hostilities and withdraw - reuters.com). However, these nations also criticize what they perceive as Western double standards and have not joined sanctions. Their overriding concern is the war’s impact on food, fuel, and fertilizer supplies, and the broader precedent of great-power conflict destabilizing the global economy. For example, large importers of grain in Africa and the Middle East suffered shortages and price spikes when Ukraine’s ports were blockaded; they urgently want grain and fertilizer flows restored. Countries like Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia have called for immediate ceasefire and offered to mediate in various ways. The African Union sent a delegation of heads of state to both Kyiv and Moscow in mid-2023 with a peace proposal that emphasized humanitarian measures and dialogue. While that did not produce a breakthrough, it reflected the Globa
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0111 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
Within the first week of ceasefire, Ukraine and Russia (with mediators) will formally convene a high-level Peace Conference in Istanbul. This might initially be at foreign minister level, with the aim to prepare a subsequent summit of national leaders. At this conference, both sides publicly affirm a set of Unified Principles that will guide the final settlement. These principles incorporate the main points of consensus from global stakeholders and moral law, giving the process a solid foundation. They could include statements such as: “We respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states, in accordance with the UN Charter” (asserting that borders cannot be changed by force, addressing Ukraine’s concern) (mfa.gov.cn); “We recognize the legitimate security interests of all parties and commit to not endanger each other’s security” (addressing Russia’s NATO fear in principle); “Conflict shall be resolved through peaceful negotiation and never again through war between our nations”; “All peoples of Ukraine, of all ethnicities and languages, are entitled to equal rights and protection” (addressing minority rights issues); “No use or threat of use of nuclear w
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0123 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
The thorniest issue is the status of territories Russia occupied and claims (Crimea and parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson). The unified position takes an approach of “principled pragmatism”: no forced recognition of illegal annexations (upholding legal principles), but also no immediate attempt to force Russia out by violence (acknowledging ground realities). Essentially, the areas under Russian de facto control at the ceasefire will remain so temporarily, but their sovereignty will be unresolved and subject to future determination by peaceful means. This concept was floated in the March 2022 talks: Ukraine proposed to set aside the Crimea question for 15 years with negotiations to continue, and possibly to address Donbas separately (reuters.com). We build on that. The peace treaty would state that the final status of Crimea and the occupied parts of Donetsk/Luhansk/Zaporizhzhia/Kherson will be decided through internationally supervised status consultation or plebiscites after a certain period of stability (e.g. 5-7 years). During that interim, those territories would have a special status. One formulation: they remain legally part of Ukraine (no recognition of Russi
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0129 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
Purpose. To ensure that any popular consultation, referendum, or status‑determination process is (a) free from coercion and manipulation, and (b) guaranteed to proceed or default to a pre‑agreed remedy if obstruction occurs. This draws on UN‑run consultations (e.g., UNAMET in East Timor, 1999), OSCE/Venice Commission standards for free and fair referendums, and lessons from South Sudan’s 2011 vote and Western Sahara’s stalled process. (digitallibrary.un.org, venice.coe.int, The Carter Center, Arso)
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0131 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
5.c.2 Integrity Shield (“Process Shield”).  a) International Security & Observation: The vote is secured and observed by a UN/International‑mandated mission with full freedom of movement and data access (UNAMET/ODIHR precedents).  b) Multi‑site & Multi‑day Voting: Polling may be conducted over several days and across multiple secure hubs to dilute localized coercion, following practice from the South Sudan referendum. (The Carter Center)   c) Diaspora/IDP Participation: Eligible voters outside the territory (refugees, IDPs, diaspora) cast ballots via accredited overseas centers or secure digital/ postal mechanisms.  d) Media & Campaign Fairness: Parties receive equitable media access; state resources cannot be used for partisan advantage; campaign rules adhere to Venice Commission/OSCE standards.
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0144 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
As part of the bargain, a phased lifting of sanctions on Russia (and any reciprocal Russian sanctions) will be tied to implementation of key steps. Western sanctions have severely affected Russia’s economy, but also world trade. Russia’s incentive to sign a deal increases if it knows sanctions relief is coming; conversely, the West’s leverage is that relief will only come after Russia fulfills obligations (like troop withdrawals, recognition of Ukraine’s borders except disputed zones, etc.). We propose a schedule: Once ceasefire holds and peace treaty is signed, certain sanctions that impede food and fertilizer exports are lifted immediately (to help global food supply) – this was already a goal of UN’s earlier grain deal attempts. As Russian troops pull back from specified areas and as the political clauses (like neutrality, UN‑supervised status consultations plans) are implemented, more sanctions (especially on individuals, certain banking restrictions) are suspended. Final removal of the most severe sanctions (like high-tech export bans, oil embargoes) could be contingent on completion of the UN‑supervised status consultations and respecting their results. The U.S. and EU would 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0147 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
To implement all the above on the ground, an International Peacekeeping Mission may be deployed. Potentially under a UN mandate (depending on Russia’s agreement in UNSC) or as a multinational force invited by both Ukraine and Russia. This force could patrol the ceasefire lines, guard demilitarized zones (such as a buffer between forces, especially if some withdrawal occurs), and secure critical sites like the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant. Ideal contributors would be countries seen as neutral/trusted by both: for example, units from India, Brazil, Austria, Finland, Kazakhstan, etc., maybe under the command of an experienced neutral general. Their presence would reassure Ukraine against surprise attack and reassure Russia that Ukraine won’t use ceasefire to mass troops either. Peacekeepers can also help prepare and oversee the future UN‑supervised status consultations (ensuring free movement, no voter intimidation). A robust monitoring regime for heavy weapons and troops through satellites, drones, and inspections will accompany this – perhaps a new international monmission with advanced tech can verify compliance with arms limitations. An important element is a Joint Commission (as me
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0177 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
Clear “non‑interference windows” (e.g., 14 days around key troop withdrawals/referenda) can delay—not cancel—procedural steps. 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0190 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
Conditional/Partial Amnesty Clause: Allowed solely for Tier‑1 crimes and only with victims’ participation/consent mechanisms; consistent with UN/ICRC guidance on conditional amnesties. 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0199 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
Multilateral Guarantee Treaty: Guarantor states sign and ratify a stand‑alone, binding treaty with Ukraine (and a mirror non‑aggression/assurance instrument vis‑à‑vis Russia), deposited under Article 102 of the UN Charter with the Secretary‑General (or a neutral Depositary if needed). 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0201 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
Domestic Lock‑ins: Each principal enacts implementing legislation or constitutional provisions to internalize the obligations (e.g., Ukraine’s neutrality clause; Russia’s pledge on non‑deployment). 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0210 Unified Peace Roadmap and Negotiating Position
In summary, the Unified Peace Roadmap is a holistic package: ceasefire now, negotiations toward a balanced compromise, neutral and secure Ukraine, phased resolution of disputed territories by peaceful means, massive reconstruction, and broad international guarantees – all of which combined create a stable equilibrium. No stakeholder’s vital interests are trampled: Ukraine remains a sovereign democratic nation aligned with Europe, Russia avoids NATO at its border and keeps influence in some areas, major powers avoid direct clash and can resume cooperation, and the world economy and food supply stabilizes. While each side makes painful concessions (Ukraine delays regaining full territory; Russia relinquishes claims to immediate recognition and accepts foreign peacekeepers; the West yields on NATO expansion principle in Ukraine; etc.), each also gains something fundamental: Ukraine gains peace and a path to prosperity in Europe, Russia gains security and an exit from quagmire, the West upholds international law (mostly) and global stability, and all nations gain the precedent that even the hardest conflicts can be solved without destroying the world.
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0224 Historical Opportunity – From the Darkest Hour to a New Dawn
Every journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. This Istanbul negotiation, happening on July 23-25, 2025, can be that step onto a new path. By implementing the comprehensive strategy outlined – scientifically sound, ethically just, and pragmatically detailed – the delegates can achieve what yesterday seemed impossible. In essence, the solution is already within reach – it has been constructed from the very demands and concerns everyone has voiced (we just aligned them differently). With sincerity, flexibility, and determination to avoid mutual doom, both sides and the international community can bless the world with an extraordinary gift: Peace with honor and hope.
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0247 Annex 1  — Game Theory Analysis: Toward a Nash Equilibrium Peace
In essence, our unified peace plan is designed to be a win-win (or at least “no-regret”) proposition for everyone involved, compared to the status quo or plausible outcomes of continued war. While it’s impossible to give each party 100% of their original aims (since those aims were mutually exclusive), we can give each enough of what they need to declare a viable victory. Ukraine’s victory would be survival as a free, rebuilt nation with most of its territory, allied support, and a route to regain what’s lost via law, not force. Russia’s victory would be avoiding collapse, securing some tangible results (like international agreement on Ukraine’s non-NATO status and de facto control of certain areas for now), and reintegrating economically so it can prosper without fear of Western regime-change efforts. The U.S. and allies’ victory is upholding the principle that aggression doesn’t pay off completely (since Russia won’t get formal recognition of conquest and faces penalties if it backtracks) and ending a draining conflict while preserving a strong, democratic Ukraine. China and others win by seeing a precedent of dialogue solve a war, improving global stability and showing that mult
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UNCARRIED MEMO7 T01.R06.C05.P01 Annex 2  — Enforcement & Snapback Matrix example (breach → consequence)
Mandated withdrawal plan; special inspection
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CARRIED MEMO7 T03.R06.C02.P01 Annex 2  — Enforcement & Snapback Matrix example (breach → consequence)
Improper amnesty/leniency (Rome Statute crimes, no victim consent) (M5)
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0309 Annex 3  — Deadlock‑Prevention & Automatic Reversion Protocol (DPARP) example
3.3 Silence = Consent
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0310 Annex 3  — Deadlock‑Prevention & Automatic Reversion Protocol (DPARP) example
Failure to register a vote or abstention counts as consent to the default auto‑activation (not as a blocking vote). 
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UNCARRIED MEMO7 P0411 Annex 4 – Quantification Questions & Parameterization Agenda
(Open issues to be co‑drafted by all parties for the unified trigger matrix)
Domestic Legislative Backsliding: How to score/quantify reversals (e.g., repeal of key clauses, constitutional amendments)? 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0427 Annex 4 – Quantification Questions & Parameterization Agenda
(Open issues to be co‑drafted by all parties for the unified trigger matrix)
Purpose. To measure whether status‑determination votes are free, fair, and intimidation‑proof, and to ensure transparent, timely communication and automatic remedies if standards are breached. This draws on the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice on Referendums, ODIHR handbooks, and UN‑run consultation precedents. (venice.coe.int)
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0437 Annex 4 – Quantification Questions & Parameterization Agenda
(Open issues to be co‑drafted by all parties for the unified trigger matrix)
Auto‑Remedy: Extend voting window; open additional hubs; digital balloting fallback.  South Sudan’s 2011 referendum used multi‑country diaspora polling as precedent. (wikipedia.org)
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0481 Annex 4 – Quantification Questions & Parameterization Agenda
(Open issues to be co‑drafted by all parties for the unified trigger matrix)
Indicator: % of amnesty/leniency grants vetted for: (i) exclusion of Rome Statute crimes, (ii) victim consent mechanisms, (iii) full-truth condition. 
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CARRIED MEMO7 P0515 Annex 4 – Quantification Questions & Parameterization Agenda
(Open issues to be co‑drafted by all parties for the unified trigger matrix)
Auto‑Remedy: Close/withdraw or formally suspend neutrality clause. 
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